THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE AND NUCLEAR TESTS

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Introduction

On 15 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to condemn the missile launches conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) on 4 July. The unanimity masked the complexity of the bargaining process that had led up to the revised resolution and the varying, and often conflicting, motives of the main players. The passing of the resolution manifested the diplomatic strength of the US, but also its limitations. Sanctions had been removed from the Japanese draft by China and Russia, with background support from South Korea. The resolution will have no major effect and is merely one episode in the continuing attempt by the US, faced by an obdurate North Korea, a wavering South Korea, and a rising China, to preserve its hegemony in East Asia. This process was replicated on 14 October with a resolution condemning the DPRK nuclear test of 9 October. Smaller countries in the United Nations, including New Zealand, have a vested interest in the efficacy and credibility of the United Nations. They should be cognisant of continued moves by the US, using its superpower status to manipulate the United Nations to serve its own foreign policy objectives to the long-term detriment of the world body. The issue took on added significance in February 2007

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when it became clear that the nuclear test, in particular, had played an important role in resuscitating the Six Party Talks and compelling the US to accede to the agreement on the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 which it had attempted to block.  

**The United Nations: Concept, Criticism and Reality**

Attitudes towards the United Nations tend to be rather schizophrenic. On the conceptual level there is general support, with the most vociferous opposition coming from the American Right for whom any form of world government is anathema. The academic literature on the United Nations, and in international relations covering world governance, tends to regard it as a good thing, or at least a necessary one. E. H. Carr, writing at the end of the Second World War (or the second instalment, as he put it, of one war) lamented how “The failure to create an international community of nations on the basis of international treaties and international law marks the final bankruptcy of nationalism in the West.” The United Nations, in principle, clearly answers to the description of an international community of nations based on treaties and laws. However, it is when it comes to what that international community of nations does, or does not do, that dissension arises and it seems that no-one is truly happy with the practice of the United Nations. For instance, the cover description of the US edition of Paul Kennedy’s *The Parliament of Man* quotes Dwight D. Eisenhower: “With all its defects, with all the failures that we can check up against it, the UN still represents man’s best-organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield;” and concludes: “As a body, the UN emerges here for what it is: fallible, human-based, oftentimes dependent on the whims of powerful national governments or the foibles of individual senior UN administrators, but utterly indispensable.”

However, most criticisms of the United Nations go beyond the mere fallibility of human institutions to an analysis of the structure of the institution. The United Nations, it is often argued, fails to live up to expectations because it needs structural reform. Prescriptions for that reform naturally vary. The dual structure of the UN, with its Security Council for the elite and General Assembly for the masses is undemocratic. The actions

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5 Rosemary Blight, in her review of Kennedy’s *The Parliament of Man* notes that “the quest for world government” used in the European edition is omitted from the US one; Rosemary Righter, “What use the UN?,” *Times Literary Supplement*, 19 July 2006.
of the UN are too often merely an extension of US foreign policy and pay little attention to the collective interests of smaller nations. Others argue that the Security Council is too small, and should be enlarged, but then there is little agreement on the size or composition of a replacement body. Still others attack the UN bureaucracy. In the US, especially, most criticism focuses on the mechanisms by which the United Nations is not aligned with US foreign policy, or the personal preferences of the commentators. In the past, focus has been on the use of the veto by adversarial permanent members of the Security Council, principally the Soviet Union and China, to prevent the United Nations from doing what the United States thought should be done. In recent years, with the veto less frequently used, but sometimes privately threatened, disapproval has tended to centre on the General Assembly and its unruly, undisciplined members. Ruth Wedgwood, writing in the conservative ‘realist’ journal, The National Interest, provides a good example:

Unfortunately, key internal changes are likely to succumb to the doldrums of the General Assembly. Many of the changes needed at the United Nations lie within the decisional power of the General Assembly, which has no obvious incentive to change its own shared perquisites. Votes in the General Assembly oft-times are predetermined before they get there. The United States cannot attend the NAM and G-77 meetings, and the rule of consensus usually means the most intense advocates carry the day. Even states friendly to the United States may be unwilling to break consensus on key points, lest they lose caucus support on other issues they do care about. Faced with competing priorities, Washington is often unable to nail down the necessary commitments from foreign capitals. And in the carnival mood of the General Assembly, some country delegations don’t even bother to call home about impending votes, or they ignore their instructions. It takes a concerted diplomatic effort to master a moving game, with 190 other players on the board, and we often do not invest the time. This makes the General Assembly a daunting place to seek reform measures.

These sentiments are echoed across the Atlantic. Rosemary Righter, assistant editor at The Times, and author of Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order exemplifies a similar position:

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8 A forceful advocate of this position is Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Christian Egyptian (and pro-American) Secretary General who was blocked by the US in getting a second term in 1996; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A US—UN Saga (New York: Random House, 1999).

The so-called G-77 of “developing” nations now includes 132 states plus, for opportunistic reasons, China. It bunches the world’s least developed together with wealthy cosmopolitan states that, outside the UN, are significant players, the worst-ruled with the best. Elsewhere they go their own ways. Yet at the UN, the G-77 debates and votes as one, perpetuating an artificial North–South cleavage which poisons the UN’s internal politics and renders reform all but impossible.\(^{10}\)

All these criticisms, and more, no doubt have an element of validity. However, amongst all these expressions of frustration at the failures of the US, and faithful allies such as Britain, to get the United Nations marching in step, and in the required direction, too little attention is paid, in the West at least, to successes which are detrimental to the very foundations of the UN. Apart from the Middle East situation, where there is considerable sympathy for the Palestinians, the remarkable ability of the US, in particular, to get the Security Council to pass resolutions, which are then binding in theory on all members of the United Nations, including the recalcitrant G-77, that are in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and of natural justice is scarcely noted. This essay focuses on two such resolutions that were passed in 2006 condemning the missile and nuclear tests by the DPRK.\(^{11}\)

The Geopolitical Context

The North Korean nuclear and missile tests were closely linked not merely in time, but as part of the same pattern of action and response. Had the response to the missile tests been different, then the nuclear test might not have been carried out. They were also linked in so far as a missile is the best way, though not the only one, of delivering a nuclear device. Nevertheless, there was considerable symbolic difference between the two. Missile tests continue to be commonplace, but nuclear tests, other than sub-critical and computer simulations, are currently uncommon. Despite this difference, the missile and nuclear tests had one other thing in common. Neither was, in themselves, illegal. They would only have been illegal if the DPRK were a

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\(^{10}\) Righter, “What use the UN?”

signatory to an agreement forbidding them. There are no blanket prohibitions on missile or nuclear tests. If there were, all the permanent members of the UNSC, along with a number of other countries, would be in the dock. That the DPRK was arraigned in the dock, and found guilty, was not a matter of law, but of geopolitics.

The geopolitical framework is beyond the scope of this paper which will confine itself to a discussion of the legality and practice of the holding and testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, focussing on the recent DPRK tests. I have discussed elsewhere the confrontation between the US and North Korea and the way it is embedded within the dynamic complexities of regional and global geopolitics. It will have to suffice here to say that the US is a global power conscious of the ramifications of local issues and the way they may impact on its position elsewhere. Moreover the prime focus of US policy in non-Islamic Asia is to resist the rise of China. US policy towards the DPRK must be seen within that dual context, the global and the regional. These are the factors behind the American refusal to negotiate with North Korea and resolve the current crisis.

The US uses direct pressure on the DPRK, principally via sanctions, and indirect pressure via other countries, mainly China, Japan and South Korea, in an attempt to prevail without resorting to a negotiated compromise. The US is willing to make concessions, or to hold out the possibility of concessions, but only as the beneficence of a superpower, not as a matter to be settled between countries equal in sovereignty. North Korea, for its part, attempts to force the US to negotiate a settlement of peaceful coexistence between sovereign states. It also does this directly and indirectly. The development of a nuclear deterrent, demonstrated in embryonic form by the 2006 tests, manifests both these modes. The explosion of the plutonium device was a direct rebuff to the Bush administration. The Agreed Framework signed with the Clinton administration effectively mothballed the Yongbyon reactor. It was only after the Bush administration abrogated that agreement in late 2002 that the reactor was reactivated, allowing the extraction of plutonium for a nuclear weapon. Similarly, the Bush administration did not continue the negotiations on missiles, which had led to the moratorium of 1999. The tests, therefore, were a direct result of Bush’s departure from Clinton’s policy, and so left him open to criticism, from Democrats and realist Republicans, that North Korea had become a nuclear power on his watch. Pyongyang’s hope here is that political forces in the US, worried by the results of Bush’s policy, will press for a return to a negotiated settlement. In addition, there is the indirect route to Washington. North

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Korea is very conscious that Russia, South Korea and especially China are fearful that its acquiring nuclear weapons will provide the excuse for Japan to follow (with perhaps Taiwan further downstream). By testing missiles, and now a nuclear device, Pyongyang is attempting to force Beijing, Seoul and Moscow to attempt to persuade Washington to accept peaceful coexistence.

The situation is further complicated by American regional objectives. At the same time as it is pursuing global objectives, and somewhat in conflict with them, the US needs to preserve a DPRK which is essentially impotent but which can be portrayed as threatening, in order to facilitate the remilitarisation of Japan, and to hold Japan and South Korea in an alliance purportedly focused on North Korea but in reality concerned with China.

Set alongside the Byzantine intricacies of these geopolitical considerations and the reality of power underlying them, the United Nations’ resolutions are somewhat peripheral. They are deficient in legality and China, Russia and South Korea, and probably other countries, will resist their implementation. However, they raise important legal and political principles and issues of particular relevance to smaller, independent countries such as New Zealand.

**Missiles in Law and Practice**

The hypocrisy surrounding the DPRK tests was all the more pronounced precisely because missile tests are so frequent and missiles themselves are so commonplace. Missiles cannot be developed, nor maintained, without testing.

Around the time of the DPRK test in July 2006, and in the period since then, there have been a number of tests of missiles, and of satellite launches. The distinction in terms of rocketry between a long-range ballistic missile and a satellite-launching rocket is a minor one; the former can be modified into the latter. Also, a satellite may be either civilian, military or, as in the case of a recent South Korean one, of dual use. Military satellites for surveillance and communication are vital if a country is to have an independent weapons system, and it is significant that both Japan and South Korea have made determined efforts to develop the capability. Japan uses its own rockets to launch its satellites and this can be seen as part of its drive for remilitarisation.

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13 This essay was written towards the end of November 2006 and was up-to-date at the time. However, there are new developments every day.
14 Iran Plans to Launch a Space Satellite (Space Today Online, 2006); available from http://www.spacetoday.org/Satellites/Iran/IranianSat.html.
Beal

Missiles can either be ballistic (“a missile that is guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight when the trajectory that it follows is subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag”) or cruise (“a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air, sea, and land”).¹⁷ Types currently deployed globally are:

SRBM    Short-range ballistic missile, 70-1000 km (43-620 miles)
MRBM    Medium-range ballistic missile, 1000-3000 km (620-1860 miles)
IRBM    Intermediate-range ballistic missile, 3000-5500 km (1860-3410 miles)
ICBM    Intercontinental ballistic missile, 5500km + (3410 miles +)
ALCM    Air-launched cruise missiles
ASM     Anti-ship missile
CM      Cruise missile (generic)
LACM    Land attack cruise missile
SLCM    Submarine-launched cruise missile.¹⁸

Most of the DPRK’s missiles appear to be ballistic but it is also reported to have at least one cruise missile, a shore to ship (i.e. anti-ship) missile.¹⁹ It is said that if the US were to attack the DPRK Yongbyon reactor, Tomahawk cruise missiles would be a likely option.²⁰ Indeed, it would appear the US only retains ballistic missiles for long-range nuclear strikes, with all its other missiles being cruise. The latest authoritative public domain document published in the US by Andrew Feickert of the Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS; quoted above) is rather ambiguous on this matter. Table 1, Missiles by Categories of Range, lists countries possessing particular types of ballistic missiles. Despite the title, the table does not include cruise missiles. The table gives countries, but not the number of missiles (or warheads). The US is shown under ICBMs, along with China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and possibly North Korea.²¹ Appendix I (Ballistics and Land Attack Missile Inventory) gives what purports to be a global picture, sometimes with the number of missiles (and launchers) or a range. We are

¹⁸ Ibid.
²¹ Feickert, “Missile Survey.”
told, for instance, that the UK has between 500 and 2000 Storm Shadow cruise missiles in service, though no numbers are given for Britain’s holdings of Tomahawk BGM 109 SLCMs. Feickert’s estimate of North Korea’s missile inventory is given in Table 1.

Table 1
CRS estimates of North Korea’s missiles, July 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Launchers</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Payload (kg)</th>
<th>Motors</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scud-B variant</td>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>In Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scud-C Nodong</td>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td></td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>In Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000-1300</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>In Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taepo Dong-1</td>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1500-2000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>Used with solid fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>third stage in satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>launch attempt 8/31/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-N-6 Variant</td>
<td>MRBM/IRBM</td>
<td>5 &lt;10</td>
<td></td>
<td>3000-3600</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>Liquid</td>
<td>In development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taepo Dong X</td>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Possibly in development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>w/ SS-N-6 as first stage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from Appendix 1 in Andrew Feickert, “Missile Survey.”

Inexplicably, or perhaps significantly, the US is not included in Feickert’s global picture and the unwary reader might well come away with the impression that North Korea and, for instance, Iran, are major deployers of missiles and the US is not.

Although the US has managed to focus attention on DPRK exports of ballistic missiles, it appears that most of the world trade in missiles concerns cruise missiles. That is in terms of numbers. A calculation in terms of potency and costs might well give another picture. The nuclear-armed Trident missiles exported by the US to Britain, for instance, must weigh heavily in those scales. One expert notes that they have “the capacity to kill tens of millions of people.”


conservatively estimated at £20 billion.\textsuperscript{24} Cruise missiles are normally used for attacking buildings and installations, as during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003; one story mentioned the deployment of between 600 and 800 over two days.\textsuperscript{25} It would seem that, apart from long-range nuclear missiles (and antiballistic missiles), cruise missiles are the weapon of choice.

Cruise missiles are found around the world. Australia, for instance, has a large order in for up to A$450 million worth of air-launched cruise missiles.\textsuperscript{26} [American] Harpoons have been exported to 19 countries, including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia. India has received [British] Sea Eagles, while Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea have [Chinese] Silkworms and Seersuckers, a version of which North Korea now manufactures. Italy has [German] Kormorans, and Taiwan, South Africa, Chile, Ecuador, Kenya, Singapore, and Thailand have [Israeli] Gabriel Mark-IIs. Italy has exported turbojet powered Otomats to Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, while the Swedes exported the RBS-15 to Yugoslavia and Finland. In addition, the Soviets sold the long-range (500 km, 850 kg) turbojet powered “Shaddock” to Syria and Yugoslavia. At the next notch down in technological capability, the Soviets have flooded the world market with 1960’s-generation liquid-fueled “Styx” (SS-N-2C) missiles. Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen, and the former Yugoslavia have the Styx missile in their inventories.\textsuperscript{27}

Sources such as this give some idea of the spread of cruise missiles, but provide no information on numbers, potency or cost and so are of limited value in trying to assess global inventories or trade. It has not been possible to locate any estimates of global stocks of missiles, but there is data on arms sales.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute collates statistics on transfers of major conventional weapons, which seems to include missiles other than nuclear ones. Table 2 shows transfers between 1995 and 2005 for

\textsuperscript{26} “Australia to Spend up to $450m on Cruise Missiles,” \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 26 August 2004.
the major arms exporters, plus the DPRK. The last column calculates North Korea’s arms sales as a percentage of those of the US. Over this period that percentage varies from 0.5% to zero, with an average of 0.3%.

Table 2
Exports of Major Conventional Weapons, 1995-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>NK as % US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>10,689</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>3273</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>1206</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2793</td>
<td>21,086</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10,377</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>3589</td>
<td>1618</td>
<td>1526</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2576</td>
<td>22,079</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13,566</td>
<td>2945</td>
<td>3011</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>2584</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4372</td>
<td>27,520</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14,546</td>
<td>3215</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td>1083</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2789</td>
<td>25,515</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10,892</td>
<td>1592</td>
<td>3771</td>
<td>1406</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3613</td>
<td>22,570</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7057</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>4064</td>
<td>1429</td>
<td>1193</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2231</td>
<td>16,978</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5516</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>5548</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2940</td>
<td>17,332</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4662</td>
<td>1259</td>
<td>5656</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2705</td>
<td>16,139</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5139</td>
<td>1268</td>
<td>5567</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3627</td>
<td>18,248</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5818</td>
<td>2514</td>
<td>6440</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3269</td>
<td>19,834</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7101</td>
<td>2399</td>
<td>5771</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3915</td>
<td>21,961</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95-05</td>
<td>95,363</td>
<td>19,461</td>
<td>48,688</td>
<td>13,655</td>
<td>12,540</td>
<td>4440</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>34,830</td>
<td>229,262</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The category Major Conventional Weapons covers more than missiles, and transfers are not the same as holdings, though they are an important issue in themselves as the proliferation debate shows. However, it would be fair to conclude that North Korea’s missile capability, and trade, is miniscule compared with the US.

**Recent Missile Tests.** The United Nations’ resolution concerned itself not with missile capability as such, but with testing. The following list of tests from June to November 2006 is not comprehensive, but is sufficient to show that the DPRK missile tests were far from the outrageous, threatening and unusual events they were portrayed to be. What appears here is what caught the eye of the media so it is what is unusual that is reported, not the commonplace. In particular, it is likely that testing by the US is under-reported because it is not considered newsworthy.

**France.** On 9 November 2006 France tested its new M51 submarine-launched ballistic missile in a flight over the Atlantic. The M51 has a designed range of 6000 miles and is scheduled to replace the M45, also submarine-based. It was reported that Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie “expressed her great satisfaction” at the success of the test and that she insisted on the “need to conduct tests to verify the performance of future
missiles of the strategic ocean forces, and attain an important stage in the adaptation and modernization of our dissuasive force.”

**India.** On 10 July 2006 India tested the Agni III missile. This missile is claimed to be capable of hitting targets within China. It was reported that Tony Snow, a White House spokesman, argued at a press conference on the launch that India was a significantly different country from North Korea and was not threatening its neighbours. It seems unlikely that China would take such a sanguine view. This particular launch, like the DPRK’s test of the Taepodong II, was unsuccessful, but such mishaps are not uncommon. India plans a further test of the Agni III in 2007. India is also planning to test a submarine-launched cruise missile developed with Israeli assistance, the Sagarika, in 2007, as well as developing a submarine version of the BrahMos cruise missile which it developed in cooperation with the Russians. On 19 November, a few days after a similar Pakistani test, India launched a medium-range nuclear-capable missile, the Prithvi. The *Washington Post* pointed out that “India routinely test-fires missiles it is developing for military use, as does Pakistan.” On 27 November India conducted what was claimed to be a successful development of anti-missile capability when one Prithvi was used to intercept another.

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31 There were a number of different accounts regarding how long the Taepodong II was airborne; Gallunt Jung, “Taepodong Missile Exploded in Midair,” *Korea Times*, 31 July 2006. Peter Hayes claims that the US needs 40 tests to bring a missile “from development into operational levels of reliability.” Peter Hayes, “Stop Hyperventilating, Start Talking,” Nautilus Policy Forum Online, 7 July 2006. Indian defence analyst Commodore C. Uday Bhaska, commenting on the Agri III test in July said that 8 to 10 tests were normal before a missile fully evolves. “Top Indian Scientists Probe Agni-III Glitch.”
32 “Agni Missile to be Tested Next Year: DRDO,” *Times of India*, 9 November 2006.
33 “First Test of Sagarika Cruise Missile Next Year” *Hindu*, 13 November 2006.
Pakistan. On 16 November 2006 Pakistan claimed to have successfully test fired an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), Hatf 5. This appears to be a version of the Ghauri which has a claimed range of 1300 km. The Ghauri is nuclear-capable and it is claimed that Pakistan is in the process of expanding its nuclear arsenal to a production capability of 50 warheads a year.

Russia. Russia launched a submarine-based long-range missile on 30 June 2006, the second that year. On 9 November Russia launched a RS-18 Stiletto missile, a Soviet-era Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. This was part of a programme intended to keep these old missiles operational for an extended period. Russia also launched a commercial satellite on behalf of Kazakhstan on 18 June 2006. The satellite was reportedly designed to provide television and communication services for Kazakhstan, part of Russia, and for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. It too was launched from Baikonur and was described as part of the country’s strategy to become a space nation. A satellite was also launched for South Korea.

Republic of Korea. On 28 July 2006 an Arirang 2 multi-purpose satellite was launched by a Russian rocket from the spaceport in Plesetsk, about 800 km northeast of Moscow. It was claimed that its airborne surveillance capability enabled it to identify objects one metre in diameter, and that it could survey North Korea three times a day. It would enable the South to monitor North Korea. Not surprisingly, the North complained about this, calling it “a grave provocative act of straining the regional situation.”

On 22 August a military communications satellite was launched. The satellite itself was French, the launch rocket American. This was the ROK’s tenth satellite but its first military one. The DPRK attempted to launch a satellite in 1998. It is usually thought that this was not successful.

43 “S. Korea’s Launch of Spy Satellite Under Fire,” KCNA, 1 August 2006.
45 “KCNA on First Artificial Satellite of DPRK,” People’s Korea, 8 September 1998.
On 9 July the ROK Defence Minister, Yoon Kwang-ung, announced plans to develop a cruise missile with a range of 300 km and a “clear advantage in terms of accuracy compared with the North’s” missiles. The ROK has already deployed a 150 km cruise missile. Significantly, it was claimed that these cruise missiles did not infringe South Korea’s commitment under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restrains the transfer and development of missiles, because “the MTCR only applies to high-velocity, free flight ballistic missiles, excluding the slower, surface-skimming cruise weapons.”

The MTCR was founded in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the US and now has 34 members including South Korea but not North Korea. There is some confusion because the MTCR website (maintained by the Canadian Government) does include cruise missiles, but does fix the limit at 300 km.

In another report at the time Mr Yoon was quoted as saying that the restrictions did not apply to cruise missiles. He claimed that, “While the North has a long-range missile capacity, our precision accuracy is far more advanced than the North’s,” and added, “Over the past three years, we probably have test-fired them more than 10 times.”

The Seoul newspaper Chosun Ilbo reports that South Korea is also developing a guided glider bomb with a range of 100 km which it hopes to export. This is a version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) used by the US during its invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Chosun Ilbo adds that:

> With capability that rivals that of missiles without the hefty price tag, the guided glider bomb has become the cutting-edge weapon concept the leading military powers are scrambling to develop. The U.S. is at the test phase of the LongShot GPS-guided glider bomb with range of 65 to 100 km, and China and Japan have similar projects in the works.

**United Kingdom.** Whilst there do not appear to have been any high profile missile tests carried out by Britain during this period, the question of replacing Trident did surface and is set to become a hot political issue. The time is approaching when a decision has to be taken on whether to replace this US submarine-based nuclear ballistic missile. Prime Minister Tony

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50 Rogers, “Britain’s Nuclear-weapons Fix.”
Blair made it clear that he wanted Britain to remain a nuclear weapons state and wanted a decision on a replacement system before he left office. At that time, his heir-apparent, Gordon Brown, indicated that he would follow the same path. The debate has added significance because there are strong arguments that the agreement under which the US supplies Tridents to Britain is an infringement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  

Jack Straw, the leader of the House of Commons, and Foreign Secretary at the time of the invasion of Iraq, dismissed such claims saying that, “only a simpleton could think replacing Trident would breach the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.”  

Recourse to argumentum *ad hominem* is often considered a sign of a weak case and it is unlikely that the debate will be stifled, though it is virtually certain that replacement of Trident will go ahead.

**United States.** On 14 June 2006 the US launched a Minuteman III ICBM from Vandenberg air force base in California across the Pacific to its Kwajalein Missile Range in the western chain of the Marshall Islands.  

According to this same article the US has about 500 Minuteman ICBMS. The US tested 67 nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958 and resulting health claims against the US are still outstanding.  

On 20 July another Minuteman III was launched from Vandenberg, making it the third such in 2006. Various commentators pointed out that this ICBM launch came less than a week after the United Nations Security Council resolution castigated the DPRK.  

According to the Californian-based SpaceArchive website, there were 1,878 missile tests launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base alone between 16 December 1958 and 4 November 2006.

The most famous space facility in the US is Cape Canaveral in Florida, and it was here that a Discovery Space shuttle was launched on 4 July 2006, Independence Day. This was, of course, part of a civilian programme,

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51 Wintour, “Blair Begins Push for Trident Replacement.”
conducted in cooperation with other countries: a German astronaut, Thomas Reiter of the European Space Agency was part of the seven member crew.\textsuperscript{58} However, in the era of the militarisation of space all space capability has military implications.\textsuperscript{59}

**Nuclear Tests and Stockpiles**

Although the testing of missiles is fairly routine, the physical testing of nuclear devices is not (today, at least). Between 1945 and 1998 there were over 2000 tests, virtually all of them conducted by the same permanent members of the UNSC—USA, Russia, UK, China, and France—who condemned the DPRK test in October 2006.\textsuperscript{60} Figure 1 shows the countries conducting nuclear tests up to 2006. The US has carried out more tests than all the other countries combined. The strangely high number of tests conducted by France compared with the UK is presumably because its nuclear deterrent was independent and it did not have the access to US technology that Britain had.

![Nuclear tests 1945-2006](source: Derived from Kristensen, Hans M. Status of world nuclear forces Federation of American Scientists, 2006)


Because of changes in technology the advanced nuclear weapons states do not need physical tests to maintain and develop their nuclear weapons. This, however, may be temporary. The US has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), has “a production schedule of 250 nuclear warheads per year, is making great efforts to develop a new generation of ‘low yield’ mini-nukes, and promises to extend its nuclear hegemony over the earth to space.”\(^{61}\) There are voices in the US publicly calling for the resumption of underground testing.\(^{62}\) Whether such calls will be heeded or indeed whether not conducting underground tests imposes any burden for advanced countries such as the US is unclear. Sub-critical tests seem to be one way around the problem. The US conducted one on 31 August 2006, its 23rd since 1997.\(^{63}\) This was not widely reported, but the DPRK did notice.\(^{64}\) The US is pushing forward on the modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, including introducing the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) programme which is thought to make testing unnecessary.\(^{65}\) Beyond that lies the beacon of tactical nuclear weapons and the Missile Defense system by which they might be used with virtual impunity.\(^{66}\)

There is an obligation, under the NPT, for nuclear weapons states to move towards nuclear disarmament, but despite frequent calls from people such as Hans Blix, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and then Chief Weapons Inspector on Iraq, for them “to take seriously their commitment,” there is little sign of progress, with 27,000 nuclear weapons still being stockpiled.\(^{67}\) Britain is moving to a new generation of ICBMs, to replace the Trident, and the US is finalising a nuclear sharing deal with India, a nuclear weapons state not party to the NPT, in contravention of long-standing rhetoric about proliferation.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{64}\) “U.S. Sub-Critical Nuclear Test Assailed,” KCNA, 13 September 2006.


\(^{67}\) Hans Blix, “Don’t Forget Those Other 27,000 Nukes,” International Herald Tribune, 8 June 2006.

\(^{68}\) Carol Giacomo, “U.S. Senate Takes Major Step on Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, 17 November 2006.
Missile tests and nuclear stockpiles are not the only part of the climate of threat that is relevant. Of particular importance are military exercises, and there are plenty of those. Notably in June 2006, the US conducted the largest military exercises in the Pacific in decades, “showing North Korea and other nations that the United States can swiftly muster a huge combat force in the region.”69 Chief among other nations presumably meaning China.

**The Legal Framework**

As the Iranians have pointed out, there is no general prohibition on nuclear tests.70 There is the CTBT, of which the DPRK has never been a signatory, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) from which it has withdrawn.71 Therefore, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters was apparently ill-advised by his officials when he condemned the DPRK announcement that it would conduct a nuclear test on the grounds that it “would go against North Korea’s commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would be contrary to the moratorium on nuclear testing that has been in place for the past eight years.”72

Similarly there is no blanket ban on missiles tests. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is concerned solely with proliferation, that is the transfer of missile systems to countries deemed by the participants to be unworthy.73 Presumably the testing of missiles between friends, as it were, poses no problems. As Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS pointed out, “There are certain international protocols that should be followed (notice to mariners, airspace closures, prior notifications, et cetera.) but a missile launch *per se* is not an illegal or necessarily hostile act.”74 The only other possible constraint on the DPRK was the moratorium it assumed in 1999 in negotiations with the Clinton Administration. However, as Cossa notes, “North Korea’s current moratorium is self-imposed; it was initiated in 1999 and was to run as long as missile talks between Washington and

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73 The Missile Technology Control Regime.
Pyongyang continued . . . which they have not." Indeed, it is surprising that the DPRK held to the moratorium for so long. Charles “Jack” Pritchard, the State Department official who was special U.S. envoy for negotiations with North Korea until he resigned in August 2003 (in protest, it is supposed, at administration policy), wrote on the eve of the July missile tests:

The U.S. negotiating team began a concentrated effort to walk back Pyongyang’s missile program, and the result was the missile moratorium of September 1999. The moratorium specified that North Korea would not launch a long-range missile of any kind while talks about its missile program were going on between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea subsequently extended the moratorium unilaterally in September 2002. In March 2005, Pyongyang announced that it would no longer observe the missile moratorium. Fifteen months later, we are caught like a deer in the headlights. But the missile test is not a violation of anything more than our pride, ripping a gaping hole in the false logic that talking with the North Koreans somehow rewards and empowers them. To the contrary, we should be opening avenues of dialogue with Pyongyang.

The DPRK missiles tests were not illegal. In the context of other tests during the same period they were by no means unusual. They did not appear to be particularly successful but that is to be expected from a small developing country with little access to international technology. The test of the long-range Taepodong II came at the end of a moratorium which had not been honoured for a number of years by the other side. DPRK’s missile inventory, and trade in missiles, is miniscule compared with the US, its main adversary. Although it has a large army, which is a traditional defence of countries faced with much more powerful and technologically advanced enemies, its military capacity is limited to defence and counter-offence.

One simple and convenient way roughly to gauge relative military capability is to look at statistics for military expenditure. Table 3 takes data from the CIA World Factbook for the top eight countries, and for North Korea. The final two columns calculate North Korea’s supposed military expenditure as a proportion of the expenditure of others. It can be seen that, according to these figures, America’s military expenditure is nearly 100 times that of North Korea, Japan’s is 8.5 times as great, and South Korea spends four times as much as its northern counterpart.

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75 Ibid.
77 For more on this issue see chapter six, Beal, North Korea: The Struggle Against American Power.
### Table 3

Military expenditure, circa 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US$ b</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>NK %</th>
<th>Times NK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>518.1</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>FY02</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The final two columns are my calculation of the relationship between the military expenditure of the specified country and that of North Korea.

It is likely that these figures exaggerate North Korea’s military expenditure in dollar terms. The Stockholm International Peace Institute has recently revised its estimates using new market-based exchange rates to convert the North Korean *won* into US$, and comes up with a figure of $27.9 million for 2004 (as against the CIA’s $5.2 billion for fiscal year 2002). Even by CIA estimates, the military disparity between the DPRK and its potential adversaries is so overwhelming that the frequent claims that the ROK needs to be defended against a possible invasion from the North strike hollow.

Whatever else it might have been, the DPRK nuclear test, too, was not illegal and although physical testing has been off the agenda for the other nuclear powers for a few years it should be viewed within the historical context (Fig 1). There are, of course, environmental dangers from any testing and the human costs over the half century of nuclear tests is considerable. There is no indication as yet that the DPRK test has caused any damage but these things often take a long while to emerge.

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Article 2.1 of the United Nations Charter affirms that, “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”\(^82\) It is clear that the DPRK is being condemned in resolutions 1695 (on the missile tests) and 1718 (on the nuclear test) for actions which are neither illegal nor unusual. That is not to say that the testing of missiles and nuclear weapons is either desirable or should pass without comment. However, if the United Nations is to live up to its charter, that all members have sovereign equality, then one set of rules for the powerful, or those under their wing, and another for the weak, is not acceptable.

In reality, we know that the world is not fair, and that double standards abound. However, the problem with the United Nations goes deeper than the violation of its Charter infringement of natural justice. Resolutions such as these exacerbate situations rather than lead to peaceful resolution. Take, for instance, UNSC resolution 1695 which proclaimed, inter alia: “Registering profound concern at the DPRK’s breaking of its pledge to maintain its moratorium on missile launching.” It went on to say that it “Demands that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.”\(^83\) There is no mention here of the fact the moratorium was entered into in the course of negotiations with the US, was contingent on those negotiations continuing, but that the US broke them off. At the very least the UNSC should have called upon the US to resume negotiations.\(^84\)

The missile and subsequent nuclear test have been portrayed as unprovoked and irrational; they are clearly nothing of the kind.\(^85\) Moreover, as Pritchard’s remarks in respect of the missile moratorium indicate, Pyongyang has been very patient in its dealings with the US. Its primary foreign policy goal for many years, certainly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been to secure guarantees of security from the US and to move forward to the normalisation of relations, with the lifting of sanctions and other hostile acts. There is nothing very surprising in any of this. The only way in which it can rehabilitate its economy and live in security and prosperity is if the US drops its hostile policy and lives in peace, if not in friendship. The tests were clearly part of a sequence in which the DPRK has been trying to get the US to negotiate and accept peaceful coexistence.


\(^83\) Resolution 1695.

\(^84\) The sceptical eye might also pick up the seemingly redundant reference to ballistic missiles. This may have been intended to prevent the resolution being used as a precedent for condemning the testing of cruise missiles, for instance by South Korea.

\(^85\) Dan Plesch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Policy is not Irrational at all,” Guardian, 10 October 2006.
Instead of opening avenues of dialogue (as Pritchard advocates), the UN resolutions allowed Washington to continue to refuse to do so.  

US Power and its limitations

The United Nations actions cause damage in two ways. Firstly, the resolutions were a violation of its Charter, and of natural justice, and their passing further undermines the moral credibility of the organisation. Secondly, the resolutions did not offer any solution to the problems that the tests exemplified, but, if implemented thoroughly, would exacerbate them. The other members of the United Nations Security Council, permanent and non-permanent, bear some moral responsibility as do countries such as New Zealand who voiced uncritical, and one suspects, unthinking, support of the US.

However, the resolutions should not be read too literally. They were the result of pressure from the US (and from Japan) in pursuit of particular foreign policy aims. If neither China nor Russia felt it worthwhile to oppose them formally, then it would be unreasonable to expect smaller, non-permanent members of the UNSC to be quixotic and resist the US.

China and South Korea have both made clear their opposition to punitive sanctions, and have expressed their desire for the US to come to terms with the DPRK. China will continue to provide aid, to trade and to invest in the DPRK in spite of US disapproval. The ROK, both government and business, will continue to support the Kumgangsan tourism venture and the Kaesong Industrial Complex despite US pressure. Despite opposition from domestic political forces and the US, the government in Seoul will continue its engagement with the North. A summit between Roh Moo-hyun

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87 The non-permanent members in 2006 were Argentina, Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia, United Republic of Tanzania; United Nations Security Council (2007 [cited 1 March 2007]); available from http://www.un.org/sc/.

88 Ewen MacAskill, Jonathan Watts, and Justin McCurry, “UN Divided Over Severity of Nuclear Sanctions,” Guardian, 11 October 2006. This is probably also true of Russia, though I have no references to support this.


and Kim Jong Il remains on the agenda. Seoul will not participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative and assist the US to intercept DPRK ships.

The condemnation of the DPRK by the United Nations has demonstrated the power and influence of the US, but also the boundaries of its hegemony and the complexity of forces challenging it. For whilst the DPRK tests have been portrayed in terms of its defiance of the international community, or, in realist terms, a struggle between it and the US, the situation is more complex than a bilateral representation suggests. The reality is that US policy towards the DPRK is a subset of both its global and regional policies. However, one of the key arenas in which these policies are deployed is the United Nations. The UN serves as a microcosm in which the politics of power and persuasion, sometimes perhaps principle, are played out.

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92 “Minister Supports a Second Summit,” JoongAng Ilbo, 1 November 2006.