Pyongyang
Report

Vol 9 No 1 March
2007

In this issue-

n      The Agreement to implement the Joint Statement
– a search for quiet on the East Asian Front?

n      Text of the Agreement; reactions and analyses

n      Wolfgang Rosenberg dies

n      The gifting of a tractor to the Korea-NZ Friendship
Farm

Commentary

The Agreement signed at the Six Party Talks
in Beijing on
13 February was a bit of a surprise, but much less so than that caused by the
Joint Statement of 19 September 2005.
In 2005 there seemed to be no likelihood of a consensual acceptance of
the Chinese draft statement.
However, according to the New York Times, China
threatened to announce publicly that the US was isolated in its refusal to
accede, and that threat, combined with the lack of intervention from Dick
Cheney seems to have carried the day. However, the Joint Statement immediately
seized up, partly because both the DPRK and the US
differed on their interpretation of the statement's deliberate ambiguities, but
mainly because the US
applied pressure on the Banco Delta Asia [BDA] in Macau
to freeze its DPRK accounts on unsubstantiated accusations of money
laundering.  The amount involved was
small, only $24 million, but the impact on the DPRK was serious because of the
knock-on effect, with other banks being frightened to have commercial dealings
with the DPRK. Pyongyang
withdrew from the Six Party Talks, saying it would not return until American
financial sanctions were lifted.

Evidence suggests that the money laundering
affair was spurious. Certainly, the US actions were disproportionate to
the amounts of money allegedly involved.
The BDA episode has turned out to be an embarrassment with companies
such as Hyundai, with its tourism venture and the Kaesong Industrial Complex,  and British American Tobacco, which has
a factory in DPRK, laying claim to a substantial part of the $24m. It is clear
from the timing that the financial sanctions were above all an attempt to
derail the talks and in that they were successful for over a year; President
Roh Moo-hyun noted that the BDA action ensured that the “September 19th
agreement was buried before it was born’.  It was the tortuous, and essentially
bilateral negotiations, between America
and North Korea in China in October and December 2006, and then in Berlin in January 2007,
which suggested that a tentative deal would be struck in February.

Other indications were present as
well.  The administration’s
setback in the mid-term elections led to the resignation of Rumsfeld and the
withdrawal of Bolton from the UN. More
telling, perhaps, than these casualties was the resignation of another leading
hardliner, Robert Joseph, in January. President Bush, in his State of the Union
address made an emollient reference to ‘intensive diplomacy to achieve a Korean Peninsula
free of nuclear weapons’, a long cry from the vitriol of the Axis of Evil
speech in 2002.

Pyongyang had stressed
that it would not return to the talks until the financial sanctions were lifted
but in the event there was compromise and the talks were resumed, first in December,
and then in February, under a private understanding that they would be lifted
under some face-saving mechanism by which the US would ‘wrap up its
investigation’. It remains unclear whether the US will agree to the complete
unfreezing of the accounts, or whether a partial unfreezing will satisfy the
DPRK- probably not, because the effect on the DPRK’s access to the
international financial system, rather than the amount itself,  has been the issue.  Moreover, there are doubts whether
either action would lead to a resumption of dealings between banks and the
DPRK, especially as America
has said that other banks may be investigated. As with the invasion of Iraq,
it is easier to embark on a policy than to stop it, even for a superpower. If
the sanctions effectively remain in place it is difficult to see the DPRK being
willing to implement its side of the bargain.

However, the biggest
stumbling block  is the alleged
uranium programme.  It was this, it
is claimed, that led the US
to abandon the Agreed Framework in 2002.
The DPRK has consistently denied having a programme but has agreed to
join a working party that reportedly will investigate the issue.  Much may depend on the definition of
‘programme’.  It is
widely asserted that North Korea,
(like South Korea),
has worked on uranium enrichment, perhaps for the civilian reactors promised
under the Agreed Framework. The best guess is that the DPRK has centrifuges
(from Pakistan)
but not a meaningful programme for producing weapons-grade uranium.  Interestingly, Christopher Hill, the US
negotiator, and other officials seem to be preparing the ground for a defusing
of the issue. However, whether the issue can be resolved so easily is quite
another matter.  If the DPRK has a
programme, it will be difficult to admit its existence after denying it.  On the other hand, if, as likely, it
does not have a programme, then it will be impossible to prove its
non-existence, certainly to the satisfaction of American hardliners.  Again, it may well be impossible to put
the genie back into the bottle even if Washington
so desires.

Does Washington so desire?  The problem is that ‘Washington’, in
the sense of a coherent, disciplined, purposeful government scarcely
exists.  What we have is a volatile,
shifting alliance of political forces without firm, strategic leadership.  What seems to have happened is that
Condoleezza Rice was able, in the aftermath of the departure of Rumsfeld and Bolton, to isolate Cheney and bypass hardliners in the
government to empower Hill to strike a deal.  Whether she will have continued authority
to implement the deal is another matter. One indication of the difficulty she
faces is that just at the time Hill was trying to convince the North Koreans
that the US was sincere in returning to negotiations, and that the BDA matter
would be ‘resolved’, other parts of the bureaucracy, within the
State Department itself, were launching an attack on the operations of the UN
Development programme in the DPRK.

Although the agreement was trumpeted by
President Bush as a great achievement of his policies, few informed observers,
right or left, American or foreign, see it that way. His administration had
torn up the Agreed Framework because it claimed the DPRK had a secret uranium
weapons programme. Neither the Joint Statement of 2005 nor the February agreement
explicitly raise the issue and there are indications that the US is trying to extricate itself by
admitting ‘doubts’ about the programme.  It froze the Joint Statement with its
actions against the Banco Delta Asia, but has back-tracked   For years it had refused to have
bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang,
but now  it does in all but
name.  Reports circulate that Rice
may accept an invitation to go to Pyongyang;
you can’t get much more bilateral than that.  For a long time it insisted that the
DPRK must have a ‘complete,
verifiable, irreversible dismantlement’ of its nuclear weapons before the
US
would reciprocate in any way.  Both
the Joint Statement, and the agreement, centralise the North Korean principle
of ‘action for action’, a sequence of mutual steps.

Why the volte-face?
There has been considerable pressure from China,
South Korea and Russia.
The North Korean nuclear test in October exposed the Bush administration to the
charge that by tearing up the Agreed Framework it had produced the outcome that
Clinton
prevented during his tenure. Clearly the administration has its problems at
home (as the mid-term elections bluntly confirmed) and more pressing issues
abroad, especially in the arc stretching from the Mediterranean through Iraq and Iran
to Pakistan.
Globally it has the Islamic ‘global insurgency’, the rise of China and the reinvigoration of Russia.  Putting the Korean situation on the
backburner, gaining some quietness on the East Asian front to concentrate on
the Middle Eastern one,  makes sense
even if it comes with its costs to imperial pride. It has also meant rebuffing
an isolated Abe Shinzo, although it is doubtful this rebuff will have more than
a temporary impact of the US-Japan relationship.

However, it is
unlikely that signing the agreement
‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint
Statement’, and hence returning to the Joint Statement, represents a
change in US
strategy.  It is a tactic to gain
time to address more important matters rather than a decision to transform the
relationship with the DPRK and to move from hostility to peaceful coexistence. North Korea,
for its part, is unlikely to dismantle its nuclear deterrent irreversibly until
it is persuaded that transformation is happening. The rumoured proposed visit
by Secretary Rice to Pyongyang,
if it comes off, will help, as would the removing of the DPRK from the
terrorism list, but it is likely that concrete, and irreversible, measures will
be needed, and that probably means Light Water Reactors (LWRs). Last year the United States
forced the winding up of the KEDO project to provide LWRs to the DPRK, clearly
indicating that it considered the Agreed Framework, and the Joint Statement
with its promises of LWRs, dead. It is difficult to see that promise being
resurrected under the Bush administration.

Handling the new
situation will be enormously difficult for Pyongyang. It desperately needs peace with
the United States
but has calculated that peace will not be produced by weakness.  It has handled an immensely stronger
adversary, on the whole, with an adept balance of firmness and flexibility. The
Bush administration, despite, or perhaps because of, America’s far stronger
position, faces an even more difficult situation. Its adventurism in the Middle East has been mirrored in its dealings with the
DPRK and extricating itself may prove equally impossible. Negotiations may
provide temporary relief but it is unlikely that the US  will have the strength to conclude them
and implement the Joint Statement.

Tim Beal

Initial Actions for the
Implementation of the Joint Statement

13 February 2007

The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the
Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the
People's Republic of China,
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan,
the Republic of Korea,
the Russian Federation and
the United States of America
from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative
for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the
talks.

I. The Parties held serious and productive
discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the
implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties
reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their
commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated
steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the
principle of "action for action".

II. The Parties agreed to take the
following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the
purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing
facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and
verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties
a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement,
including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned
pursuant to the Joint Statement.

3. The DPRK and the US will start
bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward
full diplomatic relations. The US
will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a
state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the
application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks
aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the
Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and
the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint
Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic,
energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties
agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the
initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent
to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned
initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take
coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the
establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the
initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint
Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations

3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations

4. Economy and Energy Cooperation

5. Northeast Asia
Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific
plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas.
The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the
progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect
progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a
whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet
within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial
Actions phase and the next phase - which includes provision by the DPRK of a
complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing
nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing
plant - economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1
million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent
to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said
assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments
in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are
implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to
confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for
promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will
take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts for
lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula
at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth
Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and
discuss on actions for the next phase.

Source: Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Cheney's Influence Lessens in
Second Term

Administration More Pragmatic in Foreign
Policy, Dealing With Congress

By Michael
Abramowitz

Mistrustful of North Korea and its willingness to
keep promises, Vice President Cheney worked hard in President Bush's first term
to prevent talks aimed at halting that country's push to develop a nuclear
bomb. At one point three years ago, he even bypassed the State Department to
intervene in delicate negotiations over Pyongyang's
nuclear activities.

But this month Cheney stayed out of the way
as a top State Department negotiator wrapped up a nuclear agreement with North
Korea -- a deal that many of the vice president's conservative allies consider
foolhardy and that some of his own staff are said to find hard to swallow.

The contrast underscores the vice
president's shifting status in Washington.

Source: Washington
Post, 20 February, 2007

Entering the Reality Zone on North Korea

Interview with
Graham Allison

Q: What does the agreement represent, both
in terms of the non-proliferation regime and the overall foreign policy
posturing of both Washington and Pyongyang? ..//..

GA: This is a significant step for the Bush
Administration into the reality zone, a strong departure from its previous
failed approach and a good first step. So that’s the good news. The bad
news is that this is four years, eight bombs’ worth of plutonium and one
nuclear test after the Bush Administration departed from this point that it has
inherited essentially from the Clinton Administration.

For North Korea, this represents a small
step, I would say, not a big step, in that it essentially reiterates the
position that it had agreed to and which it had complied with in the ‘94
agreement reached by the Clinton Administration that froze the Yongybon
reactor. But it does so for a country that has now conducted a nuclear test. It
has ten bombs worth of plutonium and it may or may not have a second
alternative: a highly enriched uranium route for producing materials for
nuclear bombs.  ..//..

Q: Under the agreement, North Korea will eventually be required to list
all aspects of its nuclear program, an exercise that could test the Bush
Administration’s assertions that North Korea had been developing a
uranium nuclear device, an assertion which prompted the Bush Administration to
back away from the Agreed Framework on November 2002. This agreement, should it
actually produce this list by North
Korea, could test that Bush Administration
assertion on a North Korean uranium bomb program. Is it likely, in your view,
that the administration will be validated or that it could suffer another
embarrassing illustration of miscalculating on major non-proliferation and
intelligence matter?

GA: Information about North Korea’s
uranium-enrichment program that could also produce materials for bombs is
uncertain because the facility, if it exists, has not been discovered. The
basis for believing that there is such a facility comes from what is know about
what A.Q. Kahn, the Pakistani nuclear bomb-maker, sold to the North Koreans. On
the basis of that information, it’s a reasonable inference that North Korea
has been working on an enriched uranium facility, but where the facility is and
the current status of the facility remains uncertain. In 2002, the Senate got
from the CIA an assessment that by the middle of 2005, such a facility might be
up and running. So it’s conceivable that there’s such a facility
running today, but unknown.

In the current agreement, as described, North Korea
is committed to providing a list of all of its nuclear facilities and
materials, but whether and when it will do so remains uncertain. And if it were
to provide an inadequate account of this enriched uranium facility,
that’s one of the hundred ways in which between where we now stand and
the goal line—which the Bush Administration announced of complete
verifiable, irreversible dismantlement, CVID—could again go off the rail.

Source: The National
Interest, New York, 13 February 2007

Washington's raw deal

By David Frum

Something has gone very, very wrong in this
second Bush administration. That is obvious to everyone. One of the few merits
of this week's North Korea
nuclear deal is that we can get a clearer view of what exactly the problem is
--or should I say, what the problems are?

First problem: The deal demonstrates a
lethal failure of strategic vision.

The Bush administration entered office
determined to take a tougher line on North Korea than Bill Clinton. In
February, 2002, George Bush warned in his "axis of evil" speech that North Korea was
arming to threaten world peace. In October 2002, his administration confronted
the North Koreans with proof that they had cheated on their 1994 deal with the United States,
secretly starting a whole new nuclear program.

All excellent moves --if you have a plan to
follow through. But it turns out: there was no plan.

North Korea responded (predictably) by accelerating its nuclear development,
completing half a dozen bombs and testing a nuclear device in October, 2006.
Now, five years after "axis of evil," the Bush administration finds
itself signing almost exactly the same deal that the Clinton administration bequeathed it, with no
more safeguards against cheating than before. The only difference is that North Korea has
become a declared nuclear power in the interim. And it will remain a declared
nuclear power: Last week's deal does not call on North Korea to surrender its
existing weapons.

All this raises the question: What was the
point of confronting North
Korea in the first place?

(Editors’
note: David Frum drafted the ‘Axis of Evil’ State of the Union
address in 2002)

Source: National
Post, Toronto, 17 February 2007

Freeze Minus

By Jon Wolfsthal

If the new agreement painstakingly
negotiated by the United States,
North Korea, and the other
participants of the six party talks holds, it will be an important milestone in
efforts to denuclearize North
Korea. But in and of itself, the deal is a
nuclear freeze on North
Korea’s program. It contains only the
promise, unspecified in time and scope, with no guarantee that the next step
will ever be taken. This is neither surprising nor unwelcome. Given the total
lack of trust between the United States
and North Korea,
the two sides have to gain some basic momentum before moving forward. We have
to crawl before we can walk. U.S.
government spokesmen will claim in every way possible that this deal is
entirely different from the one struck by the Clinton administration in 1994, but the facts
speak for themselves – a freeze is a freeze is a freeze. ..//..

The temptation to score easy (and even
gratifying) political points over the about-face taken by the Bush
administration will be strong. But for the sake of stability in East Asia, America’s
reputation in the region, and in the interest of seeing if nuclear rollback in North Korea is
possible, every effort should be made to support the agreement. If it fails,
let it be because North Korea
did not live up to its part of the bargain, not because America did
not.

Source: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 13 February 2007

Charade or First Step? The United
States-North Korea
Agreement

by Immanuel
Wallerstein

..//..Why did the United States
sign [the agreement]? The New York Times said that the agreement "marks a
major change of course for the Bush administration" and clearly Bolton agrees. So do most other commentators. It has been
pointed out that the agreement is quite close to that reached by the Clinton administration
and denounced by the Bush regime. Most commentators also agree that this
agreement could probably have been reached five years ago, at a moment when North Korea had
not yet tested nuclear weapons, had the Bush regime been willing.

So, what has changed? The reality of
declining options seems to have hit decision-makers in Washington. The fact is that North Korea now
has some weapons and it is doubtful they will give them up. The fact is that the
United States is bogged down
in Iraq and is concentrating
its other immediate political energies on Iran. The fact is that the
Republicans lost the last election, largely over foreign policy issues. The
fact is that its allies become less amenable to United States policies as each day
goes by. From a United
States point of view, the agreement removes
the issue from the front of the geopolitical scene temporarily. There will be
ample opportunity for the United
States to backtrack later…//..

Source: Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton
University, Commentary No. 204, Mar. 1, 2007

Renewed fears of secret uranium enrichment by North Korea

By Anna Fifield in Seoul

Suspicions over whether Pyongyang has been running a secret uranium
enrichment programme are back in the spotlight after last week's apparent
breakthrough in the long-running North Korean nuclear crisis.

Just as concerns about possible uranium
enrichment triggered the current crisis, they are again threatening to
undermine the agreement under which North Korea will receive
step-by-step rewards in return for declaring and then disabling its nuclear
weapons programme.

The issue could be a "deal
breaker", says William Perry, the US defence secretary under
President Bill Clinton. "Much more remains to be done. Two months from
now, we will know whether we have a reasonable probability of completing the
agreement."..//..

The current nuclear crisis erupted in
October 2002, when Washington charged Pyongyang with obtaining
uranium enrichment technology from A Q Khan, the rogue Pakistani scientist, and
operating a secret enrichment programme.

James Kelly, the chief US nuclear negotiator at the time, said the
North Koreans admitted the charge but Pyongyang
has denied having any such programme. ..//..

With the US
having staked the entire nuclear issue on the uranium claim and North Korea
continuing to deny the existence of any such programme, diplomats are seeking
ways to prevent the issue derailing the first signs of progress in years. ..//..

The Bush administration had already
"backed down" on the uranium issue, said Joel Wit, a former State
Department official who helped negotiate the nuclear-freeze deal with North
Korea in 1994. "This is not because the administration has become wimpish
and has decided to put it aside, but because they did not have any information
and started to wonder whether they had been accurate in the first place,"
he said...//..

Jonathan Pollack, a professor at the US
Naval War College, dismissed the concern that North Korea might ultimately use
uranium as an alternative source of fissile material.

"Pyongyang pursued this option in
transactions with A Q Khan; it also sought to procure substantial quantities of
industrial materials needed for an enrichment programme through black markets
in Europe," he wrote in the Asia Policy journal. "Yet there is still
no definitive evidence of a proven production capability, and it is possible
that North Korea
long ago shelved major efforts to develop one."

Source: Financial
Times 22 February 2007

U.S.
acknowledges gaps on N.Korea nuclear program

By Carol Giacomo,
Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States on
Thursday acknowledged gaps in its knowledge about the covert uranium enrichment
program it has long accused Pyongyang
of pursuing.

Chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill said such
a program, which could produce fuel for nuclear weapons, would require "a
lot more equipment than we know that they have actually purchased" as well
as "some considerable production techniques that we're not sure whether
they have mastered."

He also raised the possibility that
aluminum tubes the United States
believes North Korea
acquired for an enrichment program several years ago may have gone
"somewhere else."

But Hill, speaking at the Brookings
Institution, insisted "the North Koreans made certain purchases of
equipment which is entirely consistent with a highly enriched uranium
program."

A former U.S. official told Reuters the
data gaps cited by Hill have existed since 2002 when the Bush administration
first disclosed the enrichment program but this may be the first time they have
been publicly acknowledged…//..

Source: Reuters
22 February

U.S. Had Doubts on North Korean Uranium Drive

By David E. Sanger and William J. Broad

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 — Last October, the North Koreans tested their first
nuclear device, the fruition of decades of work to make a weapon out of
plutonium.

For nearly five years, though, the Bush
administration, based on intelligence estimates, has accused North Korea of
also pursuing a secret, parallel path to a bomb, using enriched uranium. That
accusation, first leveled in the fall of 2002, resulted in the rupture of an
already tense relationship: The United States cut off oil supplies, and the
North Koreans responded by throwing out international inspectors, building up
their plutonium arsenal and, ultimately, producing that first plutonium bomb.

But now, American intelligence officials
are publicly softening their position, admitting to doubts about how much
progress the uranium enrichment program has actually made. The result has been
new questions about the Bush administration’s decision to confront North Korea in
2002. ..//..

It is unclear why the new assessment is
being disclosed now. But some officials suggested that the timing could be
linked to North Korea’s
recent agreement to reopen its doors to international arms inspectors. As a
result, these officials have said, the intelligence agencies are facing the
possibility that their assessments will once again be compared to what is actually
found on the ground. “This may be preventative,” one American
diplomat said…//..

Source: New
York Times, 1 March 2007

Rice Is Said to Have Speeded North Korea Deal

By David E. Sanger
and Thom Shanker

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 — To win approval
of a deal with North Korea that has been assailed by conservatives inside and
outside the administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice bypassed layers
of government policy review that had derailed past efforts to negotiate an
agreement, several senior administration officials said this week.

After a meeting in Berlin in mid-January
with her top negotiator on North Korea, Christopher R. Hill, who had just held
lengthy sessions with his North Korean counterparts, Ms. Rice called back to
Washington to describe the outlines of the deal to Stephen J. Hadley, the
national security adviser, and then to President Bush.

But to some, it seemed the usual procedures
were cut short — vetting the details though an interagency process that
ordinarily would have brought in Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, the
Defense Department and aides at the White House and other agencies who had
previously objected to rewarding North Korea before it gives up its
weapons.

“There was no process here,”
said an official who has been deeply involved in the issue. “Nothing.
There was no airing of whether this is the way to deal with the North
Koreans.”

White House and other administration
officials dispute that, saying that all relevant agencies were consulted.

In lieu of the formal meetings where
objections to such accords were usually voiced during the president’s
first term, Mr. Hadley “walked it through with concerned people,” a
senior administration official said. The official acknowledged that the process
was much more informal, and rapid, than usual, although much of Mr.
Hill’s work was built upon previous negotiations at the talks that had
been widely vetted across the administration.

The result has been an unusual attack on
the agreement from the right, starting with John R. Bolton, the former
ambassador to the United Nations who takes a tough stance on North Korea issues. He said bluntly
that it was a “bad deal,” and expressed the hope that it would fall
apart before being carried out.

State Department officials said that Robert
Joseph, the under secretary of state for arms control and disarmament,
vehemently disagreed with the approach, telling associates privately what Mr.
Bolton has said in public: that the new agreement was no better, and perhaps
worse, than one signed by President Clinton in 1994. Mr. Joseph, who announced
last month that he would resign soon, declined to comment Thursday.

Source: New York Times
16 February 2007

The nightmare of the Korean
nuclear crisis over

By Dmitry Kosyrev

Washington has capitulated at the six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear
problem in Beijing,
an outcome that has been expected since the beginning of the crisis in 2002.

The world waited for the Bush
administration to admit its failure or pass the difficult task to the next
president.

The current U.S.
administration, which needs good news now more than any other government, has
agreed to defreeze North Korea's
$24-million account with a Macao bank despite its previous accusations of Pyongyang printing
counterfeit U.S. dollars.

There are PR experts who can present Washington's diplomatic capitulation as its victory and Pyongyang's defeat. This
can be done because few people now remember that the conflict began with
unsubstantiated U.S.
accusations, or know about the situation in North Korea at that time.

They would be surprised to learn that the
situation in that Far Eastern country has not changed since the beginning of
the crisis. Pyongyang
has again agreed to shut down its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in return for
international aid, and to grant IAEA inspectors access to it.

In other words, North
Korea has resumed the obligations it honored before the
Bush administration, which had not had the benefit of the Iraqi experience at
the time, opted for a new policy towards North Korea aimed at changing the
regime.

Source: RIA Novosti, Moscow,
14 February 2007

Tug of war with shorter rope

Hard-liners working to trip up nuclear
talks

By Leon V. Sigal

The Bush administration has struck a deal
to get North Korea
to suspend making plutonium for more nuclear weapons. It can get farther down
the road to denuclearization if it continues to engage in direct diplomatic
give-and-take and reconcile with the North.

But not if the hard-liners in Washington have their
way. They insist Pyongyang
will never live up to its pledge, made in the September 2005 round of six-party
talks, to abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs." Their belief is faith-based. How can they be so sure?..//..

Hard-liners began crowing that they finally
had Pyongyang
where they wanted it, but when President Bush took office, the North had
stopped testing longer-range missiles, had one or two bombs' worth of
plutonium, and was verifiably not making more. After six years of fanaticism on
both sides, it had seven to nine bombs' worth, had resumed testing missiles,
and had little reason to restrain itself from nuclear testing or, worse,
generating more plutonium. Is that where the hard-liners wanted North Korea
to be?

Bush did not. At last, he was ready to
negotiate in earnest. It will be much harder now to convince North Korea that the U.S. is ready to end enmity. They
will not settle for words; they will insist on concrete actions. They are
prepared to reciprocate if and when Washington
cooperates. Only time and perseverance will tell if they are willing to give up
their nuclear weapons.

Source: Chicago
Tribune, 15 February, 2007

Wolfgang Rosenberg

Born Berlin, 4 January, 1915;

died Christchurch, 16 February, 2007.

Don Borrie
remembers Woof

It is with a sense of gratitude and sadness
that on my return from the DPRK I learnt of Woof's death.

A major influential thinker and teacher in
the field of economics we, in the NZ DPRK Society are indebted to Woof for his
inspiration and leadership when in the early 1970's, he  saw the importance of establishing a
DPRK-NZ relationship. Thanks to his enthusiasm I had the confidence to join
with him in co-founding the NZ DPRK Society and shortly afterwards had the
pleasure of travelling with him to be the first NZrs to make personal contact
with the DPRK since the US
- Korean War.

Growing out of his previous German
experience, Woof began a study of the two Korean economic systems which, during
the 1970s, he shared with colleagues both in the DPRK and NZ. Arising from
these studies he was convinced of the uniqueness of the Korean situation and
the wisdom of the DPRK approach to peaceful reunification.

A man of great compassion and humility Woof
has been first and foremost a close and much loved friend to so many of us,
including myself. What contribution I have been able to make to achieve
international peace with justice, not least in Korea
and New Zealand,
has been inspired by the presence and personal affection so freely given by
Woof. As we share our support with Woof's wife Ann and family I conclude with
the same ending Woof would conclude his letters of encouragement and
gratitude.....simply, Love

(Other obituaries
can be found at http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/NK_NZ.htm)

Tractor donated to NZ Korea
Friendship Farm

In early 2004, the Haksan Cooperative Farm
was designated as the NZ-DPRK Friendship Farm in order to celebrate three years
of diplomatic relations between NZ and DPRK.  The farm is about 20km from the Capital City
of the DPRK, Pyongyang.

In 2005 a delegation from the NZ-DPRK
Friendship Society, which included an agriculturalist, visited the Friendship
Farm. The objective of the visit was to build understanding on a person to
person level, as well as to provide some humanitarian assistance. This will not
only benefit the 860 families working on the cooperative but will also
contribute to an increase in food production for the country as a whole.

After discussions with the Farm management,
the New Zealand
members of the Society undertook to find funds for a number of projects which
would help the farm.

During 2005/2006 funds were raised to
purchase suitable text books in Korean on agricultural subjects for the use of
the Friendship Farm Management Team. Fund raising was also undertaken to buy a
tractor.

A handing over ceremony for the tractor and
was held at the Friendship Farm on 1st October 2006. The Chairman of
the NZ-DPRK Society, the Rev. Don Borrie, sent a message which was read to the
Farm management, guests from New
Zealand and members of the Korea-New Zealand
Friendship Society of the DPRK who were present.

The manager of the Haksan Farm received the
tractor and expressed his gratitude.
He commented that the tractor was eagerly anticipated by the members of
the cooperative farm and would be put to immediate use in vegetable production.

The visitors enjoyed a brief walk around
the farm village and observed the harvest activities and were shown the
facilities in the village.

The tractor is a 28hp diesel Naenara,
manufactured in the DPRK, complete with cab for protection of the operator
during cold winter weather and a 3 furrow plough.

Since the tractor was donated, another
project has been fulfilled. An improved water supply for the piggery has been
provided. This is essential for the hygiene and welfare of the pigs. An
emergency grant of $NZ1000 was given for fertiliser for this year. We owe a
special thanks to the Global Mission Office of the Presbyterian Church of
Aotearoa New Zealand for their assistance.

The next project is to purchase a truck to
enable produce to be taken from the farm from Pyongyang, among other uses. This will cost
around $NZ10,000. We hope also to provide plastic sheeting for seedlings for
which we are budgeting $NZ1,200. These projects are all relatively inexpensive
but very significant steps towards increased food production on the farm. They
also build up personal friendships and allow for increasing understanding
between New Zealand
and the DPRK. The projects are practical expressions of humanitarian assistance
based on New Zealand
expertise in agricultural areas.

If you wish to contribute financially, or
otherwise, or would like some more information, please contact Stuart Vogel at [email-masked].

Further information may be
obtained from:
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/

Dr Tim Beal

19 Devon Street, Kelburn Wellington, NZ

Tel: +64 4 463 5080
(day);+64 4 934 5133 (evening)

Fax: +64 4 934
5134; Email: mailto:[email-masked]

Rev Don Borrie

7 Thornley St., Titahi
Bay, Porirua, NZ

Tel/fax: +64 4 236 6422

Email: [email-masked]