In this issue-

n      Invisible WMD- the effect of sanctions

n      2nd North-South summit; hopes and issues

n      Six Party talks re-open in Beijing

n      Floods and the NZ response; donations to NZ
Friendship Farm

Commentary

What small coverage our media gives to
Korean affairs has tended to focus on the floods, the upcoming North-South
summit and brouhaha surrounding the re-convening of the Six Party Talks in Beijing.
Fair enough, but one very important piece of news has slipped under the radar,
or been swept under the carpet, depending on which metaphor you prefer. In
mid-August the [South Korean] Bank of Korea
released its annual estimate ‘Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in
2006’. The BOK calculated that North Korea’s GDP had
decreased 1.1% in 2006 after seven consecutive years of growth. In 2005 the
northern economy had grown 3.8%, just a fraction behind South Korea’s 4.0% What
caused this abrupt, and substantial, change in economic performance?  The media trotted out the phrase it
always uses when discussing the DPRK economy – ‘economic
mismanagement’. Whether this is because of ignorance, indolence, or
ideological correctness is a moot point.
The problem with ‘economic mismanagement’ is that it does
not explain changes in performance over time.  Whilst DPRK economic policy is constantly
evolving, and there were significant market reforms in 2002, broadly speaking
the system, and the managers of it, have been fairly constant.  If the economic managers did so badly in
2006, why did the same managers, and same policies, do so well in 2005?  On a longer perspective we can ask why
the North Korean economy outperformed the South’s for decades, perhaps
into the 1980s?  How come North Korea, according to estimates by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), had a per capita
GDP three times that of China
in the 1970s and as late as 1993 was still ahead of China?  Clearly the main explanation lies in the
external environment rather than issues of management per se. The collapse of
the Soviet Union does much to explain the
economic crisis that started in the 1990s, but what happened in 2006, or
thereabouts?  The Bank of Korea
rather coyly mentions DPRK’s ‘difficult circumstances’ which
it ascribes to ‘the deterioration of [North Korea’s] international
relationships resulting from the nuclear weapons issue’.  A rather more precise  answer is increased sanctions.

The United Nations, under pressure from the
United States, passed
additional sanctions against the DPRK in July and October 2006, following the
missile and nuclear tests Japan cut off trade with the DPRK and stifled
remittances from Koreans in Japan
sending money home. According to Japanese statistics, imports from North Korea
fell from 1.6 billion yen in September 2006, to zero in December.

And then there were the US financial
sanctions which were unleashed in September 2005, presumably to derail the
Joint Statement of 19 September at the Six Party Talks which promised to bring
about peace. The allegations against the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) which were the
ostensible reason for the sanctions have now virtually collapsed, and the Talks
revived,  but the damage lingers on.

There seem to be no public estimates of the
effect of these measures on the North Korean economy. US Treasury officials
have claimed how pleased they were at their success at denying North Korea, and
whomever wanted to do business with the DPRK, access to the international
banking system and are working on the same techniques against Iran. The
financial sanctions also affected aid payments, and continue to do so.  The NZ-DPRK Society had great problems
transferring donations for flood relief from New
Zealand churches to a bank in Pyongyang because some banks in NZ are still
afraid of any connection with the DPRK. One can image the impact on business.

Although the August floods, and those of
the past decade and a half, are natural disasters their impact is very much a
function of the state of the infrastructure. North Korea has suffered much more
than the South from the bad weather to a large measure because of the long-term
effects of sanctions.

It is well established that sanctions
usually have no effect on the policies of the sanctioned government.  Sanctions have not produced any change
in policy by Pyongyang,
because the Koreans correctly calculate that weakness will only exacerbate the
situation. However, sanctions have three great advantages for the US (and Japan). Because of the huge
disparity in economies they cause virtually no pain to America, they produce no
American causalities, and the results – those malnourished babies - can
be blamed on the Koreans, which in turn is produced as evidence that the sanctions
are desirable and necessary.

Sanctions can truly be a weapon of mass
destruction, killing hundreds of thousands, impoverishing millions.  Estimates have been made of the large
numbers of Iraqis killed by sanctions in the 1990s – mainly children
because it is children who are most vulnerable.  A couple of years ago Cuba claimed
that US sanctions have cost it $82 billion. Unfortunately, this WMD is
invisible, both in its effect and in its criminality.

Not all is gloom. The leaders of North and South Korea are
scheduled to have a summit – the second – in early October. Neither
Washington nor ROK conservatives are too happy with the idea, but nobody can attack
it openly.  What effect it will have
is uncertain.  Roh Moo-hyun is a
lame duck president and even if much is achieved it may not outlast his presidency.  On top of which, it is the Unites States
which ultimately decides whether the Korean peninsula can have peace.

This is why any talk of President Roh
having an effect on the nuclear issue is misplaced.  DPRK has a nuclear weapons programme
partly as a deterrent against American attack but mainly to force it into
peaceful coexistence.  It is
therefore an issue between Pyongyang and Washington and Seoul
has little role to play.  Where it
can have a very positive impact is economic cooperation. Again, the Americans
are none too happy about that because it lessens their leverage.  Pyongyang,
for its part, should offer more people to people links and do whatever it
reasonably can to ensure that President Roh can claim a successful summit.

There is also much talk about the
possibility of discussions on some sort of peace treaty, and measures to reduce
military tension.  One significant
issue to watch is the question of the western maritime boundary.  In the 1950s the US unilaterally established a
border called the Northern Limit Line (NLL). This has never been accepted by
the DPRK which has proposed a very different Maritime Military Demarcation
Line.  A glance at the map shows
that the NLL is a very strange animal. Instead of running straight out to sea
as an extension of the land boundary (the DMZ), it curves up along the coast,
taking some of the offshore islands into Southern territory.  Presumably this was originally done in
order to facilitate the landing of commandos and agents in the North, in the
tense post-armistice period.  But those
days are gone, and yet there has been considerable opposition in the South,
especially from the military, (with US support) to a negotiation of the
boundary.  Partly this might be due
to a natural reluctance to withdraw from a border over which sailors have died,
but it is probably more than that. This is where clashes between North and South
occur, as fishing boats from both sides compete for rich crab resources. It is
the only place where armed conflict between North and South have happened in
recent years, and the only place where it is still feasible. A better maritime
border, which would inevitably approximate the North’s proposal, would
much diminish the likelihood of conflict, and tension, and may not be to everyone’s
desire.

WESTERN MARITIME BOUNDARIES

This past week has seen the resumption of
the Six Party Talks and the issue here will be whether what has been presumably
been agreed between the US and the DPRK in private bilateral negotiations will
be formally brought into the Six Party process.  This would involve ‘disablement’
and ‘disclosure’ on the part of the DPRK, and ‘delisting the
DPRK as a terrorism sponsor and lifting all sanctions that have been applied
according to the Trading with the Enemy Act’ by the US. How the thorny issue of the
alleged Heavy Enriched Uranium programme will be tackled remains to be seen.

An indication of how the vagaries of US
domestic and imperial politics impact on the Beijing talks was given by three events in
late September. South Korean newspapers expressed bemusement at ‘mixed
signals’ coming from Washington
on the eve of the resumptions of the delicate negotiations.  Firstly, the State Department, of which US negotiator
Chris Hill is an Assistant Secretary, announced sanctions against a North
Korean company for arms exports. Not only are DPRK arms exports the tiniest
fraction of  those of the United States,
the world’s largest exporter of weapons, but they are small compared with
that of the ROK, which aims to be one of the world’s top ten by 2010. Why
did the State Department take this gratuitous step?

Next came President Bush’s speech to
the United Nations in which he denounced North Korea as a ‘brutal
regime’. This may not have made Ambassador Hill’s task of
persuading the Koreans that the US
was genuinely seeking a peaceful resolution any easier.   President Bush, not bashful in the face
of reality, informed us in the same sentence that “the people of Lebanon and Afghanistan
and Iraq
have asked for our help, and every civilized nation has a responsibility to
stand with them”, for which the dead, maimed,  and displaced are no doubt truly
grateful.

Then there was the Syria affair. On 6 September it appears
that Israeli planes raided a target in Syria.  No official explanation was offered (for
what was a violation of international law) but Israeli intelligence was very
active leaking stores to the media, which in most cases had no scruples in
reporting the stories as revealed truth. There was a large number of conflicting
rumours many of which, but not quite all, mention North Korea.  What seems to be going on is another
episode in Israel’s
continuing efforts to embroil the US
in a war with Iran, of which
an attack on Syria
is considered by many as to be an essential precursor.  In this case Israel,
always adept at manipulating the American political elite, threw in the titbit
of North Korean nuclear (or was it missile?) assistance to Syria.  The experts seem not to have taken the
nuclear story very seriously; Syria
does not have a significant nuclear programme (unlike Israel which is the only nuclear power in the
Middle East), and it would be very strange of Pyongyang to imperil its negotiations with
the Americans for no great advantage.
Significantly, this seems to have been the assessment of Condoleezza
Rice. Although she, and other leaders, made the obligatory noises, Hill was
sent off to Beijing,
despite the fulminations of John Bolton, to rejoin the Six Party Talks.

It seems that October is going to be a
crucial time for the Korean peninsula. The summit in Pyongyang,
the talks in Beijing,
are both hugely important.  That
Bush is giving an audience to visiting conservative presidential candidate Lee
Myung-bak in mid October, in violation of the convention of not appearing to be
involved in the electoral affairs of other countries, indicates just how keen
the White House is that the next occupant of the Blue House will be more
amenable to discipline than Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.  But, as always, it’s what happens
in Washington
that will ultimately count.

Tim Beal

Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2006

North Korea's real annual GDP decreased 1.1% in 2006, turning negative after
seven consecutive years of positive growth. This was mainly attributable
to  decreased production in the
agriculture, forestry & fisheries, and construction sectors.

North Korea's general economy faced difficult circumstances in 2006 due to the
deterioration of its international relationships resulting from the nuclear
weapons issue and to its lack of resources.

Real GDP growth, North and South Korea, 1990-2006

year

DPRK

ROK

year

DPRK

ROK

1990

-3.7

9.2

2001

3.7

3.8

1995

-4.1

9.2

2002

1.2

7

1996

-3.6

7.0

2003

1.8

3.1

1997

-6.3

4.7

2004

2.2

4.7

1998

-1.1

-6.9

2005

3.8

4

1999

6.2

9.5

2006

-1.1

5

2000

1.3

8.5

Source: Bank
of Korea, Seoul, 16 August 2007

Roh Sees NK’s
Economic Boom

With two weeks to go before a summit with North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il, President Roh Moo-hyun said Wednesday that North Korea will have a
chance to see its economy grow at a faster pace…//..

When the armistice regime is transformed into a peace regime and when
the South and North join hands to bring in a new economic era, the (Korean)
Peninsula will certainly become the hub of the Northeast Asian economy,'' he
said.

The South will energetically expand into the Eurasian continent and
place itself on the map as the hub of trade in logistics, financial services
and business, he said. ``And the North will enjoy an opportunity to achieve
epoch-making economic development.''

To attain the goal of a simultaneous boom, Roh emphasized that the
summit slated for Aug. 28-30 in Pyongyang should
be a stepping stone in which the two Koreas will confirm their
determination to fulfill previous agreements.

He said now is the time for the parties concerned to strive to put the
accords into practice.

Regarding the inter-Korean economic cooperation, Roh said the two sides
need to develop cooperation into ``productive investment'' collaboration and
into ``two-way'' cooperation. ``In this way, the South will have more
investment opportunities, while the North will have a chance to make an
economic turnaround.''

Apparently
mindful of critics of the summit, Roh expressed hopes that people would not
impose burdens on him. ``I do not plan to be overly ambitious in the
forthcoming talks. I would rather not try to make a new historic turning point
with this meeting.''

He
indirectly asked the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) to show a
cooperative attitude toward the summit.

Source: Korea
Times, Seoul, 15 August 2007

Invest in the North, Kim
tells U.S.

NEW YORK  U.S.
businesses should help counter China’s
growing role in North Korea’s
economy by investing in the North once Pyongyang’s
nuclear program is eliminated, former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung said
Tuesday. “We should expedite our entry into North
Korea so as to attain balance against China,” Kim told the Korea Society in New York.

Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his landmark meeting in 2000 with
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and efforts to promote Korean reconciliation,
said China was “extensively involved” in the North’s economy.

The International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank and Western
firms should “advance into North Korea together with South Korea”
following denuclearization of the North, he said…//..

Source: JoongAng
Ilbo, Seoul, 27 September 2007

Glimmer of Peace

Former President Kim Dae-jung speaks at the National Press Club in
Washington D.C

I took office as the president of South Korea in February 1998. After
my inauguration, I proposed the Sunshine Policy, which was based on the three
principles of unification, namely, peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and
peaceful unification, and the three-stage unification of South-North
confederation, South-North federation, and lastly, complete unification as the
Korean government's policy toward North Korea.

The policy received full support of the Clinton administration. It also gained
support from across the world including China,
Russia, Japan, and EU.

In June 2000, I visited Pyongyang and
made an agreement between the two Koreas for peaceful coexistence,
peaceful exchange, and peaceful unification.

Following my visit, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il considered my
recommendations and sent Jo Myong-nok, the second most powerful man in North Korea, to the U.S. to meet President Clinton.

In return, Secretary of State Albright traveled to the North for further
consultations. As the result of such consultations, both sides were on the
verge of an agreement regarding North
Korea's missile and nuclear issue, as well
as the normalization of their relations.

However, the U.S.
policy completely changed as soon as the Bush administration was launched in
2001. President Bush declared that ``there cannot be any reward to bad
behaviors,'' refusing to have direct dialogue with North
Korea, and listed North Korea as an ``axis of evil.''

The U.S.-DPRK relations drastically deteriorated once again. As the
president of South Korea, at
the time, I repeatedly insisted that President Bush pursue direct dialogue and
give and take negotiations with North
Korea. However, without much success to this
end, I left office in February 2003.

Nevertheless, I have continued to make the same argument even after my
retirement. With the abrupt nuclear testing of North
Korea in October last year, resistance not only from South Korea but
from across the world arose like a storm. However, I stood firm in my view and
made the following statement via numerous press interviews at home and abroad.

I stated that, ``The reason North Korea wants to go nuclear is because
they want direct dialogue with the U.S. through which they want to discuss
security assurance, lifting of economic sanctions, and normalization of
relations with the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. should change its attitude and
pursue dialogue and give and take negotiations with the North. Then North
Korean nuclear issue will be resolved.''

Recently, President Bush changed the U.S.
policy toward North Korea
and under the Feb. 13 agreement, which was reached during the six-party
process, the U.S. agreed with North Korea on the give and take negotiations
based on the action for action approach…//..

In regards to the voice of dissatisfaction towards the U.S., I believe that the Korean people are
expressing their dissatisfaction towards the U.S.
policy and not to the U.S.
itself.

The Korean people want their opinions to be taken into full account when
the U.S. implements its
policies toward North Korea
and as such some critical views have been expressed toward Bush
administration's former stance on the North Korean issue.

The six-party process is headed in the direction of success. The
inter-Korean relations and the ties between the U.S.
and North Korea
are expected to be significantly improved.

Let us seize this opportunity and make sure
we establish peace on the Korean Peninsula and stability in Northeast
Asia. Now we can see a glimmer of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Source: Korea
Times. Seoul, 19 September 2007

Bank accused of aiding N. Korea will return to owner

By Tim Johnson

BEIJING — A tiny bank in Macau that
was at the center of stalled talks over North
Korea’s nuclear program will be quietly returned to
its former owner Saturday, a move that seems to clear him of charges that he
helped Pyongyang launder counterfeit U.S.
cash.

In a one-paragraph statement, the government in Macau,
a former Portuguese colony that's a burgeoning gambling haven, said Banco Delta
Asia had shown “remarkable improvement” during two years of
government oversight.

It said that Stanley Au, a former gold dealer who ceded control of the
bank in September 2005, would be put in charge of the bank again Saturday.

The bank issued a statement quoting Au saying that its return
“reflected the exoneration of the bank and clearance of its name as well
as its staff from taking part in any illicit activities.”

The return of the bank without any criminal charges is the latest
strange twist in the saga of Banco Delta Asia. The family-owned bank was drawn
into a political storm two years ago that led to the suspension of nuclear talks
with North Korea, adding to the tensions that indirectly prompted Pyongyang to
conduct a nuclear test 11 months ago.

U.S. Treasury Department officials claimed that the bank had for two
decades abetted North Korean-linked companies and individuals engaged in crime,
including drug trafficking and circulating sophisticated counterfeit U.S. bills…//..

The Banco Delta Asia statement suggested that the bank had become a pawn
in a conflict between the United States
and North Korea.

“The ‘BDA Affair’ is neither a commercial nor a
business dispute. It is a political case and BDA has been unwillingly and
unknowingly dragged into the epic center of a political whirlpool,” it
said.

In May, the 66-year-old Au sought to regain control of his bank with a
sworn statement that included a pledge not to rehire any former employees of
the bank who'd prompt objections from the U.S. Treasury Department.

In a sign that Treasury’s allegations against the bank appear to
have been withdrawn, Banco Delta Asia appears ready to rehire a number of
former employees. In its statement, it listed 12 board members and executive
staff who'd return to the bank under Au’s direction. Only three are new.

“The rest have been with us for some time,” bank spokeswoman
Eva Hui said, “but they may have had other positions in the past.”

Source: McClatchy
newspapers, Washington, 28 September 2007

Inter-Korean industrial
park

By Tong Kim

This is part of a
description of a visit to Kaesong (Gaesong) by
former senior interpreter at the U.S. State Department

Recently I visited Gaeseong with a South Korean humanitarian group that
provides anthracite for fuel to underprivileged people in both Koreas.
The group carries out a voluntary campaign in the name of ``sharing love and
anthracite.’’ It so far has provided the poor with over ten million
pieces of processed anthracite…//..

From Bongdukni we went to Gaeseong
City, where we visited
several famous historic sites of the old capital of the Goryeo Dynasty
(918-1392), including the Seonjuk bridge, where the stain of bloodshed by a
king’s royal servant remains, still detectable. Standing at the courtyard
of Sungkyunkwan, which was the dynasty’s highest royal educational
institute, were gigantic ginkgo trees more than a thousand years old.

The buildings were impressively well maintained. On display inside the
buildings were neatly arranged historical artifacts, which help visitors see
what life was like in Korea
a millennium ago. With other cultural assets, like the royal tombs and an old
Buddhist temple, I thought Gaeseong would present itself as an excellent
tourist attraction…//..

After I saw the vast area of the industrial park _ one million pyeong
(approximately 25 square miles) _ I felt there would be no way to reverse the
course of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Under a 50-year lease, Hyundai
Asan has cleared the land by leveling off the hills and filling the rice
paddies and fields, and it is still building the necessary infrastructure to
support the industrial park.

At present 22 South Korean companies _ mostly small- and medium-sized
firms _ are operating in the complex and five new plants are under
construction. On this North Korean territory, about 12,000 North Korean
employees are working with 680 South Koreans, who are largely managers. By
2012, the complex is expected to employ over 100,000 North Koreans.

These companies produce goods _ including shoes, clothes, watches,
kitchenware, plastic containers and electric cords _ mostly for South Korean
consumers. Under a neo-liberal policy pursued by the ROK government, the
complex makes sense as the average monthly wage is only $57, which is only half
of Chinese labor costs and less than 5 percent of South Korean
counterparts’ salaries. ..//..

Perhaps the future of the expanding industrial park depends very much on
the exportability of its products to overseas markets including the United States.
This brings up two points: resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the
inclusion of the complex as an ``outward processing zone’’ as
discussed but still pending resolution in the agreed Free Trade Agreement with
the United States.

Without exportability, which I doubt would be fully feasible before
North Korean denuclearization, the industrial complex may not be able to
attract big international companies who keep looking for lower labor costs to
compete in the contemporary neo-liberal global market.

There are other problems with the inter-Korean industrial park,
including the transparency of the payment system, labor practices and
environmental concerns. But these are only peripheral issues compared to the
issue of war and peace, which also affects the South Korean economy. As the
nuclear issue seems to be moving forward, and as I believe it will be resolved
at the end, I do see good prospects for success of the complex…//..

I know the conservatives blame the North Korean regime for this. My
problem with them is such blame or hard-line policy has not helped alleviate
the hardship of the poor people whose poverty is not their fault. I support
humanitarian aid to the North, despite some negative views.

I know North Korea
is trying hard to improve its economy in order to better feed, clothe and house
its people. I have seen some encouraging indicators of change in North Korea.
Once it feels free of perceived threat from outside, I expect the North to give
up its nuclear program and concentrate on transforming the economy, which will
eventually lead to political and social transformation as well. ..//..

Source: Korea
Times, Seoul, 1 July 2007

ROK goods now hot sellers in DPRK markets

South Korean wares have become very popular
with North Korean residents, and they are being openly sold in DPRK markets.
According to a source inside North Korea,
ROK goods with the ‘Made in Korea’
label are highly popular among those more wealthy shoppers in markets in Pyongyang, Shinuiju,
Hamheung, Chunjin, and other large cities. However, these days, ROK goods must
be labeled ‘Made in Korea’
to be recognized as having come from the South, and therefore can be sold for
high prices. ..//..

The best selling South Korean goods are
Cuckoo rice cookers, household hot/cold water dispensers, cosmetics, air
fresheners, computers, toothpaste, medicines, and candy. North Koreans have a
high degree of trust in South Korean pharmaceuticals. It was said that ROK
drugs and confectionaries are both used past their expiration dates.

Because the quality of Chinese goods is so
poor, in recent times North Koreans with a little bit of money primarily used
Japanese goods, despite their exorbitant prices. Now that Japanese goods are in
short supply, that demand is being filled by goods from the South. However,
just as before, Japanese goods are still preferred in the North, with Korean
goods next, and Chinese goods least. Prices follow demand, and so Japanese goods
are also the most expensive, Chinese goods, the cheapest. In general, those in
the North with some extra money are using one or two South Korean goods.

Currently, South Korean toothpaste in
Shinuiju’s central market is selling for 5,000 won (1,667 ROK won), and
one set of air fresheners (one canister and two gas cartridges) sells for
30,000 won (10,000 ROK won). Duty-free ‘Time’ cigarettes go for
3,000 won (1,000 ROK won) per pack, although the cost in Shinuiju is lower than
prices found deeper inside North Korea
due to counterfeit ‘Time’ cigarettes produced in China.

[1000 ROK won is
approximately NZ$1.50]

Source: Institute
for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, Seoul, 5 September 2007

GNP presidential candidate to meet U.S. president ahead of
election

Controversy could ensue over degree of U.S. influence in S. Korea’s
upcoming presidential election

Lee Myung-bak, the presidential candidate
of the main opposition Grand National Party, will visit the United States on October 14-17 for
meetings with U.S. President George W. Bush and other politicians, the
party’s spokesman, Park Hyung-joon, said yesterday.

It is rare for a U.S. president to meet a
presidential candidate of a certain nation ahead of the nation’s
presidential election. The meeting is likely to spark controversy ahead of the
December vote, as some critics may accuse Bush of supporting the candidate.
..//..

Source: Hankyoreh,
Seoul, 29 September 2007

Many problems may emerge at new round of 6-way
talks-Losyukov

BEIJING, September 26 (Itar-Tass) - Head of
the Russian delegation at the six-sided talks on the North Korean nuclear
problem settlement Alexander Losyukov believes that “many problems may
arise” at the forthcoming round of the talks. “They arise quite
unexpectedly, however we try to settle them,” the Russian deputy foreign
minister said at the airport of the Chinese capital on Wednesday.

The deputy foreign minister also stressed
that “there is limited success – the talks continue and are
yielding certain results.” Losyukov noted, however that at the
forthcoming round “it is necessary to look what the results are
like.”

According to the Russian delegation head,
“It is necessary first of all to assess prospects of the freezing
process, denuclearisation and disabling” of North Korean nuclear
facilities.

Besides, “it is necessary to look in
what mood are the North Korean colleagues regarding the fulfillment of the
planned programmes,” he pointed out. In the view of Losyukov,
representatives of Pyongyang
“will be interested in the compensation measures fulfillment.”
..//..

The steps include making public by North
Korea of the full list of remaining nuclear facilities and their following
total liquidation in exchange for economic aid and normalization of relations
with Tokyo and Washington.

Source: ITAR-Tass,
Moscow, 26 September 2007

NZ-DPRK relations

Government level

·
NZ Government has donated
NZ$500,000 through he Red Cross for flood relief.

·
Winston Peters is scheduled to
make the first-ever visit of a NZ Foreign Minister to DPRK in November

People-to-People level

The NZ-DPRK Society
has sent $20,000 from Christian World Service and $5,000 from the Presbyterian
Church of Aotearoa New Zealand Global Ministries Fund.

This is a lightly edited and reformatted
report from the DPR Korea-NZ Friendship Society in Pyongyang

Report on floods and NZ assistance

Weather in August

·
Torrential rain, started on 5th
August, continued until 17th August

·
Between 7th–14th, August
severe downpours (600~850mm), the highest record in the past 40 years, in 9
provinces especially in Kangwon, N.Hwanghae, S.Hamgyong & S.Pyongan

Types of Disasters

·
Burst-out of many river
embankment & irrigation reservoirs

·
Huge scale mud-slides &
land slides

National damage

·
Affected population: 963,887

·
Homeless: 169,561

·
Affected area: 149 counties out
of 200

·
Affected houses

Completely
destroyed :40,463

Partly
destroyed : 67,056

Submerged
: 133,732

·
More than 30 reservoirs

·
600km of river banks &19km
of dikes

·
More than 10 % of farmland

·
8,500 public buildings &
infrastructure affected

·
709 km of road cut, 135 km of
railroad bed washed away

·
Cut of electricity and drinking
water in the affected areas

·
Risk of second disaster coming
from contamination of water and poor hygienic environment

·
562 hospitals and 2,175 clinics
destroyed or heavily affected

·
Support and Donation through
government and non-government levels.

·
China, USA, EU, Russia, Australia,
New Zealand, Egypt, UN, Sweden,
Denmark, Japan, Singapore,
England,
Czech, Slovak, ECO,  etc.

Damage to  Haksan (NZ Friendship Farm) and
neighbouring farm

·
Vegetable field:100% washed
away.

·
Rice field: Among 950 hectares
(Haksan300, neighbour farm 650) 500 hectares are buried under silt and water.
And no expectation of harvest this year.

·
Houses:15 houses are completely
or partly destroyed. 60 members are suffering damages.

·
6 waterways are destroyed.

·
Electricity and water supply is
stopped broke off.

Korea-New Zealand in Action

·
Dispatched more than 300 people
for the flood rehabilitation to Haksan and its neighbour farm.

·
Asked for the emergency aid

Donation from CWS
and Global Mission
via NZ-DPRK Society

Euro12,520

Distribution plan(draft)

Item

Euros

Cement (20 tons)

800

Gasoline to till
the silty rice field and for transportation (5 tons)

3,050

Sand (40 tones)

200

Purchase of foodstuffs*
(25 tons)

7,500

Kitchen utensils
( 15packs)

300

Other daily
necessities: water purifier, quilt, clothes (including transport fee)

571

Total

12,421

* price of rice is highly accelerating.

NZ-DPRK
Society

Prior to the floods the NZ-DPRK Society had
raised funds to make various donations to the Haksan (NZ Friendship Farm).  This is a report from Peter Wilson.

Since the cooperative farm at Haksan in
Hyongsan district near Pyongyang
became the New Zealand Friendship Farm three years ago, a number of projects
have been accomplished.

(1) Donation of
South Korean agricultural Text Books.

Technical people in DPRK are very isolated
and are not readily able to take advantage of research and development taking
place elsewhere, including next door in South Korea. To help overcome this,
the NZ-DPRK Society has purchased and donated South Korean agricultural text
books to the Management Team at the NZ Friendship Farm.

Contact has been established also with the
Sariwan Livestock Research Institute. It was a surprise to find out they too
had never seen a any non-DPRK texts. Some technical books have also been
donated to the Institute.

(2) Donation of a
28 hp diesel tractor

Like all cooperatives in DPRK, the
Friendship Farm has a fleet of old Chollima tractors. These are all 15 or 25
years old. At best, these tractors are very inefficient, being of a Russian
circa 1920’s design. In 2006, a DPRK-assembled Naenara 28 hp diesel
tractor was purchased and given to the farm. This has been very well received
and is proving very useful. The Farm Manager reports that where-as it takes 50
litres of diesel to plough one hectare with a Chollima, it only takes 35 litres
with the Naenara.

(3) Pump and Piping
to Provide Water to the Piggery.

The farm has about 90 sows which are bred
to provide piglets which are sold to the farm families for backyard fattening.
Although the sow pens were cleaned out manually every day, hygiene was not of a
high standard because the piggery had no running water. This has been rectified
with purchase and installation of a water pump, piping and taps. Now, not only
has hygiene been improved, but sows can have better access to drinking water
and can be cooled down in the hot summer months.

(4) Purchase of
Fertiliser.

In acknowledgement of the damage done to
fields by flooding, in early 2007 a one-off donation was made of three tonne of
urea.

(5) Donation of a
Truck.

Tractor
and truck purchased with funds raised by  NZ-DPRK Society parked outside the
offices of the Friendship Farm

In the past transportation of compost,
fertiliser, harvests and produce for market has been limited to tractor
trailers. These have limitations because of small capacity and the need at
times to move large volumes of fertiliser or produce in a short very period of
time. Further, tractor trailers are not suitable for transporting surplus
production to the open market in the city.

The need for a truck was raised with the
NZ-DPRK Society in 2005 and was accepted as a project. By mid-2007, adequate
funds had been raised and a second hand Dong Feng tip truck was purchased from China.

A ceremony to mark the handover of the six
ton truck was held at the farm on 5th July. The NZ-DPRK Society was represented
by Mr. Peter Wilson. In receiving the truck, the Farm Manager said that they
knew NZ was a small country and that they felt that the big gift of a truck
came from the very hearts of New Zealanders.

Farm manager Kim
Jong Ho and Peter Wilson

If you wish to contribute financially, or
otherwise, or would like some more information, please contact Stuart Vogel at [email-masked]...

Further information may be obtained
from:
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/

Dr Tim Beal

19 Devon Street, Kelburn Wellington, NZ

Tel: +64 4 463 5080
(day);+64 4 934 5133 (evening)

Fax: +64 4 934 5134;
Email: [email-masked]

Rev Don Borrie

7 Thornley St., Titahi
Bay, Porirua, NZ

Tel/fax: +64 4 236 6422

Email: [email-masked]