Achieving a New Structure of Peace on the Korean Peninsula: An Atlantic Council Working Group Report
Editor’s Note: In April 2007, a distinguished bipartisan working group of U.S. policy experts, former military officials, and retired diplomats, organized by the Atlantic Council of the United States, issued a report and recommendations on achieving a “comprehensive settlement” in Korea. Entitled “A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia,” the report’s recommendations on “peace arrangements” for the Korean Peninsula seem particularly timely in light of the impending North-South summit and recent progress in the Six-Party Talks.
Rather than focusing on a single “peace regime,” declaration, or treaty to transform the political and diplomatic structure in Korea, the working group called for “parallel negotiations” to achieve a series of agreements on political, security and economic issues related to the nuclear negotiation. In the working group’s view, this approach will provide the U.S. with greater diplomatic leverage for achieving its strategic policy goals of denuclearizing North Korea and establishing long-term peace and security in Northeast Asia.
Ambassador James Goodby and General Jack Merritt co-chaired the Atlantic Council working group. Donald Gross served as project director.
[US NK policy]
Journal of Asian and Africa Studies, Special Issue on North Korea
June 2007, Volume 42, No. 3-4
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The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: An Introduction
John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Xiaobo Hu
North Korea is one of the most isolated states in the world today. Its isolation
from the rest of the world is, to a large extent, self-imposed. Its official ideology,
juche, which literally means self-reliance, imposes a mentality of self versus all
others.
However, the seemingly stable situation did not last very long. In early 2002,
US president George W. Bush labeled North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, as
part of an ‘axis of evil’. Later in the year, North Korea admitted that it had been
engaged in a secret nuclear weapons program
[Admission] [cliche]
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Politics of Human Rights in North Korea
A framework for change
Won Woong Lee
Kwandong University, Korea, leeww@kd.ac.kr
The international community is now paying more attention to `the systemic, widespread and grave violations of international human rights norms' (United Nations ECOSOC Resolution 1503, (1970) See Burgental (1995)) in North Korea due to its chronic famine and nuclear ambition. The issues and engagement politics regarding human rights in North Korea constitute hot political debates. There are three key factors to improve human rights status in North Korea: the consistent international censure; enlarging engagement and people contact through inter-Korean relations; and economic reform in North Korea. These factors are interrelated and affect each other. The crucial point is to press and induce the North Korean regime to a compromise path.
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Pyongyang Sees the Nuke Impasse
Han S. Park
In order to better understand and explain North Korea's foreign policy strategies and tactics on the controversy surrounding the nuclear program, this chapter examines the perceptions held by Pyongyang about the neighbouring counties including the United States, Japan, and South Korea. These perceptions are formulated in accordance with North Korea's perception about itself that is generally constructed based on the principle of Juche (self-reliance) and the political and security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula as perceived by Pyongyang itself. North Korea is an unconventional country if one looks from outside but it is not irrational in that it has pursued its own national interest rather effectively for which security is first and foremost. This chapter provides an explanation of North Korean conducts from the perspective of North Korea's own mind-set.
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Just Whose Side Is Time On?
North Korea and
George W. Bush, 2001–4
Robert M. Hathaway
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, USA
Abstract
President Bush’s bold National Security Strategy document of September 2002
would appear to have been written with North Korea as much as Iraq in mind. Yet
the Bush administration has been uncharacteristically passive in responding to the
challenge posed by Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons ambitions, especially in
comparison with the forceful manner with which the administration dealt with
Iraq. In the latter case, Bush mobilized the full weight of military force; seemed
disdainful of allies, international institutions and multilateral diplomacy; and
moved forward with what his critics deemed reckless abandon. In the case of
North Korea, on the other hand, the President has emphasized patience, close
coordination with allies and an overall lack of urgency oddly at variance with his
‘axis of evil’ characterization of the regime in Pyongyang, and with dangerous
advances in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.This essay attempts to explain the
rationale behind the Bush administration’s surprisingly relaxed approach to the
North Korea challenge.
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Caught between
Alliance and
Brotherhood
South Korea’s Approach
to the Six-party Talks
Tae-hyo Kim
SungKyunKwan University, Seoul, Korea
Abstract
A cost–benefit analysis leads to the conclusion that South Korea’s search for
non-violent responses to the North Korean nuclear issue causes a dilemma for
Seoul. It must balance its security policies toward Washington and Pyongyang, and
that dilemma can be resolved only when the North Korean nuclear problem, the
most critical and the most difficult hurdle, is resolved. In analyzing critical variables
that will determine the success or failure of the six-party talks multilateral
approach, this article challenges the central tenet of cooperation theories: if a
sufficient number of countries collaborate, they can achieve preventive diplomacy.
Cooperation to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program will be difficult due
to backsliding (‘sanction busting’) by concerned countries.
Keywords alliance • multilateralism • PSI • six-party talks • Sunshine
[Dilemma]
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Japanese Policy
toward the North
Korean Problem
Balancing Bilateralism
and Multilateralism
Tsuneo Akaha
Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA
Abstract
North Korea became an urgent problem for Japan as a result of the 1994
nuclear crisis in North Korea, the 1998 missile launch over Japan and the 2003–4
nuclear crisis. At the historic Tokyo–Pyongyang summit in September 2002, both
sides acknowledged the need to solve the security issues surrounding the
Korean Peninsula through peaceful, multilateral efforts. However, the issue of
North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens in earlier decades intensified
Japanese sentiment against the North and this issue halted bilateral normalization
talks. Japan has participated in six-party talks on the nuclear issue since
2004, but its distinct bilateral interests vis-à-vis North Korea, South Korea and
the United States limit its influence in the multiparty engagement.
Keywords abduction • normalization • nuclear crisis • Pyongyang Declaration