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Academic papers and commentaries
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Tim Beal

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Portrait of a patriot
by Erich Weingartner, Editor, CanKor, 4 August 2006
Friday, 4 August 2006 In celebration of the sixth anniversary of the publication of the CanKor Report, the weekly Canada-Korea electronic news and information service, Editor-in-chief Erich Weingartner has written a fictional profile entitled PORTRAIT OF A PATRIOT. “If any DPR Korean happens to read this story,” says Weingartner, “I want to underline that the person I am describing does not actually exist. He is a fiction, a figment of my imagination, a composite crafted from a quarter century experience interacting with Koreans.” Even the name of the character is fake, explains Weingartner, as will be immediately obvious to all Koreans. Breaking all naming rules, Pak Kim Li is a combination of the three most popular family names in Korea. Erich Weingartner is uniquely qualified to tell this story. He has visited Korea on many occasions since 1978. His first visit to the DPRK was on behalf of the World Council of Churches in 1985. In 1986 he arranged the first encounter since the Korean War between church delegations of both sides of Korea in Switzerland. Until 1995 he organized three more such inter-Korean non-governmental conferences. From 1997 to 1999 he headed the Food Aid Liaison Unit of the UN World Food Programme in Pyongyang, traveling by land cruiser throughout all provinces of the DPRK, visiting ports, rail yards, warehouses, nurseries, kindergartens, boarding schools, orphanages, hospitals, factories, farms and many families in their homes, both in rural and urban settings.
Emerging Regional Security Architecture in Northeast Asia
By James Goodby and Markku Heiskanen
January 3rd, 2008 James Goodby, former American Ambassador to Finland and currently is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Markku Heiskanen, a non-resident Senior Fellow of the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies NIAS in Copenhagen, write, “the future security architecture of Northeast Asia will have at its core the Korean Peninsula, at peace internally and externally, embedded in a set of cooperative understandings comprising a peace regime, all supported by a regional multilateral mechanism for promoting security and cooperation in Northeast Asia.”
Working through Korean unification blues
By Andrei Lankov
For six decades, the myth of unification as Korea's supreme goal has been enshrined in the official mythology of both nations. The lip service to this myth is still paid by virtually all political forces in both Koreas, but the actual policy of both Pyongyang and Seoul nowadays is clearly based on a very different set of assumptions and hopes: both sides try to avoid situations which might lead to unification. [Unification cost] [Spin]
North Korea: The other side of the story
Roberto Carlos Alvarez-galloso, 10 November 2007, Saturday
Maria Elvira Salazar, Cuban American presenter for Mega TV 22, did a segment about North Korea in her programme recently. But some aspects of the scenario in North Korea escaped her scanner, especially about a prospective fall of communist regime.
CUBAN AMERICAN TELEVISION presenter Maria Elvira Salazar presented a special segment dedicated to North Korea on her prime TV programme ME Live, transmitted on Mega TV. I have decided to produce this exclusive for the general public. In the summer of 2006, North Korea tested its missiles, although it did not hit the West Coast of the USA as some people feared. Recently, North Korea announced that they would "fine tune" their missiles with another test. This has left the world scared because of this never ending scene of "I will test, I tested." I will explain what each country wants. [Bizarre]
Grand National Party’s New Outlook on North Korea
by Kevin Shepard
[Research Fellow, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University] posted July 19, 2007 Article : Introduction As South Korean prepares for the upcoming presidential election, the flurry of candidate platforms and new visions for the future compete for print space with the reality of politics on the Korean Peninsula and the myriad North Korean issues that threaten to steal the spotlight from domestic campaigning. While the elections in the South are scheduled for December 19, 2007, leading candidates are still fighting for party nominations, while others are breaking away from their parties to run independently or form new parties. Over thirty candidates have already pre-registered, and registration remains open until November 26, leaving time for many surprises.
POSITION VACANT: MIDDLE POWER COORDINATOR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
by Jeffrey Robertson
[Senior Research Specialist, Foreign Affairs, Department of Parliamentary Services, Parliament of Australia] posted September 13, 2007 Preface : Article : Imagine for an instant that international relations were more like the corporate world. On 13 February 2007, after the conclusion of the agreement at the Six Party Talks on the Korean peninsula nuclear issue, an employment vacancy would have been immediately advertised: Position vacant: Reduced security tension and improving conditions mean that we are currently seeking a ‘middle power coordinator’ for the Korean peninsula. Key duties of the role include coordinating and managing initiatives and soliciting support from other middle powers. The successful applicant will be able to demonstrate a sense of timing, diplomatic capacity, creativity and credibility; as well as coordination, management and facilitation skills of a high order. Continuing the corollary to the corporate world, is the advertised vacancy appropriate for South Korea? Is South Korea’s resume good enough to obtain an interview? Finally, and most importantly, is South Korea, as a high achieving, ambitious young democracy, even interested in applying? The advertised vacancy: Middle power coordinator
Aid Could Nip the North Korean Nuclear Threat
by Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute Op-ed in Newsweek International September 17, 2007 © Newsweek International
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il once kidnapped a South Korean director and his wife when the local talent couldn’t recreate Kim’s grand visions on the silver screen. Is the Great Director now conjuring up a blockbuster tale, ending in a genuine breakthrough in the international confrontation over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program?
What Are the North Koreans Up To?
by Stephan Haggard, Peterson Institute and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute Op-ed in the Korea Times September 21, 2007 © Korea Times
Last summer North Korea conducted provocative missile and nuclear tests. Yet only four months later, Pyongyang signed on to a roadmap that included a return of international inspectors, a full declaration of contested nuclear activities, closing down existing facilities, and ultimately disabling them. American negotiator Christopher Hill predicted this last step could take place as early as the end of the year. What are the North Koreans up to?
Achieving a New Structure of Peace on the Korean Peninsula: An Atlantic Council Working Group Report
Editor’s Note: In April 2007, a distinguished bipartisan working group of U.S. policy experts, former military officials, and retired diplomats, organized by the Atlantic Council of the United States, issued a report and recommendations on achieving a “comprehensive settlement” in Korea. Entitled “A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast Asia,” the report’s recommendations on “peace arrangements” for the Korean Peninsula seem particularly timely in light of the impending North-South summit and recent progress in the Six-Party Talks. Rather than focusing on a single “peace regime,” declaration, or treaty to transform the political and diplomatic structure in Korea, the working group called for “parallel negotiations” to achieve a series of agreements on political, security and economic issues related to the nuclear negotiation. In the working group’s view, this approach will provide the U.S. with greater diplomatic leverage for achieving its strategic policy goals of denuclearizing North Korea and establishing long-term peace and security in Northeast Asia. Ambassador James Goodby and General Jack Merritt co-chaired the Atlantic Council working group. Donald Gross served as project director. [US NK policy]
Journal of Asian and Africa Studies, Special Issue on North Korea June 2007, Volume 42, No. 3-4 {cliché}
- The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: An Introduction
  John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Xiaobo Hu
  North Korea is one of the most isolated states in the world today. Its isolation from the rest of the world is, to a large extent, self-imposed. Its official ideology, juche, which literally means self-reliance, imposes a mentality of self versus all others.
  However, the seemingly stable situation did not last very long. In early 2002, US president George W. Bush labeled North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, as part of an ‘axis of evil’. Later in the year, North Korea admitted that it had been engaged in a secret nuclear weapons program [Admission] [cliche]
- Politics of Human Rights in North Korea
  A framework for change Won Woong Lee Kwandong University, Korea, leeww@kd.ac.kr The international community is now paying more attention to `the systemic, widespread and grave violations of international human rights norms' (United Nations ECOSOC Resolution 1503, (1970) See Burgental (1995)) in North Korea due to its chronic famine and nuclear ambition. The issues and engagement politics regarding human rights in North Korea constitute hot political debates. There are three key factors to improve human rights status in North Korea: the consistent international censure; enlarging engagement and people contact through inter-Korean relations; and economic reform in North Korea. These factors are interrelated and affect each other. The crucial point is to press and induce the North Korean regime to a compromise path.
- Pyongyang Sees the Nuke Impasse
  Han S. Park In order to better understand and explain North Korea's foreign policy strategies and tactics on the controversy surrounding the nuclear program, this chapter examines the perceptions held by Pyongyang about the neighbouring counties including the United States, Japan, and South Korea. These perceptions are formulated in accordance with North Korea's perception about itself that is generally constructed based on the principle of Juche (self-reliance) and the political and security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula as perceived by Pyongyang itself. North Korea is an unconventional country if one looks from outside but it is not irrational in that it has pursued its own national interest rather effectively for which security is first and foremost. This chapter provides an explanation of North Korean conducts from the perspective of North Korea's own mind-set.
- Just Whose Side Is Time On? North Korea and George W. Bush, 2001–4
  Robert M. Hathaway
  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, USA Abstract President Bush’s bold National Security Strategy document of September 2002 would appear to have been written with North Korea as much as Iraq in mind. Yet the Bush administration has been uncharacteristically passive in responding to the challenge posed by Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons ambitions, especially in comparison with the forceful manner with which the administration dealt with Iraq. In the latter case, Bush mobilized the full weight of military force; seemed disdainful of allies, international institutions and multilateral diplomacy; and moved forward with what his critics deemed reckless abandon. In the case of North Korea, on the other hand, the President has emphasized patience, close coordination with allies and an overall lack of urgency oddly at variance with his ‘axis of evil’ characterization of the regime in Pyongyang, and with dangerous advances in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.This essay attempts to explain the rationale behind the Bush administration’s surprisingly relaxed approach to the North Korea challenge.
- Caught between Alliance and Brotherhood South Korea’s Approach to the Six-party Talks
  Tae-hyo Kim
  SungKyunKwan University, Seoul, Korea Abstract A cost–benefit analysis leads to the conclusion that South Korea’s search for non-violent responses to the North Korean nuclear issue causes a dilemma for Seoul. It must balance its security policies toward Washington and Pyongyang, and that dilemma can be resolved only when the North Korean nuclear problem, the most critical and the most difficult hurdle, is resolved. In analyzing critical variables that will determine the success or failure of the six-party talks multilateral approach, this article challenges the central tenet of cooperation theories: if a sufficient number of countries collaborate, they can achieve preventive diplomacy. Cooperation to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program will be difficult due to backsliding (‘sanction busting’) by concerned countries. Keywords alliance • multilateralism • PSI • six-party talks • Sunshine [Dilemma]
- Japanese Policy toward the North Korean Problem Balancing Bilateralism and Multilateralism
  Tsuneo Akaha
  Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA
  Abstract North Korea became an urgent problem for Japan as a result of the 1994 nuclear crisis in North Korea, the 1998 missile launch over Japan and the 2003–4 nuclear crisis. At the historic Tokyo–Pyongyang summit in September 2002, both sides acknowledged the need to solve the security issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula through peaceful, multilateral efforts. However, the issue of North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens in earlier decades intensified Japanese sentiment against the North and this issue halted bilateral normalization talks. Japan has participated in six-party talks on the nuclear issue since 2004, but its distinct bilateral interests vis-à-vis North Korea, South Korea and the United States limit its influence in the multiparty engagement. Keywords abduction • normalization • nuclear crisis • Pyongyang Declaration
Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis Options and Constraints
Jeffrey Robertson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group 23 June 2003 Current Issues Brief no.33 2002-03 Contents List of Maps Map 1: Democratic People's Republic of Korea Map 2: Northern Limit Line Map 3: DPRKChina Border [NLL]
The Politics of Imagining Asia: Empires, Nations, Regional and Global Orders
Wang Hui
Translation by Matthew A. Hale Following the recent trends of globalization and regionalization, the idea of Asia has been revived in political, economic, and cultural fields. This essay examines some of the multiple uses of the idea of Asia in modern East Asian and especially Chinese history. It consists of four parts. Part One discusses how the idea of Asia developed from modern European history, especially the nineteenth century European narrative of "World History," and points out how the early modern Japanese "theory of shedding Asia" derived from this narrative. Part Two studies the relationship between the idea of Asia and two forms of Narodism against the background of the Chinese and Russian revolutions. One, exemplified by Russian Narodism, attempted to use Asian particularity to challenge modern capitalism; the other, represented by Sun Yat-sen, attempted to construct a nation-state on the basis of a socialist revolutionary program, and to develop agricultural capitalism under the particular social conditions of Asia. Part Three considers the differences and tensions between the "Great Asianism" of Chinese revolutionaries such as Sun and the Japanese idea of Toyo (East Asia), and discusses the need to overcome the categories of nation-state and international relations in order to understand the question of Asia. Part Four discusses the need to go beyond early modern maritime-centered accounts, nationalist frameworks, and Eurocentrism in reexamining the question of Asia through historical research by focusing on the particular legacies of Asia (such as the tributary system) and the problems of "early modernity." [Imperialism] [Making]
Korean Memories of the Vietnam and Korean Wars: A Counter-History
Theodore Hughes The Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington D.C. provides a privileged site for Americans to “remember” the Vietnam War. W.J.T. Mitchell writes that The Vietnam Veterans Memorial is antiheroic, antimonumental, a V-shaped gash or scar, a trace of violence suffered not of violence wielded in the service of a glorious cause (as in the conventional war memorial). It achieves the universality of the public monument not by rising above its surroundings to transcend the political, but by going beneath the political to the shared sense of a wound that will never heal…. Its legibility is not that of narrative: no heroic episode such as the planting of the flag on Iwo Jima is memorialized, only the mind-numbing and undifferentiated chronology of violence and death catalogued by the fifty-eight thousand names inscribed on the black marble walls. [1] The monument, however, produces meaning, and constructs a national narrative, precisely in its performance of differentiation, its exclusion of the deaths of the “other” (the Vietnamese).
Investigative Journalism and Speculation
'The Hidden History of the Korean War' by I.F. Stone
[Book Review]: Jay Hauben (jhauben) Email Article Print Article Published 2007-02-14 18:17 (KST) The Hidden History of the Korean War By I. F. Stone 364 pages. Monthly Review Press. 1952, 1970. The controversial book, The Hidden History of the Korean War by I. F. Stone was originally published in 1952 during the Korean War (1950-1953) and republished in 1970 during the Vietnam War (1960-1975). It raised questions about the origin of the Korean War, made a case that the United States government manipulated the United Nations, and gave evidence that the U.S. military and South Korean oligarchy dragged out the war by sabotaging the peace talks. b Publishing such a book in the U.S. during the time of McCarthyism, while the war was still continuing was an act of journalistic courage. Forty years later, declassified U.S., Soviet and People's Republic of China documents both confirmed some and corrected some of Stone's story.
Succession – A Dictator’s Dilemma
by Bryan Port January 18th, 2007
Bryan Port, an staff officer at the Pentagon for the Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence (G2) holds Masters Degree in Security Studies from Georgetown University and has spent six years in Korea working in various capacities for the US Government, writes, “The recent nuclear tests serve to highlight the importance of the succession issue to the US and the DPRK’s neighbors. While external reasoning may have lead KCI to test a nuclear device, it is more likely that internal considerations are driving decisions not only on WMD development, but also on the issue of leadership succession in the DPRK.”
Kim Jong-il's military-first policy a silver bullet
By Kim Myong Chol Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. The military-first policy, now in its 12th year, is a well-known international symbol for Kim Jong-il and his Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Twelve years may be sufficient for a report card. A look at what Kim has done during that time indicates beyond doubt that this policy has been a silver bullet. Kim officially launched the military-first policy on January 1, 1995. The DPRK has built up such a nuclear deterrence that it does not need any form of US security guarantee any longer. As the nuclear test last October 9 demonstrated, the DPRK is now a de jure nuclear-weapons state, the fourth-most-powerful after the United States, Russia and China. [Songun]
Understanding North Korea
“Che Guevara visited Pyongyang around (1965) and told the press that North Korea was a model to which revolutionary Cuba should aspire.” (1)
By Stephen Gowans
North Korea is a country that is alternately reviled and ridiculed. Its leader, Kim Jong-il, is demonized by the right and -- with the exception of Guevera in 1965 and many of his current admirers -- mocked by the left. Kim is declared to be insane, though no one can say what evidence backs this diagnosis up. It’s just that everyone says he is, so he must be.
Querying the Warfare State: A Critical Look at Contemporary American Militarism
Andrew Michael Lee
July 2006
IPEE Summer School Essay (York University, Toronto)
Recently, it became more apparent than ever that Canada is now starting to follow in the new footsteps of its big brother to the South. Last month, Prime Minister Stephen Harper spared no time in announcing the Conservatives’ plan to rebuild its nation’s military by significantly upgrading its stock of vehicles for the Canadian Armed Forces. This plan fulfills his promise to “strengthen Canada’s place in the world by means of a ‘Canada first’ defense strategy aimed at repairing years of Liberal neglect.”i The purchases, totaling $15 billion, include an ensemble of heavy-lift transport planes, helicopters, troop carrier ships and up to 1,000 new trucks.ii This spending spree is unprecedented by Canadian standards, but in fact a sign of the times. As announcements were made to spend in one week what the Canadian military normal reserves for its entire annual budget, the new procurement package was promoted with excitement and zeal by the Conservatives and criticized sharply by Canadians alarmed by the high levels of military spending being done so rapidly. It would be safe to say that this plan to build up the power of the Canadian military has the full support of the Bush administration, as the move represents a definite rightward shift in Canadian politics. Certainly no complaints will come from Boeing and Lockheed Martin, the world’s two largest defense contractors. They will be the companies selling much of the military equipment to the Canadian Armed Forces. Of course, for Boeing and Lockheed Martin, further militarizing the state both at home and abroad—wherever that might be—is good for business.
The Future of Korea: An Asia-Pacific Perspective
By Mark Selden
[Japan Focus 14 August 2006]
I The Korea Problem
The essence of the “Korea Problem” lies not in the threat of North Korean development of atomic weapons, nor in the existence of a rogue regime in North Korea, as the international press and some American presidents would have it. The central problem is the division of the Korean peninsula, an outcome of half a century of Japanese colonial rule and a legacy of the incomplete character of independence resulting from US-Soviet division of Korea and the Korean War that has now continued in various forms for more than six decades. This article reflects on Korea within an Asia-Pacific and global framework. It also examines possible steps toward resolving the core conflicts, solutions that can only succeed if they find regional and global support. Korea is the most dangerous legacy of the US-Soviet division of Asia, a war without end that continues in the form of military standoff that threatens the peace of Northeast Asia.
The effort by North Korea to draw attention to its desire to reopen negotiations drew on the only weapon in its arsenal: nuclear threat. The effect was indeed to call attention once again to the Korea question, and to demonstrate Korea’s determination to resist attack. The principal consequences, however, were to weaken North Korea’s position with its most important allies, South Korea and China, to undermine the political conditions for North-South rapprochement, and to produce mild UN Security Council sanctions. Tim Beal has pointed out in his Pyongyang Report of July, 2006. “The Security Council’s condemnation of the DRPK missiles tests was a blatant violation of the UN charter, which respects the right of all countries to self-defence. The DPRK, as a sovereign state, was quite within its rights to test missiles. The censure was also an egregious breach of natural justice. During the weeks around the DPRK tests both Russia and India test fired a ballistic missile, and the US tested two. The ROK government announced that it . . . had test fired cruise missiles, much more advanced . . . than the North’s ballistic missiles, some ten times over the last three years. It appears that the Security Council which thought that ‘such launches jeopardize peace, stability and security in the region and beyond’ considered this applied only to the DPRK, and not other countries who conducted such tests . . . The UNSC also overlooked America’s RIMPAC-2006 naval exercises (in which the ROK navy participated) although they were the largest since the Vietnam War. None of this means that the DPRK tests were wise, but they were neither illegal, nor unusual.” Blatant violation or otherwise, the consequence of the tests and the UN action have been to isolate North Korea and to undermine efforts by China and South Korea to reduce tensions
North Korea's Military-First Policy: A Curse or a Blessing?
by Alexander V. Vorontsov June 8th, 2006
Alexander V. Vorontsov, Visiting Fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, writes, "Songun should not be automatically dismissed as an ideological dead-end. As the experience of South Korea under Park Chung-hee demonstrates, military rule can have positive effects on society under certain conditions."
Relationship between North and South Korea after the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Development Plan for the Korean Peninsula
By Suh Dong-man Professor Sangji University [SK NK relations] [Unification]
Making Progress While Marking Time
by James Goodby and Markku Heiskanen May 18th, 2006
James Goodby, former U.S. ambassador to Finland, and Markku Heiskanen, an Associate Senior Fellow at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen, write, "Europeans can make a unique contribution to peace in Northeast Asia: they have shown that multi-national cooperation really works. Its example complements the American emphasis on power relationships, which is also a reality in today's international system."
Sunshine or Moonshine?:
Inter-Korean relations and their impact upon the U.S.-DPRK conundrum
L. Gordon Flake
Executive Director The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Draft prepared for presentation at the Asia Foundation/ KINU Conference on " Implementing the Six-Party Joint Statement and the Korean Peninsula" Washington D.C. November 10, 2005
Over the past several years the North Korean nuclear program has re-emerged as the highest profile issue in American views of the Korean peninsula. As such it has overshadowed and even cast a pall upon other political, diplomatic and even economic issues between the United States and South Korea. Given the primacy of this issue, inter-Korean relations, or more specifically, the South Korean policy towards North Korea has been largely viewed by the United States from the perspective of its impact upon efforts to solve the nuclear crisis.
Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis Options and Constraints
Jeffrey Robertson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group (Australian Parliamentary Library} 23 June 2003 Current Issues Brief no.33 2002-03
Transcript of SASC testimony on FY 2006 Missile Defense Programs
MAY 11, 2005 CHAIRED BY: SENATOR TED STEVENS (R-AK) LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY OBERING III, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
SEN. STEVENS: The committee is pleased to welcome General James Cartwright, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command; and Lieutenant General Henry Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency. General Obering, this is your first opportunity, I believe to testify before us as Director of the Missile Defense Agency. We welcome you. Given your service at MDA and in other roles, having been director for almost a year now, we're happy to see you onboard and to welcome you to our committee. And we thank you both for coming today. Ballistic missile defense is one of the most challenging missions in the Department of Defense.
SEN. COCHRAN (R-MS): Mr. Chairman, thank you. The testing and program for the ground-based system has had some recent difficulties after a series of successful intercepts have proven that the -- that capabilities are there in the system. What are your plans for future tests? Do you have the resources in this budget request that will enable you to carry those out? GEN. OBERING: Yes sir. I'll take that. The aborts that we had in our last two tests were caused in the December timeframe -- we had a software timing issue that we actually -- as we got in, discovered the root cause, we determined that first of all, it was a rare occurrence. And we've actually flown with that condition three times before with a booster. And it was correctable with a fix to one line of software code and one parameter in that software code
But, we're going to do that in the next several years. We're going to take an operationally configured interceptor and fly it out of Vandenberg, which is an operational site. We're going to fly it across the face of the Beal radar which is operational radar. So -- with operational crews. So we're going to get more and more realism in our testing profile. [Missile Defense]
[Whilst I am interested to read that the Beal radar is an important part of Missile Defense, I can claim no responsibility for it; Tim Beal}
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN: A SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
IN AUGUST 2006, THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY WILL HOST A WORKSHOP ON RECONCILIATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA. PREPARATORY TO THE ORGANIZATION OF THAT WORKSHOP, WE INVITE YOU TO BRAINSTORM THE TOPIC ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THIS BLOG. THE PURPOSE OF THIS BLOG IS TO INVITE DISCUSSION AND DEBATE ABOUT THE BEST WAYS TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN
The Sky Is Falling, and Kim Jong Il Is to Blame
[Book Review] 'Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes On The World' by Gordon G. Chang
Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes On The World By Gordon G. Chang 325 pages. $25.95. Random House
In the post Sept. 11 era Chicken Little's image has undergone something of a makeover. Whereas in the original story the young barnyard fowl was ridiculed for his overreaction to a little bit of rain, Disney's new animated feature turns him into a hero who saves the planet from an alien invasion. Indeed, since the World Trade Center's destruction, prophecies of doom no longer seem as far-fetched as they once did. Gordan Chang, whose previous book was "The Coming Collapse of China," thinks he has found the anti-Christ who will trigger the apocalypse in the person of the man he describes as a platform shoes and hair curler-wearing video game addict, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.
(c)2006 Random House Chang, a lawyer who worked in Hong Kong and China for two decades, lacks the background to be considered a "Korea specialist." Nevertheless, he has done an impressive amount of research, reading most of the secondary sources on the subject, and conducting interviews with various aid workers, scholars, and politicians. But if his research was thorough, Chang's analysis is uneven. At several points throughout the book, Chang can't seem to make up his mind whether he is for or against engagement of North Korea. He denounces food aid as a means of preserving the regime, but credits aid workers for giving North Koreans a new view of the outside world. He wants to stop all economic cooperation with Pyongyang, but also to increase it to much higher levels to undermine the regime's grip on the populace. At times he blatantly contradicts himself. At one point, he questions the "conventional wisdom that China will do nothing to cause North Korea to completely fail" (p. 131). Two chapters later, he decided he that the conventional wisdom is right after all, declaring, "Under no circumstances will China let North Korea go under" (p. 162). Figures as diverse as Jimmy Carter and Henry Kissinger are first derided, only to be later cited as authoritative sources of wisdom. Chang is not a scholar, and his book is not written in a scholarly style. He eschews acronyms and statistical charts in favor of breezy, sardonic prose that sometimes crosses over into smarminess, such as when he calls former Singapore President Lee Kuan Yew "Asia's meddler in chief" (p. 149 [Bizarre]
Confrontation or Engagement Policy - the Case of DPR Korea
EADI General Conference, Session report: Confrontation or Engagement Policy - the Case of DPR Korea Chair: Tatjana Chahoud (Germany), German Development Institute Speakers: Selig Harrison (USA) Director, Asisa Program at the Center for International Policy, Washington Hanns Günther Hilpert (Germany), Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin Hans Maretzki (Germany), former ambassador of the German Democratic Republic in Pyongyang
The former ambassador Hans Maretzki of the German Democratic Republic in Pyongyang agreed on engagement as the ingenious policy toward North Korea as containment policies have fostered seclusion and militancy. At the same time, he stressed that internal changes are the driving forces for transformation and the main problems can only be solved by the "two Koreas" themselves. Giving a federation of the to "antagonist" states a low chance, Mr Maretzki underlined the importance of normalizing the relations between North and South; "and seek later reconciliation". So far, the states only recognize each other on the economic level - even though the proclaimed "common economic prosperity" still seems far away. The economic cooperation is rather a one-way system with the South aiding the North - "rapprochement sometimes has to be bought". For a solution of the nuclear as well as of the Korean question mutual recognition and an inter-state agreement is necessary.
Comments about "Confrontation or Engagement Policy - the Case of DPRK"
Hans Maretzki
16 September 2005, 13:30 UTC Contribution by Dr. Hans Maretzki (EADI General Conference) 1. Engagement is the only ingenious version of dealing with the DPRK. Past containment policies encouraged seclusion and militancy. Rational approach tries to get the DPRK in lane with the standards of peaceful and cooperative interrelations customary in the international community. Hitherto need engagements with the DPRK more resonance from its side for mutuality. Transformations in North Korea are a matter of internal changes and derive not consequently from intense engagement.
How to Assess the Park Chung Hee Era and Korean Development
By Paik Nak-chung
Japan Focus 2 January 2006]
The Assessment of Park Chung Hee, the brutal dictator who many credit with launching South Korea's accelerated economic development, is central to debates on Korean democracy, development and independence. Paik Nak-chung, distinguished literary critic and a leading Korean public intellectual, delivered this keynote address to the International Korean Studies Conference on 'The Park Era: A Reassessment After Twenty-five Years' at University of Wollongong.
The 'Park era' is not the same thing as Park Chung Hee himself, but feelings about the man inevitably play a large role in any assessment of the era. As is well known, those feelings in Korea today are quite divided, indeed passionately so. Many of the people who went through that era still remain alive and active, and include both those who either took an active part in his rule or otherwise benefited from it and came to possess strong vested interests, and the victims of that rule who suffered torture, imprisonment, enforced poverty or other deprivations of their rights, plus the families and close friends of those so persecuted or even sent to their deaths. [Park Chung-hee]
North Korea's Gamble
Achin Vanaik The Hindu, 5 December 2002
Latest new bulletins about North Korea's self-acknowledged uranium enrichment programme to make nuclear weapons, and of the role of Pakistan in helping Pyongyang, have pushed both Washington and New Delhi to highlight North Korean perfidy and Pakistani duplicity respectively. But these are actually only minor themes in a more complicated overall picture, which has not really been exposed in most of the world's media. This was brought home sharply in the context of my recent visit to Japan and a sustained discussion with some Japanese experts on Korea, who outside of the Korean peninsula are really the most acute and independent of Korea-watchers. The fuller story begins with the historic decisions of Kim Dae Jung in South Korea and of the Japan government to explore the possibility of a rapprochement with North Korea. For Washington this came as an unwelcome shock. The US government now looks forward to a conservative replacement of Kim in forthcoming South Korean elections and a deceleration, if not end, to Seoul's 'Sunshine' policy. For Japan, the move towards North Korea was one of those truly rare occasions when Tokyo was prepared to defy Washington in a matter of foreign policy, especially when North Korea had been openly designated as part of the "axis of evil". [Admission]
Another "Intelligence" Fiasco
by Gordon Prather March 14, 2005
In announcing the president's decision to nominate John Bolton to be ambassador to the United Nations, Condi Rice noted that, as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, Bolton "has held primary responsibility" within the Bush-Cheney administration "for stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." Bolton's principal achievement? "John helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to help combat the spread of WMD through the president's Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI]." Now, as you probably know, the only true "weapon of mass destruction" is a nuke. But, perversely, our future ambassador to the UN has been "point man" in the Bush administration's campaign to undermine the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to discredit and/or supersede the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN organization assigned by the Treaty to verify compliance by all its signatories.
In particular, under the Agreed Framework of 1994, all existing North Korean "nuclear" activities had been "frozen" - under IAEA lock and seal - in return for a promise of free nuclear power plants and an interim supply of free fuel oil. Obviously, if Bush was to impose "regime change" on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea on the pretext they had nukes, the IAEA nuke proliferation-prevention regime had to be discredited or superseded. So, first, Bush unilaterally abrogated the Agreed Framework. Whereupon North Korea, predictably, withdrew from the NPT, and resumed producing and recovering weapons-grade plutonium.
Visit to Yangbian, December 2003
Senator Sam Brownback
January 4, 2003 This past December, I made a journey to Northeast China along the North Korean border. I spent three days in the Yangbian Prefecture (December 14-16), including a six-hour drive along the North Korean border, and two days in Beijing (December 17-18). The purpose of my trip was to discuss a wide range of issues with the primary focus on the circumstances facing North Korean refugees and border-crossers inside China, and human rights and economic conditions inside North Korea. [Refugee encouragement]
Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Long Term Strategy for the Korean Peninsula
David S. Maxwell ICAS Spring Symposium & Humanity, Peace and Security May 19, 2004 Wednesday 12:30 PM - 5:30 PM
My thesis has five propositions: 1. US and ROK policies are in turmoil, are not coherent, and not synchronized. There is no long term approach to the "Korea Question." 2. The ROK-US alliance is eroding rapidly due to actions by both governments and their respective populations. 3. North Korea will continue to execute its strategy to protect its vital national interest: Survival of the Kim Family Regime (KFR) and any strategy devised by the ROK and US must take this into account. 4. To achieve a lasting peace on the peninsula, a combined ROK-US strategy that seeks to achieve a mutually agreed upon and acceptable end state must be developed and executed in an orchestrated and cooperative approach. 5. Divergent ROK and US policies must be made compatible (e.g., Kim Dae Jung? Sunshine policy - and now the Roh Moo Hyun administration? Peace and Prosperity policy - versus those in the US who want to focus on Regime Change). Instead of causing regime change externally the ROK and US strategy must be to prepare for a post Kim Family Regime era that arises from internal regime change while at the same time managing the crises as they occur, identifying and exploiting opportunities as they arise, and preparing for the potential conflict that a post-KFR peninsula may trigger. [Strategic incoherence][personalisation] [regime change]
Is the Axis of Evil Synchronizing its Asymmetric Offensive?
by David S. Maxwell PFO 02-25A: December 20, 2002 This essay by David S. Maxwell asserts that North Korea's announcement of their nuclear development program may be a synchronized action among members of the U.S.-designated "axis of evil." The announcement potentially relieves pressure on Iraq, attacks US credibility, and further erodes the focus of US anti-terrorism efforts. While not advocating direct military confrontation, Maxwell argues that a visible commitment to South Korea is necessary and could be demonstrated by the re-start of such exercises as Team Spirit. David S. Maxwell is a U.S. Army officer with service in various command and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Europe for 22 years.
The "revelation" that North Korea is engaged in a nuclear weapons development program seems to be well-timed. The fundamental question is why did the North Korean leadership admit to this now? When faced with "evidence" in the past the Kim Family Regime never felt bad about denying it.
So what is North Korea up to? Is this a deliberate attempt by North Korea to challenge the US on its new doctrine of pre-emptive strikes against emerging threats and thus discredit the US if it does not respond and ultimately forcing the US to execute a "double standard" foreign policy? Is this a coordinated effort to relieve the pressure on Iraq? Or is this an attempt to "look respectable" by coming clean as mentioned above? [Admission] [Iraq] [US policy] [regime change] [personalisation] [Joint US military]
Hide and Seek with Kim Jong Il
By Henry Sokolski September 29th, 2005
Henry Sokolski, the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C. and former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993, writes, "...the U.S. will not even discuss providing light-water reactors until Pyongyang completely disarms and rejoins the NPT. Still, the deeper negotiators delve into the endless issues that must be resolved to disarm Pyongyang, the clearer the dangers and costs of doing so are likely to become."
In my office, next to photographs of me shaking hands with my former bosses Dan Quayle and Dick Cheney, is a framed color photograph of a half-completed light-water nuclear-power reactor located in Shinpo, North Korea. The project was part of a deal President Bill Clinton struck in 1994 to get Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear-fuel-making (and bomb-making) capacity and to come into full compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Personally signed by the project's last serving director, U.S. Ambassador Charles Kartman, the picture is inscribed with his "best wishes and greatest respect." He mailed it to me last month as one of his last official acts. I had it framed and hung. I felt vindicated. I had been fighting this venture for more than a decade. The project was unsafe, never made economic or technical sense and set a bizarre nonproliferation precedent-it began construction of a reactor that could make many bombs' worth of plutonium while suspending routine international inspections of North Korea's nuclear activities designed to prevent proliferation. Pyongyang, moreover, blew the deal apart late in 2002 when it revealed it was building a covert uranium enrichment plant. For these reasons, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced in July that the reactor project would "cease to exist." [Agreed Framework] [Neocons] [Nuclear energy]
North Korea: A Continuing Struggle against Imperialism
Steve Gowans Friday, August 26, 2005 The counter-revolution that brought down the Soviet Union in 1991 set off a series of shock waves that swept through the trading bloc of Soviet-aligned countries.
North Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the DRPK, could not help but be caught up in the devastating maelstrom. Its export markets, dependent on trade with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp, imploded, and the country soon found itself critically short of coal and petroleum. This had a domino effect. Shortages of petroleum meant north Korea's chemical industry couldn't produce enough fertilizer. Shortages of fertilizer, and of petroleum for farm machinery, meant the country's farmers couldn't grow enough food. And with hobbled agricultural production crippled further by a devastating series of natural disasters, famine swept the country
New Security Challenges and Opportunities in East Asia: Views from the Next Generation
Edited by Brad Glosserman
September 1st, 2005 This report by CSIS Pacific Forum collects the results of the forum's Young Leaders Program which seeks to, "bring talented young professionals, working on the particular subjects of our meetings, to the table to enrich our discussions and to provide them with the opportunity to acquire on-the-job training and exposure to individuals and ideas that they might only otherwise encounter in books."
The Balancer: Roh Moo-hyun's Vision of Korean Politics and the Future of Northeast Asia
By Emanuel Pastreich
[Japan Focus 4 August 2005]
The President of the Republic of Korea is unique as a politician in the media age, both in embracing the potential of the Internet and refusing to pander to the sound bite. He spends hours on-line each week promoting his vision of e-government. The website of the Cheong Wa Dae presidential residence, the Korean equivalent of the White House, features a picture of Roh typing away furiously at his laptop. Roh, who has authored a biography of Abraham Lincoln, on whom he models himself, and like Lincoln, crafts speeches of great intellectual complexity. Roh also sees himself as the leader of a nation divided between North and South, and fragmented within. He works on the assumption that concepts and ideals can transform a society.
The end of silence: Korea's A-bomb victims seek redress
By Andreas Hippin
[Japan Focus 4 August 2005]
When Shin Jin Tae's first daughter died, her mother was still breast-feeding her. "She became thinner and thinner until she passed away," the 62-year-old farmer says. When more mysterious diseases and inexplicable deaths occurred in Hapcheon county where he lives, Shin started to think that all this might be related to the past. Shin was born in Hiroshima. When the atomic bomb was dropped on August 6, 1945, he was two years old. "More than 70 percent of the Korean victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki came from Hapcheon," he says. Most of the survivors returned. Shin is one of 598 atomic bomb victims still living there. Hapcheon county is an otherwordly place in South Korea's Gyeongsangnamdo Province. With its rice paddies and mixed deciduous and coniferous forests, the poor mountainous region north of Pusan is a paradise for romantics. Haeinsa, a UNESCO world heritage temple boasting a collection of more than 80.000 beautifully carved woodblocks with Buddhist scriptures, is hidden in its mountains. But these mountains also keep darker secrets from a more recent past. Hapcheon is also called "the Korean Hiroshima." "Ten percent of the hundreds of thousands of victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were Korean. Most of them were forced laborers making guns and ammunition in the factories of the Japanese military. Others were landless farmers, mostly from Hapcheon, looking for employment in Japanese cities," says Kang Je Suk.
NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONS
Andrew Scobell July 2005
FOREWORD North Korea poses a key challenge to the global community of states. Sometimes viewed as primarily a nuclear or proliferation challenge, Pyongyang actually presents the United States and other countries with multiple problems. As the 2005 National Defense Strategy of the United States notes, these challenges include "traditional, irregular, and catastrophic." While each dimension of these threat capabilities are fairly clear and, with the exception of the third, readily documented, North Korea's intentions are a much more controversial subject upon which specialists reach widely disparate conclusions.
In this monograph, Dr. Andrew Scobell examines the topic of Pyongyang's strategic intentions. He .rst identi.es a broad spectrum of expert views and distills this wisdom into three "packages" of possible strategic intentions. He then sets out to test which package appears to re.ect actual North Korean policy. While he opines that one is more likely than the others, he concludes that it is impossible to say with certainty which package most closely resembles reality. As a result, he suggests that further probing of Pyongyang's intentions is advisable.
A gulag with nukes: inside North Korea
Jasper Becker 19 - 7 - 2005
Behind its rhetoric of anti-imperialist defiance the Pyongyang elite starves and enslaves its people. Jasper Becker talks to North Korean escapees who offer chilling testimony of Kim Jong-Il's world of luxury and fear. [Black]
Korea: U.S. Policy Casting a Long Shadow over the Sunshine Policy
By James Reilly February 14, 2002
Immediately after the September 11 attacks in New York, South Korean and U.S. forces went into a state of heightened security alert that the North claimed was "threatening," leading Pyongyang to break off ongoing negotiations on family reunions that remain stalled even today. Despite this reversal in negotiations, North Korea reacted to September 11 by unilaterally moving to sign two UN antiterrorism treaties and later expressing its willingness to sign an additional five. Instead of welcoming such signals, Bush administration officials chose the moment to make expansive new allegations about Pyongyang's biological weapons program, which they later admitted were unsubstantiated by any new evidence. The president followed up these remarks by directly implicating North Korea in the new "war on terror" due to its development of weapons of mass destruction and weapons proliferation, and then retaining North Korea on the State Department's recently revised list of nations that support terrorism.
North Korea - Food and Politics
Don Borrie
Prior to the 1990s the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, (North Korea), was one of the most advanced agricultural and industrial economies in North Asia. With well established trade and energy supply links with Eastern Europe the DPRK was managing its, at times precarious, international financial arrangements with sufficient confidence that the Government was able to begin modifying its central ideological philosophy of Juche (self reliance) to allow for the introduction of Joint Ventures with foreign companies .
Imitating the Colonizers: The Legacy of the Disciplining State from Manchukuo to South Korea
By Suk-Jung Han Scholars in the Asia field are finally turning their attention to Manchukuo. Labeling Manchukuo as a puppet state has long hindered exploring its multi-faceted character. Building Manchukuo was more complicated than Japan's outright takeover of Taiwan or Korea. Also, Manchukuo was a great laboratory for various modern projects. Grand narratives that describe the fourteen-year history of Manchukuo in terms of exploitation, heroic national resistance, or nostalgic development miss a wide space. An unknown part of Manchukuo is its role of linking the past and the future in the realm of the state-formation.
One Korea?
By Charles Wolf Jr. July 8th, 2005 Charles Wolf Jr., a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation and Hoover Institution and the co-author of "North Korean Paradoxes", wrote: "How and exactly when unification may occur -- whether by system evolution or collapse, by internal dissidence, by fragmentation or by conflict -- is no less conjectural now than it was a decade earlier. At that time, such conjectures were rife, and we were surprised that none of the envisaged possibilities ensued. Now, when such conjectures are absent, and attention instead is pre-empted by North Korea's threatened or actual acquisition of nuclear weapons, we may be surprised again -- but this time in a reverse direction." [Unification cost]
Letter from Asia: For many, two Koreas may be better than one
Norimitsu Onishi FRIDAY, JULY 1, 2005
SEOUL When South Korea's Ministry of Unification officials visited North Korea two weeks ago to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the historic summit meeting between the two countries' leaders, the talk centered, not surprisingly, on Pyongyang's nuclear program. As an indication of the ups and downs in relations between the two Koreas, there was little mention of the idea that had gripped the imagination of both sides of the demilitarized zone five years ago: reunification.
Andrei Lankov, a Russian-born historian at Kookmin University in Seoul, says the South has, effectively, abandoned the idea of reunification. Its engagement policy's real aim, he says, is to prop up Pyongyang economically and prevent a collapse that would bring refugees flooding south. "I call the Unification Ministry the 'anti-Unification Ministry,"' he said, "because it is the main government agency responsible for engaging North Korea. A collapse of the regime would be the quickest way to unification." Since the peninsula was divided half a century ago, the idea of reunification has changed along with the balance of power and economics on the peninsula. Through the 1970s, as the North seemed ahead of the South economically, Pyongyang strongly favored reunification, calculating that it would come out ahead in a unified country. "After 1979, the balance tipped in South Korea's favor," said Lee Geun, a professor of international relations at Seoul National University. As the South's lead over the North kept widening, the South's support of reunification rose, reaching its peak after the Germans unified in 1990.
Nuclear North Korea or Regime Change?
[Interview] China's dilemma could prove economically disasterous, warns neocon Nicholas Eberstadt
(c)2005 Kim T.K. "Last year, I wrote a study on nuclear scenarios in the DPRK nuclear crisis. And one of my scenarios was the possibility of a unilateral, preemptive military strike by the U.S. government. I asked, 'Is it possible a president of the United States could do such a thing?' And my conclusion was that yes, it is possible to imagine, but you have to be imagining a really, really unusual situation..."
This is what advisor to the U.S. government on North Korea and chair in political economy at the American Enterprise Institute, Nicholas Eberstadt, had to say about the more extreme scenarios which could play out in the current North Korean nuclear crisis.
The prominent academic, who was in Seoul earlier this week, told OhmyNews that China faces a terrible dilemma with its North Korean neighbor playing the high-stakes game of nuclear poker. Eberstadt said it is unclear whether China will tolerate aggressive nuclear diplomacy by the North.
"It would have a terrible economic impact on the entire region, a very big business impact," he said. "A downturn in this important region of the world economy translates very quickly into high urban unemployment rates in China. And if China is not afraid of North Korean nuclear weapons, I can promise you the Chinese government will be afraid of high rates of urban, male unemployment."
Eberstadt also expressed concern about the growing "anti-ROK administrationism" in U.S. government and the general public. If this sentiment grows, it could have serious consequences for both the relations of the two nations, but also political stability in North Asia. [neocon]
Clear and Present Danger
Reviewed by Mike Mochizuki Sunday, June 19, 2005; Page BW06 ROGUE REGIME Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea By Jasper Becker. Oxford Univ. 300 pp. $28 UNDER THE LOVING CARE OF THE FATHERLY LEADER North Korea and the Kim Dynasty By Bradley K. Martin Thomas Dunne/St. Martin's. 868 pp. $29.95
Beyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War*
s a h r c o n way- l a n z
The recent revelations about the killings at a bridge near No Gun Ri in the summer of 1950 provide a vivid illustration of the human cost of the Korean War and of the early dif.culties that the U.S. military had meeting the expanded human rights and humanitarian standards that had emerged in the post-World War II international community. In 1999, a team of Associated Press journalists revealed extensive evidence that American soldiers had .red upon a large group of Korean refugees during the opening weeks of the Korean War.1 This impressive investigative journalism spurred a year-long Department of Defense inquiry into the killings and earned the reporters a Pulitzer Prize. The uncovering of the No Gun Ri killings raised the question of whether they were an isolated instance of American forces harming vulnerable noncombatants in Korea. When the Pentagon .nished its investigation in 2001, the report's .ndings reinforced the impression that the killings had been a lone tragedy in the early weeks of a chaotic war. The report agreed that American soldiers had killed some unknown number of Korean civilians near No Gun Ri but concluded that the violence resulted from a misunderstanding on the part of frontline troops of their orders to prevent refugees from crossing battle lines. Disputing the Associated Press reports, the Defense Department review insisted that U.S. commanders had not ordered soldiers to attack refugees, nor had they implemented a policy to use lethal force against noncombatants.2 However, new evidence missed by previous investigations demonstrates the Pentagon's interpretation to be untenable.
George Bush's Unfinished Asian Agenda
by Robert M. Hathaway May 13, 2005
Robert M. Hathaway is director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He served for twelve years on the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. This essay is based on a presentation to FPRI's InterUniversity Study Group on Asia on April 26, 2005. The record of the Bush administration in East Asia over the past four years is a mixed one, but with significant accomplishments. Nonetheless, nagging problems persist that, if not adequately addressed, could create considerable difficulties for the president during his second term. Finally, George Bush's first term record in East Asia contains one very substantial failure. First, the accomplishments: By any reckoning, the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese alliance is a major achievement that is likely to pay dividends long after Bush vacates the White House. Prime Minister Koizumi has been one of Bush's strongest backers on the war in Iraq, and has dispatched Japanese troops to Iraq (albeit, in a non- combatant, reconstruction role), the first such deployment into a combat zone since World War II. The new-found warmth in U.S.- Japanese relations today is all the more notable in comparison with Washington's strained ties with many of its traditional European allies To the surprise of many "China experts," Bush has also managed the difficult U.S.-China relationship with considerable success. Candidate Bush campaigned on a platform ridiculing the Clinton administration for regarding China as a "strategic partner" and declared that a Bush administration would shed this naivete and recognize China for what it was - a "strategic competitor." One has only to compare Bush's public statement in early 2001 that the United States would do "whatever it takes" to ensure Taiwan's security with his unusually pointed warnings to Taipei more recently about not upsetting the status quo to see how far Bush - and the U.S.-China relationship - has traveled over the past four years. Turning to the Korean peninsula, here the record is rather less impressive.
Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Threat
Keynote Address by Don Oberdorfer April 9, 2005 Understanding the Koreas: a History Institute for Teachers
On April 9-10, 2005, the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education held its 13th History Institute for Teachers, focusing on "Understanding the Koreas." Specially designed for secondary school teachers and curriculum supervisors, the program featured a series of lectures by leading scholars in several fields. Forty teachers from 17 states attended the weekend conference.
Prospects for U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the Second Bush Administration
Representative James A. Leach Chairman, House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Comments Prepared for Delivery to the CSIS and Chosun Ilbo Conference on May 17, 2005
In conclusion, permit me to speculate about what may be the most unlikely of possibilities. We should not underestimate - indeed we should publicly trumpet - the fact that Pyongyang has the power to effect historic changes that would dramatically benefit North Korea's stature in the world and the welfare of its people. A credible change in strategic direction away from isolation, repression, and nuclearization would put the DPRK's international footing on a basis of amity and cooperation, with prosperity in close reach. One of our many tasks in the weeks ahead is to make that previously unthinkable possibility easier for the North Korean leadership to imagine.
Prisoner Rights and International Law
Japanese and American Responsibility From World War II to Guantanamo by Jess Bravin [Japan Focus 11 May 2005]
[This posting consists of a two part article by Wall Street Journal Correspondent Jess Bravin on the rights, and abuses of those rights, of POWs under the Japanese in World War II and under the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay, and the pertinent legal and criminal issues. The analogy should be a chilling one for a nation that pioneered, in the wake of World War II, in pressing charges of prisoner abuse and insisting on responsibility both of the immediate perpetrator of violations of human rights, on up through the chain of command to the highest authority. See also the article by Utsumi Aiko, Japan's leading specialist on World War II POW issues, which addresses Japan's policies toward prisoners.] During World War II, the American strategic bombing campaign targeted Tokyo and other Japanese cities. The U.S. considered the tactic legitimate, and eventually secured Japan's unconditional surrender by destroying the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs. But Japan saw the bombing of its cities as the deliberate targeting of civilians--and employed summary proceedings to punish captured American flyers as war criminals. Following the war, American military authorities concluded that treating Americans as war criminals was itself a war crime, because the Japanese procedures didn't meet the due-process standards of international law. At U.S. military commissions convened at Yokohama, Japan, in the late 1940s, U.S. Army officers carefully reviewed the level of due process the enemy had afforded American prisoners, and harshly punished them for falling short of what the U.S. decided was required.
Remembering 'The Good War'
The Atomic Bombing and the Internment of Japanese-Americans in U.S. History Textbooks
by Mark Selden [Japan Focus 11 May 2005]
Japan, the Japanese people, and Japanese-Americans enter the pages of American history textbooks only in treatments of World War II, which, together with the American Revolution, constitutes the high water mark of American triumphalism. At a time when Japanese textbooks are subject to intense public scrutiny for their treatment of the war and colonialism, it is appropriate to examine their American counterparts. Like the treatments of wartime foes in the textbooks of other nations, these reveal as much about dominant American nationalism and chauvinism as they do about Japan and the Japanese. Here I consider two of the primary -- and most contested -- issues discussed in 19 textbooks spanning the years 1958 to 2000 and including many of the most influential among both high school and college textbooks.
CALL FOR NEW U.S.-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS
July 27, 2003 marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Korean War Armistice. A key stipulation of that agreement was to work towards a political settlement to ensure lasting peace. Yet after a half century, political settlements in the form of peace treaty or diplomatic recognition between North Korea and the U.S. have not come to light and we still face a dangerous specter of renewed hostilities as military preoccupations and confrontational rhetoric cloud meaningful negotiations aimed at resolving the anachronistic stalemate. We should look at the current crisis over North Korea's nuclear program in this historical and political context.
At this critical juncture, what we need are bold initiatives and breakthroughs - not escalation or inaction.
A renewed war on the Korean Peninsula is unimaginable and catastrophic. Committee for Self-Determination and Peace in Korea July 27, 2003, Washington, DC [Peace proposals]
Do Not Turn Korean Peninsula Into Waste Land
By Vladimir Tikhonov
25 April, 2003 When the National Assembly approved the dispatch of troops to Iraq I could only think of the title of a famous newspaper column, written about a century ago by Chang Ji-yeon, about the Japanese takeover of diplomatic priorities. A country that was once colonized by Japanese imperialism, and that suffered numerous civilian massacres during the Korea War, is now complicit with U.S. imperialism's indiscriminate carnage against the Iraqi people. Sending troops to Iraq will reduce South Korea to a hired hand of the aggressor, decimating the historical legitimacy of the country. Whatever government apologia, April 2nd, 2003, the day the National Assembly passed the approval, will go down in history as a day of national humiliation. What will history teachers across the nation be able to teach their students when their soldiers begin to aid the aggressor? I feel the pulse of history is beginning to cease. The pro-war administration of Roh Moo Hyun likely refrains it from using the false pretexts promoted by Bush & Co.: the threats of "weapons of mass destruction", or the "elimination of the Hussein Dictatorship." Probably, government officials tacitly admit that there is no legitimate case for this war. What they attempt to sell once and again is national interest, and a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis.
Hegemony or Empire?
Niall Ferguson From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003
It is fast becoming conventional wisdom that the power of the United States today closely resembles that of the United Kingdom roughly a century ago.
Nevertheless, whereas the British were generally quite open about the fact that they were running an empire, few American politicians today would use the "e" word as anything other than a term of abuse. As the military analyst Andrew Bacevich has noted, this goes for both Democrats and Republicans. Speaking in 1999, Sandy Berger, President Clinton's national security adviser, declared that the United States is the "first global power in history that is not an imperial power." A year later, then candidate George W. Bush echoed his words, arguing, "America has never been an empire. ... We may be the only great power in history that had the chance, and refused." Reverting to this theme aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln on May 1 this year, President Bush insisted, "Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home." A few days previously, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had picked up the refrain in an interview with al Jazeera, when he claimed, "We're not imperialistic. We never have been." Americans, in short, don't "do" empire; they do "leadership" instead, or, in more academic parlance, "hegemony." [imperialism] .
What Is the Price For a United Korea?
[Opinion] Samuel Lee analyzes East Asia's most volatile drama, and places blame on all its actors
The long and bumpy road to a united Korea is filled with stop signs and speed limits, slowing traffic so much that many Koreans may think they are going backward. The investments needed and probably demanded by the North Korean government would be quite substantial, and would be made not only by the South Korean government but also by Hyundai, Samsung, LG and other large conglomerates. Once the investments are made, they will be lost if relations derail. In March 2003, reporter Donald Macintyre of Time Asia estimated that the South Korean government had sent $4.68 billion to North Korea, the private sector $2.94 billion and the general public $1.2 billion in aid and donations. The question needs to be asked, "What is South Korea getting in return?" [unification cost]
Bush's Geopolitical Legacy
Immanuel Wallerstein Commentary No. 158, April 1, 2005 The newspapers these days tell us that George W. Bush is concerned with his historical legacy. For what will he be remembered by historians writing twenty-five years from now? Apparently, he thinks that he will be remembered for advancing "liberty" in the world, and perhaps particularly in the Middle East. This seems to me most unlikely. I think he will be remembered for having anchored a major geopolitical shift that will be lasting - the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis. This comes to mind just now because on March 18 this year, there was a meeting between the leaders of these three countries (plus Spain) in Paris. Nothing extraordinary was decided at that meeting. It was rather just an ordinary, but now fairly regular, occurrence. It is the quiet regularity of these meetings one should notice.
Geopolitical shifts are analogous to the movement of tectonic plates on the earth.
Pacific Terrorism: An Exchange on War and Terror
by Robert G. Kane and Mark Selden
Japan Focus does not as a rule post reviews. Because of the centrality of the issues of terrorism in the Asia-Pacific that it addresses, we are posting Robert G. Kane's review and a response. We hope to extend discussion of these themes in the future. Gavan McCormack By Robert G. Kane With a response by Mark Selden
Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So, eds. _War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century_. War and Peace Library Series. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 304 pp. Notes, index. $80.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-7425-2390-X; $29.95 (paper), ISBN 0-7425-2391-8.
The potentially powerful corrective offered in this provocative book to the contemporary U.S. political and media definition of "terrorism" calls to mind one of Mark Selden's editorial efforts from a comparable time. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Selden was among a group of young Asian studies specialists who pointedly challenged the then prevailing Cold War premises that were the basis of dominant American perceptions of and official policies toward Asia. Whereas McCarthyite censure had largely silenced criticism of the U.S. government by more senior scholars in the field (lest one appear to be "un-American"), this group argued against an unexamined acceptance of American benevolence as being at the heart of American intervention across Asia since the end of World War II.
Their alternate analysis instead compellingly stressed the destructiveness of American military actions, first in Korea and, more pressingly given the period, the ongoing war in Vietnam. Here, a key intent was to dispel Cold War binaries in which the United States grudgingly projected its power overseas simply to defeat Chinese or North Vietnamese aggression. These Asianists also took aim at seemingly more benign American initiatives such as the Occupation of Japan or the study of China in high schools and universities in the United States. In both cases, the emphasis was squarely on the human costs of the exercise of American power and the hypocrisy of American perceptions of self and Asia. Despite its now obvious analytical flaws, the book was certainly a significant intellectual contribution to the study of Asia in the United States, at the very least due to its explosion of a distorted "us-versus-them" dichotomy.[1]
The volume under review attempts to aim a similarly bright spotlight at the highly destructive behavior of states, particularly the United States and Japan, in Asia from the late-nineteenth century to the present. While it necessarily retraces some familiar terrain in the process, the major value of the work is its thought-provoking theoretical framework. As the title suggests, the authors seek to clarify the differences between acts of war, in which states use violence against other states with the focus on military targets, and state terrorism, and those in which states employ violent means against civilians, either at home or abroad, despite their official acceptance of treaties, edicts, or laws that specifically protect such populations. The distinction is essential, the book rightly argues, given the relentless erasure of the line dividing civilians and combatants that has characterized the conduct of war during the "long twentieth century," especially in Asia. Few studies so far have attempted to unravel and compare the two ideas, and the authors intend to bring the same scholarly rigor to this nexus as others have to the study of war, crime, genocide, and the much more widely known terrorist acts in opposition to states (pp. 4-6).
History Overshadows Japan-South Korea Rapprochement
by Kosuke TAKAHASHI
KAWASAKI, Japan - The shrill voice of one old woman with humped shoulders still leaves a distant but lasting memory. When I was an elementary and junior-high-school student in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, I frequently visited my ethnic-Korean friends after school. One day, on the way to a Korean friend's house, an old woman just down the way suddenly snarled at me, saying, "Ilbon ka!" I was stunned. Later I found that what she meant by those few words was something like "Hey, Japanese!" or "Are you Japanese?" (Ilbon means "Japan" in Korean, and ka is an interrogative in Japanese.) She had expressed her deep-seated distrust of all Japanese nationals, even a boy like me. I was definitely intimidated. As can be readily understood, the older the Koreans, the more distrustful they were. Today I understand why.
Stranger Than Fiction
By B. R. MYERS Published: February 13, 2005
Seoul TO North Korea, diplomacy is another form of war. Under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, the Foreign Ministry has bullied the United Nations into submission and outwitted the United States into providing food aid - all the while developing a formidable nuclear arsenal. This is, of course, the hard-line view of North Korea that prevails in some quarters in Washington. Yet it is also the official North Korean view of North Korea. In the West, attention is almost exclusively focused on the official pronouncements released by Pyongyang's Central News Agency - statements that, for all their strange rhetoric, strive to present North Korea as a misunderstood country eager for more normal relations with Washington. Last week's announcement that North Korea has nuclear weapons, for example, said that while the country had "manufactured nukes for self-defense," it still sought only "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. But the propaganda dinned every day into the North Korean people is of a different order. School textbooks, wall posters, literary works: all celebrate a cynical "attack diplomacy" that makes a frightened and uncertain world dance to the drum of Kim Jong Il. Again and again, comic effect is derived from stories of stammering American and international officials trying to placate the relentless "warriors" of the Foreign Ministry. Washington's refusal to follow through on veiled threats of military action is mocked as a failure of nerve. The novel "Barrel of a Gun," for example, released in 2003, is an official "historical" work about how Mr. Kim's iron resolve forced the Clinton administration to its knees in 1998. "Excellency," the American negotiator says at the end of the book, groveling shamelessly before his North Korean counterpart, "you are also a mighty superpower."
John Bolton's Baggage
A UN Basher as UN Ambassador
By TOM BARRY March 14, 2005 Counterpunch
Unlike most neoconservatives, UN Ambassador-designate John Bolton didn't start out his political career on the center-left--either as a liberal, social democrat, or socialist. When Irving Kirstol, regarded by many as the "godfather of neoconservatism" described a neoconservative as a "liberal who has been mugged by reality," he wasn't describing John R. Bolton.
Bolton is not only one of the administration's leading hawks on China policy, he is also its strongest advocate of Taiwan 's independence and of U.S. defense of Taiwan . Bolton has close professional and personal ties in Taipei . According to an investigative report by the Washington Post ( April 9, 2001 ), Bolton was on the payroll of the Taiwan government before joining the Bush administration. Bolton received $30,000 for "research papers on UN membership issues involving Taiwan " at the same time he was promoting diplomatic recognition of Taiwan before various congressional committees.
East Asia and the World: The Decades Ahead
Immanuel Wallerstein Commentary No. 157, April 1, 2005
The combined economic, political, and yes military power of East Asia would become formidable in the coming half-century. In the transition the world-system is undergoing from its present historical structure - that of a capitalist world-economy - to something else, the East Asian bloc would come to play a central role, perhaps the central role. The negative side is also obvious. First, such an effort would face very vigorous opposition from the United States and, to a lesser extent, western Europe
How KATUSA Almost Didn't Happen
By Andrei Lankov In September and October 1950, the U.S. Army advanced into central and northern Korea and many Koreans were extremely surprised to see that a large number of U.S. soldiers were actually Koreans. Dressed in American uniforms and among the American soldiers, they were known as KATUSAs, or Korean Augmentations to the U.S. Army. They were attached to U.S. units where they were supposed to become ``normal'' soldiers, doing the same jobs and receiving the same treatment as their America counterparts.
How diplomacy can defuse the North Korean crisis
By EUGENE B. KOGAN Special to The Japan Times WASHINGTON -- "The sure way to miss success is to miss the opportunity," a wise man once observed. Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura asked U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to visit Japan "at the earliest possible opportunity" during a bilateral security meeting in Washington on Feb. 19. When that visit takes place, Machimura must urge Rice to take the above maxim to heart if the United States, Japan and their regional allies are to be successful in bringing North Korea back to the six-party negotiating table.
Restore US nukes to South Korea
By John Parker BANGKOK - It's the counter strategy that dares not speak its name: return US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. North Korea's announcement on February 10 that it had nuclear weapons only surprised those who were not paying attention. After all, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has a history of nuclear research dating to the 1950s, and is believed to have initiated nuclear weapons development programs in the late 1970s. [1] When the North pulled out of the 1994 Agreed Framework agreement in 2002 and ejected United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency observers from its Yongbyon nuclear complex, the regime gained unimpeded access to enough plutonium to make at least a handful of implosion warheads, and the manufacture of the actual devices has been only a matter of time.
The strategy is simple: re-introduce nuclear weapons to South Korea. As drastic as such a step might seem, it would in fact be stabilizing, and hardly unprecedented. [Bizarre]
Pyongyang's New Year's present
By Henry J. Hyde. U.S. Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.) chairs the House International Relations Committee
Published March 8, 2005 in Chicago Tribune As Asia ushered in the Chinese New Year with celebrations last month, the North Korean regime announced that it now possesses a nuclear weapon. The announcement came as an unwelcome gift for officials in South Korea and China, who were looking for a little holiday downtime. A nuclearized North Korea is, of course, something our intelligence services have asserted for years, but now Pyongyang has left little room for doubt. North Korea added insult to injury by further announcing its indefinite withdrawal from the six-party talks due to "the Bush administration's increasingly hostile policy."
It was more than just Asian New Year's dinners that were disrupted by Pyongyang's boorish announcement. Pyongyang threw the gauntlet down in front of the main advocates of "incentives" for its promised good behavior. Sunny talk with North Korea was met with bluster. It is time for Beijing and Seoul to reconsider the assistance they shower on a regime that now has nuclear blackmail in its arsenal.
Pyongyang should have no illusions concerning congressional support for normalization of relations until it provides a full accounting of its nuclear activities. This holds true for its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism as well. Pyongyang must cease such terrorist activities as the landing of commandos on the South Korean coast and the reported assassination of a South Korean diplomat in Vladivostok, Russia, both in 1996, if it ever hopes to be accepted internationally. Whether Kim Jong Il and his government [Terrorism] [US NK policy]
Why Korean-Americans Need to Get Smart
Colonel James V. Young (US Army Retired)
I have been an observer and participant in much of Korean-American relations over the past fifty years, and would like to make a statement about the current situation. It is as bad as I have ever seen it. Much of the responsibility for this situation, as I see it, is the direct result of a very poorly crafted and inaccurate system of education in Korea, and in some part, the U.S. as well. We all allow revisionist historians to educate our children, and then complain when they turn out to be idiots, without any appreciation for actual history, much of which my generation has experienced first hand, but which none of their teachers nor themselves have experienced.
Today Korean, and Korean-American children, are taught that their ancestors were foolish and somehow the puppets of either the Japanese or now, we are told the "American" colonialists. This is nonsense [Anti Americanism]
Negotiation or Ultimatum?
Stephen Gowans
Friday, March 04, 2005The US is demanding that North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the DPRK) return to the six party talks to negotiate the complete, verifiable and irrevocable dismantling of its nuclear capabilities. Using the word "negotiate" in this context is akin to characterizing a mugging at gunpoint as a negotiation. There's no negotiation involved. This is an ultimatum, and the six party talks are simply a mechanism to step up pressure on Pyongyang to comply. That North Korea refuses to return to the mislabeled "talks" until the US agrees to give up what Pyongyang, with unerring accuracy, dubs Washington's "hostile policy," is as sound and just as is its intention to develop a "nuclear deterrent." There's nothing to talk about, since Washington has steadfastly refused to do anything but repeat the same demand over and over: give up your deterrent capabilities and maybe we'll talk...that is, depending on how well you comply with our other demands; and then only maybe. We don't want to reward bad behavior.
Two Koreas Ensnared in U.S.-Inspired Nuclear Trap
[Analysis] Surrounded by nuclear powers, Korea's dilemma is nuclear sovereignty, non-proliferation
Controversy has been sparked by news that the U.S. administration of George W. Bush has decided on plans to submit the issue of South Korea's nuclear materials experiments to the United Nations Security Council. According to reports in the JoongAng Ilbo, SBS and others, U.S. State Department Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, attending a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) meeting late October, told Japanese officials the U.S. planned to submit the South Korean nuclear experiment issue to the U.N. Security Council. It is also known that this position was conveyed to National Security Deputy Advisor Lee Jong Seok, who is visiting the United States.
About this, the government said it was premature to view Bolton's comments as the official U.S. position, and officials are busy formulating countermeasures. When one considers, however, that Bolton is a mover in U.S. foreign policy and he's been entrusted with handling issues of nuclear proliferation, his comments cannot be passed off lightly.
In order to overcome this dilemma while strengthening Korea's role and position within the international non-proliferation system, it must expand its diplomacy from piggybacking on the United States to diplomacy based on the universality of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In order to do this, participating in the "Middle Power Initiative," lead by major U.S. allies and friends like Canada, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand, would be a significant start.
Korea-Japan FTA: Toward a Model Case for East Asian Economic Integration
'NK's Pandora's Box of Reform Is Open'
[Interview] Former Unification Minister Jeong Se Hyun says North Korea is 'pretending to be angry'
Reclaiming Asia From the West: Rethinking Global History
By Wang Hui
Japan Focus 24 February 2005
Asia, like Europe, wants to create regional institutions strong enough to counterbalance the power of the United States. Two apparently different ideas - liberal globalisation and the new empire?- have knit together military unions, collaborative economic associations and international political institutions to set up a global order encompassing politics, the economy, culture and the military. This order may be called neoliberal imperialism?
Jumping to the Right
by Philip J. Cunningham
Japan Focus 24 February 2005
At first glance, the handful of Tokyo rightists who created a furor about a graphic scene of the Nanjing Massacre in two September issues of the popular manga magazine Young Jump Weekly are a surprisingly tolerant lot. They restricted their complaint to technical issues in "My Country is Burningî" by Motomiya Hiroshi, the only remotely educational series in a popular weekly comic book, and ignored 400 pages of gratuitous sex, violence, scatology and gore that dominates this illustrated publication with a reported circulation of 2 million. This sends out a dubious signal to the nation's youth: Violence is fine, as long as it's entertaining and Doesn't deal with sensitive historical issues.
Japan's Grassroots Pacifism
by Mari YAMAMOTO
Japan Focus 24 February 2005
Remembering the war in the Japanese way
Much English writing about pacifism and peace movements has focused on the ideas and activities of Europeans and Americans. While attention has been paid to Mohandas Gandhi, peace movements in other parts of the world have been largely ignored. Like most Western peace activists, however, Gandhi was an exceptional figure in Indian society, far from the political mainstream. In contrast to most other societies, there has been a widely shared public consensus in Japan throughout most of the post-war years that the Japanese government should abide by the pacifistic guidelines decreed by its Constitution, which forbids Japan from waging wars or maintaining armed forces.
Secondly, pacifists need to put forward concrete strategies on how to realize or move closer to realizing the imperatives of the Constitution's Article 9, which forbids Japan from resorting to war and possessing armed forces. The issue is particularly timely at a time of heightened tensions between Japan on one hand and North Korea and China on the other. The question is whether pacifists are able to contribute effectively to conflict prevention and the creation of new forms of community as alternatives to war [Japanese remilitarisation]
North Korea Development Report 2003/04
The North Korea Development Report was launched as an annual report in 2002 in recognition of the need for a comprehensive overview of the North Korean economy and policies. The publishing of this second edition is important because it not only supplements the findings of the first edition, but also updates the present condition of the North Korean economy and reflects the recent changes in its economic policies. Like the inaugural volume, Korean authors have contributed to this Report to reflect exclusively Korean experts views. The topics covered in this report are as follows: macroeconomics and finance (Part I), industry and infrastructure (Part II), foreign economic relations and inter-Korean economic cooperation (Part III), social welfare and science & technology (Part IV), and the recent economic reforms (Part V). Parts I through IV correspond to the organization of the first edition of the report, while Part V is a new section that covers the "July 1 Economic Reforms" launched two years ago and subsequent economic policy changes. This second edition moves a step beyond the economic and policy focus of the first edition by attempting to address the most pressing questions concerning the North Korean economy.
The Structure of North Korea's Political Economy: Changes and Effects
: Young-Sun Lee and Deok Ryong Yoon Date : 2004-12-30
Expansion Strategies of South Korean Multinationals
Hongshik Lee Date : 2004-08-25
Disengagement from North Korea is a strategy to consider
By Richard Halloran Saturday, Feb 19, 2005,Page 9 Ever since North Korea declared that it had started manufacturing nuclear arms and asserted that those weapons were no longer negotiable, leaders in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Moscow, and the UN have been scurrying to persuade, cajole, or force the North Koreans to return to the negotiating table. Maybe that is the wrong way to confront this issue. More than two years of negotiation have proven futile. An alternative, military force, is an option that nobody in any capital wants because it would cause unspeakable death and destruction. Perhaps it is time for the US to adopt a third option, which would be to disengage itself completely from the Korean peninsula. Complete US disengagement would mean: 1) Walking away from the six party talks in Beijing, cutting off all communication with Pyongyang, strengthening economic sanctions, and warning North Korea that any military threat to the US, to US forces in Asia, and to US allies would be met with terrible retribution. 2) Withdrawing all US forces from the peninsula and abrogating the US-South Korea mutual security treaty because of rampant anti-Americanism in Seoul, a rising tendency to appease North Korea, and a penchant for blaming the US for blocking reunification.
US Subversion of Diplomacy and North Korea's Phantom Nukes
by Gregory Elich
www.globalresearch.ca 18 February 2005
In the months ahead, the U.S. can be expected to intensify its pressure on South Korea and China to back more aggressive measures and it is probable that the U.S. will ask the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against North Korea.
If the U.S. is successful in its efforts to further isolate and blockade North Korea, then it will risk plunging the Korean Peninsula into a state of crisis. That development would only be exacerbated by further hostile actions undertaken by the Bush Administration which could potentially raise the specter of war.
A Long-term Strategy for North Korea
by Georgy Bulychev Japan Focus 17 February 2005
With the North Korean announcement that it now possesses nuclear weapons, (simply meant to intensify pressure on the US to formulate a coherent strategy vis-a-vis Pyongyang) world attention is focused on the issue of solving the nuclear crisis: finding a way to force, or induce, or make North Korea do away with its nuclear program and nuclear aspirations. Millions of words have been written about the methods and tactics best suited to tackle the issue, including the strategy of six-party talks. However, it is rarely mentioned that the nuclear issue can probably not be solved without addressing the deeper issue -- the future of North Korea itself. Without a clear-cut strategy on this, all efforts to solve the nuclear issue are probably doomed, or worse, they could even pave the way for a military solution. So, what is preferable -- collapse or transformation of the DPRK? And if transformation was to occur, would that help alleviate the tension and solve security problems? What should the world community do?
Japanese Militarization and the Bush Doctrine
by Richard Tanter Japan Focus 17 February 2005
Japan is proceeding towards full security normalization, moving closer to throwing off all the externally and self-imposed restraints which for half a century produced a disjuncture between its economic status as the world's second largest national economy and its restricted status in the security realm. In the existing world system, normalization of this kind necessarily means militarization, and that is precisely what Japan has undertaken, a process that can be titled "Heisei militarization." The Bush Doctrine has accelerated but did not cause this process. [Japanese remilitarization]
The End of Apology
by Alexis Dudden Japan Focus 17 February 2005
In recent months, the survivors of Japan's so-called comfort women system have been dealt a series of newly cruel blows.
Premier attraction
Steve Gowans
Does Communist Evil Have Any Limits? Commented the New York Times on south Koreans working with north Koreans at a south Korean owned industrial park at Kaesong: "Some south Koreans say they may have...trouble working with the North Koreans...because South Korea's fiercely anti-Communist education taught them for decades that North Koreans were dangerous and evil. In North Korea, by contrast, government education programs taught that while South Korea's government was an American puppet, its people were brothers and sisters." (New York Times, February 8, 2005.) Brothers and sisters? That does sound dangerous and evil. South Korea's government an American puppet? Who would have thought it?
North Korea's Tactics
By Leon V. Sigal February 15th, 2005
Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York and author of "Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea", writes: "North Korea is the embodiment of evil to some Americans, who object to making a pact with the devil. Why they prefer to bluff and bluster while watching North Korea adds to its nuclear might instead of disarming it through give-and-take is a mystery of their faith."
Civil society, nuclear disarmament, and the U.S. alliance: the cases of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan
.Naoki Kamimura
East-West Center, No. 8, October 2004
Dr. Naoki Kamimura is Professor of American Studies in the Faculty of International Studies at Hiroshima City University. He has written extensively on the impact of civil society on nuclear disarmament efforts in the Asia Pacific and North America. Dr. Kamimura received his BA degree from the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and his MA and PhD degrees from the University of California, Los Angeles. This paper was presented at the workshop "In Whose Interests? The Future of the US Military in Asia," held at the East-West Center, February 20-22, 2003. As
'The World Will Be Safer Without Bush' Cho Hee Yeon (cjhoon99)
The U.S. presidential election is in its final week. America stands at the crossroads of whether or not to elect a president who will turn Asia and the rest of the globe into its enemies.
Second Inter-Korean summit: ready for re-run?
by Brent Choi
Seoul is currently abuzz with rumors of second inter-Korean summit meeting. Any expert on Korean Peninsula who failed to detect this mood must be either inept in Korean issues or pretty slow in catching few hints.
South Korea Seeks Strategic Focus Among the Behemoths
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein 14 February 2005 As a major rebalancing of power proceeds in East Asia, caused by the rise of China as an economic and military great power, South Korea -- the toughest Asian tiger, caught in a game of behemoths -- must struggle to position itself advantageously.
Paths diverging? The next decade in the U.S.-Japan security alliance
William E. Rapp January 2004 [Japanese remilitarisation]
Let Pyongyang Wail for Now
By Tom Plate Professor at University of California, Los Angeles Director of Asia Pacific Media Network But when North Korea throws its rattle out of its crib, the best thing to do is to stick earplugs in, while keeping a watchful eye on baby. He/she is just trying to get your attention. The yes-to- nukes/no-to-talks temper-tantrum really means that North Korea wants some tender-loving care. [bizarre]
Japan's hidden role in the "return" of Zainichi Koreans to North Korea
By Tessa Morris-Suzuki
The slow and troubled journey towards a future normalization of relations between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK - North Korea) is shaped by two radically different visions of the past. Both Japanese and North Korean governments demand a "settling of accounts" for past history. For Japan, however, the "account" in question is the fate of the Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea. For the North Korean side, on the other hand, it is the older and larger history of Japanese colonialism in Korea. Meanwhile there is one aspect of the shared history of the two countries which has been neglected by both sides, and where responsibilities for the past remain to be addressed. This is the issue of the "return" to North Korea of some 93,000 people - the overwhelming majority of them Zainichi Koreans (although the number also included some Japanese spouses of North Koreans).
The Self-Identities of Zainichi Koreans
Jin Saeng So Introduction Today, about half of the foreign population in Japan is Korean. It is estimated that the number of Koreans in Japan would be much higher if those who have Japanese citizenship are included. The majority of this figure is comprised by those who are called "Zainichi-kankaku/chousenjin," (Korean permanent or long-term residents in Japan).
"I just want to make Japan a better place to live":
Korean national blocked from promotion by Tokyo government vows to fight on
by David McNeill
Chong Hyang Gyun has just written herself into the history books, but not for the reason she wanted. The 54-year-old spent a decade fighting the Tokyo Metropolitan Government for the right to take a promotion exam, from which she was barred because of her South Korean nationality. If she had won, nationality would have ceased to be a factor in determining senior civil service jobs in Japan. But in late January, the Supreme Court supported Tokyo's 1994 decision to bar her from promotion from her current post as a public health nurse to managerial level, saying: "Japanese nationality is necessary for positions which are linked to the exercise of public power." The landmark decision, which effectively rules that senior civil service jobs here should be filled only by Japanese, was greeted with dismay by anti-discrimination campaigners.
Nuclear Folly
by Lawrence S. Wittner
According to recent news reports and as hinted in the president's State of the Union Address, the neocons who dominate the Bush administration are gearing up for another pre-emptive military attack, this time upon Iran. The ostensible reason for such an attack is that the Iranian government is developing nuclear weapons.
Other nations have drawn this same conclusion. In the fall of 2004, Helen Clark, the prime minister of New Zealand, warned: "First and foremost we need to keep before us the essential bargain that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty represents. While we will willingly contribute to non-proliferation and counter-proliferation initiatives, those initiatives should be promoted alongside initiatives to secure binding commitments from those who have nuclear weapons which move us further towards the longer-term goal of nuclear disarmament."[NPT]
Primary Responsibility for the Worsening in Japan-China Relations lies with Japan: Reflections on recent conflicts
by Asai Motofumi Japan Focus 10 February 2005
Foggy North Korean shuffle
By SOYOUNG KWON and GLYN FORD Special to The Japan Times BRUSSELS -- Recent events in North Korea have been interpreted in various ways and, generally, the wish has been father to the thought. The truth is difficult to discern, but indications are that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has placed himself firmly behind a reform program that may finally bring the country in from the cold. The fact that Pyongyang is considering applying for observer status at the World Trade Organization supports this contention. [Economic reform]
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness
James Kelly
South Korea Between 20th Century Political Forces and 21st Century Governance
Kang Man Gil interviewed by Kim Jae Jung
If North Korea collapses, China will fill the space Kim: Those who are concerned about the solution to the national question have recently been perplexed by 'the North Korean human rights question.' The US is trying to turn this into a big international issue by passing the 'North Korean Human Rights Bill.' It doesn't look right since the US is attempting to destroy the current North Korean regime. How should we approach this question?
Kang: I would say that we should prioritize the issues of survival and maintaining the current regime over the human rights issue. I think only after these problems are resolved can we discuss the human rights issue. Those concerned about human rights in North Korea must first concern themselves with the survival of the North Koreans and how to maintain the current government there. They should also think about aid programs.
There are moves afoot to connect North Korea's human rights issues with the collapse of the North Korean regime, as can be seen in the 'North Korean Human Rights Bill,' but these moves will only force North Korea to close its doors more tightly. Even if North Korea were to collapse, South Korea would not be able to fill the space.
When President Kim Il Sung passed on, two scenarios emerged with regard to the possibility of the collapse of the North Korean regime. One was that in the event of North Korean collapse, China might dominate the region by the use of military force. The other was that China might advocate the establishment of a pro-Chinese military government. China wants North Korean territory to remain a contained land between the US and Japan. One has to remember what enormous sacrifices China made during the Korean War in order to maintain the position of North Korea. The situation is still the same. Because of this, the North Korean human rights issue should be approached as a humanitarian issue, not as one directed toward the collapse of the regime.
Kim Jae Jung's interview with Kang Man Gil appeared in Mal, Number 222, December, 2004. He can be reached at jjkim@digitalmal.com
Translated for Japan Focus by Sonia Ryang
[Friction] [Collapse]
North Korean Human Rights Act
By Chang Se-moon Professor of University of South Alabama The year 2004 has been rather slow in terms of the relations between the two Koreas. One of the more significant events that occurred during the slow year was the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act that President Bush signed into law on Oct. 18, 2004. There are many opponents and proponents of the act. South Korean politicians from the ruling Uri Party were so concerned about the act that they issued a statement saying ``the act may have dire consequences for peace on the Korean peninsula'' and ``the act is perceived as aiming to overthrow the Kim Jung-il government and will inflame the delicate political balance in the region.'' I have no idea what it is intended to mean when the act states ``a national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall not be considered a national of the Republic of Korea.'' I have long believed that North Korea and South Korea are one nation divided due to international circumstances beyond Korea's control. All Korean-Americans and other Koreans living abroad should support the democratic government of South Korea on its policies toward unification. [Friction]
Bush and the World: The Second Term
Immanuel Wallerstein Comment No. 152, January 1, 2005
George W. Bush has been reelected for a second term of four years. It is rather certain what policy he will pursue on the U.S. domestic scene, since he has announced it clearly. He will push for further tax cuts. He will seek to privatize as much of the social security system as he can. He will appoint only judges who will reflect his conservative values, both on economic and social matters. He will seek to dismantle as much environmental legislation as possible. He will seek to strengthen the authority of the government in all police investigations and prosecutions. In short, he will pursue a classic rightwing agenda.
What remains much more obscure is what he intends to do in foreign policy, and this for one very simple reason. On the one hand, during his first term his administration committed itself strongly to a particular foreign policy - that of unilateral pre-emptive action whenever and wherever it felt like. On the other hand, this foreign policy has not been very successful, not only in the eyes of its critics at home and elsewhere in the world, but even in the eyes of many of its faithful supporters. There is turmoil in the ranks of the Bush partisans, which can be observed in the recent flurry of demands by certain major conservative figures for the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld combined with the immediate support Rumsfeld received from others, including the president himself. Rumsfeld simply exemplifies these policies.
What happens vis-a-vis Iraq will presage all the rest of the Bush foreign policy. It is already the case that Bush has pulled back on North Korea and Iran to a position of tacit recognition of impotence. The Bush team is huffing and puffing, but they know there is very little they can do.
If North Korea collapses
By Jason Lim With each passing day, it seems more and more likely that the current North Korean regime's days are numbered. Suspicious railroad explosions, the recent purge of a powerful relative of Kim Jong Il and an exodus of upper class elites all indicate a regime on the verge of a breakdown. This means America should not limit her strategic perspective only to the nuclear issue but should also prepare for a possible North Korean implosion. What we do in the immediate aftermath of North Korea's collapse will dictate what we can do in this vital region for a long time to come.
. The worst long-term scenario for America is that the Chinese will take the initiative and trigger an internal coup that would overthrow Kim Jong Il and replace his cabal with a Beijing?friendly military dictatorship. It would truly be a foreign policy disaster for America to allow the Chinese to do this, for it would help China establish hegemony over vast stretches of north Asia. It cannot be denied that China represents the biggest challenge to America's primacy in economy, technology, industry and international influence. When you examine the ethnic Korean distribution in Asia, you will notice a geographical axis that runs along the border between China and Russia. That presents America with an interesting opportunity. A strategically-located ethnic Korean axis strongly influenced by a unified Korea with close American ties offers a unique opportunity to not only check the Chinese hegemony but also to extend further influence into this all?important region and make sure that any dawning "Asian Century" also includes America. The 2 million-strong Korean American community can be utilized as a natural bridge to this ethnic Korean axis. It is vital that American foreign policy not be blinded by the short-term nuclear issue in northeast Asia. Long-term national interests and strategic options must also be seriously considered. Jason Lim was the Director of Special Projects for an international NGO.
Popular support for the Kim Jong-Il Government
-by Sejong October 05, 2004
You could look at the scholarship of Charles Armstrong, professor of history at Columbia University. He's written several books and articles on North Korea, and he's quite straightforward on this point. Clipped below is the relevant part of an interview on PBS (Public Broadcasting System) in the US from last year.
JAMIE RUBIN (PBS HOST): ...Some outside analysts and some even in the Bush administration have suggested that we can provoke the collapse of North Korea, that if we give them a little outside access, if we put the squeeze on the regime, if we sanction them, that somehow we can provoke a collapse. How likely do you think that is?
PROFESSOR CHARLES ARMSTRONG:I think that's very unlikely to work at this point in time because of the very closed nature of the regime and the degree of, I think, genuine support that the people have for their leadership. How much would it take to get people to [rebel] against the regime? Well, look, in the late 1980's we had a famine in North Korea. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps two or three million people, ten percent of the population died of starvation. And the regime is still there. What would it take to get the regime to fall? And could we take the responsibility upon ourselves to evoke anything that catastrophic?
Regime Change: A Necessity of Inter-Imperialist Rivalry?
By Stephen Gowans December 23, 2004
Not too long ago, James Kelly, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visited the perennial U.S. bete noire, north Korea, and made an accusation. "You're cheating," he said.
Here was the answer: With an American sword of Damocles hanging over its head, Pyongyang would be forced to channel a large share of its scarce and dwindling resources into national self-defense, further impoverishing a civilian economy already weakened by the overthrow of its socialist trading partners, trade sanctions, and a series of natural disasters. Who in their right mind would think a country that appeared on satellite photos as a blacked-out nothingness could be a model of anything but of what happens to small countries that run afoul of imperialist behemoths?
As for the light water reactors the Clinton administration promised, they never got built. True, construction work had begun, but by the time the scheduled completion date rolled around in 2003, the promised reactors were little more than two holes in the ground.
Then came Kelly's accusation. "We have evidence you're secretly running a nuclear weapons program." Confronted with the accusation, Kelly said the north Koreans confessed. Soon after, fuel-oil shipments were cancelled, leaving the country desperately short of energy, and - Washington hoped - on its last legs.
But that's not the way the north Koreans tell the story. Kang Sok Ju, north Korea's First Deputy Foreign Minister - the official who Kelly said made the admission -- cried foul. No confession was made, he countered, because there was no secret program [2].
Indeed, Kelly's story seems fishy. That a north Korean official would openly admit his government reneged on an important accord is unfathomable, indeed too unfathomable to be believed. If there was a secret program, why say one existed?
Another thing: Can Kelly be believed? The Bush administration's track record on telling the truth is hardly what you would call unimpeachable. Where are those weapons of mass destruction, anyway?
What seems likely is that Kelly fabricated the story to justify Bush administration plans to scupper the agreement. But what's intriguing is the possibility that Washington cooked up the story to frighten off south Korea and Japan from opening trade relations with Pyongyang [3]. [Admission]
North Korea: How Washington works to crush threats to US capital (and turn them into investor paradises)
Stephen Gowans
US cold war strategist Robert McNamara had a plan to crush the Soviet Union, which, in its broad outlines, is being used today by Washington to bring down communist hold-outs Cuba and north Korea. McNamara perceived that the post-war Soviet leadership had three goals: 1. Rebuild an economy devastated by Nazi aggression, to raise living standards and proceed along the path to communism. 2. Rebuild the military to provide protection against a stalking capitalist world. 3. Win new friends in Eastern Europe and the Third World [1]. McNamara reasoned that if the US ratcheted up military pressure on the USSR, the Soviet leadership would be forced to subordinate its first goal, rebuilding the economy, to its second, recuperating its military strength, and beyond that, keeping pace with the growing US military threat.
As regards north Korea, US efforts to bring an end to the country's socialism have largely followed the McNamara plan. There are differences, of course, some large, but in broad outline, the approach is much the same.
Korea Backgrounder: How the South Views its Brother from Another Planet
Asia Report N°89 14 December 2004
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A strong majority of South Koreans agree on the need to engage North Korea but there is no consensus on the most effective means. As the debate over how to deal with the northern brother intensifies, deep fissures are forming among the public. Significant generational and political shifts have transformed views in ways that could undermine U.S. policy in the region unless Washington develops a better understanding of the situation in Seoul. The generation that lived through the Korean War is being supplanted by the generation that led the fight for democratisation in the 1980s. Younger South Koreans are less easily swayed by appeals to anti-communism and less reflexively pro-American. They are more accustomed to prosperity and less fearful of North Korea, and thus more willing to shake up their country's system in the name of economic and social justice. They are more progressive and nationalistic in their views, although few are true followers of Pyongyang's ideology. This generation, now in its 30s and 40s, will dominate South Korean politics for years to come. As a result of this generational shift, there has been a change in both the style and substance of South Korea's approach to North Korea. While the vast majority still view the North as a threat, confrontation has been replaced by an emphasis on cooperation and reconciliation. The removal of government restrictions on inter-Korean exchanges has led to an explosion of contacts, helping to demystify the North in South Koreans' eyes. Moreover, students are no longer being taught to fear Pyongyang as their parents were. A majority of citizens now see North Korea more as an object for dialogue and assistance.
While engagement of North Korea remains controversial, there is an emerging consensus that: * North-South economic cooperation can be mutually beneficial; * gradual reunification is preferable to sudden collapse and absorption; * war on the Korean Peninsula is unthinkable; * North Korea's nuclear program is undesirable and should be negotiated away if possible, but it is not directed at South Korea and is not in itself reason to end engagement; and * it is necessary to help the people of North Korea overcome their economic hardships.
Korea Backgrounder: How the South Views its Brother from Another Planet
Full report
December 10, 2004 Deterring Threats to US Capital:
What Drives Washington to Crush North Korea and Other Foreign Policy Bogeymen
By Stephen Gowans
It's never good news when a country many times larger puts you on a list of countries targeted for regime change. And the news gets worse when one of the other countries on the list disarms, as a sop, only to be invaded soon after. Unless you're a slow learner, you arm, not disarm. Two years after north Korea booted nuclear inspectors out of the country to build what it calls a "nuclear deterrent," the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says it's "now certain that North Korea's nuclear material has been converted into fuel for four to six nuclear bombs." [1] Today, Washington says it was never too concerned about north Korea having one or two nuclear bombs, because Pyongyang would always want to keep those bombs for itself, and wouldn't sell them. [2] And while it's implied by Washington but never said directly, north Korea would never launch an unprovoked nuclear attack, because to do so would be to invite instant annihilation. But with material for four to six bombs, it could sell some, and still have enough in reserve as a deterrent. Explained General Leon J. LaPorte, commander of US forces in south Korea, "North Korea, in its desire for hard currency, could sell weapons-grade plutonium to some terrorist organization." [3] So, if north Korea was a menace before, it's even more of a menace now. But does this add up?
What to Expect on the Korean Peninsula from a Second Bush Administration
Dr. Larry M. Wortzel
November 5, 2004
The principled approach that President Bush has taken in foreign policy has been validated by the results of the election on November 2, 2004. President Bush won the election with more votes than other any president in American history, and his party, the Republicans, have gained seats in the House of Representatives and the Senate. In short, the majority of Americans have endorsed the direction of President Bush's foreign and domestic policies.
Hawk Engagement: A Dangerous Turn in US Plans for North Korea
by Gregory Elich
The recent appointment of Victor Cha as Asia Director in the National Security Council portends a more aggressive approach towards North Korea during President Bush? second term. Long an advisor to the Administration, as Asia Director, Cha will hold responsibility for developing U.S. policy towards North Korea, and it will be he who maps out the approach to the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK ·North Korea) in the coming months.
Selig Harrison, Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, visited the DPRK in the spring of 2004, where he met with high-ranking officials. Harrison "found the North Korean leadership extremely eager to find a way to conclude a nuclear deal with the United States. They need such a deal urgently because North Korea embarked on significant economic reforms in the middle of 2002, and these have intensified the economic pressures that confront its leadership." Consequently, they want to improve relations with the United States. Harrison said that although the North Korean leadership is "very eager for settlement," they are "not prepared to do it in the way the Bush Administration is asking them to do it. The North Koreans say that Washington wants them to, in effect, simply roll over and disarm unilaterally." Harrison felt that the Bush Administration has "a very rigid position," and is "not prepared to trade anything." That approach, he added, "risks a war. The point is, the Administration? objective is really regime change in Pyongyang." This policy was epitomized in Victor Cha, who Harrison described as "kind of the ideologue of the Bush Administration" on the subject of Korean affairs
The New U.S. Administration and the North Korean Nuclear Issue
Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard
2004 Sejong-SAIS Workshop Korea, United States, and Northeast Asia: Seeking Strategic Cooperation After the U.S. Presidential Election Thursday, November 11 - Friday, November 12, 2004 Seoul, Korea (Renaissance Seoul Hotel) The New U.S. Administration and the North Korean Nuclear Issue Strategy for Solving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis and the Future of Six-Party Talks: U.S. Policy for 2005 Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard Visiting Fellow The Brookings Institution Washington, DC
"Runaway Ally" Joins "the Axis of Evil"
One More Neocon Target: South Korea
By GARY LEUPP
The neocons have added yet another country to their hit list, another one targeted for regime change: the Republic of Korea.
PREVENTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF ROGUE STATES AND TERRORISTS
by Hans Blix
a speech in New Delhi on 6 November 2004
I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the burning issue of nuclear weapons in today's world here in New Delhi. The title given to my comments would seem to suggest that nuclear weapons are now in the hands of prudent and mature states and that we only have to watch out that they don't fall into the hands of some "rogues" - whoever they may be - or terrorists. I believe our concerns must be broader.
Korean Peninsula--A Flashpoint in North East Asia
Consultation to Commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the Tozanso Process "" 17-21 October 2004, Tozanso, Japan FINAL REPORT
To commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the Ecumenical Consultation on "Peace and Justice in North East Asia: Prospects for Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts," 29 October - 2 November, 1984, the World Council of Churches and the Christian Conference of Asia in cooperation with the National Council of Churches in Korea, the Korean Christians Federation and the National Christian Council in Japan, organized the present consultation. The 1984 Consultation set up an effective framework for international ecumenical cooperation for peace and reunification.
Recommendations I. Governments The June 15, 2000 Joint Summit Declaration should serve as an important basis for confidence building measures, further steps towards people to people exchanges and other forms of cooperation, reducing levels of confrontation and overall improvement in Inter-Korean relations.
U.S. Needs to Offer More to N.Korea - Security Report
By REUTERS Published: November 15, 2004 . Filed at 4:33 a.m. ET SEOUL (Reuters) - Divisions in President Bush's first administration gave North Korea valuable time to develop weapons and he needs to put far more on the table to get it to end its nuclear plans, a security group said on Monday. In a report offering an eight-stage plan to end the nuclear stand-off, the influential International Crisis Group said the increasingly urgent priority was to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program and put discussion of other problems on hold. ``It almost certainly has enough bombs to deter an attack and still have some to sell to other states or even terrorist groups,'' said the group, which is based in Brussels and used its recently opened Seoul office to help compile the report.
North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?
Asia Report N°87 15 November 2004 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS North Korea could now have as many as ten nuclear weapons. While six-party talks have continued without results in Beijing, North Korea has probably reprocessed its fuel rods and may have turned the plutonium into weapons. It almost certainly has enough bombs to deter an attack and still have some to sell to other states or even terrorist groups. This risk means that it is now an increasingly urgent priority to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program. Demands by the United States that North Korea do this before any deal can be reached have been rebuffed, and the talks have stalled. It is time to change tack and put a comprehensive offer on the table that lays out exactly what benefits North Korea stands to get in exchange for giving up its nuclear program and weapons. Only a serious offer from the United States will put the other parties in a position to increase pressure on North Korea should a reasonable deal be rejected.
North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?
15 November 2004 International Crisis Group Asia Report N°87 Seoul/Brussels Full paper
Corrections from IDG 1. On page ii "light water reactors" should replace "light water reactions". 2. Recommendation 17, on page iii should read: "Prepare to revive the development aid plan suspended in 2002". 3. On page 26, text should read: "The European Union (EU): begins implementing the staged, four-year plan of local development measures drawn up, but never used, in its country strategy paper 2001-2004." Footnote 179 should read: "The contents of the paper remain largely relevant but implementation was stalled by the onset of the nuclear crisis. See full text at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_korea/csp/01_04_en.pdf." The European Union through the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) has provided North Korea with humanitarian aid since 2000. The plan suspended in 2002 was for development aid, not humanitarian aid as mistakenly suggested in the original text of recommendation 17 and at page 27.
The Korean Peninsula in the U.S.'s Post-9/11 Military-Security Paradigm
By: Dr. Niklas L. P. Swanström
Paper presented at the First ROK-U.S.-China Future Forum on "the Changing ROK-U.S.- China Relationships and the Future of the Korean Peninsula" hosted by Institute for Diplomacy and Security Studies and Center for Contemporary China Studies, Hallym University. Abstract: This article analyses the Korean peninsula in light of the US military-security paradigm after 9/11- 2001. The intent is to analyze if there have been any changes in the US position and how this has impacted the security situation in the Korean peninsula. It seems evident that the Korean peninsula has been on the backburner of American foreign policy since 9/11, and President Bush has adopted a non-compromising stance in relation to North Korea. However, the current security concerns are actually representative of the traditional US concerns toward the Korean Peninsula, which was dominant even before September 11, i.e. meet the rise of China, nuclear proliferation and control an unpredictable North Korea. The war against terrorism has however forced the US to adopt a few changes that have impacted the Korean peninsula.
The Impact of the U.S. Presidential Election on East Asia
Peter M. Beck
Director, Northeast Asia Project International Crisis Group
The First ROK-U.S.-China Future Forum October 30, 2004
NORTH KOREA: A PHASED NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
1 August 2003 ICG Asia Report N°61 Washington/Brussels 1 August 2003
Letter of Appeal to the American Public
Advertisement in New York Times, October 2004, Korea Peace Network (USA)
United in a common urge to appeal directly to the American people on issues involving the future direction of American foreign policy on the Korean peninsula, and representing significant segments of the Korean-Americans and others concerned, we the undersigned have come together. Many Koreans believe that U.S. foreign policy dealing with the Korean peninsula in the past three years is flawed. It is flawed in that it is devoid of consistency, lacks relevant historical perspective, is insensitive to cultural nuances, and is based on an arrogant stance, best described as "Might is Right" Many Koreans believe this flawed policy is largely responsible for the steadily aggravating relationship between the U.S. and North Korea that resulted in North Korea emerging recently as a fledgling nuclear power. North Korea is a country seeking a new political and economic paradigm. This is why the historic process of détente began on June 15, 2000 as the heads of the North and South met in Pyongyang; this is why they have been insistent on the peace treaty with the U.S., lifting of U.S. sanctions and embargoes and finally, all else failing, a minimal security guarantee from the U.S. in the form of a nonaggression pact. None of these has been forthcoming. As a matter of fact, even the request for an opportunity for a meaningful bilateral dialog has been denied by the U.S. North Korea hardly constitutes a threat against the U.S. even with its fledgling nuclear weapons and 1.2 millionman army. Indeed, balancing the scale of arms is the reality of North Korea; It is located at the other side of the globe, smaller than the state of Maine, produces not a drop of oil and suffers from severe shortages of food, health care and energy. Its reported GDP is only 0.03% of that of the U.S. Confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea however could constitute a real threat against South Korea, a thriving country of 42 million people, located just south of the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) and with 37,000 U.S. soldiers stationed on its soil. Therefore, the maintenance of détente, and a cooperative relationship with its northern brethren is an essential imperative for the people of the Republic of Korea. Many Koreans believe that the current US foreign policy is in need of major rethinking, and that the time for such a process is now, just prior to November, when American people will express judgment on the current administration. Therefore, we present this "Letter of Appeal to the American Public"
Two British documentaries on North Korea
The makers of the award-winning The Game of their Lives provide another rare insight into North Korean society. The new film follows two young gymnasts and their families for over eight months in the lead up to the Mass Games. The socialist realism spectacular involves a cast of thousands in the biggest and most elaborate human performance on earth. Director Interview: Daniel Gordon BBC: Where did the idea come from? DG: After making The Game of their Lives we spoke to the BBC about a possible second project. I thought that the Mass Games was the obvious one if we were to go back. The Game of their Lives has been shown about 10 times in North Korea and because there's only one channel there everyone has seen it. It's really opened doors for us.
North Koreans for Kerry: Be Careful What You Wish For
L. Gordon Flake October 8, 2004
In their first presidential debate, President Bush and Senator Kerry gave the issue of U.S. policy toward North Korea an unexpectedly high profile. In the process, this complex and difficult crisis was dummed down to two contrasting slogans, bilateral talks versus multilateral talks. Presuming this simplistic contrast indeed represents the primary difference between the two candidate's positions, it would not be an unrealistic to presume that the North Korean leadership, and possibly other countries in the region that have been frustrated by our failure to make progress on this issue, would like to see the election of Senator Kerry. At a minimum, the Kerry camp's expressed willingness to try a new approach is likely seen to hold forth the promise of breaking the current stalemate.
Why do U.S. Conservatives and Progressives Share a Hatred of North Korea?
Kang In Kyu
[Analysis] In U.S. society the 'North Korean threat' has become 'common sense'
Korea, above all, demonstrates the danger of moralizing foreign policy. Once you have declared a regime "evil" -- as Bush famously did in his condemnation of North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an "Axis of Evil" -- how then do you negotiate with it? -- David Ignatius, Washington Post, July 3, 2001
Despite various good points we cannot ignore, the United States is a society in need of enlightenment in several ways. The rashness of first thinking that people in turbans and beards are terrorists, the simple mindedness of conceptualizing the world into a Christian "civilization" and non-Christian "anti-civilization," and the dichotomy of regarding nations that are ideologically different from the United States as "evil," are examples of this.
The Bush administration's "clear" system of thought that regards terrorism against the United States as a "provocation brought about by the forces of violence and hate in response to the spread of freedom and democracy" or the spread of anti-Americanism around the globe as "jealousy of American prosperity" is well known. The fortunate thing though, is that not all political forces and members of the public agree with this judgment.
Still, it goes without saying that there is one common target of bias and hostility shared by both conservatives and progressives in the United States. That's North Korea. From "evil" all the way to "crazy bastards," they're called by several names, but most Americans share the opinion that North Korea is an "abnormal group that cannot be trusted."
he shared opinion among experts is that U.S. hostility toward North Korea is not simply on an emotional dimension. East Asia specialist Chalmers Johnson, who was once the head of the University of California at Berkley's political science department, said:
"The Americans are behaving in a truly surly manner... What they desperately dislike is that peace has broken out in East Asia."
Why the Pentagon Hates Peace in Korea
Bill Mesler
The Progressive September 2000 Volume 64, Number 9 You might have missed the significance if you live in the United States, but South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's summit meeting with North Korean President Kim Jong Il in mid-June was heralded around the world as the historic beginning of the end of the Cold War in Asia. For a half century, the two countries have engaged in one of the globe's tensest military standoffs.
Yet when current President Kim Dae Jung returned from his three-day, televised love fest in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, he was able to announce that, for the first time since World War II, there was no longer any danger of a war between the two Koreas
So why aren't policymakers in the United States celebrating?
Truths Worth Telling
By DANIEL ELLSBERG Published: September 28, 2004 Kensington, Calif. - On a tape recording made in the Oval Office on June 14, 1971, H. R. Haldeman, Richard Nixon's chief of staff, can be heard citing Donald Rumsfeld, then a White House aide, on the effect of the Pentagon Papers, news of which had been published on the front page of that morning's newspaper: "Rumsfeld was making this point this morning,'' Haldeman says. "To the ordinary guy, all this is a bunch of gobbledygook. But out of the gobbledygook comes a very clear thing: you can't trust the government; you can't believe what they say, and you can't rely on their judgment. And the implicit infallibility of presidents, which has been an accepted thing in America, is badly hurt by this, because it shows that people do things the president wants to do even though it's wrong, and the president can be wrong."
North Korea Nuclear Talks: The View From Pyongyang
Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones In June the Bush administration made its first serious proposal to end a nearly two-year-old standoff over North Korea's nuclear program. The administration is to be commended for abandoning its "take it or leave it" position after a year of intense diplomacy and three formal rounds of negotiations. Nevertheless, Pyongyang has treated the proposal as little more than "old wine in a new bottle."
The United States' relatively inexperienced negotiators and senior officials are all too aware of the limits and constraints that domestic politics and external realities place on their diplomatic options, but they have placed little importance on knowing their enemy. North Korea, on the other hand, boasts a seasoned negotiating team and a well-honed strategy for extracting concessions
Getting serious about a multilateral approach to North Korea
James Clay Moltz and Kennrth Quinones Spring 2004
A Spyhole Into North Korea
By Andrei Lankov No state is complete without a security agency, often derogatorily described as the ``political police'' in less democratic countries (or simply countries we happen to dislike). Of course, the notion of what constitutes a challenge to law and order differs according to the political system in question. An act that may be regarded as high treason in one state might be viewed as a perfectly normal part of the political process in another.
In from the cold
North Korea's regime survived the cold war and has nuclear know-how. But it is in the west's interests to help it move towards a market economy
Glyn Ford Tuesday September 14, 2004 The Guardian
The Korean peninsula is probably the most dangerous place on earth, made worse by those who extrapolate dodgy intelligence to fanciful "worst-case" scenarios that become the sand on which policy is founded. In reality, Europe being threatened by North Korea's nuclear missiles is about as likely as the Pope converting to Islam. The most "pessimistic" estimated range of Pyongyang's projected Taepodong 2 missile would fall well short. Even concerns over last week's "mushroom cloud" in the north-east were quickly dismissed by the US and South Korea. The truth is that North Korea is changing: it wants to come in from the cold. A country seen by many as the final remnant of the cold war is trying to transform itself, driven by need, and necessity to embrace the market. These steps signify a willingness for engagement not seen before, but they have been overshadowed by the "nuclear crisis" triggered in October 2002 when Pyongyang admitted to having the "know-how", but not the technology , for a highly enriched uranium route to nuclear weapons. [admission]
Figuring Out the North
By Andrei Lankov Communist countries are notorious for their secretive approach to statistical data _ but none of them rival North Korea in this regard. From the early 1960s North Korea ceased to publish economic statistics. Almost all data in reference books about the North is based on ``estimations'' _ in other words, on learned guesses. However, there is one exception. Surprisingly enough, we know a lot about North Korean demographics. When in the late 1980s Pyongyang was planning a population census, it applied to the United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA) for technical assistance. The UNFPA officials agreed on the condition that they be given some of the resultant statistical data _ and in due course they received it. There were omissions, of course _ the most curious being the exclusion of all military personnel from the data collected after 1970!
World Council of Churches Statement on Korea
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Seoul, Korea, August 24-27, 2004 Public Issues Statement on Korea We cry out to you from the depths of despair over the division of Korea, which is the victim of a divided world. You came to this world as the servant of peace, You provided love and peace. You commanded us to love each other. We rejoice in your promises and recognise your blessings. You have given us signs of hope in the midst of despair. (Extract from World Day of Prayer - the Reunification of Korea)
The Changing Geopolitical Role of East Asia
Immanuel Wallerstein Commentary No. 143, Aug. 15, 2004
What They Would Do
By FRED KAPLAN Published: August 8, 2004 THIRTY years ago today, Richard Nixon resigned as president. The moment stands as a constitutional triumph, lamented by almost nobody. Yet one facet of Nixon's tenure continues to prompt a twinge of admiration, even a sigh of nostalgia: his foreign policy. Its architect was Henry Kissinger, the Harvard professor turned national security adviser. Mr. Kissinger had studied the 19th-century diplomacy of Metternich and Bismarck, and famously sought to emulate their principles of realpolitik - the hard-boiled pursuit of state interests and a "balance of power," coupled with a deliberate disdain for moral crusades. There was something bracing about watching him in action. Whether or not you liked what he was doing, he - most of the time - knew how to play the game. Amid today's muddle, this appeal is magnified. Many epithets could be hurled at the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, but "incompetent" isn't one of them. So is it time for a round of revisionism? Should we be scouring their playbook for guidance on how to deal with the world today? Yes and no. If the Kissinger of the 1970's had been magically transported to the White House these past three years, George W. Bush might have handled his own crises quite differently. Mr. Kissinger would not have refused to negotiate over North Korea's nuclear weapons - as Mr. Bush has - just because it is ruled by a loathsome dictator [US NK Negotiations]
Angst and Opportunities on the Korean Peninsula
Donald Gregg Korea Quarterly Vol 4 No 1 2004
On October 31, 2003, at the Second Annual Cheju Peace Forum, President Roh Moo-hyun was asked by former Secretary of Defense William Perry what could be done to halt the striking decline in trust and understanding between Koreans and Americans that Perry found deeply disturbing. President Roh replied that it is only on the question of how to deal with North Korea that there is disagreement between Seoul and Washington. He said that 50 years ago Korea had gone through a terrible fratricidal war, and that there must not be a repeat of that tragedy. Roh said that most Koreans believe North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons programs once its security is assured. He urged the United States and Japan to do more to engage in dialogue with North Korea, and closed his remarks by asking rhetorically, "Why does the United States insist on a hardline North Korean policy when it can cost so many lives?" This policy, Roh stated flatly, is the cause of rising anti- American feelings in South Korea.
Dr. Alexander Vorontsov, head of Korean studies at the Russia Academy of Sciences. Vorontsov had recently completed a documentary film on life in North Korea outside of P'yongyang. He had been allowed to travel freely, and even had been able to film North Korean army units in their bases. He cited strong evidence of economic improvement in the agricultural sector, growing out of policy changes allowing small "market gardens" to be privately developed. He spoke positively of President Vladimir Putin's relationship with Kim Jong Il of North Korea, and said he had heard Putin refer to Kim as "an absolutely modern person." There was virtually unanimous agreement among Russian, Chinese, and South Korean conferees that North Korea is making a concerted effort to achieve significant economic reform, and that positive results are emerging. [economic reform] [US NK policy]
Facing the Boogeyman
A Korean American Diplomat Recounts His Trips to North Korea Former Secretary of Defense William Perry visited North Korea in May of 1999 as a special envoy of President Bill Clinton. The delegation landed at P'yongyang International Airport in a "blue and white." l-r: Dennis Droney, Evans Revere, Chip Gregson, Ken Lieberthal, Wendy Sherman, William Perry, Ashton Carter and Philip Yun. (Photos/ Courtesy of Philip Yun and Dennis Droney) "...at my house, the boogeyman was a North Korean, who would appear in nightmares or panic attacks." By Philip W. Yun Korea Quarterly Vol 4 No 1 2004
The Seoul Capitol Building
By Andrei Lankov For some 75 years, downtown Seoul was dominated by a large grayish building in the ``neo- classical'' style, so fashionable in Europe of the 1910s and 1920s. To Westerners, this structure was known as Seoul Capitol (a name Koreans never used). Indeed, its shape was reminiscent of the U.S. Capitol building in Washington D.C. The building was the seat of the Japanese colonial administration in Korea and this pedigree let to its demise in 1996 when it was demolished amongst great nationalist pomp.
The Plane Truth
By Andrei Lankov If you are a North Korean who, for some reason, has decided to defect, how would you do it? These days, defection is no longer so difficult. The border with China is nearly open, and every North Korean defector can virtually walk there _ only to discover that nowadays getting into the South is much more difficult than getting out of the North. Despite their official statements, the Seoul authorities try to restrict the flow of defectors. [Refugee reception]
U.S. Unveils Offer At North Korea Talks
Paul Kerr Arms Control Today July/August 2004 In late June, the United States for the first time presented a detailed proposal for resolving a nearly two-year-old nuclear crisis with North Korea, demonstrating new flexibility in a series of meetings that has already stretched on for more than a year. U.S. officials said that pressure from impatient allies helped force the initiative.
A Strategy for Defusing The North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Joel S. Wit Arms Control Today January/February 2003
ENGAGING NORTH KOREA: PUT ON A HAPPY FACE, BUT KEEP ONE HAND ON THE BIG STICK
PAUL R. SUTPHIN COURSE 5601 FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGIC LOGIC SEMINAR M NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
This paper outlines strategic considerations regarding U.S. policy with respect to North Korea, and concludes that the current policy being pursued by the Bush Administration is, rightly, wary of North Korean trustworthiness and intentions. The current policy, however, also overestimates the threat to the U.S. homeland posed by the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK); overestimates the possibility of coercing North Korea into taking positive actions on key U.S. interests (especially preventing nuclear and missile proliferation); and undervalues the potential benefits of engaging Pyongyang regarding its ballistic missile program, bearing in mind that any agreement must be comprehensive and fully verifiable.
US to North Korea: Trust Us, We'd Never Lie
By Stephen Gowans June 24, 2004 Picture this: Al-Qaeda offers Washington a "provisional" guarantee not to attack the country or seek to target US interests abroad in return for the US dismantling its military. The agreement would depend on the US giving international inspectors access to US military sites and meeting a series of deadlines for disabling and dismantling its military facilities, and then shipping them out of the country. Would Washington agree? Never. No country would deliberately leave itself defenseless, simply because an enemy promised not to attack, and then only provisionally. Yet absurd as the proposal is, this is what Washington is offering North Korea.
John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms control, let it be known the US intended to play hardball. Asked to clarify US policy toward North Korea, Bolton "strode over to a bookshelf, pulled off a volume and slapped it on the table. It was called 'The End of North Korea,' by an American Enterprise Institute colleague. 'That,' he said, 'is our policy.'" ("Absent from the Korea Talks: Bush's Hard-Liner," The New York Times, September 2, 2003.)
Absent From the Korea Talks: Bush's Hard-Liner
By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS (NYT) words Late Edition - Final , Section A , Page 3 , Column 1 2 September 2003 When the United States settled down to sensitive talks with North Korea last week, one senior Bush administration policy maker was thousands of miles away -- to the relief of North Korean officials and not a few State Department ... John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms...
Editors' Note: September 12, 2003, Friday
An article on Sept. 2 profiled John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms control. The article noted several events that shaped his induction into politics: As a teenager, he worked for Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign in 1964; after law school, he established a relationship with Senator Jesse Helms, the North Carolina Republican, and he worked on a campaign that sought to counter a voter registration drive on behalf of blacks and organized labor.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Tale of Two Who Jumped the Ship at State
By Nancy Snow [Media]
Margaret Tutwiler, who announced her resignation from the U.S. State Department in April 2004 at the end of the bloodiest month in Iraq, was well-regarded in her five-month stretch as the high-profile replacement for Charlotte Beers, a former ad executive who left Washington in March 2003, just days before the outbreak of war with Iraq.
Human rights or sweatshops?
By Stephen Gowans July 16, 2004
Last month the US made a proposal to North Korea. Put a stop to your nuclear weapons program, disable and dismantle your nuclear facilities, and let international inspectors rove freely across your country to make sure you've completely, verifiably and irreversibly disarmed. In return, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea will provide you with heavy fuel oil, and Washington, which has 36,000 US troops poised on your border, will "provisionally'' commit not to attack or try to topple the government. The proposal was said to reveal growing flexibility on the part of US negotiators, but even US officials didn't think it was flexible enough. The proposal would almost certainly be turned down, they said. Russian officials chimed in, offering the same assessment, though they more revealingly pointed out that the proposal would be rejected because it was impossible for North Korea to accept. ("U.S. Revises Proposal at North Korea Nuclear Talks, "Washington Post, June 24, 2004) Little wonder. Once North Korea had effectively disarmed, completely, verifiably and irreversibly, what would stop the US from rescinding its "provisional" agreement not to attack? Appended to the US proposal was a pledge to "work toward" normalizing relations -- not to normalize relations, just work toward it. A pledge to work towards something is like a pledge to work towards quitting smoking; it's a way of making it seem you're doing something, while dragging your heels. Or it's like the pledge of a newly wed husband to work really really hard toward not hopping into bed with other women.
India frets over Yangon-Pyongyang deal
By Arun Bhattacharjee NEW DELHI - Nothing scares India more than the prospect of another nuclear power on its border, especially when that country is run by the military. So Myanmar's evident success in wooing North Korea to help it build a nuclear reactor has ruffled more than a few feathers among bureaucrats in India's Foreign Office at a time when a new foreign minister is trying to shape a new foreign policy
Korea nixes US idea of military cooperation
By David Scofield Talk of the complete withdrawal of United States forces from Korea has circulated for years, satisfying the prayers and the anger of many and inspiring anxiety and fear in others. There is a plan to withdraw all US forces from Seoul to bases elsewhere in Korea, but that hasn't happened yet. And some US forces are being withdrawn from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and redeployed to Iraq. Still, that's a far cry from full exit. Meantime, there's a new US plan afoot - or maybe just a trial balloon - US-South Korean military cooperation in the region - humanitarian and peacekeeping, meaning quelling trouble. Seoul gave Washington an emphatic "no" last week when a general floated his vision of the alliance.
North Korea's Drug Habit
By VICTOR CHA and CHRIS HOFFMEISTER Published: June 3, 2004 Reaction to last month's meeting between Junichiro Koizumi, the Japanese prime minister, and Kim Jong II, the North Korean leader, was nothing short of underwhelming. Critics said Mr. Koizumi gave up too much - millions in medical aid and thousands of tons of rice - to secure the return of five children of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea more than two decades ago. He also failed to obtain a definitive commitment from Mr. Kim to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. The critics notwithstanding, Mr. Koizumi's diplomacy should be judged a success. The lesson the United States and Japan should learn from it is that moderate pressure on the North Korean regime works - and can be used to limit the North's ambitions not only in weapons development but also in the drug trade.
Korea Economic Institute of America June Insight
"Scandal After Scandal"
Immanuel Wallerstein Comment No. 138, June 1, 2004
The US Nuclear Option and the "War on Terrorism"
by Michel Chossudovsky www.globalresearch.ca 14 May 2004
First tremor in the last outpost
Bereft of its old allies in the Soviet bloc, branded part of an 'axis of evil' by the United States, recently gripped by famine, North Korea has had to contemplate reform, even permit a little private enterprise. Will there be unlooked-for repercussions? Tim Judah reports from a closed society Saturday May 29, 2004 The Guardian
Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for Northeast Asia
A Cooperative Security Program Post Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
Report on the Roundtable Discussion of US-DPRK Relations
February 19, 2003 by John Whitaker Held at the Center for International Strategy Technology and Policy, Georgia Tech Atlanta, Georgia. Chaired by CISTP Director, Dr. John Endicott Featuring Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Song-Ryol Han as special guest speaker
Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Normalization and Northeast Asia Peace
by Wada Haruki
On the eve of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's second visit to North Korea in eighteen months, Japan Focus presents Wada Haruki's analysis of the larger stakes in the Japan-North Korea negotiations. Setting off the emotional issues of the kidnapping of Japanese against the record of Japanese colonialism in Korea, Wada examines the prospects for negotiating an agreement that could become the basis for defusing the range of contentious issues that continue to swirl around a nuclear North Korea facing acute problems of starvation and isolated from its powerful neighbor and historic antagonist, Japan. Wada Haruki is Emeritus Professor of the University of Tokyo. A specialist in Russian and Korean history and politics, he is the author of the monumental Complete History of the Korean War (Chosen senso zenshi). This article appeared in Sekai (World), January 2004.
Once negotiations for diplomatic normalization are resumed, issues such as the settlement of colonial occupation and economic assistance join the abduction issue on the agenda, rather than simply being embedded in the opening statements. If Japan and North Korea sign a diplomatic treaty at the time that settlement is reached at the six-nation talks, the Japanese can guide these talks to success. If the six-nation talks lead to agreement, and the heads of state of the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia convene to sign the agreement, they could guarantee the implementation of the agreement by agreeing to reconvene after one year. At this time it would become possible for an ANEAN (Association of Northeast Asian Nations) meeting to be held. In this way the idea presented in the DPJ Manifesto calling for the formation of a regional trust-forming organization could finally be realized.
Foreign Aggressors Target North Korea Again
by David Wall June 20, 2003. David Wall teaches at the East Asia Institute of the University of Cambridge and is associate fellow (Asia) at the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
CAMBRIDGE, England -- The war of words goes on. U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has warned the North Korean government that any aggressive activity on the Korean Peninsula sponsored by North Korea would be met by a "devastating response." Presumably that is a threat of military action by the United States. At the June 2 press conference in Seoul in which he made the threat, Wolfowitz also said he takes seriously Pyongyang's claims to have developed nuclear weapons. He added, however, that U.S. intelligence is unable to confirm whether North Korea possesses any weapons of mass destruction. The thing is, the North Korean government has never claimed publicly that it has any nuclear weapons or that it is engaged in uranium enrichment or plutonium production.
Situation Remains Bleak for North Koreans
Despite the grandeur surrounding the regime, life is still difficult for majority of North Koreans By Tim Judah
Color of North Korean Money
By Andrei Lankov
Iran, North Korea and proliferation
By Ritt Goldstein Part 1: US neo-cons and war Part 2: Preemption and an arms race with itself In early February, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted that he was instrumental in the sale of nuclear weapons technology to Iran and Libya. America's top arms control official, John Bolton, outlined that the Pakistani network sold "technology for enriching uranium as well as warhead designs to Iran, North Korea and Libya", according to the San Francisco Chronicle. And concerns exist that the warhead blueprints may have gone considerably further.
ALONE IN THE DARK
by PHILIP GOUREVITCH Kim Jong Il plays a canny game with South Korea and the U.S. New Yorker Issue of 2003-09-08 Posted 2003-09-01 The horrible weirdness of North Korea makes the place easier to parody than to make sense of, and it is folly to make too much sense of it. (Who can forget the cover of The Economist that carried a picture of a waving Kim Jong Il under the headline "Greetings, earthlings"?) For anyone not in their thrall or under their thumb, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il appear so monstrous and so aberrant that it is almost an insult to reason to acknowledge that their primitive, impoverished ideology is not an expression of madness. But the truth is scarier: from within the narrow parameters of its own fanatical self-interest-and notwithstanding its lying, its wildness, its imprudence, its cruelty, its capriciousness, its paranoia, its messianic pretensions, and its desperation-the Pyongyang regime behaves rationally. Kim Jong Il's purpose as a ruler is to sustain his power by any and all means, and whether he believes his own propaganda is, at this point, irrelevant.
Mapping the media on North Korea
Zachary Devereaux & Wenran Jiang, University of Alberta
Negotiating Survival:
The Problem of Commitment in US-North Korean Relations By Steve Grunau Research Assistant to Senator Douglas Roche MA Candidate Norm Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University
What if Kim Jong-il had been killed?
By Yoel Sano
North Korea: State of the Art
By Andrei Lankov
Patterns of Global Terrorism
US State Department Terrorism Page
US State Department: Patterns of global terrorism 2001
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) response to international efforts to combat terrorism has been disappointing. In a statement released after the September 11 attacks, the DPRK reiterated its public policy of opposing terrorism and any support for terrorism. It also signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, acceded to the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and indicated its willingness to sign five others. Despite the urging of the international community, however, North Korea did not take substantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism, including responding to requests for information on how it is implementing the UN Security Council resolutions, and it did not respond to US proposals for discussions on terrorism. It did not report any efforts to search for and block financial assets as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Similarly, the DPRK did not respond positively to the Republic of Korea's call to resume dialogue, where counterterrorism is an agenda item, nor to the United States in its call to undertake dialogue on improved implementation of the agreed framework. In light of President Bush's call to recognize the dangerous nexus between Weapons of Mass Destruction and terrorism, this latter failure, with its implications for nuclear development and proliferation, was especially troublesome. In addition, Pyongyang's provision of safehaven to four remaining Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970 remained problematic in terms of support for terrorists. Moreover, some evidence suggested the DPRK may have sold limited quantities of small arms to terrorist groups during the year.
MOON SHADOW: THE REV, BUSH & NORTH KOREA
by WAYNE MADSEN CounterPunch January 14, 2003 When President Bush added North Korea to his list of "Axis of Evil" nations, the influence of the self-declared reincarnation of Jesus Christ, the "Reverend" Sun Myung Moon of the Unification Church, loomed largely over the White House decision-making process.
PARANOID? NORTH KOREA? OH SURELY NOT
By ALEXANDER COCKBURN CounterPunch January 17, 2003
Those Inscrutable Orientals There's much fluttering among the pundits about the enigmatic North Koreans, much puzzlement about that nation's motives in withdrawing from the non-proliferation treaty and telling the US it's pressing forward with nuclear manufactures. Now let's see. President George W. Bush announces at the start of last year that North Korea is part of the Axis of Evil, and therefore a sworn foe of the US, just like Iraq and Iran. Then President George Bush emphasizes that the United States has reserves the right to "First Use" of its nuclear arsenal. Then President George Bush says the United States will not hesitate to exercise this privilege. Is the North Korean response so mysterious?
NORTH KOREA'S WARLIKE NOISES
(AND WHAT THEY MEAN)
CounterPunch January 13, 2003 by MARIA TOMCHICK North Korea has kicked UN officials out of its country, removed the cameras in its Yongbyon nuclear complex, abrogated the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and torn up a 1999 agreement to stop testing long-range missiles. It has said that any attempts by the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea would be viewed as a declaration of war. From this perspective--the portrayal of the current crisis in the U.S. media--North Korea appears to be a rogue nation ruled by a madman. The reality is somewhat different. A little history can help us understand what North Korea is doing and why.
N Korea's nukes - planted right under the DMZ?
By Michael G Gallagher SEOUL - The Beijing talks over North Korea's nuclear-weapons program ended inconclusively, and among the many issues those talks failed to resolve was one question that has probably bedeviled US and South Korean military strategists for years: Exactly where is the shadowy North Korean regime hiding its still tiny nuclear (one hopes) arsenal? The answer might be lying quietly in a tunnel right underneath the feet of the American and South Korean soldiers guarding the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates the democratic South from the Stalinist North.
Pyongyang pins false hopes on Kerry
By Yoel Sano As US Senator John Kerry now appears the presumptive Democratic challenger to President George W Bush, North Korea is assessing how its relations with the United States might change, even improve, with a Kerry victory in November. Although a lot can happen in eight months, and the contest looks very close, some polls show Kerry slightly ahead - and Pyongyang's foreign-policy shapers too are looking head, as reflected in its state-controlled media. But if Pyongyang's leaders are pinning their hopes for better relations on a Kerry victory, they are almost certainly mistaken - relations probably would not improve significantly in a Kerry presidency, though North Korea might buy more time to increase its nuclear stockpile. Kerry could, in fact, prove to be a hardliner and find himself under enormous pressure from conservatives not to make any concessions to North Korea. Further, an examination of the record demonstrates that while some statements appear more moderate and critical of the Bush administration, some of Kerry's other statements are very similar to those made by President Bush - and some are even tougher.
Bait and Switch? Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy
FPIF Policy Report March 2004 By Julie A. Mertus Julie Mertus, a professor of human rights at American University's School of International Service, is the author of Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2004) and Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (University of California Press, 1999).
In the aftermath of the failure to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, human rights have become the most prominent justification for the Iraq War in statements by President George W. Bush and other administration officials. This represents the latest of what has become a routine pattern for numerous U.S. administrations: invoking human rights to justify a range of foreign policy decisions and military ventures. But this human rights talk has not been supported by a human rights walk. Policymakers consistently apply a double standard to human rights norms: one that the rest of the world must observe but which the U.S. can safely ignore.
North Korea's War Strategy of Massive Retaliations against US Attacks
North Korea has not only the military power but also the political will to wage total war against the United States. 04/24/03 (Center for Korean Affairs) An English abstract of a paper by Han Ho Suk Director
Korean President Roh: Down but not out
By David Scofield
North Korea's Legacy of Missed Opportunities
Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning Remarks to the Heritage Foundation Washington, DC March 12, 2004 Thank you, Peter. It is a pleasure to be here again at Heritage - a place whose prominent voice has played an important role in shaping our national debate about East Asia and the world. Indeed, it is a particular pleasure to speak about North Korea to this audience and at this institution. Heritage's Asian Studies Center is one of Washington's leading repositories of expertise on East Asia. Secretary Powell's B.C. Lee lecture here last week is testament to the impact you have made. [Victim]
Violence, Legitimacy and the Future of Japanese and American Multilateralism
by Yoshikazu Sakamoto It is often said that 9/11 has changed the world. Certainly, the world being swayed by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of that event appears to prove the saying correct. But as far as the basic structure of today's international politics is concerned, the world underwent a drastic change when the Cold War ended. 9/11 served as a catalyst to make the structural change all the more manifest.
Thirdly, the confrontation with North Korea is behind the Koizumi administration's alignment with the U.S. While international concern about North Korea centers on its nuclear weapons program, there is a sentiment in Japan that prioritizes the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea. Since September 17, 2002, when North Korean leader Kim Jong Il admitted to the abduction, Japan has been engulfed with a feeling of having been unilaterally victimized, which matches the similar feeling among the U.S. citizens following 9/11. 9/17 is the Japanese counterpart to 9/11 in the U.S. in terms of unilateralist psychology. Abduction of innocent citizens is a grave human rights violation. But is the denunciation of the abduction an expression of anger toward infringement on human rights of Japanese compatriots or protest against infringement of universal human rights? If it is the former, then it is nothing more than self-centered nationalism. If it is the latter, then the Japanese must pay due attention to the violation of human rights of Koreans in the past by imperial Japan and try to solve the abduction issue while showing readiness to tackle the question of compensation for Koreans who were forcibly taken for forced labor and the former "comfort women" who were enslaved by the imperial Japanese army. If Japan discards its unilateralist response and adopts a policy of alleviating the confrontation with North Korea on the basis of universal principles, it can also play a positive role in pushing a multilateral settlement of the Iraq question in the United Nations without binding itself with the U.S.'s unilateralism, and also in seeking multilateral solutions in the area of regional security cooperation in East Asia, particularly focused on the Korean peninsula.
Libya lights way for a North Korean solution
By VICTOR D. CHA Special to The Japan Times WASHINGTON -- The six-party talks concluded in Beijing last month demonstrated incremental progress in resolving the 16-month crisis over North Korea's nuclear-weapons programs. For the causal observer, this outcome may not make sense. If the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia agree that a nuclear North Korea is unacceptable, and North Korea appears willing to freeze its program in return for help from the outside world, then a deal should be workable, yes? Well, not exactly. Pyongyang's proposal to freeze its program in return for food, fuel and security from the world constitutes the equivalent of a burglar selling back the stolen goods taken from your house, and not admitting that he committed the crime. The origins of the current crisis are exactly what the reclusive regime has been glossing over in the recently concluded talks -- the existence of a second nuclear program using highly enriched uranium.
Bombard North Korea with ideas, not threats
By David C. Kang Special to The Times We may have no choice but to live with Kim Jong- Il's North Korea for another 20 years. If that is the case, facilitating market reforms in North Korea is both the most effective - and most humane - strategy for the U.S. to pursue. David C. Kang is an associate professor in the Tuck School of Business and the Government Department of Dartmouth College. He is the author, with Victor D. Cha, of "Nuclear North Korea, A Debate on Engagement Strategies" (Columbia University Press).
"Proliferation Diplomacy: The Games Nations Play"
Take Iran. Imagine if you were running the country. You are surrounded by powers, many of them less than wholly friendly, who have nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Israel, and now the United States (with troops on borders east and west). You would have to be crazy not to develop nuclear weapons. And whatever else the regime in Iran is, it is not crazy. Take North Korea. Would you, if you were the North Korean authorities, trust the United States not to take military action some day? After all, only the fast-foot maneuvering of Jimmy Carter undid President Clinton's decision to do just that. And this "weakness" on the part of Clinton is one of the things George Bush's acolytes hold against Clinton.
Take Pakistan. The Bush regime has pressed Musharref hard on several fronts - to expose Khan, to permit the FBI to play around in northwest Pakistan looking for Osama bin Laden, not to support the resurgence of the Taliban, and in general to act like a member of the world team of those willing to support Bush from here to eternity.But of course, this is less than wholly popular in Pakistan. Many observers have noticed that every time Musharref makes a speech Bush will like, he dresses in Western clothes and speaks English. And every time he makes a speech that the Pakistani people will like, he dresses in Pakistani clothes (or in military garb) and speaks Urdu.
Come back in 50 years when the archives are opened. In the meantime, don't expect there to be much slowing down in nuclear proliferation. {Immanuel Wallerstein} Commentary No. 132, Mar. 1, 2004
Can the North Korean Nuclear Talks Lead to a Breakthrough?
by Peter M. Beck KEI March 2004
NORTH KOREA: STATUS REPORT ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM, HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
Keith Luse Frank Jannuzi Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senate Foreign Relations Committee 23 February 2004 In early January, we traveled to China, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan, to assess the prospects for a peaceful negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and to followup on three earlier visits to North Korea focused on gaining more transparency on food aid issues and encouraging greater North Korean adherence to international norms in the area of human rights.
As for U.S. allegations that North Korea has a clandestine program to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), Kim Gye-gwan and other DPRK officials stated categorically that the DPRK has no program for enriching uranium.
On the human rights front, Luse and Jannuzi had the opportunity to engage in detailed discussions on a number of issues, including food aid, prison conditions, and the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean intelligence agents. We found considerable evidence that North Korea is committed to moving toward a market economy, but it is too soon to draw conclusions about the ultimate success or failure of these initiatives.
Opening Statement by Senator Richard Lugar
North Korea Hearing March 2, 2004 Today the Foreign Relations Committee again turns its attention towards North Korea. We are pleased to welcome Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. We look forward to his timely update on the Six-Party Talks in Beijing, from which he has recently returned. The North Korean regime's drive to build nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat to American national security. All of us remain concerned about the potential for miscalculation that could lead to a deadly incident or broader conflict. We also are concerned about the transfer of North Korean weapons, materials, and technology to other nations or terrorist groups.
North Korea's Economic Reforms and Security Intentions
Testimony of Dr. Victor D. Cha Associate Professor of Government and D.S. Song Chair in Asian Studies Georgetown University Committee on Foreign Relations Committee United States Senate March 2, 2004 There is no denying the significance of the July 2002 reforms. They represent the first attempt in the regime's history at widescale economic change.
Another copy at Nautilus
Advancing Human Rights in North Korea
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony by Tom Malinowski Washington Advocacy Director Human Rights Watch 2 March 2004
Korean peace requires US compromise, troop exit
By David Scofield SEOUL - As the North Korea talks lumber on and "deals" reminiscent of those that failed 10 years ago again gain currency, one issue is crucial: extrication of US Forces from Korea. In order to pull the United States from the wreckage of 50 years of quasi-peace on the Korean Peninsula, Washington should compromise, accept key proposals from Seoul and commit to removing its troops from South Korea. That's unlikely to happen, but it should.
Talks aside, North Korea won't give up nukes
By Yoel Sano
An ordinary power, Japanese-style
[Japanese remilitarisation] Takashi Inoguchi 26 - 2 - 2004 Japan is learning a new geopolitics. Its sense of identity, capacity, and relation to the world is shifting amidst great economic, military and regional pressures. But what kind of foreign policy model will Japan choose? One of the country's foremost analysts explores the possible answers to a reopened question.
If this process now seems to be intensifying pace, it is partly because of the way that Junichiro Koizumi has mobilised two powerful currents tangible in Japanese society: national fear and national pride. The fear has one main source: North Korea. This is not a new phenomenon. On the last day of August 1998, for example, North Korea fired a Taepo-dong 1 long-range ballistic missile which overflew Japan. Japan is also deeply concerned to reunite the families of its citizens, at least thirteen of whom were abducted by North Korean agents from the country's remote western coastline areas during the 1970s and 1980s. But the Pyongyang regime's announcement of 21 February (as quoted in Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 February 2004) that it has completed "the possession of nuclear deterrence capability for self-defence" adds a higher level of insecurity to Japanese worries about its military intentions.
Japan's role in East Asia is very different. Apart from Japan, no country in the region can play the role of a key stabilising power for the United States. China does not share core values, South Korea is too small, the Asean bloc is fragmented and vulnerable. Hence the degree of autonomy the United States can afford to give to Japan is measurably smaller.
Guess who's in the driver's seat? Not the US
By Larry Niksch
Death of a Nationalist Leader
By Andrei Lankov
The Other Manchurian Candidate
By Andrei Lankov
Democratic capitalism and juche: common values and challenges
Danton R. Ford Kyungnam University
US Should Follow, Not Lead, in North Korea Talks
{Tom Plate}
'AN END TO EVIL': SHOWING THEM WHO'S BOSS
By FAREED ZAKARIA
Published: February 8, 2004
Before Sept. 11, 2001, it would have been difficult to speak meaningfully about a ''neoconservative foreign policy.'' While there was a group of intellectuals and policy experts who were identified -- sometimes self-identified -- by the neoconservative label, they did not agree on foreign policy. Today a cardinal feature of neoconservative foreign policy is the aggressive use of American power to dislodge dictators and promote democracy. But the founding father of the movement, Irving Kristol, shunned this approach, speaking in the more cautious tones of realpolitik. Throughout the 1990's, Charles Krauthammer, a leading neoconservative commentator, was deeply suspicious of the use of American power against dictators in the Balkans, Africa and the Caribbean, while others, like Richard Perle and William Kristol, were far more sympathetic. Neoconservative foreign policy during that decade lacked a central theme.
Sept. 11 changed all that. It is now possible to describe a neoconservative foreign policy, and David Frum and Richard Perle's new book, ''An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror,'' is a useful guide to it. There have been many books written by neoconservatives on aspects of the war on terror, but because of the identity of the authors, the scope of the book and the vigor of argumentation, this one deserves special attention.
Beyond our borders, the authors propose tackling the five regimes that have been most closely connected to terrorism -- North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia. The basic thrust of their argument is that the United States should get tough with these countries.
Quotes from Richard Perle's new book, "An End to Evil"
Iran is itself a terrorist state, the world's worst. North Korea has committed terrorist atrocities, too [...] Both regimes are nightmarishly repressive; both regimes present intolerable threats to American security. We must move boldly against them both and against all other sponsors of terrorism as well: Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. And we don't have much time. (pg 98)
Any new agreement with North Koreans must begin by acknowledging that North Korea cannot be trusted to honor its promises. (pg 102)
We fear that the North Korean leadership craves a nuclear arsenal even more desperately than it hungers for international approval or American aid. If those fears are correct, then the United States must ready itself for the hard possibility that our choices really shrink to two: tolerate North Korea's attempts to go nuclear - or take decisive action to stop it. Decisive action would begin with a comprehensive air and naval blockade of North Korean, cutting it off from all sea borne traffic, all international aviation, and all intercourse with the South. (pg 103)
Next, we must accelerate the redeployment of our ground troops on the Korean peninsula so they are beyond the range of North Korean artillery and short-range rockets. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have already begun to do this. (pg 103)
Third, as we reposition troops, we should develop detailed plans for a preemptive strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities. (pg 103-104)
It may be that the only way out of the decade-long crisis on the Korean peninsula is the toppling of Kim Jong Il and his replacement by a North Korean communist who is more subservient to China. If so, we should accept that outcome. (pg 104)
In time, all of Korea will be united in liberty. (pg 104)
An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror by David Frum and Richard Perle, New York, Random House, 2003
North Korea: Chronology of Provocations, 1950 - 2003
Updated March 18, 2003 Dick K. Nanto Analyst in Industry and Trade Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Report for Congress
Unmitigated Gall: North Korea's 'Bold Concession'
January 19, 2004
{Ted Galen Carpenter}
THE UNITED STATES, NORTH KOREA, AND THE END OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK
{Jonathan D. Pollack}
Naval War College Review, Summer 2003
Four weeks later, the stunning disclosure of Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi's impending visit to Pyongyang triggered movement in U.S. policy.58 The negotiations over a possible Koizumi visit had been conducted with the utmost secrecy within Japanese bureaucratic channels..... The prime minister had met the previous day with visiting Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and had informed him of the impending public disclosure of his visit to the North, which was scheduled to be announced on 30 August. Given that messages had been passed between Pyongyang and Tokyo as early as the previous fall, the absence of prior communication between Japan and the United States on the prime minister's impending visit was remarkable enough in its own right. In the context of recent intelligence findings about North Korea's enrichment activities, the prime minister's last-minute disclosure to the United States was even more stunning to American officials. //....
In the aftermath of the Japan-North Korea summit, the Bush administration confronted the prospect of abrupt and unanticipated changes in the Northeast Asian political and security environment. The United States believed that Pyongyang had defaulted on fundamental policy commitments to Washington, at the precise moment when the DPRK had opened the door to a new relationship with America's most important Asian ally and, prospectively, a major aid donor to the North. There was a real possibility that U.S. options on the peninsula would be driven increasingly by the policy agendas of others, perhaps enabling Pyongyang to achieve substantial breakthroughs at the expense of U.S. interests and without paying any price for its covert enrichment activities
North Korea: The Grand Deception Revealed
The Preliminary Report of the October 2003 National Lawyers Guild/American Association of Jurists Delegation to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
The outbreak of the Korean War - a DPRK perspective
Korean Committee for Solidarity with World Peoples, 25 June 2003
Cold War International History Project
Virtual Archive
Publications : Bulletin 6-7 - Cold War in Asia : New Evidence on the Korean War
- Bruce Cumings and Kathryn Weathersby: An Exchange on Korean War Origins
- China's Road to the Korean War, by Chen Jian
- Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51, by Evgueni Bajanov
- New Russian Documents on the Korean War, introduction and translations by Kathryn Weathersby
- Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950:
  New Evidence from Russian Archives, article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov
- The Shtykov Diaries: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in Korea, by Hyun-su Jeon with Gyoo Kahng
The Asian Front
{William Safire} [Withdrawal] A month ago, I characterized our 37,000 troops stationed near the border of North Korea as a "reverse deterrent." If we were forced to bomb the facilities producing nuclear weapons for sale to terrorists, one-third of these U.S. troops within range of 11,000 Communist artillery pieces would be the first casualties of a North Korean attack. With so many Americans as the North's human shields, Pyongyang's blackmailers are emboldened - the opposite of deterred.
Measured Reciprocal Policies to Resolve DPR Korea's Nuclear Crisis: Reviving the 4-Party Peace Talks
{Young Chun} President and Research Director (March 2003) The Institute for Strategic Reconciliation, Inc. (ISR2020.ORG)
Can catastrophic Korean war be avoided?
{Marc Erikson}
Apocalypse Now
{Peter Beinart} [Belligerence] [US strategy]
Kim Dae Jung's Close Call: A Tale of Three Dissidents
{Donald A. Ranard} [Kimdj][History] In 1973, South Korean intelligence agents kidnapped and nearly murdered Kim..., he was saved by the intervention of a pair of American diplomats acting on their own initiative, without approval from their government Habib and Ranard
An Axis of Evil or the Victim of Evil Misrepresentation?
An interview with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (sic) Lengthy interview in National Vanguard News a US 'racial nationalist' website [Pro-Pyongyang]
Korean fallout stirs nuclear Japan debate
{Stuart McMillan}NZ National Business Review 28 February 2003
Representative Edward Markey on North Korea
[US NK negotiations] [New imperialism] [Bush policy] [Partisan]`nuclear non-aggression pact...Kim Jong Il has illegitimate goals
An Open Letter To Bush
{Moon J. Pak}
Miguk Naemse - Smell of Americans
{David I. Steinberg} [Culture war] [Anti-Americanism]
Ten Reasons Why U.S. Cannot Attack North Korea
In comparison to Iraqi Case {Choe Kwan Ik} [PYR]
Cold Comfort
{Jason T. Shaplen} [Negotiating style] [KEDO] [Culture gap] [Shortages] [ewa] [Arrogance]Jason T. Shaplen was the policy adviser for KEDO, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, from 1995 to 1999.(Negotiations in April 1997)
Lighter Shadows Amidst The Gloom
By John Gershman [Public opinion] Frontier Justice #18 | Program on International Policy Attitudes. U.S. handling of relations with North Korea has dropped sharply, with 42% now giving it a negative rating (neutral 21%, positive 33%).
Secret, Scary Plans
{Nicholas D. Kristof}[Belligerence] ][Nuclear] [US NK negotiations] [cbw] talk of using tactical nuclear weapons ....Recently Mr. Bush seems to have become more hawkish. He is said to have been furious when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (one of the few senior Bush aides who know anything about Korea) told Congress that the U.S. would have to talk to North Korea
KOREA: Nuclear Threats from the North and a New Regime in the South. Is the U.S. Ready to Address Challenges from Northeast Asia as it Looks Toward Iraq?
{John E. Endicott}[Nuclear[ [US NK negotiations]Speech delivered to the Atlanta Council on International Relations, January 15, 2003 by John E. Endicott, Ph.D., Director, Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy ,Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs Colonel, US Air Force (Retired)
Experts Look to Future on US and NK Policies
[US NK relations] {Don Oberdorfer} {Larry A. Niksch} {L. Gordon Flake} {Leonard Spector} L. Gordon Flake, the executive director The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs... President Roh and US President George W. Bush have many characteristics in common such as honesty and un-circumlocutory speech styles.
North Korea's Nuclear Program: the Challenge to Stability in Northeast Asia
Opening Statement by Representative James A. Leach, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, February 13, 2003 [NPT] [Context]
North Korea
Statement of the Honorable Eni f.h. Faleomavaega before the subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific regarding February 13, 2003[Korean War cause] [Korean War events][Bizarre]
A Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue
{James Kelly} Prepared Statement of James. A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, House International Relations Committee 13 February 2002
Democracy Takes Office In South Korea
{Ha-Yun Jung}
Coping With North Korea
{Wade L. Huntley} [Admission] [US NK negotiations] Wade L. Huntley is an associate professor for security studies at the Peace Institute of the Hiroshima City University and an analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org).
Reckless Administration May Reap Disastrous Consequences
US Senator Robert Byrd Senate Floor Speech - Wednesday, February 12, 2003 [Iraq] [Imperialism]
The Martial Plan
Paul Krugman [Bush policy] [Partisan] US Aid] [New imperialism] he Marshall Plan was America's finest hour. After World War I, the victors did what victors usually do: they demanded reparations from the vanquished. But after World War II America did something unprecedented: it provided huge amounts of aid, helping both its allies and its defeated enemies rebuild. It wasn't selfless altruism, of course; it was farsighted, enlightened self-interest. America's leaders understood that fostering prosperity, stability and democracy was as important as building military might in the struggle against Communism. But one suspects that our current leaders would have jeered at this exercise in "nation-building." And they are certainly following a very different strategy today.
The 'Axis Of Evil' Guy
By Jeff Shesol (Book review) January 26, 2003, Sunday The evolution of ''axis of evil'' is one of the book's highlights. What's missing, unfortunately, is much discussion of what such explosive pronouncements mean in practice. Bush's mention of North Korea -- ''added to the axis last'' -- merits only a few sentences here, mostly concerning Frum's pleasure at Pyongyang's pique. North Korea's near absence from this book makes its inclusion in the dishonor roll seem what some critics have feared: a provocative afterthought with profound consequences.
Double or nothing, Pyongyang style
{Stephen Blank} [US NK negotiations] [Blackmail] [Misinterpretation] North Korea has said that sanctions mean war. Thus it has admitted that it is a state existing "outside of the law", ie, an outlaw or rogue state.... the only exit is the path of multilateral negotiation and genuine economic reinvigoration?
It Is a Crisis
North Korea's atomic ambitions are real. So, too, is the prospect of a nuclear arms race across Asia {Anthony Spaeth} (Time Magazine)
Roh Moo Hyun Takes Center Stage
South Korea's President-elect must prove himself in a tumultuous time {Anthony Spaeth}
Kim's War Machine
{Donald Macintyre}[NK military]With obsolete tanks, scarce ammo and scant fuel, the Dear Leader's army desperately needs nuke
Understanding North Korea: The motives behind Kim Jong Il's madness
{Kevin Kim}
Practical policy on N. Korea
{Thomas Walkom} [Bush policy] [Iraq] [Collapse] [Asymmetrical power]
DPRK Not To Blame For Nuclear Treaty Failure
{Andrew Mack} [NPT]
The Right Resolution
{William Safire} [Admission] [Bush policy] [Partisan]
America The Challenged
{Jim Hoagland} [Friction] [Arrogance]
Escaping North Korea's Nuclear Trap
{Nancy E. Soderberg} [US NK negotiations] [Bush policy] In exchange for an end to both of North Korea's nuclear programs and tougher inspections, he will need to put new incentives on the table, like more food aid, a resumption of the light-water reactor construction, a nonaggression pact and the possibility of normal relations.
Nancy E. Soderberg was a United States ambassador to the United Nations from 1997 to 2001.
Talk Therapy
{Robert J. Einhorn} [Bush policy] [Arrogance][Friction] [Asymmetrical power]it refuses to negotiate a new deal for fear of rewarding bad behavior
Robert J. Einhorn, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation from 1999 to 2001.
Canada's Failure With N. Korea
{Erich Weingartner}[Canada] Mon Feb 10 2003
Kim's Dubious Achievement
{Hong Soon-il} [Sunshine policy] [Kimdj]
Negotiation of Substance
{Sohn Hong-keun} [SK-NK negotiations] [Collapse]The potential collapse of the economy in North Korea must be avoided at all costs, as this will only bring instability, both politically and economically, first to the North Eastern region of Asia and, subsequently, to most regions of the world.
Pyongyang needs nuclear bargaining power
{Robert Madsen} [cbw] [Inscrutable] [Economic reforms]
A Letter from the Independent Task Force on Korea to the Administration
[Nuclear] {Morton Abramowitz} {James Laney} Council on Foreign Relations November 26, 2002
Misperceptions fuel Korean crisis
{Glyn Ford} Glyn Ford is Labour member of the European Parliament for Southwest England and member of the delegation for relations with Japan.
Fear of attack builds on streets of Pyongyang
By Jonathan Watts [ewa] [Spin] a siren wails, and hundreds of workers in drab coats run across Kim Il Sung Square, ; ( the photo shows two women and a child in the fog, the women have bright scarves, one has a coloured bag and the child is dressed in a bright yellow top, with a red scarf)
War By All Other Means
{Dan Smith} Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) [Aid weapon]
House Resolution Calling on North Korea and the U.S. to Begin Diplomatic Talks
HCON 18 IH 108th CONGRESS 1st Session H. CON. RES. 18 [US NK negotiations] [Agreed Framework] [Admission]
Senate amendment to express the sense of the Senate with respect to North Korea
This was passed in the Senate on January 23rd as an amendment to H.J. Res. 2, the Fiscal Year '03 Appropriations Bill. H.J. Res. 2 now goes into Conference to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions. [US NK relations]
A bill to Prohibit Assistance to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Development Organization
Note: This was introduced into Congress on January 13th. It has yet to be considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations. [Aid weapon] [KEDO] [Agreed Framework]
North Korea On Three Critical Risks: Two Documents
February 7, 2003 [NK US policy] [Negotiating style] [US NK negotiations]
President-Elect Urged to Deal With Anti-US Sentiment Soon
{David Steinberg} [Anti-Americanism] [SK US relations]
Is Kim's Peace Prize Fake?
{Kim Myong-sik} [Kim dj] [Summit00] [Hyundai loan]
Joe Biden At The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing On North Korea
[US NK relations] [Partisan] [Bush policy] [US NK negotiations] Opening Statement, Tuesday, February 4, 2003
North Korea Must End Nuclear Program in Verifiable Way
[John Bolton] [NPT] [US NK Negotiations]
'A Sea Of Fire,' Or Worse?
{Nicholas Kristof} [Nuclear][Predictions] [Bush policy][[US NK negotiations] [Partisan][Asymmetrical power]
Americans on North Korea
[Public Opinion] [US NK relations] [US NK negotiations] PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES (PIPA)The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll
PIPA-Knowledge Networks Poll: Americans on North Korea
[Public opinion] PIPA Questionnaire
Public Favors Negotiating With North Korea
Press release of PIP poll [Public opinion] [US NK relations] [US NK negotiations]
Dear Leader
{William Safire} [Culture gap] [Arrogance]
ROK-DPRK engagement and US- ROK alliance: trade-off or complementary
{Chung-in Moon}[Friction] [Withdrawal] 31 January 2003
Morality Is Not a Strategy
{Fareed Zakaria} [Strategic incoherence]
The Coalition Trap
{Robert Kagan} {William Kristol} [Strategic incoherence]
Analysts on Korea Crisis
links by Institute for Public Accuracy
Roh win underscores US-Korea rift
{Tim Shorrock} [Friction]
Women and the U.S. Military in East Asia
{Margo Okazawa-Rey} [Anti-Americanism]
Negotiating With North Korea: Lessons Learned (And Relearned?)
{Mitchell B. Reiss} [Power asymmetry] [Negotiating style] [Culture gap][Arrogance] [US NK negotiations][Strategic incoherence]
Nuclear Blackmail: The 1994 U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework on North Korea's Nuclear Program
{Victor Gilinsky} [Agreed framework] [Spin]
Fabricating an Enemy
{Michel Chossudovsky} [Media] [Imperialism]
The Cold Test What the Administration knew about Pakistan and the North Korean nuclear program
{Seymour M. Hersh} [Nuclear] [Pakistan][Media] [Exceptionalism]
The Coming War With Iraq: Deciphering The Bush Administration's Motives
{Michael T. Klare} [Iraq] [Imperialism] [WMD] [Threat] [Oil] [Racialism] [Threat]( January 16, 2003)
The Prospects For Al Qaeda
{Paul Rogers} [Terrorism] [Asymmetrical power] (January 24, 2003)
Iraq, North Korea, and the U.S. Nuclear "...or else"
{Dan Smith} [Nuclear] [Iraq] [Security](January 13, 2003)
Recent Developments In Korea
[ {Kil Sang Yoon}(Comment on Shorrock's 'Roh's Election and Widening Gap) '[Racialism] [Culture gap]
Shock And Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance
[US military] [Asymmetrical power]
Operations Against Enemy Leaders
{Stephen T. Hosmer} [US Military] [Terrorism] ' Similarly, the various U.S. attempts to use bombing and PSYOP (Psychological operations ) to encourage the North Korean and North Vietnamese publics to pressure their leaders to accept allied peace terms failed. Humanitarian and legal considerations are likely to increasingly constrain attacks that may cause civilian casualties and other collateral damage in future conflicts, and will therefore limit the forms of pressure that U.S. air power can place on a populace to rise against its rulers. ' [Asymmetrical power] [Imperialism] 'The Reagan administration had become so concerned that Surinam might evolve into the first communist state on the mainland of South America, that it actively explored different options for ousting the Bouterse regime by covert means. None of the schemes-including a CIA proposal that a force of 50 to 175 South Koreans be employed to overthrow the regime-proved practical.
North Korea: A Shared Challenge to the U.S. and the Republic of Korea
{John Bolton) [US NK relations] Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Remarks to the Korean-American Association Seoul Hilton, Seoul, Korea August 29, 2002
Eurasian railways - key to the Korean deadlock?
{Markku Heiskanen} [Railways] [Eurasian] Nautilus PFO 02-32A: January 22, 2003
U.S. 'No Talk' Policy With N. Korea 'Ineffective,' Says Oberdorfer
{Don Oberdorfer} [US NK Negotiations] [Bush policy] [Partisan] [Friction] [Agreed Framework] [Perry] [SK attitude NK] [Withdrawal] 3 January 2003
Question and answer session by Assistant Secretary For East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly
[James Kelly] [Admission] (October 19, 2002)
North Korea Wants Peace, Not War
{Harold Sunoo} [NK US policy] (editorial 21 January 2003)
Response To Haksoon Paik's Essay (on Kumchangri and Perry)
{Kim Myong Chol} [Kumchangri] [Exclusion] [US dominance] Nautilus PFO 99-06B: June 16, 1999
The Kumchangni Inspection And Perry's Visit To North Korea
{Haksoon Paik} [Kumchangri] [Perry] Nautilus PFO 99-06: June 4, 1999
Look Both Sides Of The Coin To Engage North Korea
{Hwal Woong Lee} [Kumchangri] [Agreed Framework] [Delay] October 17, 1999
North Korea: A Continuing Threat
{James Lilley}[Kumchangri] [Agreed Framework] Testimony before The House Committee on International Relations James R. Lilley Resident Fellow, the American Enterprise Institute Wednesday, March 24, 1999
Tunneling Toward Disaster
{Nicholas D. Kristof} [Cho Myung Chul] [NK strategy] [NK military] [Bush policy][Partisan]
The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast Asia
{Carl E. Haselden} [Unification] [US military] [Withdrawal]
The Shape of Korea's Future: South Korean Attitudes Toward Unification and Long-Term Security Issues
{Norman D. Levin} {Yong-Sup Han} [Unification][Security] [US military] [Withdrawal]
'Bold Compromise' for Peace
{Jang Sung-min} [Iraq] [US NK Negotiations] [Gas]
War Propaganda
{Michel Chossudovsky} [Spin] [Media]
North Korea Democracy Act of 2003
[US NK relations] [Agreed Framework] [KEDO] [Belligerence]Bill S 145 introduced into US Senate by Kyl, McCain, Sessions and Bayh'To prohibit certain assistance to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Development Organization, and for other purposes.' 13 January 2003
Park-era papers offer glimpse of trying year
[SK US relations] [Park Chung Hee] [SK NK negotiations] [Independence] [4 July statement] [History]
Accept Nuclear Reality on the Korean Peninsula
{Bennett Ramberg} [Inscrutable] [Trust] [Terrorism] [US NK Negotiations]
Kim Jong Il's 2001 Russia Railroad Odysses
[Kim Jong Il]
War of Ideas May Be the Toughest U.S. Faces
{James Pinkerton } [Asymmetrical power] [Culture war]
World History and the Texan Mind of George W. Bush
{Michael Lind} [Bush policy]
Is America The New Roman Empire?
{Michael Lind} [New imperialism] June 19, 2002
A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea
{Richard L. Armitage} [US NK relations][Agreed Framework] [Bush policy] National Defense University Strategic Forum No 159 (March 1999)
The Agreed Framework With The Democratic Peoples' Republic Of Korea
{Walter B. Slocombe}, [Agreed Framework] Under Secretary of Defense for Policy National Defense University Strategic Forum Number 23, March 1995
Koreapolitik: A Peace System in the Korean Peninsula
{James Goodby} {William Drennan} [Exclusion][SK NK negotiations] [US military dominance] National Defense University Strategic Forum Number 29, May 1995
North Korean Leadership: Kim Jong Il's Intergenerational Balancing Act
{Jei Guk Jeon} [Kim Jong Il] National Defense University Strategic Forum Number 152, December 1998
Seoul's choice: the U.S. Or the North
{Richard V. Allen} [Friction] [SK US relations] [Exceptionalism][Withdrawal] [Japanese remilitarisation] [Anti-Americanism]
A Strategy for Defusing The North Korean Nuclear Crisis
[US NK negotiations] {Joel S. Wit}
Misinformation on North Korea
{Khien Theeravit}[Media] [Agreed Framework] [Imperialism]
The North Korean side of the story
{ Khien Theeravit} [Admission] [James Kelly] [non official] [media]
Challenge For The Bush Administration: Dealing With A Nuclear North Korea
{James Steinberg} {Richard Buss} {Jae Ho Chung} {Ivo Daalder} {Michael O'Hanlon} {Don Oberdorfer} [Nuclear] [US NK relations][NK US policy] [Bush policy] [Partisan] [NPT] [Anti-Americanism] [Withdrawal] [threat] [NK military] [Admission]
Transcript of Brookings Institution forum January 14, 2003 (note there are a number of mistakes in the transcript. KITO should be KEDO, Joe Winter should be Joe Winder, Don Greg should be Don Gregg)
Back to the Framework
{Jimmy Carter} [US NK negotiations] [Agreed Framework] [Normalisation] [NK US policy] [NK Strategy] [Bush policy][Jimmy Carter]
"North Korea's gamble with the United States pays off"
{Erich Marquardt} [NK US policy] [US NK Negotiations]
North Korea's Secret
{Nicholas D. Kristof} [Bizarre] [Exceptionalism] [New imperialism]
Should We Abandon South Korea?
{Howard Kurtz} [Anti-Americanism] [Withdrawal]
North Korea, South Korea and U.S. Relations
{Eric Heginbotham} [US NK relations] [Public opinion]
Ever Faster
{Jim Hoagland} [Bizarre]
Viewpoint: N Korea follows Bush's lead
{Daniel Plesch} [Bush policy] [Double standards]
Making the Best of a Bad Situation
{Tom Plate} [NPT]
Can North Korea's Perestroika Succeed?
{Wada Haruki} [Abductees][Normalisation] [Economic reform]
North-South Talks in 1990s
{Ri Tae Sun} [SK NK negotiations] [joint US military] [Nationalism] [Joint Korean] [Kim Young-sam] [KimDJ] [Unification]
The Korean War (6.25, 1950 - 7.27, 1953) - An Unanswered Question
{Channing Liem} [Korean War cause]
South Korea Provoked War with North: American Professor
{Oliver Lee} [Korean War cause]
George W. Bush and Asia: A Midterm Assessment
{James Kelly} (11 December 2002) [US NK relations] [US NK Negotiations]
Washington's nuclear policy: moral clarity or double standards?
{Muqtedar Khan} [NPT] [US military] [Double standards] [Rocketry] January 8, 2003
North Korea
{MoveOn Peace} (Bulletin 51 11 December 2002) [US NK relations] [Agreed Framework]
Axis praxis
{Hendrik Hertzberg} [Axis] [Media] [Agreed Framework] [Friction] [Missile Defense] [Admission]
New Dynamics in U.S.-Korean Relations
{Jeffrey Robertson} [US NK Relations][SK US relations]
The Brookings Institution And The Study Of Japan
{Mindy Kotler}[Information]
How Dangerous Is North Korea?
[Spin] [Belligerence](Time magazine)
'The greatest of great men'
{Nicholas d. Kristof} [Partisan] [US NK negotiations] [ewa]
United States War Crimes
{Lenora Foerstel} {Brian Willson} [Korean War events]
The Unknown Truth About Korea: U.S. Sanctioned Death Squads and War Crimes, 1945-1953
{Brian Willson} [Korean War cause]
Pop Quiz on the History of Korean-American Relations
{Gary Leupp} [SK-US relations][History]
Hidden Casualties & Secret Diplomacy: The History of US Relations with North Korea
{Patrick Carkin} [US NK relations] [History] [Imperialism]
Don't let a cloud stop the sunshine: the new president and the legacy of South-North relations
{Kim Kook-Shin} [Sunshine Policy] [Roh Moo-hyun]
A new wave of anti-Americanism in South Korea
(Gi-Wook Shin} [Anti-Americanism] [US offences] [Nationalism] [SOFA]
Games Nations Play
{Paul Krugman} [US NK Negotiations][Partisan]
'Dear Leader' no madman
{David Wall} [Training] [Economic reform][Kim Jong Il]
Inside North Korea's ruling elite - PSR January 2003
[Information] [Kim Jong Il]
Diplomacy Key to Solving NK Nuclear Issue
[US NK negotiations][Ant-Americanism] [Imperialism] (Interview with Dr. Joseph S. Nye)
Targeting North Korea
{Gregory Elich} [Context] [Admission][Media] [Nuclear] [Joint US military] [History] [Espionage] [Agreed Framework][Missile Defense]
The Nuclear Security Crisis in the Korean Peninsula - Revisit the 1994 Agreed Framework
{Moon J. Pak} [Agreed Framework] [NK US policy][US NK Negotiations] [Opening]
Pak, Moon J. , 'Nuclear Security Crisis in the Korean Peninsula: -Korean-American Perspective,'
{Moon J. Pak} [Agreed Framework] [NK US policy][US NK Negotiations] [Opening]
Lessons From Korean Election
{David I. Steinberg} [Roh Moo-hyun]
Kim is a baby rattling the sides of a cot ; It is wrong to overreact to the supposed threat of North Korea
{Peter Preston} [Nuclear] [Arrogance]
Goulash and solidarity
{Zsuzsanna Clark} compares growing up in communist Hungary with life there, and in Britain, today [Media] [Capitalism/Socialism] [Imperialism]
Banana people's republic
[Media] [Capitalism/Socialism] (letters on Zsuzsanna Clark)
William Gleysteen: Controversial US ambassador to South Korea during its 1979 coup
(Harold Jackson} [US SK relations] [History] [Kwangju] [Chun Doo Hwan]
Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis
{William H. Gleysteen} [US-NK relations]
Massive entanglement, chapter 1
{William H. Gleysteen} [US-NK relations]
Powell Recalls Ambassador Gleysteen's Distinguished Service
[US-NK relations]
The first agonizing step towards stabilizing Northeast Asia
{Sangjung Kang} [Abductees] [Koizumi0209] [Japanese colonialism] [Reparations] [Normalisation]
U.S. must act decisively on Korea
{Victor Cha} [US NK relations]
The Evolution in anti-Americanism in South Korea: From Ideologically Embedded to Socially Constructed
{Nicole Risse} [Anti-Americanism]
Pyongyang: A blot on the map
{Francesco Sisci} [Axis] [US NK relations]
Two sides to 'Yankee, go home'
{Victor D. Cha} [Anti-Americanism]
Emerging Threats, Force Structures, and the Role of Air Power in Korea
[NK military][SK military]{US military] {Natalie Crawford} {Chung-in Moon} RAND
SIPRI: The volume of transfers of major conventional weapons: by recipients and suppliers, 1997-2001
[Armaments]
The Economist backgrounder on North Korea
[Misinterpretation]
In from the cold?
[Opening]
The US Kept Up Secret Plans to Attack North Korea with Nukes in Violation of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework
{Jung Wook Sik}[Agreed Framework] [US military] [Belligerence] [Missile Defense]
"Alleged Abduction of Japanese" Needs Reexamination: Japanese Monthly
[Abductees]
Re-examining "Alleged Abduction of Japanese"From "Sekai", Jan. & Feb. Issues
{Haruki Wada} [Abductees] [Kim Hyun Hee]
Re-examining the "Alleged Abduction of Japanese"
{Mineo Noda} [Abductees]
A Rebuttal to Mr. Haruki Wada's Article
[Abductees]
Congressman Richardson's Mission to N Korea
(article of June 01, 1996) [religion] [Clinton]
Wagging the Dog - The Korean Style
{Lee Wha Rang} [Clinton] [Imperialism][NK military]
Ruth and Billy Graham (and Korea)
[religion]
US Department of State International Religious Freedom Report on Democratic People's Republic of Korea
[religion]
Empathy Wins Trust Of Wary N. Koreans
[religion][US Aid]
WHO WAS RHEE SYNGMAN?
{Lee Wha Rang} [Syngman Rhee]
Syngman Rhee
[Syngman Rhee] (Yu Sung-man; 1875-1965) The Encyclopedia of Asian History the Asia Society 1988
Andrei A. Gromyko: On American Intervention In Korea, 1950
[Korean War cause]
PRIMARY SOURCES: THE KOREAN WAR
THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY [KOREAN WAR CAUSE] [KOREAN WAR EVENTS]
Major General Dean on Syngman Rhee
PARK JUNG HEE - THE FATHER OF KOREA'S ECONOMIC MIRACLE/DEBACLE?
{Lee Wha Rang} [Park Chung-hee]
Present Significance of the 5.18 Gwangju Revolution
[Kwangju] People's Solidarity for Social Progress(PSSP)
Liberation Day Dreaming
{Joseph Steinberg}
Japan-Resident North Korean Children's Art Troupe in Seoul
{Rev Jin Kwan} [Religion] [Chongryon] [Heritage] [Motherland] [National Security Law] [Unification] [Japanese collaborator]
The Kim-Koizumi Summit
{Joel S. Wit} [Koizumi] [Misinterpretation]
Stop shooting and start talking -IHT
[NLL] [non official][Peace efforts] { John Barry Kotch} {Michael Abbey}
Roh missed a chance for daylight
[Roh Tae-woo] [Chun Doo Hwan] [Roh Moo-hyun]{Kim Young-hie}
Big powers and Syngman Rhee
[Syngman Rhee]{John Barry Kotch}
The Unjustness of North Korea's Claim on the West Sea Sea Demarcation Line and the Position of the Republic of Korea
[NLL]
Federation of American Scientists on No-dong missile facility
[threat]
Spy pictures show Korea's empty threat
[threat]
FAS: North Korea Special Weapons Guide
[threat] [cbw]
From Yellow Cards to the Yellow Sea
{Tom Plate} [border] [non official]
Yellow Sea Clash: An All-Familiar Multi-Purpose Anti-N. Korean Bogy to Torpedo James Kelly Pyongyang Visit and Dampen Growing Anti- Americanism
{Kim Myong Chol}[pro-Pyongyang] [non-official][misinterpretation]
North Korea: Thorn in China's side(Francesco Sisci}
Trust Japanese Democracy (Brad Glosserman} (Yumiko Nakagawa}
[Japanese remilitarisation]
U.S. line on defectors has catches (Kim Young-hie}
[refugee encouragement]
The Bush Administration's North Korea Policy and the Opening of the American Mind (Tony Namkung}
[religion] [Japanese colonialism]
A Proud Leader Nearing End of His Time (Tom Plate}
(kimdj}
US Department of State Background on NK (June 1996)
Japan has no Clothes (Eun Jung Cahill Che} {Yumiko Nakagawa}
How Much Will Korean Unity Cost? {Chang Se-moon}
[unification cost]
Private economy to trigger financial reform in North analyst to Bank of Korea (Park Seok-sam}
[markets]
GHAZNAVI: Chinese or North Korean or Stolen? (B. Raman}
The Juche ideology: English in North Korea (Jae Jung Song}
South Korea's Dual Dependence on America (Doug Bandow}
International relations with DPRK post9.11 (Lankov} {James Cotton} {Leonid Petrov} {Macrhbourn}, {Peter Beck} (Tim Beal}
Progress and Challenges in Denuclearizing North Korea
On April 10, the Arms Control Association held a press conference after the Bush administration decided that it would not certify North Korea's compliance with the 1994 Agreed Framework, which requires North Korea to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for two light-water nuclear power reactors. The panelists were Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association; Robert Gallucci, dean of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service; Marc Vogelaar, director of the Public and External Promotion and Support Division at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization; and Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council.
From World Cup to Peninsula Peace?(Tom Plate}
Peace on the strategically vital Korean peninsula still has a long way to go, but we may be getting there, step by halting step.
Step one is positive input from the Bush administration. Praise to the White House for ditching its nasty ``thunder and lightning policy'' toward North Korea, as it announced acceptance of Pyongyang's offer to resume official talks. That takes the administration a distance away from the president's ``axis of evil'' speech, which threw an immense dark cloud over South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's ``sunshine policy'' and went over with the South Korean public like the proverbial lead balloon.
Interview with Wieland Wagner "Korean Unification Is Historical Necessity"
Wieland Wagner, a Tokyo-based East Asia correspondent for the German news weekly "Der Spiegel" since 1995, experienced both North and South Korea and Japan. In his latest interview with PK Wagner stressed that Korea should become one as masters of their own destiny by saying that Korean unification is "a historical necessity" which no one can check. He also said that he had been shocked to see that Japanese youngsters did not know even the historical fact that Japan had placed Korea under its colonial rule.
Pyongyang Report Dancing Night at the Central Hall of the Youth
In Pyongyang city, there is a place, which is crowded with young people everyday. That is the Central Hall of the Youth.
Especially, on Sunday night, young people come together to dance.
Since last summer, a folk dancing party has been held there every Sunday. Anybody who pays 5 won, can take part in the dancing party.
Korean-American writers bloom where they're planted
HTTP 404. Internet archieve no history.
Life in the North Korean Army
"Socialism Must Be Safeguarded Even If Life Is Harsh" Round-Table Talk of North Korean Defectors Who Served in People's Army
Editor's Note: Most young North Korean men in their late teens and early 20s serve in the military. Even without taking into account Pyongyang's "military-priority politics," they do constitute the pillar underpinning the regime today, and the central force that will lead North Korean society tomorrow. Under what circumstances do North Korean servicemen lead their barracks life, and what sorts of perceptions do they harbor about the reality of the North and South Korea? In an effort to seek answers to such questions and others, we've hosted a round-table talk of three North Korean defectors in the South who had served in the military.
North Korea's Strategy Stephen Bradner (Special Advisor to the CINC of the UN Command in Korea.)
This paper was presented at the third NPEC/Institute for National Security Studies/Army War College sponsored workshop on Competitive Strategies, held June 12-14, 2000 at the Hyatt, Arlington, VA.
Time to engage, not bully, North Korea (David Wall)
CAMBRIDGE, England -- Since January 2001, relations between Pyongyang and Seoul have been tense. The various confidence-building measures agreed to at the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in June 2000 came to a halt after newly elected U.S. President George W. Bush refused to continue the U.S.-North Korean negotiations initiated by his predecessor, Bill Clinton.
North Korea: Understanding the Limits of Reform ( Julian Pardo de Zela)
Policymakers and academics have grappled for years to explain why North Korea has fiercely resisted reforms to a rigid command economy responsible for the starvation and death of 3 million of the country's citizens. To properly understand the policies and rationale behind Pyongyang's actions, however, one must recognize that North Korea is more of a religious cult than an actual country. Policies that may seem irrational and bizarre to outside onlookers must be seen in the context of a national ideology, juche, which has fused the state to the leadership through an unprecedented personality cult. The North Korean regime refuses to liberalize its tenaciously anti-capitalist policies and open itself to external influence, because economic reforms would challenge the wisdom of juche and therefore the foundation upon which the regime's legitimacy is based. The result is the perpetuation of a paranoid, brutal dictatorship, buttressed by a failed development ideology, juche, and reliant on brinkmanship and missile sales to secure foreign aid that allows the elite to live in luxury while millions starve.
The Road Not Taken (Donald P. Gregg}
I had hoped to be writing this letter following my return from a visit to P¡¯yongyang in late February. The North Korean Foreign Ministry had invited five of us to spend three or four days in P¡¯yongyang to exchange views on the current situation. Our leader was to have been Dr. Robert Scalapino, the renowned Asia scholar from UC Berkeley. Others in the group were all former U.S. ambassadors to Seoul, William Gleysteen, Richard Walker, Stephen Bosworth and myself.
Hopefully, a quieter year in store Jeffrey Jones (president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea}
George W. Bush has been president of the United States for just over a year ££ an eventful year to say the least. President Bush enjoys unparalleled popularity in the United States. His popularity ratings have been the highest for any modern U.S. president, stemming principally from his decisive leadership in dealing with the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. His ratings have not been matched by any other leader of any other nation.
Han' and some fishy jet fighters (Suh Jeong-shin}
A Canadian professor, Sam Carter, insists that he knows Korea well. When asked about the difference between Americans and Canadians, he replied that there is an inferiority complex in being the neighbor of a powerful country. Mr. Carter added that the inferiority complex is much like han, which in Korean means a deeply imbedded sorrow arising from injustice.
[VIEWPOINT]Northeast Asia trying the U-turn (Kim Jin-hyun}
Will the 21st century be the era of Asia?
In 1985, the appreciation of the Japanese yen and a troubled American economy seemed to assure that the 21st century would be the era of Japan and Japanese culture. But around 1989, with the Cold War over, the United States set out on the road of economic revival through information technology. On the contrary, Japan entered the "Lost Decade" as its economy began to ail.
Interview with Bernard Krisher
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Progress and Challenges Toward Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: A Briefing on the Status of the Agreed Framework
Good morning, everyone. Welcome to this morning's Arms Control Association briefing on Progress and Challenges on Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. I'm Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association. We're an organization that has, for the last three decades, been working to inform the public on the security issues and arms control issues, and also trying to promote effective arms control. We have organized this briefing this morning to provide what we believe is some much needed information and analysis on the current challenges facing continued progress toward implementation of the agreed framework of 1994. Before I introduce our expert panelists here, let me just briefly outline the situation-the backdrop for the issues that we are going to be discussing here.
U.S. Policy on North Korea: The View from Seoul (Toby Dalton}
After fifty years of relative peace on the Korean Peninsula, war seemed almost out of the question until President George W. Bush applied the now famous "axis of evil" label to Iran, Iraq and North Korea. These remarks sparked fears of war among Seoul's 11 million residents. President Bush said, "We have no intention of invading North Korea," during his recent summit with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, triggering a collective sigh of relief. The Bush Administration's decision to de-certify North Korea's compliance with its nuclear commitments will surely re-ignite. But the long-term consequences of the new policy are just now becoming clear in Seoul and the clear loser is the United States, not North Korea.
China and North Korean "Refugees" (Thomas F. McCarthy}
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Bush's 'axis of evil' rhetoric based on irrefutable logic (Francis Fukuyama}
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Terrorism war a pretext for arms buildup (William Pfaff}
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North Korea: It's taking too long (David Albright, Holly Higgins Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)}.
After the September 11 attack on the United States, President George W. Bush embraced a wide range of multilateral initiatives to shore up the international coalition against global terrorism. But the Bush administration has remained surprisingly hardline where North Korea is concerned. For instance, in an Oval Office interview with Asian news editors on October 16, 2001, Bush said he was ¡°disappointed¡± in North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Il, adding that Kim should lead his people into the modern era and ¡°assume the responsibility of a good leader.¡±
North Korea¡¯s response to this comment was predictable. A few days later, the Korean Central News Agency issued a statement rejecting U.S. calls for renewed diplomatic talks, adding that Bush would ¡°pay dearly.¡±
Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle ( David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, editors ISIS}
..., describes the decade-long effort to ensure that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons. This effort will soon reach a crossroads when North Korea must make its historical and current nuclear activities transparent to international inspectors, or risk sparking another international crisis.
Carlyle's way Making a mint inside "the iron triangle" of defense, government, and industry. (Dan Briody}
Like everyone else in the United States, the group stood transfixed as the events of September 11 unfolded. Present were former secretary of defense Frank Carlucci, former secretary of state James Baker III, and representatives of the bin Laden family. This was not some underground presidential bunker or Central Intelligence Agency interrogation room. It was the Ritz-Carlton in Washington, D.C., the plush setting for the annual investor conference of one of the most powerful, well-connected, and secretive companies in the world: the Carlyle Group. And since September 11, this little-known company has become unexpectedly important.
Apologies to Seoul and Beijing (Chalmers Johnson}
SAN DIEGO -- When it comes to the histories and cultures of the countries of the Pacific, the U.S. president either received a lousy education at Andover and Yale or else failed to study.
George W. Bush opened his recent tour of Japan, South Korea and China with a gaffe that should give his daddy heartburn: "My trip to Asia begins here in Japan for an important reason. . . . For a century and a half now, America and Japan have formed one of the great and enduring alliances of modern times. From that alliance has come an era of peace in the Pacific."
Extracts from Johnson's latest book Blowback
p102 ... the South Korean armed forces-today, some 670,000 men, 461 combat aircraft, and a navy that includes 44 destroyers, frigates, and corvettes as well as 4 attack submarines, with a budget of around US $16 billion-is operationally part of a military command structure headed by an American general. No matter how hard the U.S. government tries to finesse the matter, the South Korean army, except for some elite paratroop and special forces units, is as much under American military control now as it was at the time of the Cheju massacre [1948].
Why Bush's `Axis Of Evil' Provokes Acrimony... (Henry A. Kissinger}
Not in recent memory has a presidential comment evoked the acrimony, especially in Europe, as has President George Bush's phrase ``the axis of evil.'' Remarkably little of the avalanche of disapproval addresses the substance; its focus is on motives: the imminent congressional election (this from the British foreign secretary); American imperialism (the European Commission foreign policy head); simplistic thinking (the French foreign minister); the trend toward American isolationism and hegemonism (leading German newspapers).
Korea: A Postscript on Summitry (David I. Steinberg}
The visit is over, the communiques have been issued, and the obvious but publicly unarticulated tensions that have existed between the U.S. and South Korea since the earlier summit of March 2001 in Washington have been massaged. If all is not smooth, at least the rough edges have been publicly eroded. Both sides will officially claim it was a success. But the actuality is far more dubious; the visit reflected a slightly rising tide of relations starting from a very low ebb. Essential differences remain.
The U.S. War on Terror - and East Asia By James Reilly
On January 29, President Bush's State of the Union speech served clear notice that the U.S. "war on terror" is coming to Northeast Asia. To date, U.S. media attention has focused on the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan, the worldwide manhunt for al-Qaeda leaders and supporters, and domestic security scares. U.S. policies in East Asia have been understandably overlooked. No longer. With the president's upcoming visit to Japan, South Korea, and China, Bush administration policies in East Asia and their dangerous implications for regional security are now coming under closer scrutiny.
Orginal version of Reilly paper
On January 29, President Bush's State of the Union speech served clear notice that the U.S. "war on terror" is coming to Northeast Asia. To date, U.S. media attention has focused on the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan, the worldwide manhunt for al-Qaeda leaders and supporters, and domestic security scares. U.S. policies in East Asia have been understandably overlooked. No longer. With the president's upcoming visit to Japan, South Korea, and China, Bush administration policies in East Asia and their dangerous implications for regional security are now coming under closer scrutiny.
Beware the axis of hubris By DOUG BANDOW
WASHINGTON -- As U.S. President George W. Bush wandered across Northeast Asia, it appeared that he thought it was 1942, not 2002. He seemed to believe that the world was engaged in a twilight struggle between good and evil, and only overwhelming American military involvement everywhere could prevent a new Dark Ages from descending upon the planet.
He began his trip with Japan. Although the economy took precedence, Washington continues to reaffirm the two nations' military ties.
A nation that starves its own people is worthy of the name. By Frank J. Gaffney Jr.
have a confession to make: I have never been to North Korea. Unlike former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, I have not applauded tens of thousands of automaton-like North Korean children performing precision displays of devotion to their "workers' paradise" and its communist regime. Unlike former president Jimmy Carter and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, I have not been seduced by the prospect of diplomatic breakthroughs ?and Nobel Peace prizes ?in Pyongyang. And, unlike Col. William Taylor, I have never experienced the hospitality of the world's last unreconstructed Stalinist despot, North Korea's Kim Jong Il.
Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950 P. K. Rose
0n 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) swept across the 38th parallel and came close to uniting the Korean peninsula under the Communist regime of Kim Il-sung. American military and civilian leaders were caught by surprise, and only the intercession of poorly trained and equipped US garrison troops from Japan managed to halt the North Korean advance at a high price in American dead and wounded. Four months later, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) intervened in massive numbers as American and UN forces pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel. US military and civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly price was paid in American casualties.
Two strategic intelligence blunders within six months: yet the civilian and military leaders involved were all products of World War II, when the attack on Pearl Harbor had clearly demonstrated the requirement for intelligence collection and analysis. The answers to why it happened are simple, and they hold lessons that are relevant today.
Cold War Cover-Up of Murder (re Suzy Kim)
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The Federalist Papers and Sept. 11
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The union and the axis
The State of the Union address is a message to Congress from the U.S. president about domestic and foreign policy. The message is usually sent early in the year when a new session of Congress begins. The State of the Union addresses are one of three regular presidential messages to Congress, but they attract more attention than the other presidential messages because they deal with issues that all Americans and the world are interested in.
Actually, a number of important U.S. domestic and foreign policies were presented through State of the Union addresses.
North Korea through different Prisms (John Barry Kotch}
SEOUL -- In his State of the Union address, U.S. President George W. Bush has managed to disappoint South Korea and enrage North Korea at the same time by lumping the latter with the likes of Iraq and Iran. As the president begins a Northeast Asian rain-check sojourn with stops in Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing -- and with Korean issues a high priority in all three capitals -- he is likely to be called to account. Ironically, two of them, Tokyo and Seoul just joined with Washington in a high-profile Honolulu trilateral forum designed to coordinate policy toward North Korea.
Benign Neglect or Hawk Engagement? (Victor Cha}
The following article was contributed by Professor Victor D. Cha,Director of the American Alliances in Asia Project at Georgetown University. Cha warns that if President Bush's State of the Union address signals a move toward "benign neglect" of the DPRK, the US is inviting a new crisis in Northeast Asia. Engaging the DPRK, on the other hand, will help build a coalition to be able to punish the DPRK later if it engages in unacceptable behavior.
Causes and lessons of food crisis (Tony Boys)
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the fragility of modern industrial (chemical- and fossil fuel-based) agricultural systems. If the timely supply of commercial inputs is disrupted, especially when this results in a shortage of energy (fossil resource) inputs over an extended period of time, agricultural systems are liable to catastrophic collapse, resulting in food shortages. The recent experience of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) is examined in order to focus attention on the relevant aspects of this problem.
Give North Korea what it wants (Heather Smith 1999)
Over revent months a quiet crisis has been evolving on the Korean peninsula. Four party talks scheduled in Geneva next week to discuss inspections of North Korea's suspected nuclear sites are likely to bring this crisis to a head. If talks fail, the result could be a breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the possibility that the US and North Korea could embark upon a series of face-offs over nuclear inspections as has occurred with Iraq. Under such a scenario, Australia would be faced with a stark dilemma - to support possible US unilateral action or to side with regional allies.
Korea: It's time for a strategy (Heather Smith 1999)
Before Australia starts lining up with the United States on how best to deal with North Korea we would do well to consider some of the implications for our own foreign policy of former Secretary of Defence Willian Perry's forthcoming review of US policy on North Korea.
MAOISTS' TET-LIKE OFFENSIVE IN NEPAL (B.Raman}
After three rounds of peace talks with the Government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadr Deuba of Nepal,, it was apparent that there was a logjam over the demands of the Maoists of Nepal for the formation of an interim government and elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for the country. While the Government was prepared to remove all restrictions on the Maoists and facilitate their participation in new elections, with a guarantee that they would be allowed to form the new Government if they won the elections, it was not prepared to concede their demand for a new Constitution of the Republican model.
US State Department: Background Note: North Korea (October 2000)
OFFICIAL NAME: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K. or North Korea)
Geography Area: 120,410 sq. km. (47,000 sq. mi.), about the size of Mississippi. Cities: Capital--Pyongyang. Other cities--Hamhung, Chongjin, Wonsan, Nampo, and Kaesong. Terrain: About 80% of land area is moderately high mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys and small, cultivated plains. The remainder is lowland plains covering small, scattered areas. Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid, summers.
North Korea's Historic Shift: From Self-Reliance to Engagement (Don Oberdorfer, July 31, 2001
The North-South summit meeting of June 2000 has brought dramatic change to the Korean peninsula. In political terms, it is the greatest change since the Korean War half a century ago. The resulting engagement, if sustained, has the capability of the inaugurating a fundamentally new era in Korea and Northeast Asia.
How did this surprising engagement come about? What are its essential characteristics? Where is it leading? What are the prospects of success?
Second International Peace Conference
Internal link - KPF_conference2001.html
Managing Development Assistance in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Tom McCarthy)
Internal link - mccarthy.html
THE TWO KOREAS (Don Oberdorfer)
Today we are very fortunate to have with us Don Oberdorfer, the former diplomatic correspondent of The Washington Post and now distinguished journalist in residence at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Although his official biography states that he has been a journalist for 38 years, his career as a newspaper-person actually began when he started a little community newspaper in his grammar school in Atlanta. By the time he had landed his first professional newspaper job at The Charlotte Observer in North Carolina, he had already served as the editor of his high school newspaper and of The Daily Princetonian, the student newspaper at his alma mater.
A thousand frogs in a little pond called Koreatown (K. W. Lee)
[This article was originally published in the Korea Times Bi-Lingual Monthly in LA and was republished in IEKAS 01-29, 9/7/2001]
I can't believe what I am seeing lately. It's unreal -- the way LA Koreatown behaves oblivious to the outside world. But you know, I know, and every Korean born of the Korean womb knows why -- instinctively. It's in our blood. We can't help it. It's in our cultural DNA since time immemorial. You can even see it with naked eyes. We Koreans, here in LA or there in Korea, love to fight over this or that title and splinter into rival groups -- forever. It's that deja vu time again.
(Tom Plate} Getting North Korea to the Big Dance
LOS ANGELES _ How long until North Korea comes to its senses and comes in out of the cold?
It is now past time for Kim Jong-il to face reality and implore the world to help resurrect North Korea's moribund economy. In return, he must ease long-standing Korean peninsula tensions -- for starters by reciprocating last summer's summit visit by Kim Dae Jung.
But who can pry North Korea from its scary, claustrophobic shell?
GILGIT & BALTISTAN, CHINA & NORTH KOREA (B.Raman)
Before the recent Agra summit, Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's self-reinstated Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), self-styled Chief Executive and self-promoted President, had held a series of consultations with political and religious leaders of Pakistan, including Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), on his negotiating strategy at Agra. As we had mentioned in our reports on the subject available at www.saag.org , significantly, he did not invite any representative of the Pakistan-Occupied Northern Areas (Gilgit & Baltistan) for these consultations.
The Lone Ranger's regional posse Purnendra Jain and John Bruni
ADELAIDE - Two key questions emerge from this week's annual Australia-United States (AUSMIN) meeting held in Canberra between senior ministers of the two countries. One, why does Australia still pursue it Cold War alliance with the US? Second, what would be the possible implications of the proposal made by Australia's foreign minister of a trilateral security grouping comprising the US, Japan and Australia?
A handbook for good Koreans ( Yi Taehui)
It might be useful to begin an article on Korea's conception of the nation by looking at how this idea is depicted in its history textbooks.(1) Koreans share a particular view about their nation, which is rooted in their past. Later we will see how textbooks in South Korea depict the essential characteristics of the nation and the Korean state.(2)
A U.S.-North Korea Deal Isn't Dead Yet (Stan Crock)
On the surface, the prospects for any progress in talks between the U.S. and North Korea seem slim. During the Presidential campaign, the Bush foreign policy team blasted the Clinton Administration for being soft on Pyongyang and promised to hew to a harder line. The outlook looked bleaker in March, when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung visited Washington. Not having yet looked into the soul of North Korean strongman Kim Jong Il , President Bush denounced him as untrustworthy and declared that talks with Pyongyang wouldn't be resumed any time soon.
The Korean peninsula's imperfect past (Mark B M Suh)
Ten years ago no other people in the world were more pleased than Koreans about the peaceful unification of Germany. Even now most Koreans look at Germany with envy, admiration and hope that a similar miracle will soon occur in Korea. Although some Koreans think it unjust that Germany was united before Korea since Korea was divided unjustly, they comfort themselves by believing that Korea can learn from Germany.
Asia becomes a conundrum for US policymakers (Jim Lobe)
WASHINGTON - Asia bedevils US policymakers even as it replaces Europe as the focus of their security concerns, according to a growing consensus among defense experts here.
Those concerns are especially worrisome because of the lack of multilateral security mechanisms in the region, wide gaps in understanding and confidence between key players, and the pace at which change - economic, political, and strategic - is taking place in Asia.
KOREA TASK FORCE REPORT Report of the Independent Task Force on Korea Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (Kerrey, Manning)
A year after the historic June 2000 North-South Summit, the Bush administration begins its diplomacy toward North Korea at a time of lingering hope, but troubling uncertainty about the future of the Korean peninsula. The Summit was a milestone that opened up a new chapter in inter-Korean relations and offered the prospect of genuine reconciliation, of beginning to address the causes rather than the effects -weapons of mass destruction-of the Korea problem. It also marked a transformation of the once-mysterious Kim Jong Il, who surfaced as a serious public political figure embarking on a remarkable diplomatic offensive, normalizing relations with nearly two dozen nations in Asia and Europe, including major NATO allies, as well as hosting an American Secretary of State. Yet the promise of diplomacy and the imagery of change have so far greatly outpaced the reality on the ground.
KEI-Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences May 9-11 Conference Report
The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) hosted a conference entitled "Inter-Korean Reconciliation, Economic Cooperation and the Role of Major Powers" on May 9-11 in Shanghai. The conference was co-sponsored by the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), the Atlantic Council, and the United States Institute of Peace. The Korea Foundation provided financial support for the conference.
U.S. foreign policy viewed through a military prism (William Pfaff}
NEW YORK - Military subjects have dominated the European agenda of President George W. Bush this week, but they are actually disguised political controversies.
This administration, even more than its predecessors, suffers from militarization of its policy thought, a significant development in a Washington where the Pentagon has become by far the weightiest and best-financed player in the policy debate.
The result is that Washington is losing the insight, and even the vocabulary, for treating foreign policy as political business.
Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, Takashi Kawakami, RAND
This study seeks to identify and examine the many factors influencing Japan's approach to the issue of ballistic missile defense (BMD), including the perceptions, motives, and interests of key Japanese players; the role of the United States; the Japanese decisionmaking process regarding BMD issues; and the dynamics of critical considerations such as alliance maintenance, cost, feasibility, commercial and legal factors, political or bureaucratic competition, and the behavior of the People's Republic of China. The purpose of this examination is to assess the pros and cons of various options available to Japan, to identify the most likely courses of Japan's future BMD development, and to discern the possible implications of such development for the U.S.-Japan alliance and Asian stability.
Political Economic Cooperation towards a Reconciled Korea Young-Kwan Yoon (Seoul National University)
(Note: In Korean Language)
Kim dithers atop shockwaves STRATFOR.COM's Global Intelligence Update June 14, 2000
The many problems Seoul now faces would each alone cause concern, but coming all at the same time they make a coordinated response both more important and more difficult. Yet politics, rather than economics, is driving government policies. President Kim Dae-jung is losing domestic popularity and in attempting to revive his power continues to focus on inter-Korean relations - a risky strategy because it has contributed to his falling popularity in the first place.
Text of Feulner's Speech on Bush's Korea Policy (Heritage Foundation)
A missed opportunity for security in Asia (Leon V Sigal )
The following is the full text of a speech on the Bush administration¡¯s Korea policy, titled ¡°From Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Certainty,¡± Edwin J. Feulner, president of the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, delivered to the Korea Freedom League on May 14. -- Editor
Introduction
Distinguished guests, I must emphasize, from the beginning, that I am speaking from my personal vantage point as a long time friend and observer of Korean-American relations. I am not speaking on behalf of the Bush Administration, even though many of the new policy makers in the new Administration are old and close friends of mine. And a number of them ¦¬ including our distinguished Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao ¦¬ were my colleagues at the Heritage Foundation.
Need to call for a protest movement against NMD AND TMD (Kim, Changsoo)
Internal link - protest_nmd.html
No Time To Delay On North Korea (James P Rubin)
President Bush is right to focus world attention on new threats we all face from the spread of missiles and nuclear weapons. But his administration's approach to North Korea's missiles raises some troubling questions.
Abolishing `Vision' of Unification Will Lead to Unification: German Scholar
As the peace process unfolds for the Korean peninsula, many experts have called for the need to set a more rational and realistic policy on inter- Korean reunification, saying the present discourse, based on the ``vision'' of unifying the two Koreas, will eventually clash with the needs of the changing times and the political climate.
Korea's Future and the Great Powers, Edited by Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings (book notice)
The eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula will send political and economic reverberations throughout Northeast Asia, and will catalyze the struggle over a new regional order among the four great powers of the Pacific-Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. In Korea's Future and the Great Powers, the contributors address the vital issues of how to achieve a stable political order in a unified Korea, how to finance Korean economic reconstruction, and how to link Korea into a cooperative framework of diplomatic relations.
NMD-TMD: Right Question, Wrong Answer (B.Raman)
Not only to the rest of the world, but even to many in the US, the over-enthusiasm of the US Administration for the National Missile Defence (NMD) and the Theater Missile Defence (TMD) project is a mystery. What is it due to?
Bush's Tough Line on North Korea Is Dangerous (Leo V Sigal)
NEW YORK The realists who run foreign policy in the Bush team are getting the United States into trouble in Korea. Realists believe that all countries seek security and that military power is the bedrock of their security. Sometimes, in some places, that supposedly tough-minded view of the world is simply wrong-headed. Now, in Korea, is one of those times and places.
Demonisation will not help North Korea creep from its impoverished shell (Gittings)
Internal link - demonisation.html
North-South Summit Gave the 70 Million Koreans Hope for Unification (Han Ho Suk)
In October 1997, Kim Jong Il said - "We are struggling now but things will get better in three years". No one could understand what he meant by this. It was assumed that he was merely cheering on the Party cadres.
As you know October 1997 was the most difficult period for Kim Jong Il and our compatriots in North Korea. The 'arduous march' ran into the most arduous time since the war of June 25, 1950. The future appeared bleak and there was little hope for any foreseeable improvement. While other nations were singing songs of new prosperous life, our compatriots in North Korea were forced to tighten their belt and endure unprecedented hunger and deprivation.
US, INDIA & TERRORISM (B Raham)
Discussion of US designation of states supporting terrorism
Action by the US against state-sponsors of international terrorism is governed by Section 2656 (f) of Title 22, relating to Foreign Relations and Intercourse, of the US Code enacted by the Congress on December 22,1987, Section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 and Section 2405 (j) of the Appendix to Title 50, relating to War and National Defence, of the US Code.
Deputy CIA Director Examines Challenges Posed By North Korea (John McLaughlin)
The deputy director of U.S. central intelligence says current conditions in North Korea "hold the potential for both engagement and confrontation."
John McLaughlin told participants in a conference sponsored by Texas A&M University that while North Korea was once a metaphor for some of the most extreme aspects of the Cold War, it is today a metaphor "for the most challenging aspects of the new world that has come in its wake."
NORTH KOREA: ENGAGEMENT OR CONFRONTATION (McLaughlin another version}
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The Role of the EU In Northeast Asia (Markku Heiskanen)
The following article was written by Markku Heiskanen, Deputy Policy Planning Director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki, Finland. Heiskanen examines the role of the European Union in Northeast Asia in light of the upcoming visit by Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson to the Korean Peninsula.
The Koreas - which role for the E.U. ? ( Frank H. Hesske)
1. I would like to begin by thanking the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation and its dynamic representative here in Korea, my friend Mr. Meinardus, for giving me the opportunity to make a few remarks on the state of relations between the EU and the two Koreas. As I will later point out, the interest of the European Union in the Korean peninsula has been developing for over a decade and is not motivated by any short-term considerations of wanting to be seen as a major regional player in the dynamics that have followed the inter-Korean Summit. However, it is quite clear that the entry into force of a new institutional framework - as of 1 April 2001 - between the Republic of Korea and the European Union and the up-coming visit of the Presidency of the EU, represented by Sweden to Pyongyang and Seoul in early May have raised considerable interest amongst the Korean public as regards the role of the EU in this part of the world.
Myths of KEDO(Desaix Anderson, Executive Director of KEDO)
The Myths of KEDO
-- KEDO appears to be the favorite whipping boy of Pyongyang, Republican aspirants, economists, and print journalism, so I would like to dispel a few myths about KEDO and appreciate the opportunity to do so.
- I regret that so many seem to have been duped by DPRK propaganda, or to be using this sensitive issue for partisan political goals, or remain ignorant of the facts;
Engage North Korea (Senator John F. Kerry)
One of the major questions facing the United States and its allies is how to deal with the ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea. Pyongyang has already demonstrated its capacity to launch a 500-kilogram warhead to a range of at least 1,000 kilometers, and it is known to be interested in developing a longer-range missile capability. North Korea's proliferation of missiles, missile components, technology and training to Pakistan and Iran further magnifies the need to end Pyongyang's missile program.
Keep North Korea on Life Support (Park and Treverton)
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Bush's foreign policy 'realism' may backfire on U.S. (William Pfaff}
BOSTON - The motive remains mysterious for what seems gratuitous brutality in the Bush administration's approach not only to Russia and China, but to South Korea and the Europeans.
The White House says it has adopted a "new realism,'' and Mr. Bush's press secretary has repeatedly used that word, or a variation of it, in defending what has been going on.
New ray of light on Kim's 'sunshine' thrust (Louis Hau)
SEOUL - A casual observer might view South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's cabinet reshuffle on Monday as an urgent exercise in damage control to salvage his government's ongoing reconciliation efforts with North Korea.
An American GI and a North Korean Farmer
In 1950, I was with the US 7th Infantry Division. My unit was involved in the Inchon landing operation in mid September 1950. I was rather young and very naive. It never occurred to me that people of another culture were not inferior to me. Although I personally did not mistreat anyone, I observed some nasty things, but I took it in stride. We even had ROKA personnel in our outfit as the "buddy" system (KATUSA).
The Origins of the Korean War; An Interpretation from the Soviet Archives- (Evgueni Bajanov)
Until the end of 1949 Stalin did not plan any aggression against South Korea. Instead he was worried about an attck from the South, and did everything to avoid provoking Washington and Seoul. In 1947-1948 Soviet leaders still believed in the possibility of unification of Korea, and refused to sign a separate friendship and cooperation treaty with North Korean leader Kim II Sung.
Woodrow Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, documents Library (has material from Soviet archives, etc. on Korea}
(Note: the page has been redirected to Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) )
Cold War International History Project (overview of Korean project)
Note: the page has been redirected to Cold War International History Project (CWIHP)
Bush misses the point on North Korea (Peter Scoblic)
In putting missile talks with North Korea on hold, the Bush administration has won plaudits for taking a stronger and more realistic stand toward a dangerous regime.
But the reason the administration gave for its hesitance - concern that the North would cheat on any agreement - is based not on pragmatism but on a misunderstanding of the importance of verification. An agreement ending North Korea's missile development and exports would be a boon for US security, and the inability to fully guarantee North Korea's compliance does not make a deal imprudent or dangerous.
(Stone Mirror} Double Presidential Mistakes By David I. Steinberg
The South Korean and American presidents in the space of a couple of weeks have each committed an unnecessary blunder that will hurt the important relationship between the two countries. Both South Korea and the United States need each other for a variety of reasons related to complex factors in peninsula and regional security and trade beyond Cold War considerations. The security alliance between the two may be solid, but progress in the region and in the relationship has been set back significantly through each side misunderstanding the internal political dynamics of the other country.
IT'S ELEMENTARY Planet Sport to Kim Jong-il: A little respect, please (Alan Watson)
As a bad idea, it's a good one. Less than 500 days before the opening match of soccer's World Cup in Japan and South Korea in 2002, there is still hot air being blown around about the possibility of North Korea staging a game or two in what is the world's biggest, and most-watched, sporting event. Someone light a match.
Welcome to Bush's Hobbesian world (Jim Lobe)
WASHINGTON - Less than two months after taking office, US President George W Bush last week pushed US foreign policy toward a new dimension, far removed from the sunny optimism of his predecessor, Bill Clinton, and much closer to the Hobbesian universe occupied by Richard Nixon.
The question now is whether he will continue in that direction, and, if so, whether he will drag the world with him.
Festering Pyongyang endangers all of Asia ( Francesco Sisci)
Is anybody prepared for the collapse of North Korea?
The reportedly huge number of refugees fleeing from the country to China raises the possibility of the collapse of the Pyongyang regime. The 300,000 North Koreans said to have left the country in the past four years represent well over 1 percent of the population. Putting this number in context with the active measures against their flight taken by North Korea's neighbors, including and foremost South Korea, and the fact that the refugees are at great risk if caught, then we can conclude that the Pyongyang regime has serious internal problems if so many people still want to flee.
TALKING TO THE NORTH KOREANS (Wendy R. Sherman)
(Note: need to login to the page)
The Inter-Korean Economic Exchanges and Co-operation
(Asian Solidarity Quarterly No 2 Autumn 2000)
The Summit Meeting announced the historic beginning of co-operation and reconciliation in the Korean Peninsula. Past history has shown us that any agreement between both Koreas could signify nothing unless mutual trust was established; the fundamental principle for unification was agreed in the 7.4 Joint Communique in 1972, and reconciliation and non-aggression was declared in the South-North Agreement in 1991-2. Thus it is strongly expected that the first meeting of two summits since the division of the country will establish mutual trust and enable the two parties to put all the agreement into practice.
Unintended consequences: proliferation in South Korea (STRATFOR.COM Mar 7, 2001)
Seoul's fledgling space program has accelerated with a move to abandon a 1979 agreement with Washington that limited missile development. Motivated by economic, security and nationalistic concerns, Seoul is pursuing a highly indigenous space program - one that could defend the peninsula while lessening Seoul's dependency on the United States. South Korea's late entry into Northeast Asia's space race will spur commercial competition and may trigger increased regional missile proliferation. Ironically, the problem may not be so much North Korea as South Korea.
The truth about North Korea's missile program (STRATFOR.COM)
Seoul's fledgling space program has accelerated with a move to abandon a 1979 agreement with Washington that limited missile development. Motivated by economic, security and nationalistic concerns, Seoul is pursuing a highly indigenous space program - one that could defend the peninsula while lessening Seoul's dependency on the United States. South Korea's late entry into Northeast Asia's space race will spur commercial competition and may trigger increased regional missile proliferation. Ironically, the problem may not be so much North Korea as South Korea.
Richard Armitage: His Past, Present and Future (B Raman)
Born in 1945, Mr. Richard Lee Armitage, who has been nominated by President George Bush as Deputy Secretary of State under Gen.Colin Powell, graduated in 1967 from the U.S. Naval Academy and was commissioned as an Ensign. He served on a destroyer stationed on the Vietnam coastline and subsequently did three combat tours with the riverine/advisory forces in Vietnam. He became fluent in Vietnamese.
New US defense strategy to provoke adversaries (STRATFOR.COM Mar 2, 2001)
In Washington, an internal Pentagon review of American defense strategy is likely to call for a dramatic reduction in US troops deployed overseas while increasing the use of technologies that can monitor and strike adversaries from long distances. Such a historic shift would reduce the vulnerability of US forces to attack and lower the profile of a seemingly imperial military presence. Over the long term, however, such a strategy may force allies and adversaries alike to build new regional alliances or adopt independent, antagonistic defense strategies.
US State Department on 'human rights in DPRK'
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a dictatorship under the absolute rule of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). Kim Il Sung led the DPRK from its inception until his death in 1994. Since then his son Kim Jong Il has exercised unchallenged authority. Kim Jong Il was named General Secretary of the KWP in October 1997. In September 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly reconfirmed Kim Jong Il as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and declared that position the "highest office of state." The presidency was abolished leaving the late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only president. The titular Head of State is Kim Yong Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il continue to be the objects of intense personality cults. The regime emphasizes "juche," a national ideology of self-reliance. The judiciary is not independent.
Russia makes up lost ground with Korean proposals (STRATFOR.COM)
Two key topics of Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Seoul this week will be his country's role in inter-Korean reconciliation and North Korea's missile program. Russia has been playing catch-up to Beijing and Washington in dealing with the two Koreas lately, facing several false starts and setbacks. In order to find its niche on the Korean peninsula and increase its international standing, Moscow may propose tripartite cooperation with Seoul and Pyongyang to launch North Korean satellites
Jim Lobe: Northeast Asia to test new US administration
WASHINGTON - While US President George W Bush focuses initially on Washington's closest foreign relationships, storm clouds appear to be massing steadily in Northeast Asia. The sinking earlier this month of a Japanese fishing boat after it was accidentally rammed by a US submarine off the coast of Hawaii has dealt an unexpected blow to ties with Washington's closest ally in the region.
Uwe Parpart: Bush's lone military superpower vision (Part 1 of 3)
After watching a display of simulated missiles stream toward the United States at Norfolk, Virginia, Naval Air Station last Tuesday, US President George W Bush vowed to work with Nato allies to confront the threat of nuclear weapons. At the headquarters of Allied Command Atlantic, Bush had stood before three large video screens displaying high-tech war games conducted jointly by the United States and Nato, directed from the command ship, USS Mount Whitney, 50 miles off the Virginia coast. Then, at an outdoor rotunda ringed by the flags of the 19 Nato nations, he said he was committed to working in unity with US allies on defense, whether against missiles or extremist attack, and on peacekeeping: "I'm here today with a message for America's allies. We will cooperate in the work of peace, we will consult early and candidly with our Nato allies, and we'll expect them to return the same ... Nato is the reason history records no World War III, by preserving the stability of Europe and the trans-Atlantic community. Nato has kept the peace and the work goes on." US Navy personnel and diplomats from Nato states based in Washington attended.
Uwe Parpart: The enemy is China
US President George W Bush has tasked the obscure Office of Net Assessment of the Department of Defense (Pentagon) and its publicity-shy director, veteran - very veteran, he's 79 years old - Andrew W Marshall, with conducting a fast-track, six-week review of American military strategy in light of revolutionary military-technological developments and changed, post-Cold War international strategic alignments and potential adversaries. Judging by published views of Marshall and the Office of Net Assessment, the likely principal new challenger of US dominance is China, and India bears close watching.
Uwe Parpart: The nature of future wars and US strategy
NY Times on the case of Wen Ho Lee
For several years the US Department of Defense (Pentagon) has declared that it is pursuing fundamental changes to the US force structure and modernization programs that are designed to capture an emerging "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). What sort of revolution are we talking about?
The Making of a Suspect: The Case of Wen Ho Lee
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The Prosecution Unravels: The Case of Wen Ho Lee
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Donald Rumsfeld--His Past, Present & Future (B Raman)
In the foreign policy and national security fields, Mr.Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary of President George Bush (Jr), will be one of the four heavy weights of the Bush Administration, the other three being Mr.Dick Cheney, the Vice-President, Gen. Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, and Ms.Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Adviser.
(Cultural Dimensions}Kim Jong-il triangulates
Kim Jong-il's visit to Shanghai and Beijing received a lot of good press. His expressed enthusiasm for the booming economy in Shanghai has been taken as confirmation of "change" in North Korea.
Oxford Analytica: North/South Korea Winds of Change
Internal link - oxan1.htm
World Bank on North Korea
Internal link - world bank125.pdf
UNICEF statistics on DPRK
Kyrgyzstan
The United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF works for the survival, development and protection of children, guided in its programmes by the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(US) Mission to North Korea and China August 11-23, 1998 (Mark Kirk)
At your direction, we assembled a team to assess the food situation and other bilateral issues between the United States and North Korea. The team consisted of Mark Kirk, Majority Counsel, Peter Brookes, Majority Professional Staff Member for East Asia, Maria Pica, Minority Counsel, and Larry Nowels of the Congressional Research Service.
North Korea Advisory Group Report to The Speaker U.S. House of Representatives (on North Korean Threat), , U.S. House of Representatives, 1999
Dear Mr. Speaker:
We are pleased to transmit to you our report, which answers the question: Does North Korea pose a greater threat to U.S. national security than it did five years ago? In sum, we found that the comprehensive threat posed by North Korea to our national security has increased since 1994. Our report contains an executive summary.
NKAG report on North Korea, press report and comments by Tony Hall, 3 November 1999

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Tim Beal

Photos taken in DPRK, April 2004
More to follow

Books

Crisis in Korea: America, China, and the Risk of War
Pluto Press, London 2011

North Korea: The Struggle against American Power

Book for Pluto Press of London. Published September 2005

Reviews

Korean edition, October 2010

Foreword to Korean edition of ‘North Korea: The Struggle against American Power’
November 24, 2010 The Cheonan incident of March 2010, or more precisely the response to it, has cast a dreadful pall over the Korean peninsula. The prospect of war engulfing the Koreas, and Northeast Asia, which seemed to have been banished during the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, has returned. It has made the subject of this book more relevant than ever before. The people of Korea, South and North, cannot escape the forces of geopolitics.

Papers, presentations, and articles

Theatre of War and Prospects for Peace on the Korean Peninsula on the Anniversary of the Yeonpyeong Incident
An expanded, and illustrated, version of Theatre of War for The Asia Pacific Journal, 19 December 2011
The new Korean border wars – a global flashpoint?
A shorter version of Theatre of War written for the Pluto blog This also appeared on 4th Media, Beijing as The First Anniversary of Contested Memories in Korean Peninsula
Theatre of War: Smoke and mirrors on the Korean peninsula on the anniversary of the Yeonpyeong Incident
Pyongyang Report V13 N2 6 December 2011
Beyond lips and teeth: the economics of the China-North Korea relationship Korea Yearbook 2011, edited by Rüdiger Frank, James E. Hoare, Patrick Köllner and Susan Pares Leiden, Brill, 2011
From one Cold War to Another – the role of Korea
Presentation at National University of Singapore, 31 October, 2011
The United Nations and the Korean peninsula; Critical perspectives, positive suggestions
Peace Forum, Vol. 27 Issue 2 No. 36, December 2011, The Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University, Seoul
Russian chess Russia moves to use economics to promote peace in Northeast Asia
Simmering tension in Korea originally posted on Pluto blog, 16 August 2011
Lee Myung-bak, Cheonan, and the New Cold War
Paper presented at the 19th New Zealand Asian Studies Society International Conference 2011, 2 – 4 July 201, Massey University, Palmerston North
Statistical tables on the China-DPRK relationship
Blast from the past
Short comments in the Evening Standard of London by Steven Casey and Tim Beal [Clash] [Korean War]
Korean Brinkmanship, American Provocation, and the Road to War: the manufacturing of a crisis
Tim Beal
Revised version of Pyongyang Report V12, N1, December 2010
Minjog21 interview: on the current situation
Tim Beal was interview by Chung Young-chul for Minjog21 in Seoul in October 2010. This is the front page of the journal, and the first page of the interview
In Korean
Fire Fight at Yeonpyeong: The Manufacturing of Crisis
Korean brinkmanship, American strategic paralysis, and the road to war Tim Beal Summary of Pyongyang Report V12, N1, December 2010 The artillery clash between North and South Korea around the Island of Yeonpyeong on 23 November has been portrayed as an unprovoked attack by the North which involved indiscriminate fire on a civilian area. The reality is very different,. This reality can only be reached through a careful reading of the public reports combined with an understanding of the context.
Pluto books blog
Fire fight at Yeonpyeong: the manufacturing of crisis
Korean brinkmanship, American strategic paralysis, and the road to war
Decoding Korea: Using Context to Explain the Artillery Clash
Tim Beal Reading an obituary of Chalmers Johnson – the American East Asia expert who moved from being a Cold War warrior to a trenchant critic of US imperialism – I was taken with his stress on the importance of context. Talking about the need to strip away the lies of government he wrote ‘The concept ‘blowback’ does not just mean retaliation for things our government has done to and in foreign countries. It refers to retaliation for the numerous illegal operations we have carried out abroad that were kept totally secret from the American public. This means that when the retaliation comes—as it did so spectacularly on September 11, 2001—the American public is unable to put the events in context. So they tend to support acts intended to lash out against the perpetrators, thereby most commonly preparing the ground for yet another cycle of blowback’. As with 9/11 so with the latest incident on the Korean peninsula.. [Clash] [Context]
On the Brink. Prospects for US-DPRK Settlement Dim, Yet Again
Tim Beal
Every time it looks as if US-DPRK negotiations are on the verge of a breakthrough someone in Washington throws a spanner in the works. This is what happened in 2005 as the Chinese were forcing through the Joint Statement of 19 September which seemed to put the negotiations, under the aegis of the Six Party Talks, on a course for a successful resolution. The US Treasury designated the Macau bank used by North Korean entities (and British companies and joint ventures in DPRK), Banco Delta Asia, as a “Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act”. [1] Although the allegations were subsequently discredited, partly through the investigative reporting of the US chain McClatchy Newspapers, the action put the Six Party Talks in limbo for over a year, as well as having a serious impact on DPRK foreign trade, and hence on the economy itself, which reportedly shrank 1.1% in 2006. [2] Negotiations between US Under Secretary of State Christopher Hill and DPRK Vice Minister Kim Kye-gwan resulted in a couple of agreements in 2007, one in February the other in October, which seemed to offer a way forward.[3]These hopes have been dashed and prospects at the moment look dim. [Agreement071003] [Dissension] [Syria] [HEU]
State, Globalisation and Imperialism: the case of North Korea
Paper presented at the 58th Political Studies Association Annual Conference University of Swansea, 2 April 2008
Definitions and debates There has been much talk of empire in recent years, even challenging for a while the less loaded word hegemony, at least until failure in Iraq and Afghanistan became more apparent. Perry Anderson has commented that ‘its [the Bush Administration] performance in the Middle East has aroused an international furore, giving rise to now familiar rival depictions of the unconcealed emergence of an American empire, or the precipitous decline. of one. Niall Ferguson is probably the most prominent contemporary celebrant of the ‘benign empire’. But the word imperialism was not much used. This was significant because imperialism is what empires do, and, more important, why they do it. It is perhaps no accident that we had talk of empire without imperialism; empire could be celebrated without an analysis of its driving forces and rationale.
The United Nations and the North Korean missile and nuclear tests
NZ Journal of Asian Studies, 9, 2 (December 2007), pp. 104-25
The North Korea-China Relationship: Context and Dynamics
Tim Beal
Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
Working Paper No. 184 (Jun 07) CAPS
The Road to Peace in Northeast Asia – Prospects and Pitfalls
Tim Beal
The shutdown of the DPRK plutonium reactor, the New York Times noted angrily recently, shows that ‘real nonproliferation diplomacy can produce real results’ as long as it is stripped of ‘empty, ideological posturing’.[1] The target of the Times’ fulminations was not, as is usually the case, and as it will probably be again tomorrow, the government in Pyongyang, but that in Washington. Tearing up the agreement it had inherited from the Clinton administration had only produced an ‘embarrassing outcome for the hard-line tactics favored by Vice-President Dick Cheney’. The Bush administration, recalled the Times, had ‘walked away from Mr. Clinton’s deal in 2002, with sensational charges, from which it has since retreated, that North Korea was pursuing a second, secret bomb-making program based on uranium enrichment.’ We might recall that the newspaper had itself published an embarrassed mea culpa that the administration’s ‘sensational charges’ about Iraq, subsequently proven fraudulent, had misled it into enthusiastically supported the disastrous invasion. Were the charges against the DPRK equally fraudulent? Probably, but since they cannot be disproved – and there’s the rub – the Times is left with nagging doubt, and anger about ‘the six bombs’ worth of nuclear fuel Pyongyang produced – and the nuclear test - while Washington strutted and postured.’[2]
(This is an expanded and annotated version of the commentary to Pyongyang Report V9 N3 July 2007)
North Korea - prospects for peace
United Nations Association, Wellington branch
12 July 2007
PowerPoint presentation
The North Korea-US agreement - prospects for peace
NZ Institute of International Affairs, Canterbury branch
27 March 2007
PowerPoint presentation
Armageddon averted or just postponed?
Political Economy Research Centre, University of Sheffield
14 December 2006
PowerPoint presentation
Using India to Keep China at Bay
December 12, 2006
Foreign Policy in Focus www.fpif.org
Editor: John Feffer, IRC
U.S. attempts to construct and consolidate an alliance to contain China's seemingly inexorable rise registered another milestone in November when the U.S. Senate passed a bill to allow the government to transfer nuclear fuel and technology to India. The nuclear deal with India flies in the face of long-standing U.S. rhetoric about nuclear proliferation and is yet another blow to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Annotated, pre-publication version.
North Korea's Nuclear Test—Bush's Godchild?
By Tim Beal
[Japan Focus 6 November 2006]
The nuclear test by the DPRK has led to a predictable deluge of hype and hypocrisy, amidst a dearth of informed and sensible comment. Politicians, and journalists, have reveled in the situation. North Korea is a convenient whipping boy, with few friends. It tends to be excoriated across the political spectrum. Since it is a small country targeted by the world’s superpower, which, though hemorrhaging and perhaps in relative decline, still possesses such formidable political, economic and military power that no country, or international civil servant for that matter, dares openly speak up, even if they so desired. Politicians have hastened to express moral outrage even if, and perhaps especially if, they come from countries which have many nuclear weapons and have conducted tests. Journalists have been having a field day, many delighting in the opportunity to write lurid stories unencumbered by the need to check facts and qualify opinions. Under the circumstances, it is more necessary than ever before to keep a clear head and try to disentangle fact from fantasy, to unearth what has been going on, and what is likely to happen. [Camouflage]
This essay is an expanded and annotated version of the commentary which appeared in Pyongyang Report V8 nos 4-5, November 2006. It was subsequently also posted on Z-net
US, China, and the Korean Peninsula: Implications for Argentina Center for Korean Studies, Department of Asian and Pacific Studies, National University of La Plata, La Plata, Argentina Second National Congress on Korean Studies, 24-5 August 2006
Presentation
Missile condemnation reeks of double standards The DominionPost, Wellington, 12 July 2006
opinion piece
Interview with Chuck Mertz
Our interview will be broadcast live over-the-air here in Chicago on Northwestern University's WNUR 89.3 FM, live online via our station's web site at http://www.wnur.org, and it will also be archived at our site, http://www.thisishell.net. 8 July 2006
Archived programme
Their Rockets’ red glare TomPaine.commonsense, 6 July 2006
opinion piece
North Korea and the Boundaries of American Hegemony Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC
20 June 2006
Building bridges for understanding The DominionPost, Wellington, 7 June 2006
opinion piece
Convoluted Contestations: The United States, China and the Two Koreas Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast, annual conference, Pullman, WA, USA , 16 June 2006
Presentation
Discordant Beijing Sextet Plays in Harmony: But for How Long? New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, December 2005, 71-108
paper
North Korea, American Power, and China , Beijing Bookworm, Beijing, China
23 February 2006
PowerPoint presentation
Multilayered Confrontation in East Asia: The North Korea-Japan Conflict, Asian Affairs,Vol XXXVI, no III, November 2005, pp. 368-404
Japan-North Korea Relations and the Realignment of Power and Policy in Asia 16th New Zealand Asian Studies Society International Conference, Waikato University, 21-23 November 2005
Japan's Soft Power Dilemmas Globalization, Localization and Japanese Studies in the Asia Pacific Region, The Department of Japanese Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong and International Research Center for Japanese Studies, Kyoto, Japan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 30 September -2 October 2005
The Logic of Empire, Korean Quarterly , Fall 2005, Vol 9 No 1, pp. 10-11.
Japan, North Korea and the East Asia confrontation British Association of Japanese Studies, University of Kent at Canterbury, 6-8 September, 2005
The mysterious death of the Pyongyang Declaration Korean Studies Association of Australasia, University of Auckland, 14-15 July, 2005, pp. 324-337
The abductee issue and the looming East Asian crisis: Japan-North Korea relations within the Six Party context, Japanese Politics Colloquium, Clare College, Cambridge, 12-13 April 2005
Preliminary discussion paper[..]Presentation
Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
Briefing for Scholarship Students, Asia:NZ Korean Studies Programme
Wellington, 17 February 2005
Positions, Policies and Prospects: A view from outside the Six [with postscript] in The North Korean Crisis and Beyond , edited by Stephen J. Epstein, Asian Studies Institute, Victoria University of Wellington, December 2004
North Korea- Building Bridges Asian Studies Institute, Victoria University of Wellington and NZ Institute of International Affairs, 21 July 2004
PowerPoint presentation
Things familiar, things different: Easter in Pyongyang
Presentation for Wellington Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa/New Zealand, St Mathews Church, Brooklyn, 20 July 2004
Pyongyang goes to market; Marketization of the North Korean economy
Paper for Academy of Marketing conference, Cheltenham, England, 7 July 2004
paper
The Contrived Korean Crisis
Presentation for Service Civil International, Seoul, 11 December 2003
Positions, Policies and Prospects - a view from outside the Six
Paper for Moving Forward on the Korean Peninsula 11th Meeting of the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group November 13-15, 2003 Renaissance Hotel, Seoul, Korea.
paper..............presentation
Giving as Good as You Get: North Korea and the Bush Doctrine
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, With a focus on North Korea and the USA
A Public Seminar sponsored by the National Consultative Committee on Disarmament
Friday 9th of May 2003
presentation ...Maps
Crisis in Korea: Causes and Prospects
Asia Forum, Wellington, 19 March 2003
presentation
Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Current situation, its background and future prospects
NZ Defence Force Junior Staff Course No 66, Wednesday 12 February 2003
presentation
E-unification of Koreas: Dreams, Plans, and Realities Information Technology Revolution and National Security on the Korean Peninsula Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hawai'i 8-10 October 2002
presentation
Information and Communications Technologies in the two Koreas: Contrasts, Commonalities, Challenges
Global Economic Review(Seoul), Vol 30, No. 4, 2001, 51-67
Digital Divide on the Korean Peninsula: Constructive Engagement Offers Solutions
Institute for Corean-American Studies, ICAS Special Contribution No. 2002-0218-TxB, (posted 10 June 2002)
Missed opportunities and blighted promise: Problems and prospects for DPRK tourism
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies (Seoul), Vol. 10, No. 2 , 2001 pp. 165-197
Pre-publication version
Ghosts of the Past: The Japanese History Textbook Controversy
NZ Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 3, No 2, December 2001, 177-188 ( with Yoshiko Nozaki and Jian Yang}
North Korea and the new strategic industries of the future: the case of ICT and tourism
NZ Asian Studies Society, 14th International Conference, University of Canterbury, 28 November-1 December, 2001
presentation
Back to Business on the Korean Peninsula?
This appeared in the NZ National Business Review 14 September 2001 under the title 'Innovation is the key to North Korea for Kiwi firms'
Is Kumgangsan the beginning or end of the road? Prospects and Problems for the development of DPRK inbound international tourism
Korean Studies at the Dawn of the Millennium
Korean Studies Association of Australasian 2nd biennial conference, 24-25 September 2001, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
North Korean crisis continues amidst signs of progress
The Evening Post, Wellington, 25 July 2001, p.15
Bush clouds Korean sunshine
NZ Journal of Asian Studies, Vol III, No. 1, June 2001, pp 128-133
Crossing boundaries: prospects and challenges for DPRK tourism
Conference New Economic Policies of DPRK (North Korea), and Reconciliation Strategies between DPRK and USA ,Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 7-8 June 2001
The Opening of North Korea after The Summit: Opportunities and Challenges for International Business
International Quarterly Journal of Marketing , Vol. 1, No. 1, January-March, 2001, pp. 67-72
The Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula: Agenda for the New Administration
Harvard Asia Quarterly, Spring 2001
Korean Peninsula: Developments since the Pyongyang summit
NZ Journal of Asian Studies, Vol II, No. 2, December 2000, pp. 143-146
Milestones of peace and reconciliation
Newsletter of International Institute of Asian Studies (IIAS), October 2000
NZ Journal of Asian Studies, Vol II, No. 1, June 2000
- A Summit of High Hopes
  A survey of the events leading to the June summit and some of the political implications
- The Waters of Prosperity will fill the Taedong and Han Rivers
  Economic Recovery and Business Prospects for the DPRK after the Summit
Window of Opportunity: Progress towards détente and normalisation on the Korean peninsula?
Draft of an article written for NZ Strategic Review
The developing dialogue between North Korea and New Zealand
NZ Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 1, No. 2, December 1999
The Crisis in North Korea - Seeds of Hope
Asian Studies Institute, Victoria University of Wellington, Working Paper No 11, October 1999
From Confrontation to Communication: The pressing need to build communication with North Korea
NZ International Review Vol XXIII, No 6, November/December 1998, pp. 14-18'
Journey to a far away place
A report of a visit to DPRK in New Zealand Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol VI, No 1, 1998, pp.105-119

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Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies

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Cato Institute
Libertarian Washington thinktank

Korea: The Case For Disengagement
{Doug Bandow} [Withdrawal] (December 8, 1987)
Options for Dealing with North Korea
{Ted Galen Carpenter} [US NK relations] [Japanese remilitarisation] (6 January 2003)

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Ralph A. Cossa
Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS, Hawaii

6-Party Talks: Prospects for Success
Ralph A. Cossa
President of Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies
HIROSHIMA _ The six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs are set to resume in Beijing on July 26 after a 13-month hiatus. But what are the prospects for success? Some, particularly in China and South Korea, see the mere act of talking as progress . . . and certainly talking is better than not talking. But it is clearly not enough.
Progress is indeed possible if Pyongyang is serious about trading away its nuclear programs and Washington is equally serious about cutting a deal.
Rice's `Unfortunate' Decision
by Ralph Cossa column President of Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies The recent decision by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to skip the annual ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial-level dialogue later this month (July 29) in Vientiane represents a setback for U.S. efforts to persuade Southeast Asians that Washington really cares about their region. Rice plans to send her highly regarded deputy, Robert Zoellick, instead. Zoellick had a very successful visit to six Southeast Asian nations in May, but the decision by the secretary to skip her first opportunity to meet face-to-face with all her ASEAN and other East Asian counterparts has still widely been reported as "an unnecessary snub."
One country that is no doubt delighted by the announcement is China. Rice's absence will make the shadow cast by the presence of her Chinese counterpart all the larger and more significant. [China confrontation]
President Bush's Press Conference: Missing the Point!
By Ralph A. Cossa May 5th, 2005
Ralph A. Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, writes: "If the President truly wants a diplomatic solution he must surround himself with true diplomats . . . and he must speak and act diplomatically. Otherwise he will not only lose the diplomatic stand-off with North Korea but will lose the hearts and minds of the South Korean people as well." [Vituperation]
Pyongyang Raises the Stakes
By Ralph A. Cossa February 22nd, 2005
Ralph A. Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, writes: "North Korea has effectively played a "divide and conquer" game throughout the nuclear stand-off. If it receives conflicting signals from Washington, Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, and Moscow in the face of this latest provocation, it will be encouraged to continue this tactic. The time has come for the other five finally to begin speaking with one voice to Pyongyang, to hold it accountable for its own words and actions."
America's Role in Asia
By Ralph A. Cossa SINGAPORE - In its second term, the Bush administration needs to pay more attention to Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular. Most importantly, while Asians need to recognize the importance of the war on terrorism to Washington in the post-9/11 world, so too does Washington need to understand that a seemingly unidimensional approach toward Southeast Asia _ frequently characterized as Washington's continued ``hectoring'' on terrorism issues _ detracts from the accomplishment of other key objectives shared by Washington and the majority of East Asian nations: the promotion of open markets, democracy and the rule of law; the need to address the root causes of instability; human security concerns, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, etc.; the desire for safe and secure sea lanes and the need to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) _ an effort that has gained a sense of urgency over fear that such weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists. These are among the key findings of an ``America's Role in Asia'' U.S. task force sponsored by the Asia Foundation, which prepared its report prior to the November U.S. presidential election to serve as a guide for whichever candidate emerged victorious
Seoul Should Call Pyongyang's Bluff
Ralph A Cossa September 28th, 2004
"It's all South Korea's fault!" In a refreshing change from its natural tendency to blame Washington for all the world's troubles, Pyongyang has recently announced that it cannot proceed with the six-party talks on defusing its clandestine nuclear-weapons programs since "the foundation for talks has been destroyed" as a result of Seoul's secret nuclear experiments. The United States, of course, shares the blame, given its "double standards regarding the nuclear issue", but the primary blame has now apparently shifted from Washington to Seoul (conveniently bypassing Pyongyang, where the real problem continues to lie). China has regrettably reinforced this argument by noting that the South's nuclear experiments have complicated the situation. In an attempt to get the talks back on track, Beijing has hinted that South Korea's nuclear transgressions could be discussed at the next round of talks; an idea that Seoul promptly (and I believe foolishly) rejected. Meanwhile, senior officials from all five of North Korea's interlocutors have called on Pyongyang to agree to another round of talks, even as many profess to see little prospect of success prior to the November US presidential elections.
Seoul-Washington: Closing the Gap
{Ralph A. Cossa} [Friction]
Who's Worse, North Korea or Iraq?
{Ralph A. Cossa}
Korea: Alliance at Risk?
{Ralph A. Cossa} [US NK relations] [Anti-Americanism]
North Korea's Dangerous Game
{Ralph A. Cossa} [Nuclear] [Agreed Framework] [Spin]
U.S.-DPRK: Setting New Ground Rules
{Ralph A. Cossa}
'Sweet and sour' diplomacy in Korea {Ralph A Cossa}
[US- NK Negotiations] [culture gap]
Asian Multilateralism Takes on New Energy
{Ralph A. Cossa}
US-North Korea: Dialogue of the deaf
{Ralph A Cossa} [US-NK negotiations] (Same as following article)
U.S.-DPRK: Prerequisites for Progress
{Ralph A Cossa} [US-NK negotiations] (same as above article)
And the Winner Is . . . 'Tae~han-min-guk'
2002 World Cup: Building Bridges and Promoting Globalization (Ralph A. Cossa and Jane Skanderup}
US-North/South Korea Relations-- Is `Good Cop, Bad Cop' Working?
Method to the Nuclear Madness?
Sept.-11: 6 Months Later, Has Asia Changed?
US-North Korea: `Axis of Evil' Revisited...
U.S.-Korea Policy: Now What?
(Pacific Perspective} Korean Peninsula: Missed Opportunities
War on Terrorism: Implications for Asia
N. Korea: New Approach Needed
Japan: Dealing With History
Bush's Asia Policy Slowly Taking Shape
"Comprehensive Approach" to Dialogue With Pyongyang
The price of uncertainty: What Koreans want
The Korean Peninsula: Restoring the Peace Momentum(Pacific Perspective}
Pacific Perspectives} US-Korea Summit Aftermath By Ralph A. Cossa
(Pacific Perspective} U.S.-ROK Relations: Alleviating Anxiety
(Pacific perspective} Bush's Emerging Asia Policy: What's Still Missing
(Pacific Perspectives} Dealing With Regional Anxiety
Korea: Next step is up to President-elect Bush
Cautiously Along a Korean Tightrope
U.S.-North Korea: Why Clinton should not visit

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Gregory Clark
One-time Australian diplomat long domiciled in Japan
Gregory Clark - recent articles

Western lies blackened Beijing's image
By GREGORY CLARK 2005.05.30
China's successful moves to improve ties with India have done more than sabotage Tokyo's hopes for an anti-China alliance with New Delhi. They have also put an end to the myth that China's alleged aggressions against India since the 1960s would prevent any rapprochement between the two countries. The key to this strange belief was the claim that China in 1962 had launched an unprovoked border attack against India. That claim was a blatant lie -- and one of the brighter and shinier variety. It was a classic example of the ease with which Western governments and intelligence agencies, together with their friends in academic, media and research organs, combine to distort information and blacken China's reputation in Asia.
But hopes of Japan-India cooperation to oppose China still smolder in the hearts of many Japanese hawks. For years the goal was a tripartite Japan- India-Australia alliance against Beijing in Asia. That began to fall apart as Canberra belatedly realized its economic future lay with China.
Talk about Japan's 60 year postwar record of peaceful behavior in Asia and official development assistance to China is also meaningless when it is clear that Tokyo wants to be involved in U.S. plans for military action against North Korea and China. ODA was simply a cheap way for Japan to avoid having to pay war reparations to China [Media] [China confrontation] [Japanese remilitarisation]
Japan's Migration Conundrum
by Gregory Clark
Does Japan realise that it has a population problem? On paper it does. But in terms of concrete measures to cope with the problem it has some light years to go. The problem has several dimensions. One is the economic damage from population decline, the downsizing of demand in an economy already suffering from chronic lack of demand. Then there is the burden of maintaining health and pension payments in a rapidly aging population. Finally there is the unpleasant fact that declining population, combined with continued economic weakness, guarantees a further decline in Japan's Asian and global status just as China's power and status are on the rise.
The Japanese Rightwing's Contrived Hysteria
By GREGORY CLARK
This article appeared in The Japan Times, Jan. 18, 2005
Japan seems headed for yet another bout of emotional confrontation with North Korea and China.
The latest anti-North Korea anger concerns the fate of Yokota Megumi, a girl that Pyongyang admits it abducted from Japan in 1977. Pyongyang authorities had claimed she had since died, but DNA examination of the bone they produced to prove her death suggests it is not hers. Images of Yokota's grieving parents calling for economic sanctions against North Korea have flashed across the TV screens for weeks. The rightwing media call for even stronger measures to punish and isolate North Korea for its "insincerity."
But if the bone does not belong to Yokota, doesn't this suggest that the woman could still be alive and active? Instead of grief, there should be relief. Instead of sanctions, there should be more contacts to get to the truth of things.
Pyongyang's officials have already admitted that they have a problem with their "special agencies" -- North Korea's all-powerful spy outfits. The conclusion should be obvious: At least some of the abductees, including maybe Yokota, have had to work in the agency's spy-training outfits, and cannot be released now for fear of jeopardizing spy operations.
Shifting rightwing goal posts
Japan's increasingly powerful rightwing has gone to some strange lengths to condemn Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's recent admirable efforts to improve relations with North Korea. Koizumi was accused of kowtowing to North Korean blackmail by going to Pyongyang to gain freedom for the eight family members of the five abductees sent to Japan in October 2002. From the beginning, though, it was clear that Pyongyang had no objection to the family members going to Japan. Its only objection was to the way Tokyo had reneged on Koizumi's earlier promise to allow a return visit to North Korea of the five repatriated abductees. Koizumi's dramatic Pyongyang visit last month was in effect a bid to make up for breaking this promise.
Myths of intelligence exposed
By GREGORY CLARK One reads with anger the conclusions of the U.S. Senate report and the British Butler report on the false intelligence reporting used to justify the U.S.-British attack on Iraq. To any impartial observer at the time, it was obvious that the justifications were almost certain to be false. The weakened Iraqi regime was in no condition to be preparing or even hiding weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations had reported no findings. Previous U.S. reports of WMD stockpiles had turned out to be false.
ABDUCTION ISSUE - Rightwing's political football
By GREGORY CLARK Japan Times 2004.02.27 ?
Don't underestimate the depth of genuine public anger in Japan over the abduction issue with North Korea. At the same time don't underestimate the degree to which Japan's powerful rightwing is exploiting the issue to shift Japan even further to hardline foreign policies, a shift typified by the extraordinary pomp and jingoism in the recent send-off for troops going to Iraq. Nor is there much to suggest that Tokyo is in the right over the abduction issue. During Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's historic September 2002 talks in Pyongyang, North Korea about-faced dramatically to admit, and even apologize for, past abductions of Japanese citizens. Its willingness to release five of the abductees to go to Japan was a clear bid to improve relations. But now we see it being used as a blunt weapon for creating worse relations. North Korea released the five abductees in exchange for a promise that they would return within two weeks. Tokyo has reneged on that promise. What's more, it now insists that North Korea send to Japan the family members of these former abductees, regardless of whether they want to go or not. And it will not allow the parents to return to North Korea, even briefly, to confirm or persuade the children to go.
Pressure won't bring peace
The Japan Times: Nov. 8, 2003 The same could be true for North Korea today. True, the personalist flavor of the regime, together with its cruelties and paranoia, go beyond even what we saw in Mao's China. But once again there are reasons -- the cruel postwar division of the nation, genuine fears of being attacked, spy and sabotage pressure from South Korean hardliners. But even Pyongyang can change. Like China in the early 1970s, tentative efforts are being made to open up to the outside world. Most who know Kim Jong Il agree that the North Korean leader is no fool. Indeed, Pyongyang's recent diplomacy has a consistency and logic that far outshines what we have seen from Washington and Tokyo lately. Only ignorant or devious hardliners could possibly see malice in Pyongyang's perfectly reasonable demand for a nonaggression pact in exchange for a promise to abandon nuclear development. Japan's hardliners now use the abductee issue to push for pressure, including regime-changing military pressure, against Pyongyang. One would like to ask these people: If you are so concerned over the fate of abductees and their relatives, are you more likely to improve things by confrontation, including reneging on earlier promises, or by a closer relationship that allows Japanese officials and others to get to North Korea and try to solve things through contacts and negotiation? The answer should be obvious. Cool it, and, as with China, time will heal most wounds.
IRAQ AND JAPAN'S EXTREME RIGHTWING
By GREGORY CLARK Japan Times 2003.12.18 If you think that, because Japan's conservative rightwing is pro-US, then the extreme rightwing must be extremely pro-US, then think again. Over policy to Iraq and quite a few other issues, Japan's extreme rightwing is just the opposite. It is violently anti-US. I have before me a book recently published by some extreme-rightists. The cover says "Struggle On (ganbare), Saddam Hussein." It carries a photo of the former Iraqi leader flashing a sword, samurai-style.
Ishihara also goes along with hard-line calls for military action against North Korea. But while most on the right assume this can only happen in cooperation with the US, and are busily escalating the abduction issue in order to assist US hawks in blocking any nuclear agreement with Pyongyang, Ishihara seems to prefer a strong Japanese military that can operate independently from the US.
Japan blind to Chinese reality
By GREGORY CLARK Japan Times 2004.01.14 A modern university covers a campus that could embrace half a dozen of Japan's main universities. Unlike in Japan, its students operate in a system that rewards hard work and intelligence. Even in the bitter cold of a Manchurian winter, one could feel the dynamism of a nation on the move. And Changchun is only one of China's little-known boom towns. Before leaving for China I had been invited to a conference on China organized by some of Japan's alleged opinion leaders. Most were in severe denial. Some wanted to insist that China's growth figures were faked, as if those well-dressed crowds, floods of cars and endless apartment blocks meant nothing
We find foreign policies spinning out of control, leaving Japan in bed with U.S. hawks determined to force military confrontation with North Korea and ultimately China. Only now are we beginning to see a reluctant response to Pyongyang's very reasonable and long-standing offer to allow former abductees to return to North Korea to find out whether their kin want to go to Japan. Needless to say, we are told that it was tough threats -- harsh economic sanctions and even talk of war -- that forced this alleged concession from Pyongyang, and that these threats will probably be revived if any of the kin decide they do not want to be forced to go to Japan. And we have still to see any movement on Pyongyang's equally reasonable offer to freeze nuclear development in exchange for security guarantees. Hopefully China's sensible leadership will intervene to put an end to this nonsense.
U.S.-British naivete unmasked
By GREGORY CLARK Japan Times 2004.02.17 Yet another factor is the growing power of the U.S. military-intelligence complex, fed by enormous budgets and now virtually out of control. For an insight see another recent book, "The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic," by that former intelligence operative and old Japan hand, Chalmers Johnson. It paints a frightening and meticulous picture of a sinister force that will stop at nothing to expand its power and bases around the globe -- the new imperialism.
Rightwing's political football
By GREGORY CLARK [Abductees] ABDUCTION ISSUE Don't underestimate the depth of genuine public anger in Japan over the abduction issue with North Korea. At the same time don't underestimate the degree to which Japan's powerful rightwing is exploiting the issue to shift Japan even further to hardline foreign policies, a shift typified by the extraordinary pomp and jingoism in the recent send-off for troops going to Iraq. Nor is there much to suggest that Tokyo is in the right over the abduction issue.
North Korea released the five abductees in exchange for a promise that they would return within two weeks. Tokyo has reneged on that promise. What's more, it now insists that North Korea send to Japan the family members of these former abductees, regardless of whether they want to go or not. And it will not allow the parents to return to North Korea, even briefly, to confirm or persuade the children to go.
website
Pyongyang is the real victim
{Gregory Clark} [NK US policy] [Negotiating style]
Abductee hysteria in Japan
{Gregory Clark} [Abductees]
Label that foils compromise
{Gregory Clark} [Terrorism] [Bush policy]
India's China War, by Neville Maxwell
{Gregory Clark} [Media] (book review)
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS - The Radicalization of a Conservative
{Gregory Clark} [Media] [Negotiating style] [Predictions]
WHY JAPAN?
{Gregory Clark} [Confucianism]

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James Cotton
The Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra

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Bruce Cumings

Fear and Loathing on the Pyongyang Trail: North Korea and the United States By Bruce Cumings
Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 300 pp.
Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004. 868 pp.
In his brilliant three-volume biography of Leon Trotsky, the late Isaac Deutscher left the indelible impression that Trotsky was the best mind among those who made the Bolshevik Revolution, just as Stalin was the undertaker of that same revolution, turning it toward a brutal dictatorship that squelched whatever progressive and humane impulses existed at the beginning. When the exiled Trotsky turned his own attentions toward Stalin, he began his biography with the observation that the old revolutionist, Leonid Krassin, "was the first, if I am not mistaken, to call Stalin an 'Asiatic.'" He proceeded to write about "Asiatic" leaders as cunning and brutal, presiding over static societies with a huge peasant base. Another Bolshevik who ran afoul of Stalin, Nikolai Bukharin, called him "a Genghis Khan." Meanwhile Deutscher himself, a broadly learned man, wrote that Stalin was "primitive, oriental, but unfailingly shrewd." [1] [Orientalism]
Korea: Forgotten Nuclear Threats
By Bruce Cumings January 11th, 2005 Bruce Cumings, history professor at the University of Chicago and author of several books on the DPRK, writes: "What was indelible about it [the Korean war of 1950-53] was the extraordinary destructiveness of the United States' air campaigns against North Korea, from the widespread and continuous use of firebombing (mainly with napalm), to threats to use nuclear and chemical weapons, and the destruction of huge North Korean dams in the final stages of the war."
Chiding America Over the North Korean Uproar
By STEPHEN KOTKIN
Published: January 24, 2004
(hostile) Review of Cumings' North Korea
The Historian Who Defends North Korea
By Anders Lewis
Vituperative attack on Bruce Cumings' North Korea: Another Country
Wrong Again
Bruce Cumings writes about US policy on North Korea
In June 1994, Bill Clinton came close to launching a 'pre-emptive strike' against North Korea's nuclear reactors at Yongbyon, about sixty miles north of Pyongyang. Then, at the last minute, Jimmy Carter got North Korea to agree to a complete freeze on activity at the Yongbyon complex, and a Framework Agreement was signed in October 1994. The Republican Right railed against this for the next six years, until George W. Bush brought a host of the Agreement's critics into his Administration, and they set about dismantling it, thus fulfilling their own prophecy and initiating another dangerous confrontation with Pyongyang. The same folks who brought us the invasion of Iraq and a menu of hyped-up warnings about Saddam Hussein's weapons have similarly exaggerated the North Korean threat: indeed, the second North Korean nuclear crisis began in October 2002, when 'sexed-up' intelligence was used to push Pyongyang against the wall and make bilateral negotiations impossible.
For more than a decade, the North Koreans have been trying to get American officials to understand that genuine give- and-take negotiations on their nuclear programme could be successful, based on the terms of a 'package deal' that they first tabled in November 1993. The North has steadfastly said it would give up its nukes and missiles in return for a formal end to the Korean War, a termination of mutual hostility, the lifting of numerous economic and technological embargoes, diplomatic recognition, and direct or indirect compensation for giving up very expensive programmes. Their willingness to do this was tested in 1994, when they froze their nuclear complex and kept it frozen under the eyes of UN inspectors for eight years.
Zone of contention
By Soo Ji Min
A better understanding of the origins of the Korean War, argues Chicago historian Bruce Cumings, may be the best way to prevent another, more dangerous conflict.
In his latest book, North Korea: Another Country (The New Press, 2003) and in an essay, "Decoupled from History: North Korea in the 'Axis of Evil,'" in the forthcoming collection Axis of Evil (The New Press, 2004), Cumings rails against policies such as unilateralism, preemptive strikes, and preventive wars
THE NEW DANGER IN KOREA
{Bruce Cumings} [Culture gap] [Bush policy] [US NK relations]
Spring thaw for Korea's cold war? (1992?}
Diplomacy by Dereliction: U.S. Policy Toward Korea Is in Disarray
The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Chejudo Uprising
Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies during and after the Cold War
paper in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars Volume 29 number 1, Jan. - March 1997 ,Asia, Asian studies and the National Security State: A symposium ( Guest editor - Mark Selden}
Time to end the Korean War
Where the Cold War never ends

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Ian Davies

Infrastructure Plan for North Korea needs rethinking
Interview with ROK journal SISA, 20 July 2000

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Far Eastern Economic Review
Right-wing journal based in HK

Own Goal
{David Murphy} China was kept in the dark about Pyongyang's plans for a capitalist enclave on the border. That was rash as Beijing will be key to its success [Economic reform]
Can Kim Be Trusted?
[Hostility] [US NK relations] [Koizumi0209]
Taking Kim Jong Il's Word
[Koizumi0209] [Abductees] [Espionage]
Breakthrough: A stunning admission and apology by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il could help peace moves
{John Larkin} [Abductees] [Koizumi0209]
Celebrating in a State of Denial
Behind the Tyrant's Mask
PUT YOUR MONEY WHERE YOUR MOUTH IS NORTH KOREA CONDEMNS TERRORISM BUT HARBOURS RED ARMY MEMBERS
No Big Deal Taipei's use of a slush fund to promote itself overseas in the 1990s bothers few in the United States
The Loopy North Documents from Pyongyang's leadership to senior officials indicate that North Koreans' only hope lies in the end of Kim Jong Il's regime

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John Feffer and Karin Lee
Formerly of American Friends Service Committee in Tokyo. Karin Lee is currently Executive Director of National Committee on North Korea. John Feffer is Director of the Global Affairs Program at International Research Center (Washington DC) and Co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus

South Korea Can Play Role of Transformer
Members of a civic group applaud after singing a song, "Our Hope Is Unification," wishing for a successful summit between President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il on Oct. 2-4 in Pyongyang during a rally held at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, Wednesday. / Yonhap This is the sixth in a series of articles on the forthcoming inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang. .. ED.
By John Feffer
Northeast Asia is a high voltage environment. In other words, an enormous gap in power separates the strongest and the weakest countries currently negotiating in the six-party process. Over the last two decades, this gap in power has sustained the Cold War in the region. It has both justified the maintenance of the huge U.S. military presence and pushed North Korea to develop nuclear weapons to equalize the situation.
Bush and Kim: Brothers Under the Skin?
John Feffer
IRC | February 1, 2007 Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org They don’t look alike. One is tall and thin, the other short and pot-bellied. If they ever meet for a summit, they could pose for photos as the Blues Brothers of international relations. But it’s not likely that George W. Bush and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il will face the cameras together any time soon. It’s too bad. Clasping hands, they would probably see into each other’s souls and discover a secret affinity.
Sanctions and War on the Korean Peninsula
Martin Hart-Landsberg and John Feffer
| January 17, 2007
The risk of war on the Korean peninsula remains high, and the U.S. government is raising it higher by opening an economic front. In September 2005, one day after regional negotiations produced an agreement with the potential to defuse North Korean-U.S. tensions, the U.S. government charged North Korea with counterfeiting $100 bills. Calling this alleged North Korean effort a direct attack on U.S. sovereignty and technically an act of war, Washington imposed an ever-tightening and ever-widening web of financial restrictions on the country.
FPIF Special Report North Korea and the Politics of Famine
John Feffer,
IRC | September 18, 2006 Editor: Chuck Hosking, IRC
Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org This paper was produced under the auspices of a research project sponsored by the Sejong Institute. It will be published in book form later this year. The author would like to thank the following people for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts: Ruediger Frank, Sang-jin Han, Chuck Hosking, Karin Lee, Wonhyuk Lim, Marcus Noland, and Kie-duck Park. He would also like to thank Randy Ireson, Erica Kang, Rajiv Narayan, Richard Ragan, and Sun-song Park for agreeing to be interviewed. Introduction Part One: Agricultural System Part Two: Human Rights Violations Part Three: Reform Part Four: Policy Implications Conclusion: Sovereignty End Notes
Access to food is a basic human right. For several decades, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) prided itself on meeting the food needs of its population, although it has little arable land. Like many socialist countries, North Korea emphasized this success—along with high literacy rates, an equitable health care system, and guaranteed jobs for all—as proof that it upheld human rights, that its record in fact exceeded that of Western countries. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, a deteriorating economy and a steep rise in the cost of energy, followed in mid-decade by a series of natural disasters, undercut North Korea's capacity to feed its population. The public distribution system collapsed, and famine ensued.1 Pyongyang appealed to its neighbors and then the world at large for help.
Writers From the Other Asia
JOHN FEFFER
REVIEW | posted August 31, 2006 (September 18, 2006 issue) According to the official North Korean version, the Americans were the culprits. In October 1950, the first year of the Korean War, American soldiers massacred tens of thousands of innocent people in the North Korean city of Sinchon. In perhaps the most horrifying incident, US soldiers led 900 residents, including 300 women and children, into an air-raid shelter. After the victims passed three days in thirst and fear, the GIs poured gasoline into the dark, confined space and threw in a match. Today in Sinchon, the North Korean authorities have memorialized this slaughter with burial mounds for the victims. The nearby American Imperial Massacre Remembrance Museum holds tours for school groups and the occasional foreign visitor. In September 1998 I visited the Sinchon museum and listened to the guide itemize the many wartime cruelties committed by American troops. She took our delegation to the burned-out shell of the air-raid shelter and, on the basis of survivor accounts, reconstructed the atrocities. It would be another year before the Associated Press published the first revelations of the US killings of civilians in July 1950 under a railway bridge near the South Korean hamlet of Nogun-ri. But based on what historian Bruce Cumings and others had described of US conduct during the Korean War--the saturation bombings, the threatened use of nuclear weapons--the museum guide's well-rehearsed stories seemed plausible, even accounting for the embellishments of North Korean propaganda. In the 1980s South Korean novelist Hwang Sok-Yong visited the same museum. He subsequently interviewed several survivors of the Sinchon massacre who had immigrated to the United States. Their description of what transpired in the fall of 1950 diverged so radically from the North Korean account that Hwang was driven to write about the incident. His novel The Guest provoked fierce controversy among readers in South Korea, where it was published in 2001. [Korea War events]
North Korean Fireworks?
John Feffer, IRC | June 30, 2006 Editor: John Feffer, IRC
No foreigner, with the possible exception of Simon Cowell, can get the attention of Americans like North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. In the middle of June, the North Korea government began preparations to launch a long-range rocket. Though Pyongyang's intentions were far from clear-even to the point of whether it would go through with the test-some otherwise level-headed people went ballistic. William Perry, the architect of the better-late-than-never engagement policy of the Clinton administration, recommended that the Bush administration take out the missile site with a preemptive attack. The epitome of sober politics, Walter Mondale, seconded the motion. It was up to Dick Cheney, no friend of North Korea, to urge that calmer heads should prevail.
Korea's Slow-Motion Reunification
by John Feffer June 28th, 2005
John Feffer, author of ''North Korea, South Korea," and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, writes: "It's time for the United States to stop fantasizing about an imminent North Korean collapse. Let's support instead the Korean reunification happening right before our eyes."
Something extraordinary is happening in Korea, and Washington appears to be paying no attention. The two Koreas have plunged headlong in to unknown territory: reunification. For 50 years, aside from the occasional defector, it was impossible to cross the demilitarized zone dividing the Korean Peninsula. Today a bus leaves the capital of South Korea every day to bring workers to an industrial complex just north of the DMZ. There, at the Kaesong complex, North and South Koreans labor together at new factories that produce kitchenware and clothing. South Korea has stretched electricity lines across the DMZ to power the facilities and laid an optical cable for direct phone calls. Raw materials and finished products are passing back and forth along what was once considered a major invasion route.
Friends Committee on National Legislation: Congressional Briefing Book
- North Korean Security Issues
- North Korean Humanitarian Issues
- North Korean Economic Issues
Caught in the Muddle-Round Two of Bush vs. North Korea
By John Feffer
John Feffer is the author of North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis and a regular contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org). Foreign Policy In Focus www.fpif.org FPIF Policy Report February 2005 Hope springs eternal that the Bush administration, in its new post-election configuration, will finally get serious about the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to the most optimistic assessment, the new appointments at the State Department-Condoleezza Rice, Robert Zoellick, Christopher Hill-will leaven the administration's hard-line policy with a measure of pragmatism. This more realistic diplomacy will attract North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks. Then the new team of U.S. negotiators will take over, having devised a magic formula of carrots and sticks that will persuade Pyongyang to shut down and then eliminate its plutonium facilities as well as its not-yet-acknowledged highly enriched uranium program.
This scenario is remotely possible.
Much more likely is a continuation of the previous Bush policy: half-hearted negotiations with North Korea, persistent faith that the regime in Pyongyang will collapse, and a program to hasten that end through covert and non-governmental means. When Washington diplomatic circles began to murmur in late January about a possible breakthrough in the U.S. approach, the hardliners dusted off an older charge that North Korea had provided Libya with processed uranium and deployed it to nip any détente in the bud. The net result of all this maneuvering is stasis. "Muddling through" is how North Korea-watchers routinely describe Pyongyang's approach to its economic and foreign policy predicament. But "muddling through" is in fact a much better description of Washington's attempts to resolve a conflict that everyone else considers a very serious crisis.
Untangling the Knot: The Future of U.S.-South Korean Security Relations
By John Feffer
28 October 2004
John Feffer--www.johnfeffer.com--is currently a Pantech Fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford Universityand a regular contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org). He is the author, most recently, of North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis.
In its crudest form, geopolitics is a zero-sum game. The United States recognizes mainland China and breaks official ties with Taiwan; Washington leans toward Karachi and away from New Delhi. A gain along one axis is offset by a loss along a second. But diplomacy is usually too complex an amalgam of relationships to evaluate so starkly on a balance sheet, and there are often opportunities for simultaneous improvements between mutually antagonistic countries. Take, for example, the surprising improvement in U.S. relations with both China and Taiwan over the last three years. Alas, the flip side to win-win diplomacy is lose-lose diplomacy. Since 2000, when U.S. relations with both halves of the Korean Peninsula seemed to be on the upswing, Washington has managed to unravel its incipient relationship with Pyongyang while tangling its ties with Seoul.
The North Korean Human Rights Act and other Congressional Agendas
by Karin J. Lee October 7th, 2004
HR 4011, the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, passed the Senate on September 28, 2004, after a lengthy amendment process. The amended version of the bill passed the House on October 4 without further changes. It will now be sent to the president to be signed into law.
While the bill is still recognizable as kin to its predecessor, S. 1903, the North Korean Freedom Act of 2003, the Human Rights Act is a great improvement. The new bill focuses more effectively on human rights, the result of the dedicated work of staff on the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, concerns for the safety of refugees persist. In addition, Congress has more work to do: it needs to strengthen efforts to improve dialogue on US-North Korean security issues. Doing so would not only advance the United States government's security agenda, it would also create a better chance of improving human rights.
July 15, 2004 Senate Foreign Relations Hearing
: A Report on Latest Round of Six-Way Talks Regarding Nuclear Weapons in North Korea
Informal summary
It's Our Party (and We'll Cheer If We Want To)
By John Feffer | April 30, 2004
Imagine if nearly three-quarters of the U.S. Congress were thrown out on its collective ear and replaced by a new generation of 30 and 40-somethings, many of them considerably more progressive than John Kerry. Imagine if the number of women in Congress doubled. Imagine a new labor party securing ten seats and a pivotal minority position. A fantasy? Not for South Koreans
And yet, as the recent elections in South Korea suggest, a profound reorientation of South Korean policy is under way. East Asia is coming into its own, and the new generation in South Korea wants to be part of it. If U.S. voters take a cue from their South Korean counterparts and de-Bushify Washington this November-which could shift U.S. foreign policy toward diplomatic engagement with North Korea and the world more generally-then perhaps future historians will attribute the beginning of the turn away from global war and madness to the victory of "Our" Party.
Intelligence Questions in North Korea
By Karin Lee and Adam Miles | April 29, 2004 Foreign Policy In Focus
The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges
Informal summary: March 30, 2004 House Committee on International Relations Hearing: Adam Miles and Karin Lee Witnesses Panel I: John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Dept. of State written testimony:http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/bolt033004.htm. Panel II: Henry Sokolski, Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center written testimony: http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/sok033004.htm Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace written testimony: http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/ciri033004.htm Victor Gilinsky, Former Commissioner, Nuclear Regulator Commission written testimony: http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/gili033004.htm
The United States and Asia: Continuity, Instability, and Transition.
House Committee on International Relations: Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific March 17, 2004
Notes by Adam Miles , Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)
Chairman Jim Leach (IA) presided over an expansive hearing that covered much of Asia - from Pakistan to Japan - and focused on a broad range of security, political, and economic concerns throughout the region.
Robert Scalapino: ...On North Korea, Scalapino suggested to think of the DPRK not as "revolutionary, but as a very traditional society." He advocates continued negotiations with the North and believes that the three-tiered process, or something similar, proposed by the South Koreans during the last round of talks should be implemented
Peter Ennis, Washington "frustrated" Beijing and Seoul, who feel that "[Assistant Secretary of State] Jim Kelly went into the talks with his hands tied [by Washington], without sufficient authority from a divided administration to engage in any meaningful discussion."
Peter Ennis offered the most complete answer, adding to his earlier testimony: "I don't intend at all to sound partisan. But the problem has been, I think...the [North Koreans] were dismayed by the stance of the administration from day one...ever since the President publicly questioned the Sunshine Policy." He continued, "And since then, I think what we've found is a tug-of-war inside the administration, which has deeply frustrated the Chinese and the South Koreans, and privately the Japanese."
Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives Sub-committee on Asia Pacific Page giving details of hearings, sometimes testaments and videocams
Asia-Pacific Security Issues and U.S. Policy
Robert A. Scalapino, hearing Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives 17 March 2004
TESTIMONY OF PETER ENNIS
Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives 17 March 2004 First: as things stand now, we face the prospect that China might emerge, in the minds of Koreans, as the nation that brokered reunification, while the US might be seen as having been an obstacle. As a result, China could very well emerge from the current 6-party talks process with greater influence on the Korean Peninsula than the United States. That could result in a forced withdrawal of American forces from the Peninsula, and could cause deep concerns in Japan.
Informal notes from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing
"The North Korean Nuclear Calculus: Beyond the Six Power Talks" March 2, 2004 Karin Lee [Terrorism] [HEU]
Between Kim Jong Il and a Hard Place
by John Feffer www.dissidentvoice.org March 2, 2004 The Bush administration remains inflexible on two major issues. It doesn't want to meet North Korea face to face to work out a compromise. (Joseph DeTrani, recently appointed envoy on the North Korean issue, has even been prohibited from talking with the North Korean embassy in New York , something his predecessor Charles Pritchard relied on.) And the administration insists that North Korea freeze its nuclear program first before the United States offers anything.
North Korea / South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis
- introduction
- Blurb and Reviews
South Korea Joins The Axis Of Independence
{John Feffer} February 24, 2003 [Roh Moo-hyun] [SK US relations] [Nationalism]
The Time-Out Method Doesn't Work
{John Feffer} [US NK Negotiations] January 23, 2003
Responding To North Korea's Surprises
{John Feffer} [Admission] [NK US policy] [US NK negotiations]
Korea Conflict Profile {John Feffer}
Korea overview {John Feffer}
Myths and mystification in US-North Korea ties (John Feffer}
Bush Policy Undermines Progress on Korean Peninsula John Feffer
Foot in mouth disease (Karin Lee)
Shifting Security Paradigms in East Asia (Karin Lee)
Foreign Policy in Focus: Korea
Korea: Liberation and self-determination
The Bush Administration and the Korean Peninsula (Karin Lee and John Feffer)
Book reviews March 2001
Progress on the Korean Peninsula?
U.S.-North Korea Relations

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Glyn Ford
Member of the European Parliament for South-West Britain.
website

'Neocon' recipe for disaster: Japan Times 05/07/03
The Newspapers are currently awash with speculation as to the likely outcome of the Korean Peninsula's nuclear crisis. Will it be the US that blinks or North Korea? Nobody knows. What is clear is that while North Korea and the world wants and needs a solution, opinion in the US is sharply divided between doves and hawks, between Secretary of State Colin Powell and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The former wants to negotiate away North Korea's imminent nuclear arsenal, and buy out its missile sales, both of which were nearly achieved by Bill Clinton at the end of his presidency and only stopped by the chads hanging on Florida's voter punchcards. US doves want to address the genuine danger that North Korea's activities will trigger the spread of nuclear weapons. For unless there is a negotiated solution Japan, bribed by the US's Star Wars 2 lobby, will deploy theatre missile defence forcing China to increase the number of its intercontinental ballistic missiles and to fit them with multiple independent warheads. Then Taiwan and probably South Korea will go nuclear.
CHANGING REGIMES VERSUS REGIME CHANGE
North Korea is changing, embracing the market. Colourful stalls are blossoming along Pyongyang's streets selling all manner of mundane goods, from food to flowers. The local Tong-Il market is heavy with customers haggling and buying a cornucopia of goods, rice to razors, suits (Mao or western) to socks and shirts, palm trees to palm tops. Another new market in central Pyongyang is under construction and scheduled to open in May, while each city has been promised its own. Marx's slogan from 'each according to his ability to each according to his need' is being substituted by 'from each according to his productivity to each according to his pocket'. The drive of the market works better to raise productivity than chemistry. In the agricultural sector farms and co-operatives, whose sole commitment to the centre is now the delivery of a low target of cereal production for public distribution and whose excesses can now be sold at market, have shown productivity increases far higher than those procured with the mere application of fertilisers. A positive advert for Vietnamese or Chinese style Socialism.
KOREAN WAR ll
Hidden behind the smoke of Iraq a new war is in the making. George Bush says he 'hates' Kim Jung Il, North Korea's less than cuddly leader, a turn of phrase never hung round the neck of the possibly late and unlamented Saddam Hussein, and one of the triad of countries anointed as Father, Son and Holy Ghost of the 'axis of evil'. True Bush claims he is optimistic that the crisis can be peacefully resolved, yet it's hard to see how without substantial concessions from both sides. There are forces around the White House that are merely looking for a pause for breath after Iraq rather than a halt to the construction of the New American Empire and the North Koreans know it. For the US 'hawks' the final solution is regime change, and they continue to up the ante.
FROM CONFUCIAN COMMUNISM TO MARKET LENINISM?
Now in the middle of Pyongyang's high rise apartments there is a new building that's attracting attention and customers. The Tong Il market is thronged with thousands of North Koreans haggling and buying from an extensive array of products. Fresh meat and dried fish, Spanish oranges and North African dates, suits, skirts, shoes and a range of electrical goods from light bulbs to computer parts. If your fancy takes you there is even a range of embroidered armbands declaring the wearer an engine driver, controller of machines or captain of guards.
North Korea, Iraq and Pakistan; who's the real threat?
The current crisis in Iraq overshadows everything. Yet far more dangerous is the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The first will, at worst, be a terrible conventional war of invasion with tens of thousands of casualties, allowing the US to impose regime change to stop Saddam Hussein exporting his murderous chemical weapons technologies, used against domestic opposition and Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, to the rest of the world, and, in the meantime making American gas stations safe for democracy and oil prices seasonably low. While the second, in contrast, triggered by US revelations that North Korea has uranium-enrichment technology, threatens the lives of millions as North Korea threatens if attacked to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire' and if the CIA are right in a last resort go nuclear using its missile technology to randomly target Japan. The US expects to be able to repel with ease a North Korean invasion of the south, but will be frustrated if the North fails to play the US game and merely uses its ten thousand guns dung in deep near the border, and its two thousand five hundred rocket launchers to rain half a million shells an hour on Seoul and force the US to invade the North. US estimates suggest up to one hundred thousand Americans would die.

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Aidan Foster-Carter

Seoul Needs Sound Policy, Not Soundbites
By Aidan Foster-Carter
February 19th, 2008 Aidan Foster-Carter, honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University, England, writes, “South Korea’s real problems run deeper than soundbites. They include jobless graduates – too many study the wrong subjects – and, above all, how to create a growth model to meet China’s challenge. That entails boosting services, which means more FDI. Mr Roh, to his credit, saw this. Does Mr Lee?”
Summit Success?
By Aidan Foster-Carter b November 6th, 2007 Aidan Foster-Carter, Professor at Leeds University in the United Kingdom, writes,/ /“Given all this, it is surely possible to see the SPT and the summit as broadly parallel tracks in a single peace process, albeit by different routes. While fears that Seoul may prop up the Northern regime are understandable, so also is the ROK’s goal of drawing the DPRK into a web of win-win business and economic dependency. The respective timings of these two tracks will be crucial, but it is not the end of the world if the Seoul train runs ahead a little.”
Paek the Opaque: Another Old North Korean Bites the Dust
by Aidan Foster-Carter
January 16th, 2007
Aidan Foster-Carter, is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University in the UK, writes, “A nuclear North Korea is indeed a worry, but it is not the only one. The world, and even Pyongyang, will take the death of Paek Nam Sun (who?) in its stride. But Kim Jong Il could go just as suddenly. In that case all bets for North Korea would be off.”
The sun is setting on North Korea
Aidan Foster-Carter
Financial Times 15 June 2005 Summary: Five years ago today, the first inter-Korean summit in half a century of partition raised hopes of peace on the peninsula, writes Aidan Foster-Carter, honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University. Kim Dae-jung, then South Korea's president, won the Nobel peace prize for what was hailed as a big breakthrough. But all was not as it seemed. The disclosure in 2002 that Kim Jong-il, North Korea's leader, was secretly paid at least Dollars 500m to host this show soured sentiment in Seoul. Some of those involved were jailed, despite claims they had acted in the national interest.
The Six-Party Failure
By Aidan Foster-Carter February 17th, 2005
"the Dear Leader has trouble at home too. Six-party fixations have also distracted us from internal North Korean politics: a murky area, but one where hidden eruptions begin to ruffle the bland theatrical veneer. Last year Kim purged his brother-in-law and ex-right-hand man Chang Song-taek. Three sons vie to be dauphin, with rumors of murder plots (in Vienna, even). This struggle may be over policy - hawks versus doves - or simply power. Either way, stability can no longer be taken for granted."
North Korea's long, subtle game
By Aidan Foster-Carter On Thursday, StratFor's (Strategic Forecasting's) Morning Intelligence Brief led its Geopolitical Diary thus: "Iran's nuclear program continues to dominate headlines."
Here's a rash prediction. Thursday's shock headlines will fade as swiftly as, less than a month ago, the brief hurrahs for an outbreak of peace and love in Pyongyang. Then, just after two US congressional delegations had visited, KCNA said North Korea was ready to treat the US as a friend. We really should know by now to avoid knee-jerk reactions: be it to crack open the bubbly, or run for cover. Kim Jong-il is playing a long, subtle game. Whether it's a wise one, I doubt. But the end of the world it ain't. Not for today, at least.
Double jeopardy for North Korean defectors
By Aidan Foster-Carter
North Korea: Guns or Butter?
By Aidan Foster-Carter April 6, 2004 By analyzing recently reported economic data and citing public statements by Minister Pak Pong-ju, Aidan Foster-Carter of Leeds University argues that at the macroeconomic level, Kim Jong-il cannot put off forever his choice between a military-first policy or a viable North Korean economy. Kim's Songun (military-first) policy is a direct and indirect barrier to economic recovery and Prime Minister Pak cannot deliver economic progress while shackled by Songun.
Beware defective tales of defectors
By Aidan Foster-Carter 21 May 2003
Castro and Kim: Ill-suited comrades
{Aidan Foster-Carter}
What is North Korea's game?
{Aidan Foster-Carter} [Nuclear]
North Korea and the lightbulb dilemma
{Aidan Foster-Carter}
North Korea: Here We Go Again
{Aidan Foster-Carter}
Charcoal heroes {Aidan Foster-Carter}
North Korea's tentative telecoms
(ICT}
No-penalty shootout
(NLL}
South Korea and Japan: High Time These Neighbors Put Future Before Past
Why Bush is scarier than Kim Jong-il
Could North Korea be in the firing line?
No, it wasn't North Korea
Talks good, action better
Memo from JZ to KJI: Get real, comrade
Is North Korea Stalinist?
Divided they fall: How not to unify Korea
Salt on Feffer: Myth and reality
Memo to Kim Jong-pil: kindly leave the stage
Food for thought: Should North Korea get aid?
Liberation day: Playing games, as usual
Life-worlds' and death: aid agencies and North Korea
Trundling over the tundra: a train of thought
Further reading for juche junkies
A Pyongyang-watcher confesses
O Paek, opaque: North Korea, not ARF that is
Juche on the beach: summer reading on North Korea
North Korea in Southeast Asia: comradeship bombs
North Korea: first of the worst
Go north, go west: growth poles in a reunified Korea
One country, two planets
Shenanigans in South Asia
Unhappy birthday: Is the summit sunk?
Out of Africa
Nukes and missiles: the Pakistan connection
Pyongyang watch
Great vituperator: North Korea's insult lexicon
North Korea's Kim-made famine
A reader's view}Selective indignation: If Japan, why not China? (foster carter)
Pyongyang and Washington: the real agenda
Fat Bear: No meeting Mickey Mouse any time soon
Comrades once more? Moscow arms Pyongyang
Beaten about the Bush: US clouds Korea's sunshine
Back to (the) front: North Korea reverts to type
Great Bulldozer
Boldly going where no parliament has gone before
Hyundai and North Korea: What now?
They shoot people, don't they?
North Koreans' in Japan: a dying breed?
Bush Should Listen To A Korean Elder Statesman
Refugees: North Korea's Achilles' heel?
Whither the Web?
Guerrilla economics: Why self-reliance doesn't add up
The shipping forecast: choppy waters
From Sinatra to Dylan: Kim Jong-il's new groove
Reform: Halfway house, or the full monty?
Great thespian: Kim Jong-il's political theatre
An outbreak of real politics
North Korea's missiles: just so convenient
Some of that old-time religion
Investing in North Korea: As easy as ABB?
Family reunions: too little, too late
Hwang Jang-yop: an enemy of which state?
Feudal frolics: North Korea's mass displays
Getting down to business
Kim Jong-il on catfish row
Europe and North Korea: The more things change?
Lighten their darkness
Rogue and superpower: best buddies?
Who runs North Korea?
Breakthrough déjà vu
Interesting times: A blessing or a curse?
Half empty, or half full?

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Selig S. Harrison
Director, Asia Project, Center for International Policy

Getting Around Pyongyang's Hard-Liners
By Selig S. Harrison July 7th, 2005 (also at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/09/AR2005060901728.html)
North Korea and the United States
Selig Harrison Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy
Transcript Friday, June 10, 2005; 12:00 PM Does North Korea have a unified policy toward the United States? As Kim Jong Il wields power, how is North Korea's nuclear program developing? What outcomes can we expect out of the six-party talks? Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy and a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, just returned from North Korea, where he saw a factionalism in the nation's nuclear outlook. He was online Friday, June 10, at Noon ET to discuss a nuclear North Korea.
Ninth trip to North Korea
The following is an article written by Selig S. Harrison after his trip to North Korea from April 5th to April 9th. It appeared on April 19th in the Hankyoreh Shinmun Seoul.
During the next three months, North Korea will unload its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, removing fuel rods that can be reprocessed into plutonium for more nuclear weapons. Once again, Pyongyang is offering to negotiate a freeze that would prevent further reprocessing, as it did in June, 1994, leading to the Agreed Framework, and as it has repeatedly offered to do in the six-party talks. This is the good news emerging from my ninth visit to North Korea from April 5 to April 9. The bad news is that Pyongyang is no longer prepared to discuss the dismantlement of its existing nuclear weapons as part of the six-party process in Beijing. First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju told me categorically that North Korea will no longer engage in discussions on dismantlement until the United States normalizes its economic and political relations with Pyongyang and makes a credible commitment not to continue promoting "regime change".
North Koreans Send a Signal: We'll Wait Till Bush Is Gone
Senior North Korean officials in Pyongyang have told a visiting American scholar that later this month they will begin unloading 8,000 nuclear fuel rods--a first step toward extracting their plutonium--from the reactor at Yongbyon, unless Washington agrees to their terms for a freeze in their nuclear programs. Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy in Washington, told U.S. News the new North Korean position takes dismantling of nuclear facilities "off the table." The North Koreans say they would freeze nuclear development if the United States assures them it would accept peaceful coexistence with the Pyongyang regime.
The new posture suggests stronger influence by the North Korean Army, Harrison says. One senior North Korean Army general told Harrison that if the United States imposes economic sanctions, enforced through a naval quarantine or blockade, "it would be the beginning of a war." Harrison's interpretation of the latest position: "They basically have given up on this administration . . . they're going to wait it out for another administration." -Thomas Omestad, Julian E. Barnes and Paul Bedard
The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and U.S.-North Korea Relations
The following was prepared for a conference on "The Second Bush Administration and the Korean Peninsula" sponsored by the Sejong Institute in association with the Korea Foundation and Joong Ang Ilbo, in Cheju, South Korea, March 30th-April 1st, 2005.
On June 25, 2004, the United States and South Korea both put forward detailed proposals for a denuclearization agreement with North Korea at the six-party negotiations in Beijing. The most significant feature of the U.S. proposal was that it explicitly ruled out the normalization of relations with Pyongyang as a reward for denuclearization. Even after the dismantlement of its nuclear capabilities, normalization would follow only if North Korea "changes its behavior on human rights," addresses the "issues underlying" its inclusion on the U.S. State Department terrorist list, eliminates chemical and biological weapons programs, "puts an end to the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology, and adopts a less provocative conventional force disposition." By contrast, the South Korean proposal envisaged discussions on normalization in parallel with the first steps toward dismantlement. In the South Korean proposal, once steps toward dismantlement begin, the parties would agree to "make efforts to remove obstacles on the way toward normalization of diplomatic relations and significantly improve the environment for economic cooperation between North Korea and the international community." North Korea is not likely to agree to a meaningful denuclearization agreement with acceptable verification provisions unless denuclearization measures are explicitly linked at each step of the way with incremental movement toward the economic and political normalization of U.S.-North Korean relations.
The belief that North Korea is not prepared to liquidate its nuclear weapons, at any price, has been most explicitly articulated by Robert G. Joseph, who will succeed John Bolton as Undersecretary of State for Security and Arms Control. It is Joseph who first promoted the concept of "counter-proliferation" to justify the U.S. right of preemptive attack set forth in the September, 2002, Bush National Security Doctrine. It is Joseph who has most forcefully articulated the rationale for a national missile defense program, focused on North Korea, and for a new generation of nuclear weapons capable of penetrating hardened underground targets such as those in North Korea. It is Joseph who fathered the "Proliferation Security Initiative" during his recent tenure in the National Security Council.
Crafting Intelligence: Iraq, North Korea and the Road to War
by Selig Harrison Japan Focus 3 March 2005
Different location for article below
Iraq, North Korea and the Road to War
[Analysis] It's reckless to base policy on worst-case scenario intelligence, warns Selig Harrison
The latest numbers out of Iraq are some 11,000 Americans wounded in action and some 1,500 dead. The most conservative estimate of non-combatant Iraqis killed is about 15,700. This is happening because the war was sold to the U.S. Congress on the basis of false and misleading intelligence. So it's important to keep these numbers in mind in coping with the barrage of intelligence leaks we are getting about North Korea, in particular about the suspected uranium enrichment program that we'll be focusing on today. The people who put out the intelligence on Iraq don't think of themselves as liars. They operate according to an ideological, black and white view of the world in which there are good guys and bad guys and with bad guys you have to assume the worst.
Condoleezza Rice defined this approach to intelligence very explicitly in an ABC news interview in October when she was asked to justify misleading congress about WMD in Iraq. Here's what she said: "a policymaker cannot afford to be wrong on the short side, underestimating the ability of a tyrant like Saddam Hussein." In other words, it's O.K. to be wrong on the high side, overestimating Saddam or Kim Jong Il and starting a preemptive war on the basis of a hypothetical worst-case scenario.
Did North Korea Cheat?
Selig S. Harrison From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005 Summary: Two years ago, Washington accused Pyongyang of running a secret nuclear weapons program. But how much evidence was there to back up the charge? A review of the facts shows that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the data-while ignoring the one real threat North Korea actually poses.
- U.S. Fabrication of False Information under Fire
  Pyongyang, December 20 (KCNA) -- Selig Harrison, chairman of the U.S. North Korea Policy Special Investigative Committee and Director for the Asian Plan of the International Policy Center, in his article asserted that the story about north Korea's nuclear development based on "enriched uranium" is at variance with facts and is baseless. Much upset by this assertion, the Bush administration is now busy refuting it, observes Rodong Sinmun Monday in a signed commentary. It says: Deputy Spokesman for the State Department Ereli let loose a string of sheer rubbish, saying that his assertion is unreasonable, it seems to me that there is convincing evidence proving north Korea's uranium enrichment program and that he knows that north Korea has involved itself in enrichment technology. The story about the uranium enrichment program is a far-fetched assertion and fiction the Bush group has faked up on the basis of misinformation just as it did against Iraq in a bid to charge the DPRK with nuclear development. It is its ultimate purpose to force the DPRK to disarm itself and overturn the Korean-style socialist system in it under the absurd pretext of its "enrichment program." In fact the U.S. is least interested in the solution to the nuclear issue. What it seeks in vociferating about the resumption of the "six-party talks" and "peaceful solution to the nuclear issue" before the international community is to mislead public opinion and conceal its dark intention, concludes the commentary.
- State Department on Selig Harrison and uranium
  QUESTION: In Foreign Affairs today, there is an article by Selig Harrison, who's described as a North Korea expert, is saying the U.S. Government exaggerated the threat from North Korea's nuclear programs, just as it manipulated intelligence about weapons in Iraq. Do you have a comment on that? MR. ERELI: Yeah. I think that those claims are wrong. And we think there is clear and compelling evidence, a wealth of clear and compelling evidence about North Korea's uranium enrichment program. We have known since the late 1990's that North Korea is interested in enrichment technology. We obtained clear evidence over two-and-a-half years ago, that it was pursuing a covert program to enrich uranium and assessed that North Korea was pursuing uranium enrichment as an alternate route to nuclear weapons. This program was in clear violation of international commitments that North Korea voluntarily undertook, including its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its commitments under that 1994 Agreed Framework in the North-South Denuclearization Declaration. In addition to that, the director of Central Intelligence reported to Congress that North Korea had begun seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities in 2001, and that it was also obtaining equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems. There are claims made in the article that we learned about the uranium enrichment program from the North Koreans. That's not the case. We were already aware of the program before they ever talked to us and we informed them of our knowledge about it in October 2002, and it was at that time that North Korea acknowledged to senior U.S. officials that it was pursuing such a covert program. So I think that it's not a question, as Dr. Harrison suggests, of us exaggerating something, but rather the case of there being a multitude of, I think, clear and persuasive evidence that North Korea itself has acknowledged. .
- State Department on Selig Harrison and NK and terrorism
  QUESTION: Yesterday's Financial Times carried the front-page story based on the interview, American journalist interview with the North Korean member to Kim Yong-nam. And he said to this American journalist and they're not going to transfer any nuclear technology or material to terrorists. On the other side, he said the -- they are entitled to share the missile technology to any party. What's your comment on that? What's your view of that?
  MR. BOUCHER: I read the story. I guess there was also the first story by Selig Harrison himself on the inside page. You know, all I can say is our policy is very clear on this. North Korea has been a problem in terms of proliferation. There are international standards. There are international rules. There are rules that other members of the international community find very important in terms of controlling the proliferation of weapons -- controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons, controlling the proliferation of missiles. Those are important to us. Those are important to China's -- to North Korea's neighbors. I think you all know that China has joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group -- another step, we think, in helping with the international adoption of standards.
  So we don't think it's right for North Korea to become a source of proliferation, and therefore a danger, to the rest of the world. That's why we do think it's important to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula to lead to stability there, and that's why we think that North Korea needs to put its economic energies into helping its people and not trying to sell arms overseas. So we will continue our very strong nonproliferation policies because that is a dangerous -- proliferation is a danger to us all.
Ending the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
A Proposal by the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy
Selig S. Harrison, Chairman
Cosponsored by The Center for International Policy The Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago
program for enriching uranium about which little is known." "The Task Force recommends that the United States should give priority to dealing with the clear and present threat posed by the plutonium program." (p. 8) Does a Weapons-Grade Uranium Enrichment Program Exist? "No evidence has yet been presented publicly to justify the conclusion that facilities capable of producing high-enriched, weapons-grade uranium exist in North Korea. No such evidence has been made available to the U.S. Congress or to other states participating in the sixnation negotiations. At the same time, the Task Force finds that the evidence so far available does suggest the existence of a pilot or experimental program..." "Given the greater urgency of the threat posed by the plutonium program, the start of the negotiation process should no longer be delayed by the continuation of the stalemate that has resulted from attempting to compel North Korean acknowledgement of a weapons-grade uranium enrichment program... Whether a weapons-grade program exists...would be difficult to determine without North Korean cooperation as part of an agreed denuclearization process with intrusive inspections. The Task Force recommends, therefore, that the United States should give priority to dealing with the clear and present threat posed by the plutonium program and confront the uranium issue in the final stages of the process after greater trust has been developed through step-by-step mutual concessions." (p.8) Getting the Plutonium Out of North Korea The Task Force recommends a four-step proposal designed to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, starting with a freeze of its plutonium program accompanied by additional measures that reflect a "recognition of the urgency of the threat posed by its possession of significant quantities of weapons-usable plutonium that could be transferred to third parties." Calling for "the complete removal of all of this plutonium from North Korea in the first phase of denuclearization," the Task Force declared, "In order to get North Korea to take the extraordinary step of giving up its plutonium the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia should be prepared to offer significant economic and political incentives," including, "substantial bilateral and multilateral programs of assistance...valued collectively in accordance with an agreed price per kilogram" of plutonium. The Task Force pointed out that the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement with North Korea, known as the Agreed Framework, deferred the complete removal of the plutonium until the final phase of the denuclearization process. (p. 13)
Riding a Tiger in North Korea
By Selig S. Harrison Newsweek International
May 17 issue - When you go to Pyongyang, the place to look for the keys to resolving the nuclear crisis is not the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Foreign Ministry or the headquarters of the Korean People's Army. It is the Tong-Il Market, the showcase for Kim Jong Il's bold new market-based economic reforms. There some 2,200 vendors compete in a frenzy of newly released capitalist fervor, selling everything from farm produce to TV sets. Twenty more indoor markets patterned after Tong-Il are now under construction in Pyongyang, and more are planned for other cities
Inside North Korea: leaders open to ending nuclear crisis
By Selig Harrison, CIP senior fellow The Financial Times (UK) May 4, 2004
North Korean leaders rarely talk in depth with visitors, but when they do the result is much-needed new perspective on one of the most pressing security issues confronting the world today. Based on four days of intensive conversations with senior officials in Pyongyang, it is clear that North Korea is eager to resolve the nuclear weapons crisis - but only by concluding a step-by-step denuclearisation agreement linked with progress towards the normalisation of ties with the US. Economic pressures, intensified by bold, market-based reforms, make such a deal critical for the stability of Kim Jong-il's regime. But he will not accept the Bush administration's demand for the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantling" (CVID) of his nuclear weapons programme all at once, without knowing what he will get in return.
Interview with Selig Harrison
Rebecca MacKinnon 4 May 2004
NK Expert Pushes Energy Pact to End Nuke Crisis
By Reuben Staines Staff Reporter Energy cooperation between Seoul, Pyongyang and other regional neighbors is the key to achieving a complete resolution to the nuclear standoff, according to visiting North Korea expert Selig Harrison. Harrison, director of the Asia program at the Washington-based Center for International Policy, said the only way to convince North Korea to fully denuclearize is to help it resolve the power shortage it has suffered since China and Russia cut energy aid at the end of the Cold War.
The North Korean Conundrum
by Selig S. Harrison Posted May 20, 2004
In the prevailing American stereotype, North Korea is a failing Stalinist dictatorship held together only by the ruthless repression of a mad ruler who dreams of firing nuclear weapons at Los Angeles. Sooner or later, in this imagery, the Kim Jong Il regime, strangled in its Communist straitjacket, will crumble economically, and the only issue is whether its collapse will come in the form of an implosion or an explosion. For George W. Bush, who says he "loathes" Kim Jong Il and wants to "topple" his regime, the assumption that Kim's power rests solely on repression has shaped the current US policy response to the much-discussed North Korean nuclear weapons program. Given patience and enough pressure on Pyongyang, Bush and his advisers appear to believe, the Kim regime will fall. Thus, it is neither necessary nor desirable to reward Kim for denuclearization with economic quid pro quos and security assurances that would merely help to keep him afloat.
What accounts for the emotional intensity of the Bush Administration's desire for "regime change" in Pyongyang? More broadly, does the conventional wisdom in the United States about the nature of the North Korean system, reflected in US policy, rest on an informed assessment of what enables Kim to survive? The President's own explanation is that Kim is loathsome because he presides over an Orwellian totalitarian system. But one can agree that the North Korean system is indeed Orwellian while disputing the wisdom of a policy of confrontation. Moreover, there are other reasons why Pyongyang is demonized in Administration policy. North Korea challenges two American articles of faith: that the United States is entitled to be treated with deference as the "only superpower," and that Western-style democracy, together with economic globalization based on market principles, is now the natural, universal order of things.
Pyongyang refuses to defer to the United States and seeks to deal with Washington on a basis of sovereign equality despite its inferior power position. Although eager to obtain foreign capital and technology, it is seeking to do so selectively, on its own terms, resisting pressure for wholesale political and economic reforms, all at once, that might weaken the control of the Korean Workers Party regime. Above all, what exasperates many Americans about North Korea, no doubt including the President, is the very fact that it continues to exist at all and has not gone the way of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist states, thus finally confirming the ideological victory of the West in the cold war.
"Beyond the Axis of Evil: What Price for a Nuclear-Free Korea?
Selig Harrison Remarks delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Project Roundtable 10 May 2002
I'm going to make three main points today. First, the Bush administration's North Korea Policy increases the danger that the North Koreans will make nuclear weapons and longrange Missiles. Second, it's a provocative policy that could in a worst-case scenario- lead to a war. Third, it is possible for the United States to negotiate a stable peace with North Korea. We could get them to stop missile exports and to stop developing long-range missiles at a relatively low price. But getting North Korea to give up its nuclear option, and to pull back its forward-deployed conventional forces, would require a higher price. My new book, Korean Endgame, focuses on just what that price would have to be. I find no indication that the administration is ready to pay any price for North Korean concessions. Unless that attitude changes it doesn't really matter whether or not there is a resumption of dialogue with Pyongyang.
Turning point in Korea: New Dangers and new Opportunities for the United States
Report of the Task Force on US Korea Policy , Selig S Harrison chair, co-sponsored by The Center for International Policy and The Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago, February 2003
Expert Panel Proposes Plan For Ending North Korea Crisis
A blue-ribbon Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy has presented detailed recommendations for resolving the nuclear crisis with North Korea, starting with immediate bilateral U.S.-North Korea negotiations (Press release 25 February 2003)
Bargain with North Korea
{Selig S. Harrison} [Agreed Framework] [James Kelly]
North Korea's Confession: Why?
{Howard W. French} [Agreed Framework] [James Kelly]{Selig Harrison] [Victor Cha] [Admission]{Kim Jong Il] [Koizumi0209]
North Korea Going Nuclear PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer
{Selig Harrison} (Ray Suarez interviews Selig Harrison, James Lilley and David Albright) [Agreed Framework] [Delay] [Inspection] [US-NK negotiations] [Aid weapon]
North Korea Acknowledges Nuclear Weapons Program
[Agreed Framework](Interview with Selig Harrison] [Media]
PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer
[Bush02] {George W Bush} [Friction] [US-NK negotiations] [Rocketry] [Imperialism][Sherman] (interview with Selig Harrison, James Lilley, Wendy Sherman)
Summary of Selig Harrison's "Korean Endgame"
Rethinking US Policy on Korean Peninsula (Book Review of Selig Harrison book}
Beyond the Axis of Evil: What Price for Nuclear-free Korea?
Painting Pyongyang Into a Corner
The Missiles of North Korea: How real a threat?
World Policy Journal, Fall 2000
Time to Leave Korea?
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2001

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ICAS
Institute for Corean-American Studies, Washington

North Korea: Dreaming of High-Tech -- Subsisting on Hand-Outs (Helen-Louise Hunter)
The U.S. Agenda in Asia: Korean Peninsula Issues and Competing Priorities Robert A. Manning
The Economics of National Reconciliation Marcus Noland
Extension of American Commerce - Proposed Mission to Japan and Corea, 28th Congress, February 15, 1845
North Korea: Leveraging Uncertainty? Mitchell B. Reiss
North Korea: Chronology of Provocations, 1950 - 2000 Rinn S. Shinn
North East Asian Security: the North Korean Dilemma Desaix Anderson
North Korea-U. S. Relations: Issues and Answers Chuck Downs
The Korean Peninsula Issues: "Sunshine Policy" and North Korea, Japan's Posture and China's Sensitivity, U. S. Interests: Rinn-Sup Shinn
KEDO: Seed for Peace in the Korean Peninsula? Desaix Anderson
Human Rights and Humanity: The Case of the "Comfort Women" Chunghee Sarah Soh
North Korea's Missile Capability and the Regional and International Security Implications Curt Weldon
Asian Values and Civilization Francis Fukuyama

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Randall Ireson
DPRK Development Assistance Coordinator for American Friends Service Committee

The Human Side of North Korea

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Japan Policy Research Institute
The Japan Policy Research Institute is a non-profit membership organization dedicated to the promotion of understanding of Japan's political economic behavior and growing significance in world affairs.(Chalmbers Johnson and Steven C. Clemons)

'Keep Away From Washington'
US Maverick Scholar Says Seoul's Balancer Policy on Right Track
By Reuben Staines, Kim Seung-il Staff Reporter, Hankook Ilbo Correspondent
Chalmers Johnson South Korea is right to distance itself from Washington to avoid ending up on the losing side in a new Cold War-like standoff between the United States and China, a renowned American expert on Northeast Asian politics advised.
[Question & Answer With Chalmers Johnson] 'China Will Emerge as Hegemon of East Asia'
Below are excerpts from The Korea Times' interview with Chalmers Johnson. _ Ed. Question: How would you summarize the security landscape in Northeast Asia? Answer: I think the most basic issue in Northeast Asia is that peace is breaking out; that is, there is a powerful movement towards commerce. This is reflected above all by the emergence of China now after 20 years of growth above 9 percent, and the fact that China is not the same kind of totalitarian regime that we saw during the period of Mao Tse-tung. The fundamental thing is readjusting to China, the world's oldest continually existent civilization. It seems to me that the most dangerous development is the fact that the United States has failed to readjust. The United States is caught up in an anachronism, a way of doing business associated with the Cold War.
Wake Up! Washington's alarming foreign policy
By Chalmers Johnson March 31, 2005 In This Article The Sorrows of Empire : Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic [The American Empire Project] By Chalmers Johnson Metropolitan Books · $25.00 The Rubicon is a small stream in northern Italy just south of the city of Ravenna. During the prime of the Roman Republic, roughly the last two centuries B.C., it served as a northern boundary protecting the heartland of Italy and the city of Rome from its own imperial armies. An ancient Roman law made it treason for any general to cross the Rubicon and enter Italy proper with a standing army. In 49 B.C., Julius Caesar, Rome's most brilliant and successful general, stopped with his army at the Rubicon, contemplated what he was about to do, and then plunged south. The Republic exploded in civil war, Caesar became dictator and then in 44 B.C. was assassinated in the Roman Senate by politicians who saw themselves as ridding the Republic of a tyrant. However, Caesar's death generated even more civil war, which ended only in 27 B.C. when his grand nephew, Octavian, took the title Augustus Caesar, abolished the Republic and established a military dictatorship with himself as "emperor" for life. Thus ended the great Roman experiment with democracy. Ever since, the phrase "to cross the Rubicon" has been a metaphor for starting on a course of action from which there is no turning back. It refers to the taking of an irrevocable step.
I believe that on November 2, 2004, the United States crossed its own Rubicon. Until last year's presidential election, ordinary citizens could claim that our foreign policy, including the invasion of Iraq, was George Bush's doing and that we had not voted for him. In 2000, Bush lost the popular vote and was appointed president by the Supreme Court. In 2004, he garnered 3.5 million more votes than John Kerry. The result is that Bush's war changed into America's war and his conduct of international relations became our own.
Foreign policy analysts devote considerable attention to the concept of "credibility"- whether or not a nation is trustworthy. There are several ways to lose one's credibility. One is to politicize intelligence, as Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney did in preparing for their preventive war against Iraq. Today, only a fool would take at face value something said by the CIA or our other secret intelligence services. China has already informed us that it does not believe our intelligence on North Korea, and our European allies have said the same thing about our apocalyptic estimates on Iran.
The real 'China threat'
By Chalmers Johnson
I recall 40 years ago, when I was a new professor working in the field of Chinese and Japanese international relations, that Edwin O Reischauer once commented, "The great payoff from our victory of 1945 was a permanently disarmed Japan." Born in Japan and a Japanese historian at Harvard, Reischauer served as US ambassador to Tokyo in the administrations of presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Strange to say, since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and particularly under the administration of George W Bush, the United States has been doing everything in its power to encourage and even accelerate Japanese rearmament.
Full JPRI Version
Japan Policy Research Institute website
September 28, 2004 A TALE OF TWO COLD WARRIORS WHO CHANGED COURSE
Steve Clemons
CHALMERS JOHNSON AND DANIEL ELLSBERG are roughly the same age of slightly more than 70 years. They both worked for America's military-industrial complex, Johnson as a CIA consultant and Ellsberg as a Marine and then an an intelligence analyst and strategist. Ellsberg broke loose earlier than Johnson from his hawkishness and his belief in the mission and practice of American empire, and put his life and career in jeapordy by leaking secret files, known as the Pentagon Papers, from the RAND Corporation on the conduct of America's war with Vietnam. Chalmers Johnson defected from his role as 'spear-carrier for American empire' in 1995 after the 1995 publication of the East Asia Strategy Report by the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs (known as the Nye Report, named after then DOD/ISA Director Joseph Nye). In this report, Johnson saw that America was committing itself to permanent global military engagement despite the fact that it's chief rival in global affairs, the Soviet Union, had collapsed.
NEOCON CIVIL WAR? DEBATING "THE NATIONAL INTEREST"
Steve Clemons August 13, 2004
"THE NEOCONSERVATIVE MOMENT" BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA is an important new essay in the latest edition of The National Interest . The link only provides an excerpt -- but a subscription to this magazine is a cheap price to pay to read what may be the beginnings of a civil war among neoconservatives. I attended a dinner last week hosted by The National Interest and the Nixon Center featuring Francis Fukuyama discussing this article. The rules for the meeting were not presented, but I am going to respect the non-attribution rule of many such in house discussions as I want to make sure I'm invited back. It was one of the most fascinating roundtable discussions I've participated in in quite a long time. Among those in attendance at the 25 person dinner were Nixon Center President and former Nixon advisor Dimitri Simes, former Defense and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, U.S. News and World Report's Michael Barone, Eisenhower Institute President Susan Eisenhower, former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Georgetown University's Charles Kupchan, former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, National Interest Editor John O'Sullivan, and recent Department of Defense Comptroller Dov Zakheim -- who now works in the same firm of Booz Allen and Hamilton with James Woolsey, who has received some attention in this column. [New imperialism]
Thought Control
Steve Clemons on think tanks
Chrysanthemum's Strange Life: Ruth Benedict in Postwar Japan
by Sonia Ryang Occasional Paper 32 (July 2004)
The North Korea Abduction Issue and Its Effect on Japanese Domestic Politics
by Eric Johnston JPRI Working Paper No. 101 (June 2004)
The Bush Administration's Failed North Korea Policy
by Peter M. Beck JPRI Critique Vol. XI, No. 3 (June 2004) The Bush Administration's mishandling of the North Korean nuclear threat has left us with a looming crisis that, if not managed properly, could be many times more horrific than the tragedy of September 11. Unlike Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-il does have "weapons of mass destruction," and has indicated that if an invasion threat were imminent he would not hesitate to use them on American forces stationed in South Korea, the 12-million city of Seoul, and possibly cities in Japan. Misjudging North Korea I would like to focus on three failures of the Bush Administration's North Korea policy that are responsible for the crisis we may soon face. The first is our inability to understand and accept North Korea the way it is, not the way we would like it to be.
A second and more serious Bush Administration failure is the inability to engage in meaningful negotiations with North Korea.
This vacillation has led to the third Bush Administration failure, which is the most serious of all -- namely, North Korea's nuclear breakout.
Sailing Toward a Storm in China
U.S. maneuvers could spark a war. By Chalmers Johnson, Chalmers Johnson's latest book is "The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic" (Metropolitan, 2004). Quietly and with minimal coverage in the U.S. press, the Navy announced that from mid-July through August it would hold exercises dubbed Operation Summer Pulse '04 in waters off the China coast near Taiwan.
This will be the first time in U.S. naval history that seven of our 12 carrier strike groups deploy in one place at the same time. It will look like the peacetime equivalent of the Normandy landings and may well end in a disaster.
If left alone by U.S. militarists, China will almost surely, over time, become a democracy on the same pattern as that of South Korea and Taiwan (both of which had U.S.-sponsored military dictatorships until the late 1980s). But a strong mainland makes the anti-China lobby in the United States very nervous. It won't give up its decades-old animosity toward Beijing and jumps at any opportunity to stir up trouble - "defending Taiwan" is just a convenient cover story. These ideologues appear to be trying to precipitate a confrontation with China while they still have the chance. Today, they happen to have rabidly anti-Chinese governments in Taipei and Tokyo as allies, but these governments don't have the popular support of their own citizens. If American militarists are successful in sparking a war, the results are all too predictable: We will halt China's march away from communism and militarize its leadership, bankrupt ourselves, split Japan over whether to renew aggression against China and lose the war. We also will earn the lasting enmity of the most populous nation on Earth.
November 2003 SORROWS OF EMPIRE
By Chalmers Johnson Chalmers Johnson is the president of the Japan Policy Research Institute in California and author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. This essay is an excerpt from his forthcoming book The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books; and London: Verso).
Four sorrows, it seems to me, are certain to be visited on the United States. Their cumulative effect guarantees that the U.S. will cease to resemble the country outlined in the Constitution of 1787. First, there will be a state of perpetual war, leading to more terrorism against Americans wherever they may be and a spreading reliance on nuclear weapons among smaller nations as they try to ward off the imperial juggernaut
The American budget dedicated to international affairs allocates 93% to the military and only 7% to the State Department, and does not have much flexibility left for further military adventures.3 The Pentagon has deployed a quarter of a million troops against Iraq, several thousand soldiers are engaged in daily skirmishes in Afghanistan, countless Navy and Air Force crews are manning strategic weapons in the waters off North Korea, a few thousand Marines have been dispatched to the southern Philippines to fight a century-old Islamic separatist movement, several hundred "advisers" are participating in the early stages of a Vietnam-like insurgency in Colombia and elsewhere in the Andean nations, and the U.S. currently maintains a military presence in 140 of the 189 member countries of the United Nations, including significant deployments in twenty-five. The U.S. has military treaties or binding security arrangements with at least thirty-six countries.
Moreover, simply by insisting on employing such weaponry, the American military is deliberately flouting a 1996 United Nations resolution that classifies DU ammunition as an illegal weapon of mass destruction.
The U.S. worries that they might acquire or be given fissionable material by a "rogue state," but the much more likely source is via theft from the huge nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Russia.
The U.S. proved to be ready militarily for an Iraq war, maybe even a North Korea war, and perhaps an Iran war, but it is unprepared economically for even one of them, much less all three in short succession. The permanent military domination of the world is an expensive business. I fear, however, that the U.S. has indeed crossed the Rubicon and that there is no way to restore Constitutional government short of a revolutionary rehabilitation of American democracy. Without root and branch reform, Nemesis awaits. She is the goddess of revenge, the punisher of pride and arrogance, and the United States is on course for a rendezvous with her.
A Spark in North Korea: "This Tragic Loss of Life Was Unnecessary" (Chalmers Johnson 1995}
Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea (Selig S. Harrison}
The Dilemma of North Korea's Japanese Wives (Yong Mok Kim}
Whither Japan-Korea Relations? (Yong-mok Kim}
South Korea's Academic Lobby (Bruce Cummings}
The Three Cold Wars (Chalmers Johnson}
The Armitage Report: Reading Between the Lines (Steven C. Clemons}
Japan Studies Under Attack: How Rational Choice Theory is Undermining America's Understanding of the World (Steven Clemons}
Korean Scandal, or American Scandal? (Bruce Cummings}

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JoongAng Ilbo
Analysis and Op-ed from Seoul newspaper

Six-party Talks: Sunny prospect
Brent Choi 25 July 2005
The forecast for the fourth round of the six-party talks at Beijing's Daioyutai is "mostly sunny with some clouds," with 6:4 chances for settling the overall crisis. The six nations - the U.S., South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan and Russia - are likely to agree on some kind pact dubbed "2005 Beijing Agreement" after about two weeks of diplomatic tug of war. But the essence of the problem will lie not on the agreements itself but on its implementation. The process of resolving North Korean nukes will be like a long-distance marathon, taking at least 5-6 years for full disposal.
One of the biggest reasons to feel optimistic about the upcoming talks attribute to series of positive factors that exceed that of the negative ones. First of all, the U.S. attitude toward the North changed for the better, in a practical sense.
What if Machiavelli was to handle the Nuclear issue?
Brent Choi North Korea Specialist The Joongang Daily brent1@joongang.co.kr
When I asked one American official what he finds most difficult in dealing with N.K. nuclear issue, I half expected him to say something about North Korea's stubborn attitude or the latest discord between U.S.-ROK relations. To my surprise he pointed out to the division inside the U.S. administration. With neocons insisting on overthrowing of incumbent N.K. regime and the moderates calling for an engagement policy, it has become hard to conclude on a real policy to implement upon. What if President George W. Bush took some advice from Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)? This is what the political genius would have said;
the real problem lies not in lack of solutions but in lack of will and present discord within the administration that hinders any real policy to take place
A blunder from the New York Times?
Brent Choi North korea specialist The Joongang Daily
June 22, 2004
An interesting piece of article on North Korea's nuclear status was released by the New York Times on May 23rd. According to David E. Sanger who wrote the article, the inspectors of International Atomic Energy Agency discovered strong evidence of North Korea's secret transaction with Libya that involves transfer of nearly two tons of uranium in early 2001. Mr. Sanger pointed out such would be the "first known" case of North Korea's export of key ingredient for atomic weapons if confirmed citing the words of American and European intelligence officials. He added this is based on the testimony of a research worker who belonged to the international network on nuclear development found by Pakistan's nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Until the notification from IAEA, the U.S. presumed the Uranium 6 Hexafluoride or UF-6 handed out by Libya to be from. The report added that such has spurred new race between worldwide intelligence agencies to find out more about proliferation of other dangerous goods as well as other options such as the North's possible dealing with terrorist groups. By now, the report is no longer just interesting but mind-blowing in sense that it could change the overall U.S. strategy on Korean Peninsula. If there was one thing that drove! President George W. Bush to go on for past 4 years, that would be the extermination of Al Quaeda Group and the complete disposal of weapons of mass destruction. After all, isn't that what the war in Iraq was all about? Given the latest possibility of Pyeongyang's contact with Al Quaeda, the consequences could be equally deadly. To put it simple, the latest article, if fully confirmed, could actually help materialize what is currently just a flying rumor in Was! hington; the elimination of N.K. leader Kim Jong-il, overthrowing of totalitarian government, or bombing the whole nuclear site there.
I, as a journalist in charge of North Korea section and international relations in JoongAng Daily, however, plac! ed the article in the second page of our newspaper instead of the first. Yes, I admit I felt something amiss from the recent founding.
First, the New York Times article displayed a flawed logic both in scientific and economic respect. There are two ways to make an atomic bomb - through plutonium and through enriched uranium. The earlier article started out that the North is doing it the uranium way. In order extract nuclear fuel from uranium we need to extract raw uranium-ores from the mine. The ores should go through some refining process to eliminate impurities and form into a granular solid, commonly known as "yellow cake" because of its color. The yellow cake would then go through another processing proces! s to form UF-6. What we're precisely seeking would be U-235 ingredient within the UF-6, which is the exact material for nuclear fuel. UF-6 usually has about 0.7 percent of U-235. To make a full-fledged atomic bomb, however the density of U-235 must reach at least 90 percent. That's where the term weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (WG HEU) came from. To put it even simpler, jut picture uranium ore as a sugar cane, UF-6 as a neat trimming of that sugar cane and white sugar as the enriched uranium. - New York Times said that North Korea has presumably exported about 2-tons of UF-6 to Libya. Experts point out that you can about 13 kilograms of enriched uranium from UF-6 that contains about 1 percent of U-235. Because one needs at least 15 kilograms of enriched uranium to make a full atomic bomb, I'd say the New York Times got that part right. -The real question is, if Libya was indeed serious about making an atomic bomb for itself, why would it try to d! o it the hard way by importing UF-6? As explained beforehand, UF-6 is not the direct ingredient for atomic bomb but intermediate thing. If Libya acquired UF-6 from the North, it would have to place the material inside 600 high-speed centrifuges and wait for it to condense well for at least a year. Why would Libya do that and waste their precious time and labor when they can simply bring in the already enriched uranium from the same state? -Same goes for North Korea. Uranium may be a bit tougher to handle than plutonium but other than that, it's easi! er to preserve and is as good as any other bomb. Why would the North not enrich UF-6 they possess but have them sold to Libya instead? Second question goes to whether the North is truly capable of securing facility for the massive enrichment. For the New York Times to be 100 percent correct, North Korea must have a complete facility to condense uranium and should already have certain amount of finished goods by now. That means that the North does not need self-made enriched uranium and UF-6. It makes sense that the North sold UF-6 to Libya for extra cash. -The problem is that it requires an impressively humongous facility to enrich uranium. Even if they use the best of centrifuges around the world - let's say, G-2 from Germany? - the North would still need to be equipped with about 3,500 of those centrifuges to make gain satisfactory result. Centrifuge also happens to be a very delicate machine that requires constant amount of electric pressure for proper operation or else, it'd simply go out of order. Imagine that in a! country where commoners look for fire woods at night. -Of course, the North could at least experiment with centrifuges just to see how far it can go. There were even reports of Doctor Abdul Qadeer Khan providing them with design of centrifuges. But to think that the North has succeeded in building not just one but thousands of centrifuges during last few years, yield their own enriched uranium and still managed to have leftovers to sell to Libya is just too much.
Finally I'd like to point out that when it comes to issues concerning North Korea, Mr. Sanger somewhat lacks in ! credibility down here. For example Mr. Sanger's article last year on July 1st which covered Central Intelligence Agency's discovery of a site where has presumably experimented its high-explosives is still in question. He at the time added that the North is probably in the process of developing small nuclear warhead that could be attached to its mid or long range missiles. The paper even gave out the precise location of the newly found area, called Youngdoktong of Hwanghae province placed south of Pyongyang. One problem, though - there is no Youngdoktong in Hwanghae province. Furthermore, even before the New York Times, South Korean newspapers, including JoongAng Daily had already reported of! high explosive tests around Sookcheon County of Yongduk-ri in South Pyongan ! Province nearby nuclear site at Youngbyon for quite some time. Korean newspapers have gone as far as speculating the number of experiments done by the North's research team , which is over 70 times. Mr. Sanger reported the worn-out news as if something new without confirming the exact location and other basic facts. This is part of the reason Korean experts tend to get skeptical when addressing any U.S. report regarding North Korea and Mr. Sanger's articles are not exception to this. I just hope he understands our view because it's hard to regain back the lost credential [Media] [HEU] by email
Anti-Americanism or Anti-Baseism: U.S.-South Korea Relations Through Changing Generations
{Brent Choi} Brent (won-ki) Choi Editor & Researcher The Joong-ang Daily
Prepared for the Asian Studies Program, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University's conference on "Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: The Complexities of an Enduring and Endured Relationship held in Washington DC, January 30-February 1, 2003
Who needs U.S. forces in Korea?
{Hal Piper} [Withdrawal] [Anti-Americanism]
Toadying is holding Korea back
{Chun Chu-song} [Anti-Americanism] [Nationalism]
Good riddance to bad politics
{Kim Meen-geon [Ro Moo-hyun] }
Action or dialogue: United States divided over North Korea
[US NK relations] [Nuclear] {Brent (Won-ki) Choi} {Lee Hyo-joon}
Nuclear wrangling, the way it should be
[Nuclear] {Brent (Won-ki) Choi}
North Korea 'reforms?' Not likely
{Kim Kyung-won} [Economic reform]
The grand adventure now begins
{Bae Myung-bok} [Sinuiju]
Kim Jong-il's effort to make difference acknowledged }
{Lee Won-deok} [Kim Jong Il] [Abductees] [Japanese colonialism]
Unification begins on Wednesday
{Hal Piper} [Unification benefit] [Isolation]
Some advice for Koizumi
{Brent (Won-ki) Choi} [Koizumi] [NK US policy]
Mr. Bush is running out of patience
{Brent (Won-ki) Choi} [Inspection][Delay]
Time to sit down and talk for real
{Brent (Won-ki) Choi} [border]
An awkward peace on the peninsula
(Brent Choi} (misinterpretation}
North-U.S. relations after the World Cup (Brent (Won-ki) Choi}
Dealing with North Korea: Reality versus Fiction (Dong-bok Lee Visiting Fellow, AEI}
World Cup and Northeast Asia: An opportunity for a new diplomacy (Brent Choi}
VIEWPOINT}Policies must reflect new realities
TODAY}Missile exports fuel Asian strife
VIEWPOINT}Forging a link (railway}
Kim Jong-il: Promises, promises (Brent Choi}
Unification sooner than we think (Hal Piper}
Why North Korea's people starved
EDITORIALS}Bush visit is a crucial one
VIEWPOINT}A strategy for the 21st century
Dear Leader Just Says No to Compliments From 'Enemies'
North's Media Open One Eye On What's Going on Outside
Movements to Improve Rural Community
Rewarding System Boost Morale Plus Concern
Kim Jong-il Will Not Come to Seoul
EDITORIALS}Visa snub was wrong
OUTLOOK}Political reform for unification
Reconsidering Four Party Talks in Korea
America's Choice for Korea's Next President
EDITORIALS}Dangers of a sliding yen
Beyond Collapse: Continuity and Change in North Korea (Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones}
To recover goodwill between U.S. and North Korea (Brent (Won-ki) Cho}
Predicting North Korea : Experts in the dark? (Brent (Won-ki) Choi January 06, 2002}
Special Interview} Resumption of inter-Korean dialogue not too far away (Lee Dong-hyun January 04, 2002}
Mixed views on prospects for North-South ties
Kim made 83 public appearances in 2001
North Korea's Top 10 News for 2001 from JoongAng NK net
Japan needs clear N.K. policy (Brent (Won-ki) Choi}
Cloudy prospect for case into spy boat
Merry Christmas in Pyeongyang, but not why you might think
Sigal: U.S. must live up to pact with North
Consumer prices in North show signs of stability
Intelligence official warns of embracing North too tightly
Prospects good for unification? Think again, says one scholar
North Korean defectors' new life in South Korea
Kim focused on old Cold War allies
Tightly controlled equality: a glimpse into North Korean society
Pyeongyang encourages IT development
North Korea Deserves to Remain on U.S. List of Sponsors of Terrorism- Heritage Foundation

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Kimsoft
US-based Korean website

The Korean War: 1950 - 1953
Kimsoft portal
The Strange Saga of US Army Sgt. Robert Jenkins
Lee Wha Rang
The Koryo-Mongol Allied Invasion of Japan
- The Myth of Kamikaze Lee Wha Rang
Park Kun-hye - The New Leader of the Grand National Party
Like daughter, like father - Park Jung-hee: Korea's Hitler and Triple Turncoats? Lee Wha Rang, March 26, 2004 [Park Geun-hye]
Roh Moon-hyun's Ouster: For Whom the Impeachment?
Lee Wha Rang On March 9, 2004, the National Assembly of South Korea voted to impeach President Roh Moon-hyun on the ground of violation of the election law, illegal election funding, and unethical conducts of his close relatives, which 'crimes' all of the preceding presidents of South Korea, and indeed, of the United States of America are guilty of, but have not been impeached for. Roh had no effective backers in the Assembly who could have blocked the impeachment vote.
It is no secret that the National Assembly is dominated by 'conservatives' whose power base dates back to the Japanese rule, during which a sizable percentage of the Korean people supported Hirohito's war efforts. These Koreans had served the Emperor as kamikaze pilots, POW camp guards, cannon fodders, police, informants, enforcers and such, not only in Korea but also in the nations occupied by the Japanese army - Manchuria, China, Indochina, and the Philippines. These Koreans were richly awarded by their grateful Japanese masters and had acquired wealth and power at the expense of the Korean people. The US Military Government of Korea, which ruled South Korea from 1945 to 1948, inherited and continued the Japanese rule of Korea. The Americans employed and empowered the former servants of Hirohito, and continued Japan's persecution of the Korean nationalists. Nearly half million Koreans, several times more than the number killed by the Japanese in 50 years of its occupation of Korea, were killed under the US Military Government of Korea and Rhee Syngman, a Korean-American dictator whose misrule followed the American rule.
In fact, it was the Japanese who drew the 38th Parallel line of division. Hirohito in 1944, placed Korea north of the 38th under the Kwangtung army and the south under the Japanese Home Defense Army. The former army was primed to fight the Soviet Army while the latter was arrayed against the Americans.
The Origin of the Korean People: 2mWho are the Koreans? Lee Wha Rang
Whose Head Is It?
'Let the dumb gooks kill each other - the only good gook is a dead gook' - An American general.
"Republic of Korea Army" - Whose Army Is It?
[US military dominance] Unlike the US war on Iraq that involves messy negotiations at the United Nations, US preemptive strikes can be mounted without any notice to any nation - including South Korea. Preemptive strikes will force North Korea to strike at US bases in South Korea, Japan, Guam, Okinawa and the US homeland, and the armies of South Korea and Japan will be forced to attack North Korea. There is nothing Roh Moo Hyun can do to stop Bush from attacking North Korea. As far as Bush is concerned, Roh Moo Hyun is a mere "shoeshine" boy and of Roh stands in the way, he will be dealt with. A military coup or an assassin's bullets will take care of Roh. Since the beginning, Bush had no intention of resolving the nuclear issue with North Korea peacefully.
Moving and positioning the military assets from Iraq to the Far East may take 1-2 months and it is likely that Bush will start his war on North Korea in June of July of this year.
Faulty Intelligence or 'See No Danger' Syndrome?
[Rocketry]
American Nukes in South Korea
[US military] [Joint US military] A South Korean investigative Lee Si-woo reporter has made public documentary evidence that indicate that the US military has nuclear weapons in South Korea at its naval base at Jinhae, South Korea and has been practicing nuclear attacks on North Korea in spite of the 1992 Nuclear-Free Declaration and the 1994 Agreed Framework
All of the US subs and nuclear surface ships are equipped with nuclear- tipped Tomahawk missiles and the presence of these vessels in Korea are clear violations of the 1991 denuclearization agreement based on President Roh Tae Woo's statement that there was no nuclear weapons in South Korea. It is suspected that the US military has been keeping nuclear weapons at Ohsan and Gunsan airbases in addition to the Jinhae navy base.
South Korea vehemently denied this "baseless accusation" and refused to allow North Korea to inspect Jinhae, thus nullifying the mutual inspection clause of the 1992 agreement for nuclear-free Korea.
In 1995, Japan and the United Stated conducted a joint military exercise called "Keen Edge", in place of the Team Spirit that was cancelled in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework.
North Korea Informed Japan of Missile Tests
[Rocketry] Much has been said about the timing: the missiles were fired on the eve of President Roh Moo Hyun's swearing-in ceremony in Seoul. Firing small cruise missiles during a war game has no political significance. North Korea makes several types of anti-ship cruise missiles and has a large supply of them. North Korea has sold cruise missiles to Iran and other Muslim nations. North Korea would have fired an ICBM if it had intended to make a political statement.
Roh Moo Hyun Becomes South Korea's New President
[Roh Moo-Hyun] [US NK negotiations] In his inaugural speech, he regrettably toted the Bush line on North Korea: namely, North Korea must renounce its nuclear program before US military threats and economic sanctions would be lifted. What North Korea has been demanding is negotiated tradeoff of its nuclear program for security. If North Korea is to give up its nuclear security blanket first, who would guarantee its security? North Korea is well aware of the US tactics in dealing with its enemies. For example, Iraq has been disarming itself over the years in order to avoid US military attacks. What Iraq has found is that the more it disarms, the more disarmament the United States demands. When finally, Iraq is completely disarmed, it is about to be attacked anyways. The Bush administration wants North Korea to get rid of nuclear weapons, biochemical weapons, long-range missiles and to reduce its forces. Kim Jong Il may be weird but he is not stupid
Bush's Next War - North Korea: A War Scenario
[NK military] [Predictions]
Captain James Hausman
US Army Military Advisor to Korea, 1946-48: The Intelligent Man on the Spot {Peter Clemens}
James Hausman: The Ugly American in Korea?
Part I. The Hangang Bridge Massacre {Lee Wha Rang}
Tonghak Revolution and Chundoism
[Religion][Chondo Kyo] [Nationalism] [Japanese colonialism] [History] Chundo-gyo is a religion indigenous to Korea.. With the revival of Korean nationalism, this Korean religion is becoming more and more popular in North and South Korea
Korea WebWeekly Editor Interviewed
[History] Nationalism]
The Left-Right Confrontation in Korea - Its Origin
{Kim Young Sik} February 8, 2003, [Nationalism][History] (Word file)
The Left-Right Confrontation in Korea - Its Origin
A short history of modern Korea as seen from a Korean nationalist's eye.{Kim Young Sik} February 8, 2003, Portland, Oregon (html)
America's Broken Treaties with Native Indians A Lesson for North Korea
{Lee Wha Rang}, January 26, 2003 [Agreed Framework] [Electricity] [Collapse] [Negotiating style] [US NK Negotiations] [NK Military]
Kim Jong Il's Candid Talk Caught on Tape
[Kim Jong Il]
The March 1, 1946 Plot To Assassinate Kim Il Sung
{Lee Wha Rang} [Terrorism]
Guerrilla Operations Outline
[Terrorism] [Korean War events] Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea) 8240th Army Unit , Guerrilla Section , 11 April, 1952
Who is Kim Jong Il?
[Kim Jong Il]
Soap Opera By Coast Guard Faced With Shakeout In Koizumi's Reforms
{Kim Myong Chol}' High-Profile N. Korean Spy Ship Saga Needed to Vindicate Its Seaworthiness ' [Sunken ship] [Predictions]
A Christian Cult in South Korea on Anti-North, Pro-US Crusades
[Pro-Americanism] [Religion] [Withdrawal] [Espionage]
Contingency Plan 5027 to Defend Seoul
[US military dominance] [US military] [Joint US military] [Spin]
North Korea's Next Move: A Test-Flight of ICBMs with MIRVs
[Rocketry] [US NK negotiations] [Satellite]
The Truth About North Korea's Satellite: Faulty Intelligence Or Politics?
{Lee Wha Rang} [Satellite] [Rocketry] (October 4, 1998)
Russian Space Center Tracks North Korea's Elusive Satellite
[Satellite]
N Korean Nuclear Arsenal
[NK Military] {Lee Wha Rang}
Ballistic missiles by range
[Rocketry]
The US-North Korean Conflict - How Will It End?
[US NK Negotiations] [NK US policy] [Agreed Framework]
Solving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis of 2002
{Lee Wha Rang} [NK US policy]
US Soldiers Abused POWs During The Korean War
{Richard Ford} {Richard Beeston} [Korean War events]
Kim Dae Jung Opposes Economic Blockade of North Korea
What has forced Kim Dae Jung to step out to dare Bush after 5 years of humiliating subservience? [Friction] [Role of SK military] [Kimdj] [Roh Moo-hyun] [Joint Korean]
North Korea Challenges the US to a Nuclear War
Nuclear war on Earth and Hatred for all Mankind - Bush Pushes for 3- front War and he will get it in 2003 {Lee Wha Rang} [Imperialism] [NK military] [Roh Moo-Hyun] [US dominance]
US Hawks Fire Opening Shots at Roh Moo Hyun, Korea's President- Elect
[Roh Moo-hyun] [Anti-Americanism] [Culture gap] [Arrogance]
Jung Mong Jun, Judas Isacriot, and the US CIA
{Lee Wha Rang} [Chung Mong-jun]
Roh Moo Hyun's Election: Victory of the New Politics and of the Anti- Cold War Forces
[Roh Moo-Hyun] [SK US relations]
Anti-US Sentiment in South Korea: Root Causes
{Lee Wha Rang} [Anti- Americanism]
The Anti-US Sentiment in Korea - Then and Now
[Anti-Americanism] [US Offences] [National Security Law]
100,000 Demand End to the 50-year US Domination of South Korea
[Anti- Americanism] [US Offences] [SOFA]
The US offers no apology for its illegal seizure of a North Korean freighter in international waters. How would North Korea retaliate?
{Lee Wha Rang} [Yemen] [Imperialism] [NK military] [Nuclear]
US Navy Boards a North Korean Freighter in International Waters Is America trying to help Lee Hoe Chang win the election?
[Yemen] [Anti- Americanism][Partisan]
What has Kim Dae Jung's 'Government of People' done for the Slain Girls?
[US offences] [Kimdj][Anti-Americanism]
'Rumsfeld - Lee Jun' Secret Contingency Plan: Would that be Gen. MacArthur's Plan Everready?
{Lee Wha Rang} [US offences] [Anti-Americanism] [History]
The KCIA Kim Dae Jung File
[Kimdj]
North Korea's Nukes - What are we going to do?
[Nuclear]
The Tragic Saga of Choe Sung Hee
[History][Culture war]
Kim Jong Il's Reforms: Will he become North Korea's Deng Xiaoping?
{Lee Wha Rang} [Economic reform] [Kim Jong Il] [China model]
What's Korean Nationalism?
{Lee Wha Rang} December 5, 1997 [Independence] [History] [Nationalism]
Chundoism - A Korean Religion
[Religion] [Nationalism] [Chondo Kyo]
The Secret Massacre of 200,000 Bodo League Members By Rhee Syngman
[War crimes] [Korean War events]
Revisiting the Satanic Era of the Bodo Massacre
[War crimes] [Korean War events] [Japanese colonialism] [Japanese collaborators]
Kim Chang Ryong: Japanese Military Police to Rhee's CIC Chief
[Japanese collaborators] [war crimes]

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Gary Klintworth
Australian Parliamentary Library

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Korea Economic Institute of America (KEIA)
Joseph A.B. Winder, President; Peter M. Beck, Director of Research

Korea Insight
December 2007
Korea Insight
November
Korea Insight
October
Disaster Management and Institutional Change in the DPRK: Trends in the Songun Era
September 2007. Volume 2. No 9 Dr. Alexandre Mansourov "One cannot enter the same river twice. Every time one looks at North Korea, on the surface it appears boringly the same. Its life flows in the same predictable direction, accelerating at narrow rapids in well known locations that shake up internal stability and generate international agitation. Once these easily identifiable but hard to overcome bottlenecks are cleared, the stream of life flattens, slows, and returns to the acceptable order. One can detect the signs of some subterranean trends—economic, social, demographic, political, and cultural trends—shaping the direction and pace of life in the country and affecting its relationships with the outside world. Interpretation of these trends is subjective, and frame of reference is important: neither demonization nor adulation nor ignorant arrogance increase our understanding of reality."
Korea Insight
September
Korea Insight
August
Korea Insight
April 2007
Korea Insight
March 2007
Korea Insight
October 2006
US-ROK FTA survey
THE KOREA-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: KORUS FTA VIEWS OF EXPERTS AND CONCERNED PARTIES: OPINION SURVEY REPORT #1
May 15, 2006 by William Watts, President, Potomac Associates prepared for the Korea Economic Institute, Charles Pritchard, President
Korea Insight
August 2006
U.S.-Korea FTA Resource Center
Korea and the United States will begin negotiations this June on a Free Trade Agreement. Over the next year of negotiations, there will be a wealth of news stories, scholarly articles, reports, and statements on what may prove to be the most significant event in the two nations' relationship since the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty. To help you better follow these events, KEI has developed the "FTA Resource Center
Korea insight
March 2006
Korea's Energy Insecurities Comparative and Regional Perspectives
Kent E. Calder Korea Economic Institute December 2005 [Energy security]
Korea Insight
December 2005
Korea Insight
October 2005
Korea Insight
September 2005
The Newly Emerging Asian Order and the Korean Peninsula
JOINT U.S. - KOREA ACADEMIC STUDIES Volume 15, 2005
Contents:
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
South Korea and the Rise of China The "Rise" of China and Its Impact on South Korea's Strategic Soul-Searching Chung Jae Ho. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Rise of China and South Korea Robert Sutter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Becoming an Asian Hub: A Race For the Swift Korea as a Northeast Asian Business Hub: Visions and Tasks Lee Chang-jae. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Will Korea Become a Hub for International Finance? Edward M. Graham. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
After the Tsunami: Assessing Economic Reform in Asia Financial Restructuring and Corporate Governance in Korea and Taiwan after 1997: Toward Sustainable Development in East Asia Peter Chow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Financial Globalization and East Asian Capitalism Mo Jongryn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
The North Korean Economy and the New Asian Economic Order The North Korea Economy and the New Asian Economic Order Bradley Babson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 North Korea's Economic Integration and Diplomatic Normalization Dominique Dwor-Frécaut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 North Korea's Nuclear Program and Asian Security Cooperation The Dilemma of Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
North Korea's Nuclear Program and Asian Security Cooperation Xia Liping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
America's Role in Asia: From Patron to Partner America's Role in Asia-The Evolution Required Robert Scalapino. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 A View on America's Role in Asia and Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Choi Kang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Korea Insight
July 2005
Korea Insight
April 2005
Korea insight
March 2005
Korea insight
February 2005
Korea insight
January 2005
Korea Insight
December 2004
Korea insight
November 2004
Korea Insight
September 2004
Korea Insight
August 2004
Korea Insight July 2004
April 2004 Insight
Korea Economic Institute
Is the North Serious About Reviving Its Economy?
{Peter M. Beck} [Economic reforms]
Conference report: Inter-Korean Reconciliation, Economic Cooperation and the Role of Major Powers
Engaging North Korea: The European Way (Peter Beck)
Winder: The Shifting Economic Dynamics on the Peninsula (Nov 2000, pdf file)
Winder: The Economic Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula Peace Process (July 2000, Word file)
Beck: Beyond Balancing: Economic Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula (Oct 1999, corrupted pdf file)
Suchan Chae and Kap Young Jeong (eds): North Korea Workshop II ( Rice University, March 23, 2000; pdf file)

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Gavan McCormack
Gavan McCormack is author of the just released Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, New York, Nation Books He has published widely on aspects of modern and contemporary East Asia and his books have also been translated into Japanese, Chinese and Korean. A research professor at the Australian National University, he is currently also a visiting professor at International Christian University in Tokyo.

Criminal States: Soprano vs. Baritone – North Korea and the US
By Gavan McCormack
[Japan Focus 14 August 2006]
1. State Crime
“… the only government in the world today that can be identified as being actively involved in directing crime as a central part of its national economic strategy and foreign policy. … In essence, North Korea has become a ‘soprano state’ - a government guided by a Worker's Party leadership whose actions, attitudes, and affiliations increasingly resemble those of an organized crime family more than a normal nation [1] From September 2005, the US shifted the primary focus of its North Korea attention from nuclear weapons to crime and human rights, denouncing North Korea as a “criminal state” or “soprano state.” This paper reflects on why it might have done this and considers the implications. Following David Asher, coordinator of the Bush administration’s North Korea working group, who wrote the above in November 2005, I want to tease out further the reference to state criminality. Various kinds of criminality are widely attributed to North Korea, although there is little explicit proof of state responsibility, and few would quibble with the attribution to of the label “Soprano,” derived from the popular US series about organized crime. I suggest, however, that we face a problem of confrontation between two outlaw regimes, one a small and very minor state and the other the global super-power, a veritable baritone. The two, locked in symbiotic embrace, share a lack or regard or contempt for law and a nuclear obsession. In this 61st year of the nuclear era, with the non-proliferation regime in tatters, the continued confrontation between these two regimes over issues that should have been addressed decades ago is a problem that destabilizes the region and beyond. [Double standards] [Counterfeiting] [drugs] [evidence]
North Korea and the US "Strategic Decision"
By Gavan McCormack
What is the outlook in 2006 for the "North Korea" problem? In September 2005 the parties to the Beijing "Six-Sided" conference reached a historic agreement on principles and objectives: North Korea would scrap "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs," return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allow international inspections. In return, it would be granted diplomatic recognition, normalization, and economic benefits, including, at "an appropriate time," a light-water reactor.
The September agreement was the more remarkable given that just over two years earlier the US had been refusing to talk to the North Koreans at all, still less to contemplate any security guarantees, let alone a civil nuclear program and a light water reactor. In that two years, what had begun as a US attempt to mobilize a united front of pressure on North Korea was turning, under South Korean, Chinese, and Russian "reverse pressure," into a true, multilateral, negotiating forum. Fearful of becoming what Jack Pritchard, formerly the State Department's top North Korea expert, described as "a minority of one ... isolated from the mainstream of its four other allies and friends in the Six-Party Talks," the US had yielded on one point after another [1]. Its September decision, on the light-water reactor, occurred only under an ultimatum from the Chinese chair of the conference to sign or else bear the blame for the breakdown of the talks [2].
The Umbrella and the Mushroom: Realism and Extremism on North Korea
Gavan McCormack
Japan Focus 25 August 2005
Four times now since August 2003, the government of China has been host to what have become known as the "Six-Sided Talks." The key protagonists, the United States and North Korea, are as asymmetrical as any two countries could be, on one side the greatest military and industrial power in history and on the other one of the world's poorest and most isolated small states. For the United States, elimination of any North Korean nuclear weapons and related programs is the overriding goal, but the US also seems to want to deny North Korea any right to a civilian nuclear energy program. It also wishes to deal with its missile program and human rights record. Beyond this, there are also within the Bush administration those who are absolutely committed to regime change. For North Korea, the nuclear weapons issue is probably secondary. It is the means to try to achieve resolution of the problems that have plagued it for so long: isolation, intimidation and sanctions. What it wants above all is to convert the ceasefire of 1953 into a permanent peace treaty and to "normalize" relations of all kinds - security, political, diplomatic, economic - with the United States and Japan. The memory of a previous attempt at a comprehensive deal, a trade-off of nuclear programs for security, is fresh: in 1994 North Korea suspended its reactors and froze its plutonium wastes under international inspection, in return for a promise of two light-water reactors, heavy oil, and diplomatic and economic normalization. All it got in almost ten years was the supply of heavy oil, so it wants to be sure of a better outcome this time.
North Korean Visitor to the White House
[Analysis] Bush's view of the communist nation matches author Kang Chol Hwan's black and white tale
Gavan McCormack (internews)
President George W. Bush welcomes Kang Chol Hwan to the Oval Office Monday, June 13, 2005. Mr. Kang is the author of, "The Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag." Mr. Kang defected from North Korea and now lives in South Korea and works as a journalist. White House photo by Eric Draper
On June 13, 2005, the doors of the White House Oval Office opened to admit a young (37-year- old) Korean man named Kang Chol Hwan, a refugee from North Korea and perhaps the first person from North Korea for the president to meet. Kang was slightly overwhelmed by the warmth of his welcome, not only from President George W. Bush but also Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. Just three days earlier, in the same room, Bush had hosted a visit by South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun. The welcome for Kang, the refugee, was by all accounts much warmer than that for the head of state, and at forty minutes lasted about as long.
Kang may have been virtually unknown outside Korea prior to his White House reception, but in South Korea he has become a representative of the community of dappokusha, or "those who have fled the North." He was invited to the White House because Bush had just read his book, co-authored with Pierre Rigoulet, The Aquariums of Pyongyang-Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag (New York, Basic Books, 2001). He so much liked it that he had not only recommended it to his close advisers but told Kang he wanted "all Americans" to read it.
Appearing on Japanese television some weeks after meeting the president, Kang recounted Bush's question: what, if the two were to change places, would Kang adopt as basic U.S. policy on North Korea? Kang replied that he thought priority should be given to human rights over nuclear matters since, he said, that was what the people of North Korea most cared about. Bush, he said, responded with enthusiastic agreement. About a month after the White House visit, Kang's call for a hard-line approach to North Korea was featured in the Wall Street Journal (July 17) and a major conference on the subject of North Korean human rights was due to open in Washington just one week before the scheduled re-convening of the Beijing conference. [human rights] [US NK policy] [Friction]
Disputed Bones Fracture Japan-N. Korea Relations
[Analysis] Gavan McCormack delves into the controversy over abductees, the return of their remains
On April 14, the 61st session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting, adopted a resolution drafted and submitted jointly by Japan and the EU on the situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). It called on North Korea to immediately return Japanese abductees and on the UN General Assembly to take up the question of North Korean human rights violations in general.(1)
While it may be true that North Korea "routinely and egregiously violates nearly all international human rights standards,"(17) that does not diminish the requirement for scrupulousness on the part of the Japanese government in presenting its case. The Japanese government presumably thought its claim to the moral high ground in a dispute with North Korea would go unchallenged, yet the bureaucratically controlled, peer-unsupervised, analysis, by a single researcher without experience in work on cremated remains, whose findings could not be confirmed and who was promptly removed from public accountability when doubts were raised about his work, served to complicate the issue and to give comfort rather than to undermine the regime in North Korea.
Pyongyang Waiting for the Spring
Gavan McCormack says Bush's 2nd term Korean policy review is one of studied ambiguity
With the lunar New Year, in Northeast Asia the darkness of winter recedes, a pale sun gains strength, daylight hours lengthen and the earth stirs. However, in one of the bleakest and coldest corners of the region, North Korea,
Looking Back at the Occupation -- The US and Japan over 60 Years
by Gavan McCormack Japan Focus 17 February 2005
The U.S. occupation of Iraq has become ever more chaotic. For three years and nine months to August 1945, the US and Japan fought bitterly and without quarter. By then, much of Asia lay waste, Japan's cities were rubble and its people on the brink of starvation. Today, a new generation scarcely remembers that Japan ever fought against America, has never known poverty or want, and can hardly imagine that time when their parents and grandparents reviled British and Americans as "beasts." Much of what is taken for granted today -- a close relationship with the United, States, capitalism, democracy and prosperity -- is a tribute to the legacy of the Occupation that followed the defeat.
War and Japan's Memory Wars: the media and the globalization of consciousness
by Gavan McCormack
The Fox-ification of the US media proceeds apace. In Italy, the country's media mogul doubles as Prime Minister. In Britain public broadcasting is under pressure from Blairite forces. Japan, the world's No 2 capitalist power, is left out of most discussion on global media trends, but is undergoing the same pressures. Allegations of political intervention to tailor the way the issue of "comfort women" in 1930s and 1940s Asia should be addressed in a 2001 documentary stirred a full scale media war in 2005. [Media]
Koizumi's Japan in Bush's World: After 9/11
by Gavan McCormack
Japan Focus 8 October 2004
Target North Korea: a review
......... by Hamish McDonald June 19, 2004
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE NEEDED ON NORTH KOREA: EXPERT
PM - Monday, 29 March , 2004 18:42:57 ABC interview with Gavan McCormack This is a transcript from PM. The program is broadcast around Australia at 5:10pm on Radio National and 6:10pm on ABC Local Radio.
Gulags on both sides of the DMZ
Book review by Gavan McCormack For ABC Radio National, 'Book Talk' (Jill Kitson: presenter), for broadcast Saturday 1 March 2003, 1:30 pm, repeated Thursday 6 March, 2:30 pm Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, The Aquariums of Pyongyang - Ten years in the North Korean Gulag, translated from French by Yair Reiner, New York, Basic Books, 2001. Suh Sung, Unbroken Spirits: Nineteen years in South Korea's Gulag, translated by Jean Inglis and with introduction by James Palais, New York, Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. [human rights]
Making Sense of the Korean Crisis
An Interview with Gavan McCormack by Stephen R. Shalom and Mark Selden; February 15, 2004
Sunshine, Containment, War: The Korean Options
{Gavan McCormack} [Imperialism]
"Putting Pressure On Rogues"
{Gavan McCormack} [US NK Negotiations][Context] [Terrorism] [Double standards] [NPT] [Friction][Bush policy] [Sunshine]
North Korea In The Vice
{Gavan McCormack} [Koizumi0209] [History]
The 'Evil' Empire That Wants To Come In From The Cold
{Gavan McCormack} [NK US policy]
North Korea Coming in from the cold?
{Gavan McCormack} [Abductees] [Normalisation] [Koizumi0209] [History] [Japanese colonialism]
Peace And Regional Security In The Asia-Pacific: A Japanese Proposal
by Shichi Koseki, Tetsuo Maeda, Yji Suzuki, Susumu Takahashi, Sakio Takayanagi, Yoshiharu Tsuboi, Haruki Wada, Jir Yamaguchi and Sadamu Yamaguchi Edited and Introduced by Gavan McCormack

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Ronald Meinardus
former Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Seoul

Defining Anti-Americanism
{Ronald Meinardus} [Anti-Americanism] `the U.S. is out of control,'' argues the scholar.
`Anti-Americanism' in Germany & Korea
{Ronald Meinardus}[Anti-Americanism]
Conflict Between South Korea, America
{Ronald Meinardus} [Friction]
Shift in US North Korea policy?
{Ronald Meinardus} [NK US Policy] [Spin]
Kim's last chance to shine?
[Kimdj] [Sunshine policy] { Ronald Meinardus}
Kim Dae-jung and the `Axis of Hawks'
(Liberal Times}Challenges for Korea's Unification: A German perspective
Europe's New Role in Korea
(Liberal Times} Advocate of Unity
A Discussion on the Prospects for Unification. (interview with Lothar de Maiziere, and Seo Byung-chul )
(Liberal Times} Bush and NK: Old Wine, New Bottle
The Future of the Sunshine Policy
Limits of Independence
The President, the candidates and the constitution
North Korea: What Role for Europe?
Korean Stalemate: Who to Blame?
(Kim's US Visit} President Kim in search for continuity
(Pres. Anniversary} Sunshine Policy: A Political Drama, Successful Hero
South Korea giving a lot more than it gets from North Korea
Pyongyang in urgent need of perestroika
Sunshine Policy: What to expect in 2001
How to deal with North Korea?

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Nautilus Institute
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, California

Denuclearization and Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula are Possible
By Wooksik Cheong July 8th, 2008 Wooksik Cheong, representative of Peace Network Korea, writes, "Eventually, "practically complete denuclearization" requires Bush's determination as much as Kim Jong-il's. Particularly, a DPRK-U.S. Summit is essential for a final agreement between the two nations. The most practical and symbolic way to show the end of hostile relations between the U.S. and DPRK is to create a scene of a firm handshake between Bush and Kim."
Asian Energy Security Workshop 2007
October 31 - November 2, 2007 Beijing, China
The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program
Daniel A. Pinkston March 6th , 2008 Daniel A. Pinkston, Senior Analyst for the International Crisis Group, writes, “North Korea has a significant infrastructure and institutional arrangement to sustain its missile program. The country is nearly self-sufficient in ballistic missile production, but still relies upon some advanced foreign technologies and components, particularly for guidance systems. Pyongyang has established foreign entities and front companies to acquire inputs, but international export controls and denial strategies have made it increasingly difficult to procure dual-use items and technologies.”
A Maritime Security Regime for Northeast Asia: Part II
By Mark J. Valencia February 27th, 2008 Mark J. Valencia, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate and Visiting Senior Fellow at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, writes, “there is a growing consensus that it is not too early to begin discussing a security architecture in Northeast Asia. That discussion should begin ‘at sea’.”
The Six-Party Talks: Meeting North Korea’s energy needs
By Peter Hayes | 14 November 2007 On February 13, 2007, North Korea and its five negotiating adversaries (the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia) agreed to reaffirm their 2005 commitments to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula but in a carefully sequenced manner. First Pyongyang was to freeze its plutonium production, then declare and disable its nuclear-weapons related capacities, and finally dismantle or remove those capacities irreversibly.
Environmental Security: Agenda Item for the Inter-Korean Summit
By Ke Chung Kim October 3rd, 2007 Ke Chung Kim, Chair of the DMZ Forum (http://www.dmzforum.org/) and Director of the Center for BioDiversity Research at Pennsylvania State University, writes, “The 2nd Inter-Korean Summit in Pyongyang offers an timely opportunity for the leaders of two Koreas, Dear Leader Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK and President Roh Moo-Hyun of the ROK to forge an ultimate agenda, building environmental security on the Korean peninsula for which the formation of an inter-Korean commission for environmental security should be considered a positive contribution towards peace, prosperity and healthy environment for the Korean people.”
Australia and Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia: From Hegemony to a Multilateral Security Mechanism?
Peter Van Ness
Austral Policy Forum 07-11A 17 May 2007
Introduction Peter Van Ness of the Australian National University notes that Australia will never want to choose between China and the United States. Yet the contrasting approaches of the US and China to security in the post Cold war era are stark. Now, argues Van Ness, "even the defenders of US hegemony acknowledge that American hegemony can no longer be sustained by unilateralist designs." Paradoxically "the crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons presents the best opportunity yet to build new security institutions in East Asia." Australia, Van Ness concludes, "would not directly participate in the new Northeast Asian institution, but would nonetheless enjoy the public goods generated by that initiative in security cooperation. The opportunity may only be temporary, so it is urgent to undertake the task."
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1965
This annual history notes the visit of nuclear powered US surface ships and submarines to Japanese ports and the controversy over their arrival including mass demonstrations and protests (page 31). The report also notes proposed changes in the Fuji Maneuver Area to release the area from the control of the United States and give the Government of Japan jurisdiction over the area (page 4, 24).
N.K.'s partners in nuke talks should immediately address light-water reactor issue: report
WASHINGTON, June 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is highly unlikely to give up its demand for light water reactors (LWRs) at the talks over its nuclear ambitions, and its negotiating partners should think about what they need to propose as a substitute for them, a report by a U.S. research institute said Sunday. Pyongyang's negotiating tactics concerning energy aid will not be based on technical or economic realities but on political needs, said the report issued by the Nautilus Institute. The foremost factor would be to enhance the legitimacy of the Kim Jong-il regime and recognize the importance of his father, Kim Il-sung, as the founder of the state, according to the report. [LWR]
Nautilus grants
(The Nautilus Institute received a $299,000 grant from the US Department of Energy to work on energy security and nuclear fuel in East Asia. The project will involve national teams in the US, ROK, DPRK, PRC, Russia, Japan, Vietnam, and Australia exploring strategies for spent nuclear fuel, increasing nuclear fuel supply security, while compiling and exchanging energy data from each country.)
The Nautilus Institute is a non-profit organization funded primarily by grants and research contracts. You, too, can make a tax-deductible contribution to our work. Supporting foundations include the below
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1966
Nautilus Institute Military History Series Scott Bruce, Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Program Officer July 11th, 2007
This annual history notes the visit of nuclear powered US ships such as the Yokosuka in May and June 1966. The report notes that this successful visit was hoped to be a precursor for further visits of nuclear powered ships to Japan (page 23). The report also notes that information relative to the possession of instructions by USFJ for safe storage and handling of nuclear weapons was supplied to the Joint Defense Agency's Staff Office for possible use in Diet Interpellation (page 42).
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1968
This annual history notes the reversion of the Bonin Islands including Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima, and Marcus Island (page 4, 46) and preparations for the Okinawa Reversion (page 90-91, 129-130). Information on USFJ reaction to the US Pueblo incident is notes on page 21. The report notes continuing controversy over visits to Japan by US nuclear subs in 1968 (page 88, 126-128).
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1969
This annual history notes discussion on the time and method of reversion of control of Okinawa to the Japanese government (page 24). Discussion on the reversion also addressed the issue of defensive nuclear weapons on the island (page 26, 66, 109, 144) including comments from a Japanese Diet member suggesting that the reversion be made "with N-weapons" (page 30). The commitment was made in November of 1968 that all nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from Okinawa before the reversion (page 145). The history also notes commentary over the presence of chemical weapons in Okinawa (page 113).
What Next After Kim Jong-il?
By Lee Byong-Chul June 12th, 2007
Lee Byong-Chul, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation(IPC), a non-partisan policy advisory body based in Seoul, South Korea, writes, "Whatever the scenario might be, it is clear in the minds of many that the stability of the communist regime is more important than anything else; in particular, China and the U.S. could not invoke a regime change in North Korea at their own disposal but certainly want to lead the North in the respective directions that they think it needs to go. At present, the only hope they have is North Korea's complete, verifiable and irrevocable dismantlement of all the nuclear facilities. In other words, Kim Jong-il as a negotiable partner still seems to be on their mind."
The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea: Conventional or Hybrid Military Threat?
By Brian P. Duplessis
May 8th, 2007 Brian P. Duplessis, a Major in the United States Marine Corps with 17 years service, writes, “For too long, military thought has almost exclusively focused on the DPRK’s sizeable conventional forces and WMD capabilities while giving short shrift to irregular warfare capabilities and disruptive activities. In order to successfully blunt a future DPRK military attack, this trend must be reversed.”
Anticipating Six Party Energy Negotiations
By Peter Hayes and David von Hippel May 31st, 2007 Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director and David von Hippel, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, write, “In the long run… it is critical that a substantial fraction of the energy aid agreed to at the Six Party Talks result in developmental outcomes for the people living in the DPRK. Falling short of this goal will leave the DPRK highly insecure, and one of the essential girders of a non-nuclear future for the Korean Peninsula, the social and political stability of the DPRK, will collapse.”
United States CINCPAC Command History 1967
May 30th, 2007
This annual history assesses the strength of North Korean forces and notes increased infiltration activities of DPRK agents into the ROK (page 83, 919) and the construction of a DMZ fence to deter such intrusion (page 265) and the creation of a “Counter Infiltration – Counter Guerilla Concept and Requirement Plan” in response (page 927-933). The report notes the need to distinguish between the nuclear deterrent capability of the USSR and the nuclear threat of the PRC (page 116). Reviews of OPLANs are noted on page 125. The report also notes significant revision of authentication procedures for nuclear control orders (page 137). The history notes Joint Exercises in 1967 including HIGH HEELS which simulated a “a world situation in which the United States was confronted by, the USSR and China in collaboration in a policy of ‘violent revolution.’ The Chinese had deployed extensive forces, some to coastal regions opposite Taiwan and along the Yalu River. North Korean ground and air forces were mobilized and action by North Vietnam continued at the existing level.” (page 142). The report also features an extensive chronology of ROLLING THUNDER, the air campaign against North Vietnam, from 1964-1967 (pages 935 – 963).
The New Nuclear Arms Race
By Hugh White May 17th, 2007 Hugh White, Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute and Professor of Strategic Studies at ANU, writes, “Short of the elimination of nuclear weapons, the US and China can moderate their nuclear competition and reduce the risk of nuclear war by reaching an agreement about the size and nature of each other's nuclear forces, offensive and defensive.”
"United States Forces Japan, Command History 1971
This annual history notes the history of operation Red Hat, the U.S. removal of chemical weapons from Okinawa to Johnston Island preceding the Okinawa Reversion (page 2, 43, 44, 116). The history also notes the debate over the "total" removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Okinawa preceding the Reversion (page 60, 119). The report also notes the regular accusation of storage of nuclear weapons at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni (pages 54-55, 61). [cbw]
Open Minds, Open Futures: How will Asia-Pacific Communities respond to Global Insecurity?
Global Scenarios Workshop Report co-sponsored by Nautilus Institute at RMIT and Australia 21 May 10th, 2007
The Global Scenarios Workshop was convened by the Nautilus Institute at RMIT and Australia 21. This report from the workshop summarizes the narratives of the four scenarios developed at the workshop and uses these conceptions of the future to draw conclusions about threat perception, insecurity, and resiliency in the face of critical uncertainty. The report concludes that NGOs, civil society groups, and corporations all have an important role to play in issues of global problem solving and that "security is not an issue that can be left to governments alone."
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1973
This command history describes milestones in 1973 for the transfer of Okinawa defense responsibilities to the Government of Japan. Including transfer of surface to air missile air defense responsibilities in May 1973 and assumption of "ground defense, maritime patrol, air fighter interceptor" responsibilities in January (page 16).
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1975
This command history the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons training conducted by U.S. Forces Japan (page 29). The report also notes accusation of the presence of nuclear weapons in Yokosuka by the Japan Socialist Party (page 111) and the public reaction to these accusations and port calls by nuclear powered ships in Japan (page 62). The report also notes comments by US Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on the use of tactical nuclear weapons under certain contingencies on the Korean peninsula (page 129
Building Multi-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula
by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) August 22nd, 2006 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) released this report from their Workshop, held in Honolulu in February 2006 as part of IFPA's Building Six-Party Capacity Project (http://www.ifpa.org/projects/carnrok.htm). The report states: "Simply put, the six-party process, on its own, is not sufficient to address this problem, and it is now time to supplement that process with a concerted capacity building effort… Passive acceptance of the status quo reinforces unhealthy divisions in Northeast Asia, and it not only weakens the nations’ abilities to work together in the face of regional troubles, it also exacerbates those problems in the first place.”
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1976
This command history notes Japanese ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, discussion over the application of the Three Non-nuclear principals to Japanese territorial waters, and describes Japanese sensitivity to nuclear issues including the PRC's four nuclear tests in 1976 (page 80, 160, 161). The history notes Japanese "non-support" for US military aid to the PRC (page 159). The report also notes the 1976 High Court decision over the constitutionality of the Self Defense Forces and the construction of Nike missile site in Hokaido (page 177).
DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting
June 26th and 27th San Francisco, CA
- Energy Crisis in DPR Korea and Cooperation Issues
  Ji-Chul Ryu
  DPRK's Reform and Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation
  Li Dunqiu
  - presentation
  - Paper
- Trends in the DPRK Agricultural Sector & Implications for Energy Use
  Hugh Bentley
- Options for DPRK Energy Sector Engagement
  Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director
- Estimated DPRK Military Energy Use: Analytical Approach and Draft Updated Results
  David von Hippel, Senior Associate, Nautilus Institute
- North Korean Energy: 2005-2006 New Technologies and Construction
  John Lewis, Stanford University
  Energy and Economy in North Korea
  William B. Brown
  - presentation
  - paper
- Energy Dialog with DRPK Officials Aug. 23–27, 2005 Visit to DPRK
  Sig Hecker
- Analysis of Present Status and Future Supply /Demand Prospects for the DPRK Power System
  J. Y. Yoon
- Mineral Resources in DPRK
  Woo Jin Chung
- Forest and Other Biomass Production in the DPRK: Current Situation and Recent Trends as Indicated by Remote Sensing Data
  Seung-Ho Lee
- Current Situation and Prospects of Energy Cooperation between Two Koreas
  Kyung Sool Kim
- DPR Korean Energy Demand/Supply Analysis: Energy Balance Sheet 2003
  Kyung-Sool Kim
- Updated DPRK Energy Balance (Draft) and Work to Be Done
  David F. Von Hippel and Jungmin Kang
- Modeling of Future DPRK Energy Paths (Draft)
  Kyung-Sool Kim
UNITED STATES FORCES JAPAN, COMMAND HISTORY 1977
This command history notes questions regarding the impact of the proposed withdrawal of the US Second Infantry Division from the ROK (see: U.S. Ground Force Withdrawal From Korea for more information) on Japan. Some Diet members questioned if the withdrawal from Korea would result in store of US nuclear weapons in Okinawa (page 106). The history also notes other critiques of the proposal from the Japanese perspective, including the idea that Japan would be more vulnerable to Chinese and Russian forces without a US presence in South Korea as a "buffer zone" (page 200, 209) and concerns from US Generals that such a withdrawal might necessitate Japanese remilitarization (page 227). The report details ROK Foreign Minister Park’s public statements that South Korea might need to consider the development of nuclear weapons in response to the withdrawal of US forces (page 228). The report also notes debate between the US and Japan over the test operation of the Tokai-Mura Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant in 1977 (page 208, 254).
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1978
his command history notes discussion of US nuclear deployments in Japan. In 1978 the Diet announced that the Japanese Constitution "did not prohibit Japan from possessing nuclear weapons" although the Three Non-Nuclear Principals, the Atomic Energy Basic Law, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty did block Japan from possessing such weapons (page 102, 223). The history also notes comments by Daniel Ellsberg that the U.S. had stored nuclear weapons at the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station in Iwakuni in the late 50s and early 60s (page 102, 248). The history also notes the signing of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty in August of 1978 (page 249).
DPR Korean Energy Demand/Supply Analysis: Energy Balance Sheet 2003
by Kyung-Sool Kim
United States Forces Japan, Command History 1979
January 10th, 2007 Nautilus Institute Military History Series Scott Bruce, Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Program Officer
The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests. This command history notes the importance of Japan for storing and supplying fuel in contingency planning for the defense of the ROK (page 41). The chronology notes several Japanese questions regarding the presence of US nuclear weapons in Japan. In February of 1979 JCP Party Secretary General Tetsuzo Fuwa noted the presence of US Marines in Japan who were trained to handle nuclear weapons and alleged that this indicated the presence of US nukes in Japan (page 92). In April a CGP member questions the presence of nuclear shells in Okinawa noting that the M-10 guns there were capable of firing such arms (page 97). In both cases authorities noted that such personnel and guns did not indicate the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan and that the U.S. had obeyed all commitments to Japan regarding the deployment of nuclear arms.
Forest and Other Biomass Production in the DPRK: Current Situation and Recent Trends as Indicated by Remote Sensing Data
by Seung-Ho Lee
North Korea Turns Back the Clock
by Andrei Lankov December 21st, 2006 Andrei Lankov, lecturer in the faculty of Asian Studies, China and Korea Center, Australian National University, writes, "news emanating from the North since late 2004 seems to indicate that the government is now working hard to turn the clock back, to revive the system that existed until the early 1990s and then collapsed under the manifold pressures of famine and social disruption." [Economic reforms]
Inspector O And The Case Of The Missing Tea Thermos
by Peter Hayes December 18, 2006
Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, contributes this review of A Corpse in the Koryo by James Church, a detective novel set in North Korea. Peter writes, "Those who want to really understand what is happening in North Korea should read this book, not only because it is gripping, but because it is the best unclassified account of how North Korea works and why it has survived all these years when the rest of the communist world capitulated to the global market a decade ago. This novel should be required bedtime reading for President Bush and his national security team.
Inspector O Gets a Thermos
by James Church December 19, 2006
James Church (a pseudonym) is the author of the detective novel, A Corpse in the Koryo, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2006. In this essay, Church meets Inspector O, the primary fictional character in A Corpse in the Koryo and discusses the state of play in the DPRK after the October 9th nuclear test.
United States Forces Command Japan, Command History 1980
This command history notes the participation of US Forces in Japan in the activities of TEAM SPIRIT 1980 (page 24, 118). The history also notes controversy over the passage of a crippled Russian nuclear submarine through Japanese waters unannounced in August of 1980 (page 115). The report also notes comments from Japanese Defense Agency Director General Omura and Defense Bureau Director Shiota that under the Japanese Constitution "there are some nuclear weapons Japan can possess and some she cannot" (page 120). [Japanese remilitarisation] [Nuclearisation]
Analysis of Present Status and Future Supply /Demand Prospects for the DPRK Power System
by J. Y. Yoon
Internal DPRK Electricity policy: * Devise various countermeasures to overcome electricity shortage o Construction of Large hydro plants (11 units 1180MW) o Remodeling of overall power system § Generation plants, Transmission, Distribution system o Co-operational policy with neighboring countries § Russia, The ROK o Energy saving policy § Discriminatory power supply, replace by lighting lamp for energy saving § Using the Electronic metering ticket * Energy 3-year’s plan (03-05) 1. Restructuring power plants 2. Coal production increase 3. Expansion for coal production machinery * Science & Technology 5-year’s plan (03-07) 1. Efficiency improve of water turbine (90%) 2. Saving the heavy oil & Modernize the coal production tech. 3. Reduce the power loss (21% 16%) 4. Transmission systemize for NEAREST 5. Develop the renewable energy [Energy]
Mineral Resources in DPRK
by Woo Jin Chung
Problems in industry production * Scarcity of electricity, materials and old equipments - Decreasing the production and stopping the operations of mines * Many mines but a few competitive mines - Almost mines are small and have deep pits due to long-time productions * Qualities of minerals uncertain * Old and small steel-manufacturing and refining mineral facilities - DPRK technologies fitting to the minerals produced in DPRK ’s mines - Many facilities but small unit scales * High potential to increase the production of minerals when new equipments are employed and electricity is supplied in the mines Problems in Investment * Requiring huge indirect costs for reconstruction of infrastructures such a s harbor and railroad in developing mines - Might need new power plants for stable electricity supply - Difficulties in moving the materials even within the region of DPRK * Uncertain qualities and few information on the mineral resources - Strictly closed to the mining information - No permitted to conduct any investigating on the quality of minerals without promising the investment * Difficulty in closing the mines even when the quality of minerals produced is low and no marketable. - By law(25 provision, article of underground resources), all of the resources in the mine should be dig up, disregarding the quality of minerals produced * No permission to the foreigner in engaging management of joint companies. - Just providing materials and equipments in exchange of a part of the minerals the invested mine produces [Energy]
United States Forces Command Japan, Command History 1981
This command history notes the participation of US Forces in Japan in the activities of TEAM SPIRIT 1981 (page 22). The history also notes a discussion between Ex-Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer and Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki on the entry of US Ships armed with nuclear munitions into Japanese waters both in normal situation and in the case of a nuclear conflict (page 92).
United States Forces Command Japan, Command History 1983
This command history notes discussion related to the TEAM SPIRIT 1983 operation regarding the role of US Lance missiles in Japan in the USFK exercise (page 18, 140). The history also notes support from the US for a build-up in Japanese defense capabilities coupled with concerns from neighboring nations regarding the potential threat posed by the Japanese defense force (page 62). The chronology in the appendix of the report notes developments in ROK-Japan relations in 1983 (page 136). The report also notes the manufacture of Patriot missile systems in Japan under license (page 143). Exercise VALIANT BLITZ 83 is also noted on page 148.
Red-faced media retracts reports
September 26, 2006 ? Major morning newspapers in South Korea were embarrassed yesterday after they reported about an American expert's fictional essay on North Korea as if it were real. At 11:17 p.m. on Sunday, Yonhap News Agency, one of the nation's two news wire services, issued a report in Korean that Pyongyang had developed at least five nuclear weapons, attributing the quote to Kang Sok-ju, the North's first vice foreign minister, from an essay by Robert Carlin, former chief of the Northeast Asia Division at the U.S. State Department. The report said Mr. Kang spoke about the weapons at a meeting of North Korean diplomats in Pyongyang over the summer, citing the essay posted on the U.S.-based think tank, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development. An English-language article was aired eight minutes later. Twelve related articles in Korean were aired during the following hour. The Dong-A Ilbo carried a large article on the front page. Other major Korean-language daily newspapers, including the Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh, reported stories inside their front section, with headlines saying the North's vice foreign minister said his country has several nuclear weapons. The Korean-language JoongAng Ilbo, unable to reach Mr. Carlin before its midnight deadline, issued a similar report on page 4, with a remark from a South Korean senior official that he had not been informed about Mr. Kang's discussion. At 5:05 a.m., Yonhap News' Korean edition retracted all of its stories based on the essay. About an hour later, the newswire's English service issued a retraction, pointing out that "the North Korean official's speech was found to be a fictional composition by Robert Carlin." Morning newspapers issued apologies and corrections yesterday on their Internet sites. The essay, titled "Wabbit in Free Fall," was posted on the Policy Forum Online section of the Nautilus Institute's Internet site. The think tank updated an introduction to the essay to clarify the matter yesterday. Before posting it on the Internet forum, Mr. Carlin also presented the essay at a seminar on Sept. 14 and told attendees that it was a hypothetical piece. by Ser Myo-ja [Bizarre]
Misreport on Nukes Damages Dailies
By Lee Jin-woo Staff Reporter Reports by South Korean media that claimed North Korea has developed at least five to six nuclear weapons have been found out to be grossly inaccurate. The reports were based on an alleged speech by a high-ranking North Korean official, which was found to be a fictional composition by a U.S. expert on North Korean issues. Yonhap News Agency, a wire service in Seoul, reported Sunday night that Kang Suk-ju, the North's first vice foreign minister, told a meeting of North Korean diplomats in Pyongyang that the North has developed five or six nuclear weapons and its nuclear program is nearing the point of no return. The series of news reports was based on an article recently posted at the Web site of the U.S.-based think tank, the Nautilus Institute, that was written by Robert Carlin, former chief of the Northeast Asia Division at the U.S. State Department. In the article, Carlin said he received a hand-written script of Kang's speech in an envelope postmarked Prague. He said he translated the speech, originally in Korean, adding that he could not say who sent it to him. However, it was a fiction, which Yonhap reporters were not aware of until getting a phone call from its correspondent in Washington D.C. the very next day.
Wabbit in Free Fall
by Robert Carlin
September 21st, 2006
This speech was presented at Brookings-Stanford Conference in Washington, DC on September 14, 2006.
Robert Carlin, former Chief of the Northeast Asia Division in INR at the State Department, presented this speech given by DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju to a meeting of North Korean diplomats held in Pyongyang over the summer. The speech states, "On the nuclear question, the guidance is quite clear and you will stick to it, no matter how often you are pestered. Whether or not we will test is not for us to know. I can tell you this-the situation in Pyongyang is where we never wanted it to be. We have no standing at all, no weight, no credibility any longer to influence the decision." [Agreed Framework] [NK US policy]
United States Forces Command Japan, Command History 1984
This command history notes coordination with USFJ on logistics and other support plans for OPLAN 5027, the US plan in case of a war on the Korean Peninsula (47, 52, 62). The report references communication between Japanese politicians and North Korea leader Kim Il Sung over possible agreements with Japan over maritime borders and fishing zones (page 190). The report also includes a full chronology for USFJ in 1984 on page 146-211.
United States Forces Command Japan, Command History 1985
This command history notes coordination with USFJ on logistics and other support plans for OPLAN 5027, the US plan in case of a war on the Korean Peninsula (page 33, 47). The report also notes consultations taken to determine if participation in the US led Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would violate the Japanese peace-oriented constitution and the subsequent decision to allow private industries in Japan to participate in the Initiative without any restrictions (page 57-8). The report also notes the controversy over Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone and other cabinet members official visit to the Yasukuni Shine in August of 1985 (page 53).
The report also includes a full chronology for USFJ in 1985 on page 157-172.
Energy and Economy in North Korea
by William B. Brown
In this presentation William B. Brown, Senior Research Analyst at CENTRA Technology Inc, discusses the DPRK energy sector and the countries economy. Some of his observations include:
1. North Korea was built as energy intensive economy 2. North Korea’s agriculture sector, whose collapse caused massive famine in the mid 1990s, is a heavy user of energy. 3. North Korea probably has large coal resources, especially anthracite, but production has fallen sharply in the past decade. 4. North Korea has no oil or gas and few imports 5. Other than food, electricity is seen as North Korea’s most important shortage.
Energy Dialog with DRPK Officials
Energy Dialog with DRPK Officials Aug. 23–27, 2005 Visit to DPRK by Sig Hecker
In this Sigfried Hecker, currently at the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, describes his August 23-27, 2005 visit to the DPRK on and his conversations with officials about their energy sector there. He notes: ‘DPRK reaction ranged from energy infrastructure upgrade is “good idea,” to “don’t tell us about our own country, we need LWR. No LWR, no deal.”’
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1961
This history notes that 1961 saw the promulgation of a nuclear operations component to OPLAN 27-60, the primary US plan for war on the Korean peninsula (page 18). The report also contains some information on OPLAN 22-60, the plan for support of revolutionary outbreaks in the DPRK or PRC (page 16). Other Operations Plans of interest included 23-61, a plan for US forces to support British forces in the event of a forced withdrawal from Hong Kong, another plan that also included a nuclear operations component (page 17).
The report also notes that, following a Joint-Chief of Staff directive, Pacific Command incorporated the use of biological and chemical weapons in all operations plans and instructed that these munitions be stocked in strategic locations to support existing Operations Plans (page 28). The command history also describes exercise HIGH HEELS, a world-wide exercise testing communication in a nuclear war scenario in July of 1961 (page 59).
The report notes orders for Pacific Command to prepare support plans to aid Atlantic Command in two contingency plans for an amphibious assault on Cuba (page 44).
Options for DPRK energy sector engagement
Peter Hayes
Trends in the DPRK Agricultural Sector & Implications for Energy Use
by Hugh Bentley
In this presentation Hugh Bentley of Hugh Bentley Associates describes the necessary next steps for the rehabilitation of the agricultural energy sector of the DPRK.
* Rehabilitation of Fertiliser Plants * Reduction in post harvest losses through improved machinery, electricity supply and fuel oils * Improvement in energy supply for timing of critical agricultural activities at planting and harvest * Land Re-zoning into larger parcels of land * Promotion of Agro-forestry and forestation to reduce serious soil erosion and long term ecological damage
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1962
This history notes the 100% increase in the DPRK Air Force in 1962 when the DPRK acquired MIG-21 jets from the USSR (page 3). The report also notes changes in OPLAN 27, the plan for defense of the ROK in the event of a war, on page 25. The report describes changes in US nuclear arsenal in 1962 including changes in warhead types and their allocation (page 37). The report also notes that the annual nuclear weapons requirement study was altered to make better use of support resources and "delivery vehicles" in the "Taiwan and Korean area" (page 38). The history describes US military estimates of the Communist threat to the ROK and the use of these estimates to determine if a reduction in ROK forces was necessary. By considering the threat to the ROK to be from both PRC and DPRK forces, as opposed to just DPRK forces, the report was able to conclude that there should be no such reduction (page 47). A considered reduction of one division of US forces from the ROK to Japan would have eliminated half the US front line strength and reduce the US nuclear capability by 25-50% (page 116).
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1964
The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
The report notes several revisions of OPLAN 27 that imply the timeline the US military envisioned for the defense of the ROK in the case of a DPRK attack that included "massive Chinese Communist participation". The revisions assumed that the ROK's internal infrastructure would need to be used for 105 days before Inchon or Wonsan could be regained to be used as a port instead of Pusan and that an airborne division arriving in the ROK from Japan to bolster the defensive stage of the OPLAN (Phase I) could then play an important role in the counter-attack against the DPRK in Phase II of the Plan (pages 42-45).
This history also notes consideration of redeploying a division of US soldiers from the ROK to Hawaii based on economics considerations (page 7). This consideration led CINCPAC to recommend that Military Assistance Programs to the ROK be substantially increased to bolster ROK self-defense capability and that the US initiate an annual Mobilization Exercise (MOBEX) to test its capability of enacting OPLAN 27 which would both demonstrate "the U.S. intent toward the allies" and demonstrate "U.S. capabilities to potential enemies" (page 8-9).
Other Operation Plans described in the report include several to "stabilize the situation" in the Republic of Vietnam and Laos (page 49) including plan to strike targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (page 51). Plans to "terminate aggression" in Southeast Asia emphasized "maximum application of U.S. air and naval forces" with "minimum essential U.S. ground forces" present (page 54). Elsewhere in the history the report assesses the usefulness of nuclear retaliation to attacks in Southeast Asia (page 86). FOr more on Nuclear Weapons in Vietnam see:
Finally the report notes Exercise DICE DROP which tested the implementation and reporting procedures for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's Nuclear Strike Plan including "movement of nuclear weapons", "coordination of Atomic Operations", and "Nuclear Detonation and Radioactive Fallout Reporting Procedures" (page 76).
US Navy Missile Defence
"US Navy Set Missile Defence Operations Area in the Sea of Japan 190 Kilometres West of Okushiri: Japan as a Base for the Defense of the US Homeland." by Hiromichi Umebayashi
June 2nd 2006 Translation by Richard Tanter. This paper first appeared in Japanese in Kakuheiki-Kakujikken Monitaa (Nuclear Weapon and Nuclear Test Monitor), No. 239, (August 1st, 2005) pp.1-8
Related materials:
The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective
by Mark J. Valencia
May 25th, 2006
Mark J. Valencia, a Maritime Policy Analyst in Kaneohe, Hawaii and Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, writes, "Most of the PSI's shortcomings stem from its ad-hoc, extra-UN, US driven nature. Bringing it into the UN system would rectify many of these shortcomings by loosening US control, enhancing its legitimacy, and engendering near universal support." [PSI]
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1966
This history notes the transfer of new aircraft and ground equipment to the DPRK by the USSR along with the increased deployment of anti-aircraft assets in the DPRK (page 39). The report summarizes the perceived feasibility and strategies for "limited-objective offenses" against China should the PRC become involved in the Vietnam War. The methods of deterring PRC intervention included "a ground offensive in Mainland China" although such a plan was an "undesirable possibility" (pages 75-80). The history examines the relationship between US military assistance to South Korea and the South Korean contributions to the war in Vietnam. The United States made a commitment to increase military assistance to the ROK during negotiations for the second deployment of ROK troops to South Vietnam (page 206).
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1968
This history describes "intensified belligerency" on the part of the DPRK in 1969 as seen in the seizure of the USS Pueblo and the Blue House Incident in January 1968 that motivated a program of "force modernization" for the ROK military most of which was "of World War II or Korean War vintage". (page 203). The report assesses the North Korean military threat emphasizing the unconventional capacity of DPRK forces (pages 969-970). The history analyzes the Blue House incident (pages 979-981) and the USS Pueblo incident (pages 981-995). The report also notes the chronology of message traffic over the Pueblo incident (pages 1021-1031) and discusses the retaliation plans considered by the US military that included an assault on Wonsan harbor in the DPRK (page 983). In the wake of these events, and a study that indicated that US/ROK forces would lose almost 73% of their aircraft in the event of a DPRK surprise attack, the CINCPAC proposed authorizing US Battle Directors to declare hostilities against the North because of the need for quick reaction time (pages 1011-1016).
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1969 :vol 1
This history describes OPlan 43-69 which notes actions that were to be taken in case of an open conflict between the Warsaw Block and NATO forces. Under this Operations Plan the US was required to "conduct defensive actions in SEAsia and South Korea" but, if the US could not secure mainland Asia, NATO forces would pull back from the ROK to "hold the general line of Philippines-Taiwan-Okinawa-Japan" (Volume I: pages 104-105). This history notes precautions taken to protect US reconnaissance aircraft after the shoot-down of an EC-121 aircraft by DPRK forces in April of 1969. After the shoot-down whenever a US reconnaissance aircraft "entered certain areas offshore from Korea" there would be four US fighters in the air to support to protect the reconnaissance operation (Volume I: page 135). The shoot-down is described in detail along with plans for possible retaliatory attacks against airfields in the DPRK at Sondok and Wonsan (Volume IV: pages 133-144). The report also notes that in 1969 the US military considered Japanese rearmament, even for offensive purposes, as a possible long term development given the phase down of US military forces in the Pacific (Volume I: page 131). The report notes military exercises conducted in 1969 including FOCUS LENS and FOG HAZE in the ROK (Volume I: pages 157-158). The history also details plans on how to restore communications during a strategic nuclear war (Volume I: page 208-209).
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1969 Volume II:
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1969 Volume III:
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1969 Volume IV:
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1970
This history notes the performance of exercises FOAL EAGLE, FOCUS LENS, and GOLDEN DRAGON in 1970 (Vol. I. Page 179). The report details the Military Assistance Program efforts to modernize the ROK military and the distribution of those funds (Vol I. pages 346-359). The report assessed the North Korean military threat to the ROK, the modernization of DPRK forces, an estimation of the strength of its Army, Airforce, Navy, and missile capability (Vol II. Pages 379-382). The history notes the augmentation of US air assets in the ROK after the USS Pueblo incident in 1968 and the shoot down of an EC-121 in 1969 by DPRK MIGs (Vol II. page 383). This report also describes the reduction of US Force strength in Korea in 1970 (Vol. II pages 387-395). Vol 2
The Role of Think Tanks and Think Nets in Defining Security Issues and Agendas
Peter Hayes
June 6, 2005 Globalism Institute RMIT University
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1972
March 22nd, 2006
This report notes details on OPLAN 5020A, a series of "reprisal options" against "North Korean provocations" (page 93-94). The report details OPLAN 5027, the basic warplan for US-ROK forces against the DPRK. The report notes that in 1972 the coordination and timing of the deployment of forces was greatly revised (pages 94-96). Planning for combined US-ROK counteroffensive airstrikes coordinated by the Joint Air Operations Center, Korea was also begun in 1972 (page 103). The military history notes discussions on the transition of operational control to the ROK following the reduction in the number of US forces in Korea the early seventies. COMUS Korea was concerned about the loss of operational control of forces to the ROK noting "turbulence in Korea caused by world events and possible reactions to future United Nations actions" as reasons for not phasing operational control to the ROK (page 46-47). The report notes exercise FREEWAY QUIZ, a scenario which "portrayed the simulated unauthorized flight of a C-130 aircraft by unknown persons from Chuan Kang Air Base in Taiwan (page 227).
Only Continued Pressure, Combined With Inducements, Can Bring End to North Korean Nuclear Program
by Aaron L. Friedberg March 21st, 2006
Aaron L. Friedberg, an East Asian expert who served as Vice President Dick Cheney's deputy national security adviser from 2003 to 2005, says North Korea has boycotted new talks on ending its nuclear arms program because of the U.S. program of cracking down on North Korean counterfeiting and other illicit activities. But Friedberg says such pressure is the only way to hope for a breakthrough.
Critics of the Bush administration have said that after reaching this agreement in principle in September, it has backed away; that the crackdown on the counterfeiting was linked somehow to the talks, knowing that North Korea would react very negatively. Do you think there's much substance to that?
I think that criticism is unfounded for deeper reasons. People have complained about the timing, and I know the official administration position is that these were not synchronized in any way. I think the official notification about the findings of this North Korean-linked bank in Macau accused of money-laundering was actually published several days before the agreement in principle at the six-party talks. So the argument that we got them to agree to something in principle and then slammed them a few days later is not right.
But the deeper question is whether we can get the North Koreans to agree to do what we want them to do without applying pressure. [Neocon] [Cheney] [Camouflage] [Pressure]
Taking Care of Business
by Bruce Klingner January 31st, 2006
Bruce Klingner, Korea analyst for Eurasia Group, the world's largest political-risk consultancy firm, writes "even if China could achieve a resumption of six-party talks - most likely by having Pyongyang agree to distinguish between the illegal actions of "rogue" North Korean companies and the government - the nuclear negotiations would remain deadlocked."
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1977
Nautilus Institute Military History Series Scott Bruce, Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Program Officer " The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
This history details the proposal to withdraw US troops from the ROK in 1977 including an explanation by the US Secretary of States for this policy and the response by the COMUS Korea including recommendations to offset the impact of the proposed troop withdrawal (pages 41-67). For more information on the attempted withdrawal of troops during the Cater administration see: U.S. Ground Force Withdrawal From Korea at: http://www.nautilus.org/foia/richwithdrawl.html. The history details all US Operation Plans in the Pacific, their status, and the date they were last altered (pages 133-140). The report details the crash of a CH-47 Chinook helicopter over the DMZ in June of 1977 (pages 194-196). The report describes the military exercises TEAM SPIRIT 77 noting the first incorporation of the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force into the exercise (pages 204-207) ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 77 (page 207). The history also describes discussions regarding international terrorism and plane hijacking (page 391).
North East Asia's Undercurrents of Conflict
by the International Crisis Group January 24th, 2006
The International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, multinational organization, that works through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict, write "resolving territorial and historical disputes that have been building for decades will not be easy or quick but failure at least to ameliorate them risks undermining the peace and prosperity of the region."
The "Sopranos State"? North Korean Involvement in Criminal Activity and Implications for International Security
by Sheena E. Chestnut January 17th, 2006
Sheena E. Chestnut, MPhil student in International Relations at Oxford University and graduate of Stanford University's International Security Studies honors program, writes "Although interdiction remains a useful counter-proliferation tool, the potentially multi-use nature of criminal networks suggests that interdiction is insufficient in addressing the risks of nuclear smuggling from North Korea... the effectiveness of this kind of deterrence may rest as much on a sophisticated understanding of North Korean participation in illicit networks as on the notorious difficulties of interdiction. For these reasons, identifying and limiting North Korean involvement in illicit activity must remain a key component of U.S. policy toward the D.P.R.K."
Risks and Hopes for N.E. Asia Peace
by Ruediger Frank
January 17th, 2006
Ruediger Frank, Professor of East Asian Political Economy at the University of Vienna, writes "there is both a high risk of conflict as well as a good chance for progress on the Korean Peninsula...The Korean government therefore has a chance to actively shape the Northeast Asian future by its efforts toward North Korea, and it can utilize regional dynamics to support its policy toward the DPRK. Maintaining a proper relationship with the United States appears to be of key importance for either task." [Neutrality] [In denial] [US NK policy]
New Global Disclosure Release Reveals State Department's Role in Reversing US Withdrawal from South Korea in Mid-Seventies
Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs, 1981-82 Read the report. Robert G. Rich, "U.S. Ground Force Withdrawal From Korea: A Case Study in National Security Decision Making", Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs, 1981-82. This case study is taken from an Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs that was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act. Other papers from this series will be released shortly. The tug-of-war between different hardline policy currents over US policy towards the DPRK is well known in Washington DC. The subject of insider newsletters, it is also displayed openly in the American media as the regime transformationalist current competes head-on with the pragmatic engagement current for presidential and congressional support, most obviously in media leaks and counter-leaks aimed at spinning the latest news.
Robert G. Rich presents an insider's view (from the Korea Desk) on the bureaucratic stratagems used to reverse President Carter policy of withdrawing the Second Infantry Division from Korea in the mid-seventies [Withdrawal] [Carter] [Misinformation] [Threat]
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1978
This history details the slowdown of plans to withdraw US troops from the ROK in 1978 (pages 47-61). It also details the provision of aircraft, tanks, and other defense and weapons systems to the ROK in preparation for the withdrawal (pages 424-445). For more information on the attempted withdrawal of troops during the Cater administration see: U.S. Ground Force Withdrawal From Korea at: http://www.nautilus.org/foia/richwithdrawl.html. The report contains an assessment of the DPRK threat to the ROK including information on DPRK tunneling, infiltration activities, and changed to the Ground Order of Battle (GOB) of DPRK forces (pages 101-110). The report details the TEAM SPIRIT 78 (page 227 - 232) and ULCHI FOCUS LENS (page 232 - 235) exercises. [Joint US military]
A Better Korea Strategy
by David Kang December 22th, 2005
David Kang , associate professor of government, adjunct associate professor and research director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, and co-author of Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, writes "The United States can improve its position in East Asia, as well as solidify its alliance with South Korea, by widening its focus beyond North Korean denuclearization and coming out strongly and enthusiastically in favor of Korean unification." [Friction] [US Korea policy] [Strategic incoherence][Partisan]
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1979
December 21st, 2005 Nautilus Institute Military History Series
This history details the end of plans to withdraw US troops from the ROK in 1979 after a reassessment of North Korean military strength (pages 41-46). For more information on the attempted withdrawal of troops during the Cater administration see: U.S. Ground Force Withdrawal From Korea at: http://www.nautilus.org/foia/richwithdrawl.html. The assessment of the DPRK military is available on pages 100-108. This report also details the US withdrawal of troops from Taiwan and the disestablishment of the Taiwan Defense Command (page 49 and the Appendix: Taiwan WrapUp). The history details North Korean attempts to tunnel underneath the DMZ and assesses "counter-tunnel operations" (page 98). The report also notes US military reaction to the assassination of ROK President Park Chung-Hee (pages 216-217). The report describes the military exercises TEAM SPIRIT 79 (pages 253-257) ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 79 (pages 257-258), and COPE JADE 1-80 (pages 258-259). The report notes that FOAL EAGLE 80 had to be canceled because of political instability in the ROK following the assassination of Park Chung-Hee (page 259).
Bring the Proliferation Security Initiative Into the UN
by Mark J. Valencia
December 20th, 2005 I. Introduction Mark J. Valencia, Maritime Policy Analyst and Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, writes "Most of the PSI's shortcomings stem from its ad-hoc, extra-UN, US-driven nature. Bringing it into the UN system would rectify many of these shortcomings by loosening US control, enhancing its legitimacy, and engendering near universal support."
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an activity initiated by the Bush Administration to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems and related materials from reaching or leaving states or sub-state actors of proliferation concern. Reflecting the Bush Administration's disdain for the UN, it was conceived, originated and implemented outside the UN system. However, despite some early success, the PSI seems to have reached a plateau and suffers from serious shortcomings that can be resolved by the exact opposite--bringing the activity into the UN system. The main focus of the PSI has been on interdictions of ships carrying WMD-related materials to or from targeted countries like North Korea, Libya, Iran, the Sudan, Syria and Cuba. [PSI][In denial] [Proliferation] [Imperialism] [Camouflage] [Double standards]
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1980
The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
This report notes that, after incidents of civil unrest in the ROK such as the Kwang-ju incident, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that CINCPAC "improve combat capabilities" not just to respond to an infiltration or attack by North Korea but also to be prepared in case of the "complete breakdown of internal order in the ROK". CINCPAC considered the request and determined that it was not appropriate to revise OPLAN 5027 to include a "response to ROK civil unrest" (page 44). The history contains an assessment of the North Korean threat to the ROK (page 73). It details Presidential Directive 59 that modified US nuclear weapons strategy to target Soviet military targets rather than Soviet cities (page 138-139). The report notes attempts to better integrate unconventional warfare and special operations in to operations like OPLAN 5000, 5001 and 5027 (page 204-206). The report notes the exercise PRIZE GAUNTLET 80 which focuses on "trans- and post- nuclear attack procedures" in which a "strategic nuclear exchange occurred early in the exercise" (pages 206-207). Also included is a summary of TEAM SPIRIT 80, ULCHI-FOCUS LENS 80, FOAL EAGLE 81, and CODE JADE (pages 207-222). [Nuclear weapons] [Spin] [[Joint US military]
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1981
This report compares the ROK and DPRK ground, naval, and air forces (page 73-76). The history also assesses DPRK infiltration and tunneling activities (pages 77-78). The report contains an update on OPLANS (page 121-128) as well as information on the revisions of OPLANs 5027, 5000 and 5001 in 1981 (page 129) and an assessment of the military's ability to execute those OPLANs (pages 217-219). The report describes Nuclear Contingency Planning System duties (pages 187-188). The report describes an incident where North Korean forces fired a Surface to Air Missile at a US SR-71 surveillance aircraft. US forces charged the DPRK with an "unprovoked missile attack" while the DPRK maintained that the SR-71 had "intruded North Korean airspace" (pages 275-276). TEAM SPIRIT 81 is described on pages 293-297 and 351-352. 1981 was the first year in which chemical defense was incorporated into both ground and air force operations. FOAL EAGLE 82 included counterinfultration operations and "3 mobile strike force operations which simulated reaction against a North Korean command attack against U.S and ROK airfields; an 'Entebbe-type' rescue operation of hostages at Kimhae AFB... and a survival, evasion, resistance, escape and recovery exercise on Cheju-do" (page 298). POTENT PUNCH 81 used a scenario where "all intelligence indicators displayed North Korea forces preparing for an attack on along traditional invasion corridors" (page 299).
The North Korean Criminal State, its Ties to Organized Crime, and the Possibility of WMD Proliferation
by David L. Asher November 15th, 2005
David L. Asher, Adjunct Scholar, Institute for Defense Analyses, Coordinator, North Korea Working Group and Senior Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, wrote: "The North must cease its dealings with trans-national organized criminals, its illicit export of weapons, its nuclear reprocessing, its threats to engage in nuclear proliferation, etc. Instead it should accept the extremely reasonable terms the US, with the others parties in the talks, have offered for promoting a positive and peaceful transformation of relations in the context of full denuclearization." [Bizarre] [Black] [Double standards][Drugs] [Proliferation] [Counterfeiting]
Stabilized Democracy in Mongolia in 2005
by Jeong-jin Lee November 10th, 2005 Jeong-jin Lee, wrote the following paper for the IFES Forum, noting: "Since it established a democratic constitution in 1992, Mongolia has shown peaceful transfers of power in four parliamentary elections and four presidential elections... However, the citizens did not give the power to any one group for a long time... After experiencing the governance of both groups for 14 years, the citizens chose a balanced government in 2004. Such peaceful and stabilized transfers of power show that procedural democracy has been established in Mongolia."
Land of the Rising Khan: Moving the US Forward on a Mongolia Action Plan
by Stephen E. Noerper
November 8th, 2005
Stephen E. Noerper, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate and former director of the Nautilus Institute's Washington, DC office, wrote: "Mongolia also stands as a potential harbinger of democracy and transition from a Stalinist economy to North Korea - a mere 1800 miles away. Though the regime of Kim Jong-il has no ready inclination to discuss Mongolia's political model, it has expressed continued interest in how Mongolia had transitioned to free market capitalism and privatized eighty percent of once state-held assets." [Economic reforms]
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1983
This report notes the strength of North Korean military forces (page 105) and an assessment of the military balance between the ROK and DPRK on the peninsula (page 106). A discussion of the 1983 Rangoon assassination attempt on ROK President Chun Doo Hwan that killed 17 ROK nationals including 4 cabinet members (pages 215-217, 413-416). The application of the Air-Land battle concept to the ROK (page 279). The report notes the COMUSKOREA response to a Joint Chief of Staff peacetime Rules of Engagement document which noted that "According to the Armistice Period ROE, CINCCFC could undertake military action necessary to deter acts of external aggression against the ROK. However, a literal interpretation of the draft JCS ROE seemed to prohibit this response when the element of necessity or present danger did not exist" (page 281-282). The report features a detailed assessment of TEAM SPIRIT 83 (pages 365-375), COPE JADE a air defense and offensive exercise (pages 375-376), and SNARE 83 a short notice, combat-readiness drill (page 376). The history notes details on the downing of KAL flight 007 by the Soviets in November 1983 (page 401-413). The report notes OPLAN 5027 refinement in 1983 (pages 447-450). Finally the report has an assessment of the legal issues in ULCHI-FOCUS LENS involving issues like "the use of chemical weapons", the "impact of USCINCPAC OPLAN 5027", and the "mining of North Korean harbors" (page 770).
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1984
October 5th, 2005 Nautilus Institute Military History Series Scott Bruce, Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure Program Officer
This report contains an assessment of North Korean intentions and capabilities as well as North Korean military deployment and redeployment (pages 69-74). A proposal for tripartite peace talks between the ROK, US, and DPRK in 1984 (pages 229-232). This report notes information on TEAM SPIRIT 84 (page 442, 555-557) with a detailed assessment of the exercise on pages 863-866. The report contains notes on the Panmunjom firefight that occurred after a Russian national attempted to defect through the JSA (page 486-488). The report discussed chemical operations as part of ULCHI FOCUS LENS noting "USCINCPAC considered it extremely important that we continue to press for the full evaluation of our combined chemical operations and logistical procedures... It appeared to him that any unwillingness to see chemical retaliation through to the ultimate conclusion of ceasing chemical hostilities might give our ROK allies a false impression of our resolve" (page 446-447, details 870-873). The report features a few details on the NIGHT TRAIN 84 plan (page 849). [Joint US military] [WMD] [CBW]
Commander in Chief US Pacific Command History 1991
The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
This report contains an update of the status on all USCINCPAC Operations Plans (page 83). The report notes the ordered evaluation of the contribution of Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF) "as they related to deterrence and warfighting strategy" (page 90). The report also summarizes the 1991 Nuclear and Chemical Force Initiatives (page 90-93). The dissolving of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSA) is discussed in this command history (page 103). The report notes that OPLAN 5027-88 "was not supportable" because of Operation Desert Storm. "The ability of CFC to executive successfully Phase I of the plan, the defense of Seoul, was severely reduced, and the ability to execute a counteroffensive under Phase II was virtually denied" (Page 102-103). The report includes notes on military training exercises, FOCUS CLEAR 91, TEAM SPIRIT 91, planning for TEAM SPIRIT 92, FOCUS LENS 91, FOAL EAGLE 91, and other exercises in Japan, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, and the greater Pacific area (page 161-166). [Joint US military]
South Korea's Power Play at the Six-Party Talks
East Asia Science and Security Collaborative Special Report
July 21st, 2005
Peter Hayes, David von Hippel, Jungmin Kang, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Richard Tanter, and Scott Bruce, members of the Nautilus Institute's East Asian Science and Security Collaborative (EASSC), wrote: "The participants at the six-party talks should consider the full scope of activities needed to implement the South Korean scheme; that they should explore an alternative approach that would link the Russian and South Korean grids, thereby achieving the same outcome at lower cost and lesser political risk; and that the six parties should consider adopting a short-term, alternative package rather than resuming HFO deliveries to the DPRK because this approach would provide more energy services, faster, and at lower risk and cost to give immediate substance to statements of longer -term intention to supply assistance to the DPRK. We further suggest that these issues be explored with the North Koreans at the six-party talks at a subsequent technical working group before major commitments are made to proceeding with the South Korean proposal.
Drifting into the Six Party Talks?
By Peter Hayes and Scott Bruce July 19th, 2005
Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, and Scott Bruce, the Nautilus Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, wrote: "In short, bad intentions and bad faith can only breed further mistrust, accelerate nuclear proliferation in the region, and extend the frozen cold war in Korea indefinitely into the future. The DPRK case shows once again that strategic drift is not substitute for realistic policy when it comes to nuclear weapons."
Building Multi-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula
By the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) July 14th, 2005
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) released this final report from their Multilateral Workshop, held in Shanghai and cosponsored by the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), part of IFPA's Building Six-Party Capacity Project The report states: "Ultimately, it matters less exactly what form the capacity-building effort assumes. Instead the most important factor is that collective discussion be initiated and expanded among a wider range of functional activities, and preferably away from media attention and with minimal political interference."
Reframing the US-DPRK Conflict
By Erich Weingartner
July 12th, 2005
Erich Weingartner, Editor-in-Chief, CanKor Virtual ThinkNet on Korean Peace and Security (www.cankor.ca), wrote: "Re-framing is not an escape from reality. It is a conscious effort to return to reality. It requires communication, dialogue, learning and teaching, refusing to walk away when the going gets tough, engaging without illusion for the purpose of influencing outcomes. These may be viewed as very small steps, but this is a very long-term problem. And as we have learned from the six-party process, any step is better than no step at all.
Finger on the Button
By Bruce Klingner
June 21st, 2005 Bruce Klingner, Korea analyst for Eurasia Group, an independent research and consulting firm that provides global political risk analysis, wrote: "A test would remove the strategic ambiguity that allows Beijing and Seoul to avoid acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear state... A test would likely derail any potential diplomatic resolution to the nuclear impasse, encouraging a range of more aggressive US strategies."
U.S. Forces Korea / 8th U.S. Army 1980 Annual Historical Review: 1980
Sanctions
Collection of articles on sanctions
Reunification
Collection of articles on reunification
What Should US Do About North Korea?
By Jason T. Shaplen and James Laney April 27th, 2005
Jason T. Shaplen, Policy Adviser at the Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO) from 1995-1999, and James Laney, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea from 1993-1997, write: "In Iraq, we had the luxury of destroying the regime first to bring about the change we sought. In North Korea the opposite is true. We must engage the regime first to end and ultimately reverse its nuclear program. We must therefore hold our noses in seeking to bring the North into the world community, including securing its membership in security forums, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank etc."
U.S. Forces Korea / 8th U.S. Army 1981 Annual Historical Review: 1981
Nautilus Institute Military History Series
April 27th, 2005 The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests. This report contains details on the termination of martial law in the ROK in 1981 after 15 months in force following the assassination of President Park Chunghee in 1979. (Page 15). The first-time inclusion of NBC (Nuclear-Biological-Chemical) defense measures in Team Spirit 1981. (Pgs. 146-147). The eight Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections conducted in 1981. "Each inspected unit demonstrated a capability to accomplish its nuclear mission while providing a safe environment in accordance with approved publications and directives.
A New Foreign Policy Paradigm: Perspectives on the Role of South Korea as a Balancer
By Ruediger Frank April 25th, 2005
Ruediger Frank, Professor of East Asian Political Economy at the University of Vienna, writes: "The recent efforts of South Korea's president Roh Moo-hyun to establish the country not only as a mediator, but as a "balancing power in Northeast Asia to prevent possible disputes in the region" ... are an expression of the dissatisfaction with the progress made under the current arrangement and could be interpreted as a change of the Status quo that benefits Beijing at the expense of the alliance with Washington, which will nevertheless not be given up. Quite remarkably, this position of being an independent actor in international relations corresponds very well with the North Korean position and opens one more field of possible future cooperation of both Koreas."
U.S. Tries New Tack in Pursuing Interests, Stability in East Asia
By Bruce Klingner April 19th, 2005
Bruce Klingner, an Asia analyst at Eurasia Group, an independent research and consulting firm that provides global political risk analysis, writes: "Pyongyang will calibrate its strategy to take advantage of the divisive political landscape and seek to further isolate the US from South Korea and Japan from South Korea...Such efforts collectively undermine US objectives to present a unified negotiating position to Pyongyang as well as any future attempts to garner international support for stronger measures. "
The Folly of Forcing Regime Change
By Kenneth Lieberthal March 22nd, 2005
This is an excerpt. A full world wide web version of the entire report Kenneth Lieberthal is a professor of political science and of business administration at the University of Michigan, and is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was special assistant to the US president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, 1998-2000. Kenneth Lieberthal writes: "North Korea is both morally repugnant and a maddening adversary in negotiations. But simply going through the motions of negotiation in the hope that regime change will somehow happen enhances Kim Jong-Il's opportunity to develop and proliferate nuclear capabilities."
The North Korean Crisis
Desaix Anderson March 17th, 2005
The following is text of a speech given on March 8, 2005 by Desaix Anderson at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.
Desaix Anderson writes: "Kim Jong Il has repeatedly claimed, again last week, that North Korea seeks a solution that would eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons programs in exchange for ending U.S. hostility. Given the stakes, the U.S. is irresponsible not to test Kim's real intentions by serious negotiations."
Washington's handling of the North Korean issue has put the United States at serious odds with all its allies and partners in the region - South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. All have repeatedly urged the U.S. to pursue serious negotiations with the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), but U.S. performance has not matched their hopes or expectations.
The Structure of North Korea's Political Economy: Changes and Effects
By Young-Sun Lee and Deok Ryong Yoon March 15th, 2005
Young-Sun Lee, Professor of Economics at Yonsei University, and Deok Ryong Yoon, research fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KEIP), write: "To make sure that North Korea does not return to its past state, more people must continue to show interest in the market system development in the North. Investment in various forms will help enlarge the basement for international cooperation as well." [Economic reform]
Allow Two Nukes For North Korea
By Hy-Sang Lee March 10th, 2005 Hy-Sang Lee, emeritus professor of the University of Wisconsin and author of North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress, writes: "Under a settlement allowing a two-bomb scarecrow strategy... Pyongyang would be committing suicide if the bombs would be used in a first strike (inviting an obliterating retaliation), and this scarecrow strategy would be rendered precarious if one of the bombs would be sold. Hence, the two-bomb settlement is a second best option which still would respect the red line of the United States."
The North Korea Nuclear Issue and Inter-Korean Relations: Prospects and South Korea's Corresponding Strategy
By Yang Moo-Jin March 3rd, 2005
Yang Moo-Jin, Professor at Kyungnam University's Graduate School of North Korea Studies, writes: "Peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula depend primarily on the efforts of the two Koreas. The situation could be positive or negative according to how they manage it. The year 2005 is very meaningful for both South and North, since it is their 60th year of Independence, and the 5th year of the June 15 Joint Declaration. This year, I expect that we will be able to settle peace on the peninsula more firmly through economic development, improvement of the South-North relationship, and resolution of the North Korea nuclear problem."
Reading North Korean Ruins
By Soyoung Kwon and Glyn Ford (MEP) February 24th, 2005
Dr. Soyoung Kwon, post-doctorate fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center of Stanford University, and Glyn Ford, member of the Korean Peninsula Delegation in the European Parliament, write: "security and the economy are North Korea's two top priorities. North Korea knows that the two are closely intertwined and that economic reforms cannot be pushed forward unless security issues are resolved..... For those who favor a changing regime rather than regime change the message is clear. Now is the time to engage."
Boycott or Business?
By Aidan Foster-Carter January 27th, 2005 Aidan Foster-Carter, senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds, writes: "The current stasis in inter-Korean ties partly reflects the fact that right now North Korea is no mood to talk seriously to anyone about anything. But there are also specific aspects to this always distinctive relationship between two halves of a divided land... One is the refugee issue... The other is the one field of cooperation that Pyongyang is still keen on, doubtless because there is money in it. The first goods made by an ROK firm in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) - saucepans, as it happens - hit the stores in Seoul just in time for Christmas, and sold out in two days. So maybe an otherwise bleak New Year is not wholly without hope after all."
Waiting Game
By Scott Snyder January 25th, 2005 Scott Snyder, Senior Associate, Pacific Forum CSIS/The Asia Foundation, writes: "It is still premature to say that the six-party process is dead, but the lengthy pause raises some dilemmas for all parties concerned. The challenges for Chinese diplomacy may be the most interesting and complex.
Democracy and National Security in South Korea: The Song Du Yol Affair
By Kajimura Tai'ichiro Kajimura Tai'ichiro, an independent Japanese journalist, human rights activist, and historian, long resident in Berlin, writes: "The South Korean media pronounced him [Song Du Yol] the 'biggest ever catch' under the web of this anti-communist law. Yet at the same time his fate was seen as inseparable from that of this legislation, so that the moment when he is eventually found not guilty is likely also to be the moment when the life of the National Security Law comes to an end." [human rights] [National Security Law]
"2nd Infantry Division Annual Historical Review: 1987
Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.-ROK Relations
By Balbina Y. Hwang January 18th, 2005 Balbina Y. Hwang, Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, writes: "The United States has much to gain from maintaining its formal alliance with the Republic of Korea, as well as the broader bilateral relationship. However, to do so, both sides must work to overcome the serious gap in public perception that has emerged in recent years."
2004 Was a Difficult Year. Will 2005 Be Any Better?
By Jon Wolfsthal January 13th, 2005 Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director for Non-Proliferation at Carnegie, writes: "If North Korea's nuclear program cannot be eliminated, then the other members of the six party talks will have a difficult 2005and beyond. Can South Korea accept a nuclear neighbor to the North and if not, what will it do to respond over the long term? This is the questions that will increasingly occupy the minds of American experts in the years to come unless 2005 surprises many and leads to a negotiated end to North Korea's nuclear program."
19th Support Command, Annual Historical Review: 1st October 1982 to 30th September 1983
Prepared by MAJ R. D. Foote, Command Historian
Failure or success of a hybrid system?
By Ruediger Frank February 10th, 2005 Ruediger Frank, Professor of East Asian Political Economy at the University of Vienna, writes: "those who regard a strengthened market system in North Korea as beneficial are well advised to increase the total supply of food. Here, THEY can catch two birds with one stone: improve the humanitarian situation AND support a gradual transformation - with the goal of regional security and stability, not regime change per se." [Economic reform]
2nd Infantry Division Annual Historical Review: 1986
Who Will Stop Nuclear Next Use?
Nautilus Institute Scenarios Workshop Final Report 2004 December 24th, 2004 The Nautilus Institute is pleased to release the Final Report for its 2004 Scenarios Workshop, held in Berkeley, California from April 27th to the 28th, 2004. "Most felt that some nuclear attack (involving at least radiological weapons) is a near certainty over the next two decades, but that a full-scale exchange is avoidable," concluded participants in the Nautilus Institute's 2004 Scenarios Workshop. Representatives from government, civil society, media, artists, military, and universities, from the US, Canada, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and South Korea contributed to this exploration of the uncertainties underlying and opportunities for reducing the risk of nuclear war.
North Korea: 2005 Outlook
By Brent Choi December 23rd, 2004 rent Choi, a North Korea Specialist at the the Joongang Daily in the ROK, writes: "By the end of 2005 Kim [Jong-Il] must improve ties with the U.S. through resolving the nuclear crisis and induce Japanese capital to his state. At home he must re-organize his ruling party and establish a strong basis to revive its economy by promoting investment from Japan and other countries. But if Kim fails to address those problems in timely manner he will not only be heir-less but also under serious military threat from the outside. Time is definitely not on his side."
"19th Support Command, Annual Historical Review: 1st October 1983 to 31st December 1984"
Prepared by MAJ R. D. Foote, Command Historian The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
Eighth United States Army Chronology:
"Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 January to 31 June, 1967" "Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 July to 31 December, 1967" Staff Historians Office, Headquarters, US Army The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these quarterly histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
The New Image of Kim Jong-il: The First Step towards a New Leadership Model
By Ruediger Frank November 19th, 2004
A probably more realistic option originates from my attitude as optimist concerning North Korea's reform process (or adaptation, to use the official expression). As such, I suggest looking into the future of a changing North Korea. In earlier posts, I have insisted that the economic reforms are for real and that ideology is being changed as well (see http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0331_Frank.html and http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/transition/Ruediger_Socialism.html). So what happens if the current policy is successful, if private economic activities blossom, economic cooperation with South Korea and Japan develops, the conflict with the U.S. is resolved peacefully, the standard of living rises and orthodox socialism is replaced by dynamic nationalism as the predominant ideology? The sense of individuality will increase. Military tension will be reduced. The readiness to risk the own life and (growing) private property will reach alarmingly low levels, while the wish for political participation will become stronger. Problems such as corruption will aggravate, and provoke a public reaction. The leadership will have to bear the consequences, which includes the option of resignation. A single leader, which is a characteristic of the old system, does neither fit with the new vision of a reformed socialism, nor with its reality. If the single leader resigns, the system collapses. If he doesn't, social unrest will be the result.
Why APEC Still Matters"
By Edward J. Lincoln November 18th, 2004
Mongolia's New Strategic Vision
By Steve Noerper November 16th, 2004 Given its NWFZ status, transition from a Stalinist economy, and 'low frequency broadcast' of democracy, Mongolia is seeking to position itself as a more relevant regional player."
Eighth United States Army Chronology
: 1 January to 31 June, 1968" "Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 July to 31 December, 1968" Staff Historian's Office, Headquarters, US Army
The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing these quarterly histories two volumes a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
We Had Power to Prevent N. Korea from Going Nuclear
By Peter D. Zimmerman
NANJING, China -Senior Chinese nuclear scientists attending an international arms control meeting in this ancient capital city, as well as senior officials and scholars in Beijing, express significant fears over the twin developments on Taiwan and in South Korea. Both countries have been caught red-handed producing enriched uranium or plutonium which can be used in nuclear weapons. Both countries are also a long way from being able to build atomic weapons. But the same Chinese scientists are even more worried about the failure of the Six Party Talks intended to end the North Korean nuclear program. They do not want yet another nuclear power on their borders; Russia and India are enough.
The question most frequently asked in Chinese scientific circles is whether the Six Party Talks, including North and South Korea, Russia, Japan, China and the United States have any chance to succeed. These are the talks of which George W. Bush appears to be so proud because he is reaching out to "form a coalition." My Chinese counterparts point out that the dispute over a nuclear North Korea, formally called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK, does not involve four of the six parties. Early on North Korea cast the issue as a simple one between the United States and itself, and it has stuck to that formula.
What North Korea wants, and the Chinese impressed this on me most strongly, is some kind of normal relations with the United States along with a pledge that the United States will not invade the DPRK. In principle, these should have been easy for the United States to grant. Diplomatic recognition does not state that the United States approves of a government; it merely says that we acknowledge that the government controls a specific piece of land, and that we will talk to that government should problems arise.
Colin Powell's Agenda in China
By John J. Tkacik Jr November 2nd, 2004 John J. Tkacik Jr, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., writes: "In these important foreign-policy matters, a candid, clear dialogue between Washington and Beijing is essential if both sides are to avoid stumbling into a crisis."
During his visit to Asia this week, Colin Powell can expect Chinese leaders to speak bluntly, and the U.S. secretary of state will need to speak plainly in return. What is most needed is a frank discussion about China's relations with North Korea, Taiwan and Japan. First, Mr. Powell should warn Beijing that its political, economic and military support for North Korea in its quest for a nuclear weapons capability belies Beijing's claims that China values a denuclearized Korean peninsula. Second, Mr. Powell will need to remind Beijing's leaders that the level of U.S. arms sales and military exchanges with Taiwan are linked to the level of threat China poses to Taiwan. And finally, Mr. Powell must caution China not to test America's commitment to Tokyo with illegal incursions into Japanese waters.
Power Grid Interconnection for a Nuclear Free Korean Peninsula
By Jungmin Kang November 4th, 2004 Jungmin Kang, an independent nuclear policy analyst in Seoul and Associate of the Nautilus Institute, writes: "Via the implementation of the ROK-DPRK-RFE power grid interconnection, the energy support to the DPRK could get the DPRK involved in the multilateral energy cooperation system, reduce political tension around the Korean peninsula, and thereby bring a positive effect in resolving the DPRK nuclear conundrum."
Migration
By G. Pascal Zachary November 5th, 2004
. Pascal Zachary, the author of The Diversity Advantage: Multicultural Identity in the New World Economy, writes: "the influence of migrants is not limited to themselves.... In short, migrants have a "multiplier effect" and it is only by understanding the broader social reality of migrants that we can begin to understand their actual influence."
"Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 July to 31 December, 1969"
Staff Historian's Office, Headquarters, US Army The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing a volume from these quarterly histories one a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
North Korea: Consider What We Don't Know
By Daniel Poneman October 26th, 2004 Daniel Poneman, member of the National Security Council staff under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, writes: "if...we defer tackling the plutonium threat while waiting for the North Koreans to admit to the world that they have been lying about their uranium program, the odds are that we will confront tragedy before we receive truth." [HEU] [Admission]
Debaters Bungled Korea
By Ralph Cossa October 20th, 2004
The South Korean Laser Isotope Separation Experience
By Mark Gorwitz October 18th, 2004
Mark Gorwitz, Special Contributor to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) Online, writes: "Taken as a whole, the open literature shows the extent of South Korean research in the area of laser isotope separation. Technology learned in one enrichment program has been successfully transferred to another. The undeclared uranium enrichment experiments have been the main beneficiary of such a transfer and are a proliferation concern that deserves to be thoroughly examined by the IAEA."
Eighth United States Army Chronology
"Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 January to 31 June, 1970" "Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 July to 31 December, 1970" Staff Historian's Office, Headquarters, US Army The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing a volume from these quarterly histories one a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
Policy Recommendations For Japan: Unification Of The Korean Peninsula
By Hideki Yamaji October 13th, 2004 The following is an except from a paper by Hideki Yamaji, 2003-2004 Japan Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. Mr. Yamaji writes: "Japan will need the U.S. military presence for a long time in order to build a lasting trust with the ROK, but definitely not forever. Some day in the future, Japan and the ROK will be able to form an 'axis of freedom and democracy' in East Asia."
Three major findings are discussed in this paper. First, the ROK-led unified Korea allied with the United States serves the best interests of Japan. Second, North Korean nuclear weapon programs work against Japanese long-term interests on the Korean peninsula, as well as its short- to mid-term interests. Third, Japan should continue to focus on the security triangle among Japan, the ROK and the United States to secure its long-term interests on the Korean peninsula. These findings endorse the basic policy approach of the current Japanese government
Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues
by Mark E. Manyin October 12th, 2004 The following is an except from a report by Mark E. Manyin, Analyst in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service. The report states that: "in recent years, Members of Congress have monitored the course of North Korea-Japan relations because Japan plays a potentially critical role in addressing the military threat posed by North Korea, particularly its nuclear weapons program."
The Transformation Of South Korean Politics: Implications For U.S.-Korea Relations
by Sook-Jong Lee October 5th, 2004
The following is an except from a paper by Sook-Jong Lee, Korea Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. Dr. Lee writes: "Under these circumstances, it is imperative for the leadership in the U.S. and South Korea to take a long term view of the alliance. By avoiding excessive politicization, both governments should be able to redefine their alliance relationship in a way that suits their individual as well as mutual national interests."
Bush's Hardline Approach to NK is Producing No Results
by Harry Sterling September 30th, 2004 The following is a paper by Harry Sterling, a former diplomat and Ottawa-based commentator. Sterling writes: "It's important for President Bush to face up to the fact that he too must be willing to be more pragmatic in dealing with North Korea if the nuclear controversy is to be resolved peacefully."
Eighth United States Army Chronology:
"Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 January to 31 June, 1971" "Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 July to 31 December, 1971" Staff Historian's Office, Headquarters, US Army
Threatening Gestures as Cries for Help? Questioning an Overly Fixed Image of North Korea
by Lutz Drescher September 23rd, 2004 This is an essay by Lutz Drescher. Drescher, lived as an ecumenical worker in the ROK from 1987 to 1995. Since 2001, he works for the Association of Churches and Missions in Southwest Germany (EMS) as liaison secretary for East Asia. He has participated in numerous meetings with representatives of the North Korean Christian Federation. He coordinated the first official Visit of an EKD (Evangelical Church Germany) delegation to the DPRK in May 2002. The essay states "there is thus freedom of religion, and yet it is a restricted freedom insofar as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not a democratic country with individual rights of liberty in the Western sense. One can say that the members of the church in North Korea live out their faith under particularly harsh conditions. For precisely this reason, they depend on our intercessions and visits."
The Student Movement in South Korea
By Vincent Brandt July 30, 1987
Cooperative Verified Dismantlement of Nuclear Programs: An Eye Toward North Korea
This is an except from a report by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). The report states "because this type of verification task is unprecedented, it is now necessary to design a verifiable dismantlement procedure that takes the steps necessary to create a transparent dismantlement process and ensure that a proliferant state cannot reconstitute the enrichment program without timely detection by the international community."
Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 July to 31 June, 1972
Staff Historian's Office, Headquarters, US Army The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing a volume from these quarterly histories one a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
The North Korea Nuclear Issue: The Road Ahead
by Robert J. Einhorn September 14th, 2004 The following is a paper by Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation in 1999 to August 2001. Einhorn writes: "if the North Koreans have decided they must have a substantial nuclear weapons capability whatever we may do (hardly a remote possibility), they would likely reject a reasonable offer. In that event, the next U.S. administration would have little choice but to turn to a longer-term strategy of pressure, containment, and eventual rollback. But having made a proposal that North Korea's neighbors considered fair and balanced, we would be in a stronger position to gain multilateral support for that strategy."
Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula
by the CSIS Working Group August 24th, 2002 This is an except from a group report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The report states "although the North has no real prospect of prevailing in an armed conflict with the South, it nonetheless maintains the offensive capability to hold the Republic of Korea (ROK), and especially Seoul, hostage to the threat of a massive, short-warning attack that could inflict an unacceptable level of damage. This conventional arms threat, which provides Pyongyang with leverage in any crisis or confrontation with the United States or South Korea, should be addressed in upcoming talks among the United States, the ROK, and the DPRK."
South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects
Mark E. Manyin Congressional Research Service August 19th, 2004
Eighth United States Army Chronology: 1 January to 30 June, 1973
The Nautilus Institute Global Disclosure / Freedom of Information Act Project will be publishing a volume from these quarterly histories once a month. These histories from US service or unified commands in the Pacific were released to Nautilus under US Freedom of Information Act requests.
Another Engagement Strategy For North Korea
This is an excerpt from a paper by Marta J. Bailey, a Department of the Army civilian who works at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters in the Leader Development and Education Directorate. This paper was initially written for a National War College course titled Fundamentals of Strategic Logic taught by Dr. David Auerswald and COL Dave Knack. Students were asked to propose a national security strategy that considered ends, ways, means, and consequences for a selected country. The expanded version of the paper won the "National War College 2004 Dean of Faculty and Academic Affairs Award for Excellence in Research and Writing." Dr. Michael Mazarr served as faculty advisor. Bailey argues that, "keeping North Korea coming to the table and maintaining a cohesive alliance with the regional partners is in itself important. Ultimately, it is the parallel passage of time, North Korea's continued interactions with other countries, and eventual change in leadership that will facilitate the achievement of long term goals. The key is not to let North Korea disrupt our overall strategic regional goals for Asia."
Moody's Parallel Universe on North Korea's Nukes
This policy forum essay is by Ian Bremmer, the President of the Eurasia Group and Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute. Bremmer argues that, "far from being aligned in a strategy to put pressure on Kim's rogue regime, unilateral initiatives by the U.S.'s two allies at the negotiating table are undermining the prospects for a diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear issue."
U.S. Troop Withdrawals and Self-Reliant Defense
This essay by Taik-young Hamm, Professor of Political Science at Kyungnam University and Advisor to the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, discusses the US troop withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula and its implications for the ROK. Prof. Hamm writes, "the current asymmetric ROK-U.S. alliance structure is excessive, as is the South Korean mentality of dependence on the United States for security. South Korean citizens and government alike need to overcome this latter neurosis, while the government additionally must foster self-reliant defense posture and doctrine, diplomacy skills, and an effective indigenous 'crisis management' system rather than undertake simple arms buildups with an enlarged defense budget."
July 15, 2004 Introduction It has been fifty years since the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and the U.S.-ROK alliance is at a crucial turning point. While the United States appears to seek to transform it into a regional alliance aimed at the containment of China, South Korea desires a more equal alliance partnership--a military alliance limited to the security of the Korean peninsula. This change in interpretation of the alliance on the part of South Koreans cannot be labeled anti-Americanism or a weakening of "security consciousness." In the difficult times of the past, South Korea relied unconditionally on its alliance with the United States for national security. Now, however, Seoul understands the need to move on and pursue "quality" of security, something that includes military sovereignty and equality in the alliance partnership.
Eighth United States Army Chronology
: 1 January to 30 June, 1974" Staff Historian's Office, Headquarters, US Army
Options For Rehabilitation of Energy System & Energy Security & Energy Planning in DPR of Korea"
by the DPRK Delegation
July 22th, 2004
This report by the DPRK delegation was presented at the Nautilus Institute's Asian Energy Security Workshop in Beijing, China from May 12th to the 14th, 2004. The report states, "the most important task for the sustainable development of the economy is to realize the rehabilitation of existing energy systems and to ensure its long-term safety in the DPRK." The overall objective of the energy sector - an increase in production of domestic resources with improved demand side management and environmental sustainability - is subject to a lack of funding and technology. Policy priorities focus on the establishment of "an efficient, stable and sustainable system.
Implications of Indian and/or Japanese Nuclear Proliferation for U.S. Defense Policy Planning
By R. M. Lawrence, W. R. Van Cleave, and S. E. Young, Strategic Studies Center, January 1974
This study project was prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency and released to the Nautilus Institute Under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Iran, North Korea, and Libya are all suspected or have acknowledged their pursuit of a nuclear deterrent. In this context, this report written by the Strategic Studies Center only a few months before India would test its first nuclear weapon, is particularly significant. The report considers proliferation in Japan and India in the context of the impact that these states going nuclear would have on the balance of power in Asia.
"The study indicates that the interest in nonproliferation [in India and Japan] is subordinate to most of the other interests..." [page 3]. The report concludes that US policy on Indian and/or Japanese nuclear proliferation should be based on whether, "proliferation occur[s] in the Asian-Pacific Theater in a way that will alter the balance of power leading to U.S. inferiority or enhance the balance and thus contribute to political stability among the super- and near superpowers." [page 11]
North Korea's Military Strategy
by Homer Hodge July 20th, 2004
This special report by Homer Hodge, Senior Intelligence Officer for Asia at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in Charlottesville, Virginia, notes that, "North Korea's military strategy remains an offensive strategy designed to achieve reunification by force.... Therefore, regime survival depends on staying the course. Simply stated, Pyongyang cannot abandon its offensive military strategy."
In his book, The Origins of Major War, Dale Copeland sets forth a strong argument that a state facing irreversible economic decline but still possessing military power vis-à-vis a competing state may resort to preventive war, especially if it perceives its own decline as deep and inevitable. One might counter by arguing that Pyongyang must know that it lacks any military superiority over the United States, which guarantees the defense of South Korea through the security treaty. This is no doubt true, as evidenced by the effective deterrence of a US military presence in South Korea for the past five decades. However, it is not so certain that Kim Jong Il judges South Korean military forces alone as superior to the KPA. North Korea's continued insistence that the question of reunification can be settled only among Koreans, and that the withdrawal of all foreign forces is essential to that process, suggests that Pyongyang would prefer to deal militarily with the South Korean army alone.
North Korea's military strategy remains an offensive strategy designed to achieve reunification by force. While the KPA has deployed forces to protect its coasts, airfields, and especially the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, the overall forward deployment of forces and, particularly, forward deployment of large numbers of long-range artillery underscore the offensive nature of its strategy.
Renunciation of reunification as its premier goal, shifting to a defensive military strategy, or dismantling of the military force to achieve it would gravely undermine the raison d'etre of the regime. North Korean leaders see the demise of the Soviet Union as primarily the result of Gorbachev's "New Thinking," which included the shift of the Soviet Union's military strategy to "defensive defense." Therefore, regime survival depends on staying the course. Simply stated, Pyongyang cannot abandon its offensive military strategy.
The North Korean Nuclear Challenge And American Interests: Getting The Priorities Right
By Avery Goldstein November 6, 2003 The paper below is by Avery Goldstein, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Goldstein argues that given the current efforts to address the North Korean nuclear challenge, it would be a strategic mistake of the first order to eschew an agreement that fails to guarantee a "nuclear-free North" as there are outcomes that fall short of this goal that will nevertheless serve important US interests.
U.S. Ground Force Withdrawal From Korea: A Case Study in National Security Decision Making
, Robert G. Rich, "Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs, 1981-82. Released under US Freedom of Information Act to Nautilus Institute.
September 29, 2003 The tug-of-war between different hardline policy currents over US policy towards the DPRK is well known in Washington DC. The subject of insider newsletters, it is also displayed openly in the American media as the regime transformationalist current competes head-on with the pragmatic engagement current for presidential and congressional support, most obviously in media leaks and counter-leaks aimed at spinning the latest news. As the United States prepares for the third round of multilateral talks with North Korea, it is useful to understand how conflict between contending policy currents toward Korea has played out in political and bureaucratic warfare in the past, especially when the fundamental policy direction set by the White House is problematic to the foreign policy establishment. Robert G. Rich presents an insider's view (from the Korea Desk) on the bureaucratic stratagems used to reverse President Carter policy of withdrawing the Second Infantry Division from Korea in the mid-seventies. Rich's case study shows how an alliance of senior State Department and Pentagon officials managed the process of policy implementation in a way that ultimately reversed presidential policy in the face of broad public support. The historical analogy with today's policy conflict is not exact-Carter's policy was crystal clear but was reversed during implementation by a closed bureaucratic consensus (note lack of leaks designed to embarrass President Jimmy Carter while the bureaucracy set about changing Carter's mind), whereas President George Bush's Korea policy is unclear, the bureaucracy is at odds over policy towards the DPRK, and the outcome will (or so it seems) be defined by appealing to public domestic and international constituencies in the process of implementation, thereby making up Bush's mind after rather than before the fact.
Diplomatic Fantasyland: The Illusion of a Negotiated Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis"
By Nicholas Eberstadt Wednesday, September 23, 2003 Nichoas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, argues that a negotiated settlement to the North Korean nuclear drama would be the most desirable outcome for all of the DPRK's neighbors. However, a diplomatic settlement resulting in a permanent and irreversible denuclearization is an exceedingly unlikely prospet. Eberstadt identifies three major obstacles to a peaceful diplomatic solution: Pyongyang's own nuclear intentions, he international precedents for other would-be proliferators that would be established by any deal that rewarded the DPRK, and Pyongyang's credibility as negotiation partners.
Hu Jintao writes to Kim Jong-il to open door to six-party talks
Hong Kong Economic Journal September 5, 2003 The six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis in Beijing in August were the hard-earned result of diplomatic efforts by Chinese President Hu Jintao, says an article under the pseudonym "Zong Hairen." Zong explained how Hu had finally persuaded North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to hold talks with the US, South Korea, Japan, Russia and China to resolve the nuclear issue. Zong said that Hu's shuttle diplomacy had given the new Chinese government a good international image, improved Sino-US relations, and won the trust of Kim Jong-il. Despite China's "dislike" of Kim Jong-il's government and the financial burden of granting more economic aid to North Korea, Zong said that it was a price worth paying in order to repel the infiltration of US influence in Northeast Asia. Zong predicted that the Korean nuclear issue would not trigger a war and would eventually be resolved at the negotiating table.
DPRK Puts Forward 'Package Of Solutions' To Nuclear Crisis
Korean Central News Agency September 5, 2003
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) has reported North Korea put forward "a package of solutions" to the nuclear issue during the six-party talks held in Beijing. The package solutions include the United States signing a non- aggression treaty with the DPRK, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the DPRK, a guarantee of DPRK-Japan and inter-Korean economic cooperation, and the completion of light-water reactors, the report said. It also said North Korea in return will not manufacture nuclear weapons, it will allow inspections, realize the ultimate dismantlement of nuclear facilities and stop the export and experimentation of missiles. The following is the text of the report in English by North Korean news agency KCNA
Designing Public Capital Mobilization Strategies for DPRK
by Bradley O. Babson July 6th, 2004 This special report by Bradley O. Babson, an Asian specialist and former World Bank official, was presented at the 2004 Workshop: "Towards a Peaceful Resolution with North Korea: Crafting a New International Engagement Framework" in Washington D.C. The workshop, which ran from February 12-13, 2004, was hosted by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and the Korea Economic Institute (KEI), in cooperation with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). In this presentation Babson gives an excellent summary of the methods of mobilizing capital for the DPRK. This presentation notes the intricacy of the relationship between political and economic issues in the DPRK. Babson also emphasizes the need for open dialogue between nations to support such an endeavour
Conference Diplomacy, All Over Again
by Nicholas Eberstadt July 6th, 2004 Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, compares the recent six-party talks in Beijing over the DPRK nuclear issue with "Conference Diplomacy" in the 1930s. Eberstadt writes that "'Conference Diplomacy' only came to an end when the escalating provocations of dictators awakened the sleepers, and shredded the last remaining illusions of the would-be appeasers."
Six-Party Talks: Round 3
by B. C. Koh July 1st, 2004
The following is a paper presented by B. C. Koh, Director of the Institute for Far-Eastern Studies. In this paper Mr. Koh argues that the change in both the US and the DPRK's position at the workshop was a repositioning, not a softening, of each countries stance. The United States is still looking for CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling) even if it is not using that specific term. The DPRK is likewise still unwilling to acknowledge the existence of a HEU or compromise on the distinction between a peaceful and a military nuclear program.
Notes From Ground Zero: Power, Equity and Postwar Reconstruction in Two Eras
by Mark Selden June 30th, 2004 The following paper by Mark Selden closely examines the American occupation of Japan following the Second World War. He compares it to the current US role in Afghanistan and Iraq. Selden argues that post-war reconstruction in both cases takes a similar form, especially in regards to the use of US military bases and assets. But, he suggests, the dependency built into the Afghani and Iraqi governments by the United States leaves them lacking in legitimacy. It has also weakened the very institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan that bolstered and supported the US occupation of Japan decades ago.
Lessons Learned: The Road Ahead " from Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis
by Joel Wit, Dan Poneman, and Robert Gallucci
The following is an excerpt from the book, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis published by the Brookings Institute and reprinted here with permission of the Brookings Institution Press. Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci lay out seven lessons from the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations that bear directly on the current six party talks in Beijing.
Lesson 1. Set strategic priorities; then stick to them.
Lesson 2. Integrate carrots and sticks into a strategy of coercive diplomacy.
Lesson 3. Use multilateral institutions and forums to reinforce U.S. diplomacy
Lesson 4. Use bilateral talks to probe diplomatic alternatives.
Lesson 5. South Korean support is crucial to any lasting solution of the North Korean nuclear problem.
Lesson 6. Take full advantage of China's continuing sway over North Korea.
Lesson 7. Negotiated arrangements can advance U.S. interests even if the other party engages in cheating.
China's Role in the Course of North Korea Transition
Liu Ming Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences The North Korea nuclear offers a good chance for fundamentally curing this country's structural problems and routinely-erupted crisis. Since all the periphery countries plus the US have formed a consensus that it is urgent for them to find a way out to the current nuclear stalemate, which not only remains in the nuclear program, but also touches upon other sectors of North Korea and its long-existed concern towards outside. In other words, the solution needs a kind of comprehensive approach and arrangement, or as called by many Korea experts a great bargain plan, among which the economic leverage or incentive will play a significant role. China has a long history of clientage relationship with North Korea, during the current nuclear crisis, it draws world spotlight through its proactive shuttle diplomacy. If all the participants in the six-party talks can work out a solution package finally, China must be an indispensable guarantor and a contributor in the implementation process. This chapter will elaborate present China and North Korea ties and a possible Chinese role in the peaceful arrangement and positive transition.
Negotiating with North Koreans: The U.S. Experience at Panmunjom
By Reed R. Probst, May 16, 1977 This study project was prepared for the US Army War College and released to the Nautilus Institute Under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
This study report by Reed Probst examines the negotiation strategy between the US and the DPRK in regards to discussions over two major events between the two countries: the Axe Murder incident in the DMZ in 1976 [more information on this incident is available at http://www.nautilus.org/foia/panmunjom.html] and the negotiations over the USS Pueblo, captured by the DPRK in 1968. Mr. Probst writes: "The record shows that the North Koreans have been quick to go to the conference table with the US when one or more of the following conditions have obtained: a. when the North Korean position or recent gains are physically threatened. b. when the North Koreans believe that negotiations might help them to consolidate past gains or to facilitate future gains. c. when the North Koreans wish to avoid an escalation of tension or a direct military confrontation." [page 12] "For all their slander and belittling of the 'US imperialist aggressors' in their propaganda, the North Koreans respect power and will back down only when confronted with a superior military force." [page 14] This study report reveals underlying assumptions based on past experience that inform American negotiations with North Korea today. For contrasting perspectives, readers may wish to review items posted at the Negotiating Style section of the Nautilus Institute DPRK Briefing Book available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/negotiating/index.html.
North Korea's Uranium Exports: Much Ado About Something
By Peter Hayes May 25, 2004 Uranium mining is the basis of the independent DPRK nuclear program. North Korea has used natural uranium mined, processed, and fabricated into reactor fuel in that country, to make plutonium, a fissile material suitable for making nuclear weapons. Enriched, uranium offers a second track to obtaining nuclear weapons based on uranium-235. The DPRK's pursuit of this second route was the basis for the October 2002 confrontation between the United States and the DPRK that led to the unraveling of the 1994 Agreed Framework. It is also the basis for the recent report that the DPRK exported uranium to Libya (see May 24, NAPSNet Daily Report http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0405/MAY24-04.html#item1) What is not well understood in the public discussion is that the DPRK has substantial uranium deposits and has long aspired to operate a closed fuel cycle that is completely self-reliant-- the same dream held by nuclear advocates in South Korea and many other countries. Nor has the DPRK kept secret its interest in uranium enrichment.
The 'CSCE Helsinki Model' and the Security and Cooperation Process in Northeast Asia
Markku Heiskanen, Associate Senior Fellow, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen/Helsinki, February 24, 2004.
Kim Jong Il's April 2004 Visit To China
by Byung Chul Koh May 7, 2004 This essay originally appeared in the Institute for Far Eastern Studies posted April 26, 2004
In this essay, Byung Chul Koh, director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, asserts that Kim Jong Il's recent visit to China is a significant event with meaningful implications beyond just North Korea-China relations. Rather, it potentially impacts the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, as well as all of Northeast Asia. However, the single most important outcome of Kim's visit was North Korea's reaffirmation of their commitment to the continuation of six-party talks. What is not known, however, is whether the North has agreed or intends to display "patience and flexibility" in a true sense.
Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968
U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters Seventh Infantry Division Artillery, June 15, 1968. Released under US Freedom of Information Act to Nautilus Institute. Release date: May 4, 2004
In 1968, tensions were much higher in the Korean Peninsula than today. The United States had a variety of tactical and theater nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and surrounding oceanic and airspace, and on other forward bases in the region including Okinawa and Guam. To test the readiness of the 7th Infantry Division in Korea to use nuclear artillery, various command post and field training exercises were conducted, and subsequent training programs implemented. It is likely that both North and South Korean military intelligence and leadership was well-informed on these exercises which, in turn, may have affected Korean proliferation propensity via demonstration effects. These documents reveal that the US Army was exploring whether it could reliably and efficiently lower the operational assignment of nuclear weapons from the Brigade to Division level in order to "facilitate the timely utilization of this type of fire [nuclear weapons] to respond to a North Korean attack or threat."
Kim Jong Il Should Read George Bush's Lips
Peter Hayes This piece by Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, argues that the recent offer by the United States to send assistance to North Korea to aid in the recovery of Ryongchon reveals a significant shift in US policy. Never before in the lead up to nuclear talks has the Bush Administration ever made a proactive offer to assist the DPRK. More importantly, Kim Jong Il must recognize this subtle yet profound shift, and not let the opportunity slip away.
Global Insecurity and Nuclear Next Use Briefing Paper
By Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute April 21, 2004 The focal question of this paper is whether and how nuclear next-use can be avoided, and if not, what should we do to prepare for this eventuality? The next-use of nuclear weapons is of unknown probability. Such next-use is defined here as detonation against military and civilian targets as distinct from mere threat of use expressed in coercive diplomacy and weapons displays of various kinds. Two types of nuclear next-use may be defined. The first is nuclear next-use by a state against any human target (precluding nuclear tests); the second is nuclear next-use by a sub-national actor against any human target.
Vulnerability of North Korean Forces, Vol. I: Evaluation of Vulnerability of North Korean Divisions to Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Nautilus Reports on Nuclear War-fighting Strategy in Korea "Vulnerability of North Korean Forces, Vol. I: Evaluation of Vulnerability of North Korean Divisions to Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Science Applications Inc., March 1978. This study was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act. "Vulnerability of North Korean Forces, Vol. II: Korean Scenario and Target Arrays," Science Applications Inc., March 1978. This study was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act. Read Volume I here. Read Volume II here. In 1976-78 while the Carter administration was struggling with its withdrawal policy for US forces in Korea, the Defense Nuclear Agency was examining how to use tactical nuclear weapons to coerce North Korea on the battlefield. This study by Science Applications Inc. concludes that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be most effective against DPRK armored units attacking south of the DMZ. Indeed, the study suggested that at least 30 airburst nuclear weapons would be used in an area only 9 miles away from Seoul and some 15 miles south of the DMZ [Page 5-1, 5-2, Vol. I]. The release of this heavily-redacted study follows on the last Global Disclosure release of the Standard Operation Procedures for the delivery systems of US nuclear forces then located in South Korea [http://www.nautilus.org/foia/NOSOPROK.html]. The next release will deal with military exercises involving nuclear -armed artillery in South Korea. These documents suggest that North Koreans may have deeply entrenched nuclear threat perceptions that drive their own strategy to acquire nuclear weapons today. Readers will find detailed summary of these documents in Pacific Powderkeg [http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/nuclearweapons/PacificPowderkegbyPeterHayes.pdf] at pages 62-68. Wednesday, March 31, 2004
EU-DPRK relations
EU's Policy Towards the DPRK - Engagement or Standstill?
By Axel Berkofsky March 31, 2004 This paper concludes that the EU's policy towards the DPRK is closer to standstill than to engagement although the EU's decision to separate security from humanitarian issues is without a doubt proof that the EU is still committed to easing the humanitarian and food crisis in North Korea. The EU's contributions, however, are neigh4er sufficient nor able to fill the gap left by the U.S. and Japan's decision to suspend humanitarian assistance and food aid to the DPRK.
EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason
By Ruediger Frank March 30, 2004
The article reviews the achievements in economic and political relations between the EU and the DPRK so far, analyzes the interests of both sides, pinpoints controversial and inconsistent issues and provides an outlook on possible future developments and implications. The European engagement in North Korea is quantified by using a comparative perspective based on data on North Korean activities of South Korea and international organizations, leading to an explanation for the pace and scope of Europe's involvement. In particular, aid and humanitarian assistance, trade and political exchange are analyzed. It becomes obvious - and this is the major finding of the paper - that there is a strong contrast between private European activities, which do not appear to be above average, and state-coordinated and state activities. The latter are remarkable if compared to other countries and the overall European interest in North Korea. This contradiction can partially be explained by a dominance of internal over external concerns in current EU policy on one hand and the latter's role in a global tripartite partnership with the USA and Japan on the other.
"Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy"
By Raphael F. Perl, Specialist in International Affairs - Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DIivision December 5, 2003 Summary
At least 50 documented incidents in more than 20 countries around the world, many involving arrest or detention of North Korean diplomats, link North Korea to drug trafficking. Such events, in the context of credible, but unproven, allegations of large scale state sponsorship of drug production and trafficking, raise important issues for the United States and its allies in combating international drug trafficking. The challenge to policy makers is how to pursue an effective counter drug policy and comply with U.S. law which may require cutting off aid to North Korea while pursuing other high-priority U.S. foreign policy objectives including: (1) limiting possession and production of weapons of mass destruction; (2) limiting ballistic missile production and export; (3) curbing terrorism, counterfeiting, and international crime; and (4) addressing humanitarian needs.
Reports that the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) may be limiting some of its food crop production in favor of drug crop production are particularly disturbing given the country's chronic food shortages, though the acreage in question is comparatively small. Another issue of rising concern is the degree to which profits from any North Korean drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and other crime-for-profits enterprises may be used to underwrite the costs of maintaining or expanding North Korean nuclear and missile programs. As the DPRK's drug trade becomes increasingly entrenched, and arguably decentralized, analysts question whether the Pyongyang regime (or any subsequent government) would have the ability to restrain such activity, should it so desire.
North Korea on the Terrorism List
The "terrorism list" generally refers to the list of countries generated by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2450(j)) and currently includes North Korea, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Cuba, and Libya. There are two other pieces of legislation related to supporting international terrorism that authorize the Secretary of State to generate a list of countries: Section 630A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) and Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780). However, in lieu of drawing up a list, it is understood that the states listed for Section 6(j) also face the restrictions imposed in Section 620A and section 40. The only slight variation from the original list of seven is another statute, Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781), which prohibits the licensing or selling of defense articles or defense services to any country that the President finds "is not cooperating fully with the U.S. antiterrorism efforts." Iraq was recently removed from the separate, annually-published Section 40A list. Sanctions are imposed on North Korea for reasons other than those specifically relating to terrorism; Pyongyang also faces sanctions because it is a Marxist-Leninist state [Export-Import Bank Act of 1945(p.L. 79-173; 12 U.S.C. 635(b)(2))] is considered a threat U.S. security [Trading with the Enemy ACT (p.L. 65-91; 50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.) and National Emergencies Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)], and has engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [Arms Export Control ACT (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2797b); Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. App. 2410b), and Iran Proliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).]
The Proliferation Security Initiative: The Legal Challenge
Benjamin Friedman, Bipartisan Security Group, Global Security Institute, September 4, 2003. Introduction On December 10, 2002, in the Indian Ocean, Spanish forces acting in concert with the United States seized a North Korean cargo ship called the So San. Beneath the deck and 40,000 sacks of cement, naval inspectors found 15 scud missiles and 15 conventional warheads. A day later, US officials made a surprising decision: they let the ship and its cargo sail to its destination, Yemen.1 The decision surprised the Spanish, who complained that their sailors had needlessly risked their lives.2 And many Americans wondered why the United States allowed missile sales by a country President Bush had placed in "the axis of evil." As a legal matter, however, the decision was correct.
How can these dangers be avoided? The simple answer is that risks cannot be avoided. The North Koreans are unpredictable and potentially irrational. But a US strategy of rolling out the initiative in tandem with the multilateral negotiations underway in Beijing and offering concessions would create a carrot and stick approach to the crisis that could helps mitigate danger. Within negotiations, the United States can offer the North Koreans the kind of conditional assistance that might allow them to seek settlement of their grievances at the table. International law is pliable. It should be a tool to enhance security, not a hindrance. There is perhaps no greater way to honor law than to seek to change it. But between changing the law and breaking it there is fine line, a line the United States and its allies should be careful not to cross. If the international community, under US leadership, can rise to occasion and create a real legal response to the danger posed by North Korea, both international security and international law will be the better for it.
Curtailing North Korea's Illicit Activities
Balbina Hwang, Heritage Foundation, August 25, 2003. On May 31, 2003, a new multilateral approach to limiting North Korea's threatening behavior was quietly launched in Poland when President George W. Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a heightened effort to disrupt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related delivery systems via sea, air, and land.1 Since then, the 11-member group has met twice to review the legal basis for action, establish channels for intelligence sharing, and write a statement of principles. Current members include Australia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United States. Plans call for member states to strengthen trade inspections, share information about suspected shipments, and step up searches and seizures of ships, planes, and vehicles suspected of smuggling WMD and related missile delivery systems.2 Existing national and international laws provide sufficient basis for most of the PSI's objectives. Other measures that require legal clarification can be pursued with the full support of nations involved. For now, closer international coordination and stricter enforcement can successfully launch this effort to curb dangerous proliferation.
"US Policy Toward North Korea with Respect to Ballistic Missiles"
Alvin Perkins, Strategy Research Project, US Army War College March 18, 2004 North Korea's emerging long-range ballistic missile capability has created debate on whether the US foreign policy toward North Korea is effective or is actually encouraging its ballistic missile programs. North Korea's ballistic missile program is critical to sustain the existence of the North Korean regime and its ballistic missile exports total about $1 billion a year. North Korea is the world's largest exporter of ballistic missiles yet it is the largest recipient of foreign aid in the Asia-Pacific region from the US. These North Korean weapons are not viewed as operational weapons of war, but primarily as strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. The full development of this capability would give North Korea a potent diplomatic card in influencing US foreign policy toward North Korea, in the region and even beyond. The implication of a mature North Korean long-range ballistic missile capability presents new policy challenges to the US. The most effective US policy towards the North Korea ballistic missile threat in the near to midterm is to selectively engage North Korea, while maintaining credible conventional and nuclear deterrents and concurrently pursuing an effecting National Missile Defense (NMD) system.
The Prospect of Economic Reform in North Korea
Yukie Yoshikawa, MIA student at School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, posted March 15, 2004.
THE REALITY BEHIND SOUTH KOREA-US ALLIANCE
by Koo Kab-woo 12 March 2004 This essay is by Professor Koo Kab-woo from Kyungnam University. Koo argues that the intervention for dismantling the unbalanced South Korea-US alliance is essential and could be done through the solidarity of the South Korean civil society with the civil society in other East Asian countries. East Asia must be re-discovered as a new space for action. Changing the historical structure of global politics in East Asia can only be possible with the intervention of the civil society
Nuclear power
Environmental Impacts and Benefits of Regional Power Grid Interconnections for the Republic of Korea: Potential Impacts on Nuclear Power Generation and Nuclear Waste Production Jungmin KANG Ph.D., Nuclear Engineering, ROK
The Semiconductor Industry and South Korea's Hynix Corporation
Mark Manyin
South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects
Mark Manyin
South Korean Politics and Rising 'Anti-Americanism': Implications for U.S. Policy Toward North Korea
- Mark Manyin
Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations - Issues for Congress
- Larry Niksch
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan
- Sharon Squassoni
Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy
- Raphael Perl
North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options
- Edward Bruner
North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to United States
- Andrew Feickert
Korea: Long-term Decline in the North Korea Premium
[Economic reform] Dominique Dwor-Frécaut 27 February 2004 An expected lack of progress at the nuclear talks is unlikely to lead to the collapse of the North Korean economy, but rather to slow growth due to limited aid and foreign investment. In the North Korean context, slow income growth could be supportive of political stability. By mid-2005, the market could get used to political and economic stability in North Korea, together with an uneasy coexistence with the US. This in turn could lead to a reduction in the North Korea premium followed by a North Korea-based sovereign upgrade for the South. __The North Korean economy does not seem about to collapse: the mid-2002 reforms have not resulted in loss of monetary control, most likely as a result of the lack of monetary accommodation and the removal of bottlenecks to domestic and international trade. __Some supply response to the mid-2002 reforms seems to have taken place, but will remain limited in the absence of large-scale international aid and foreign investment, which would require a successful conclusion to the nuclear talks. __A successful conclusion to the talks is unlikely in view of North Korea's reliance on its nuclear weapons programme as a means to ensuring regime survival and of the divisions within the US administration. __A lack of a successful conclusion to the talks does not mean war but rather the development of an uneasy coexistence with the US, since neither side has an incentive to let the confrontation escalate into military conflict. __A slow income growth could be supportive of political stability because it would make it easier for the regime to control popular expectations. __Political and economic stability would, over the longer term, see the completion of the transition from a planned to a market economy and greater integration of North Korea into the global economy. This in turn, could support a long-term normalisation of North Korea's diplomatic relations with the external world. __While this provides grounds for a North Korea-based ratings upgrade in H2 05, we still see good prospects for a South Korea ratings upgrade this year, based on strong relations with the US; political stabilisation in South Korea; a final resolution of the credit card crisis as well as further progress in corporate and financial sector reform.
The Multilateral Mantra And North Korea
Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute, February 20, 2004 Flying to Beijing for the second round of six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, American diplomats are chanting a multilateral mantra "CVID CVID CVID" as if repeating it often enough will make it happen in North Korea. CVID stands for Complete Verifiable Irreversible Disarmament. It is the formula that the State Department is bringing to the talks, saying that North Korea must commit to CVID and commence tangible dismantlement before the United States will outline its roadmap of reciprocal commitments to provide security and development assistance to North Korea.
La Grande Illusion, Korean Style
Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, February 12, 2004.
For the moment, the primary obstacle to nuclear appeasement bonuses for Pyongyang is the United States-or more specifically, the President and certain limited circles within his government. Just this week, however, Pyongyang executed a deft end-run around W., using US minions to do the blocking. North Korea's play was to invite an unofficial delegation of Americans (all would-be dealmakers) for a pilgrimage to Pyongyang -and then, with the international media trained on the event, to rush past the White House with a highly-publicized "bold solution" for ending the nuclear impasse.
Enemy to Friend: Providing Security Assurances to North Korea
{Peter Hayes}
Introduction Over the last year, as part of their proposed package settlement of the nuclear issue, the North Koreans have shifted their demands that the United States sign a "non-aggression pact" to a legally binding security treaty, and from the latter to a mere "security assurance." The issue will continue to bedevil talks between the DPRK and the United States and its partners at the six-party talks. Given their evolving demand, there are three basic ways to respond. These models are not mutually exclusive and can be used in combination:
Don't misunderstand firing of South Korean Foreign Minister
{Brent Choi}
5 February 2004
Potential For Cooperative Energy Development in Siberia
"Essentially Annihilated" Nuclear First-Use in Vietnam: Implications for the War on Terror
[Nuclear threat] [Asymmetrical power] (Report and commentaries)
- Peter Hayes interviews Freeman Dyson
- Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia
  {Freeman Dyson} {Steven Weinberg} {S. Courtenay Wright} {Robert Gomer} Full report
- A Bad Idea in Vietnam, An Even Worse Idea Today
  {Peter Hayes} {Nina Tannenwald} The JASON study of first use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam is a stark warning that using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against Iraq, North Korea or transnational terrorists would make more likely the use of the only weapons that can really threaten the United States.
Economic Cooperation On The Korean Peninsula
{Bradley O. Babson} [US NK relations] [Joint Venture] [Economic reform] [Foreign trade] [Collapse] [Bush Policy] March 6, 2003 This report is by Bradley O. Babson, Senior Consultant on East Asia to the World Bank. Babson argues that economic conditions in DPRK and the nature of DPRK's relations with other countries have changed so fundamentally that ambiguity on economic issues is not a viable option for future U.S. policy. Also, economic relations in Northeast Asia are undergoing fundamental changes and the U.S. needs to position its future policy in the context of the wider regional perspectives. The focus of debate needs to shift to defining strategic goals for U.S. policy on economic engagement with DPRK and Northeast Asia, and to defining and building consensus on modalities for advancing these strategic goals.
a deliberately slow-going implementation of the KEDO light-water reactor project
The Reagan Solution to the North Korean Puzzle: Strategic Benign Neglect and Back-breaking Arms Race
{Alexandre Y. Mansourov} [US NK Negotiations] [NK US policy] [Weaponization] Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues that Kim Jong Il is engaged in a two-level game whereby his domestic political and economic considerations are as important to him, if not more, as the signals, which he sends to and receives from the international community. The author believes that at the current stage of confrontation, Kim Jong Il is not interested in any sort of negotiations with the United States. Kim wants the Bomb, and North Korea will do its utmost to become a nuclear state, whether it will officially declare it outright or not. On its part, Washington refuses to negotiate with Pyongyang because it pursues a Reaganesque strategy, reminiscent of the old Cold War days, of mounting international isolation and an escalating arms race that will hopefully lead to an implosion of the bankrupt North Korean state. The author argues that the real danger from such an uncontrolled escalation of tensions is an accidental outbreak of hostilities contrary to the real intentions of all the parties concerned. Mansourov outlines the initial steps to be required to jump start constructive negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington at the time of total mutual distrust, zero credibility, and personal enmity among leaders
The DPRK Energy Sector: Current Status And Options For The Future
(David Von Hippel} {Peter Hayes} Prepared for the International Workshop on "Upgrading and integration of energy systems in the korean peninsula. Energy scenarios for the DPR of Korea" Como, Italy, September 19-21, 2002
Regional Energy Infrastructure Proposals And The DPRK Energy Sector: Opportunities And Constraints
{David Von Hippel} {Peter Hayes} Prepared for the KEI-KIEP Policy Forum on "Northeast Asian Energy Cooperation" Washington, DC, January 7, 2003
Gas Fired Electrical Generation, Catalyst For DPRK Security And Development
{John Fetter} PFO 03-14: February 25, 2003[Energy] [Gas] [Electricity]
The U-S Should Negotiate with North Korea Over Nuclear Impasse
{Peter Hayes}12 February 2003
Security Dilemma, War Trap, And The South Protectorate Over The North
{Alexandre Y. Mansourov} PFO 03-10A: February 10, 2003 Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues that as the security dilemma facing the United States and North Korea in the current nuclear standoff aggravates, they increasingly fall into the war trap. Although Pyongyang and Washington talk peace, neither side has the interest nor will to negotiate at the present time. Instead, they are both stuck in the escalation mode and actively prepare for war. Dr. Mansourov suggests that perhaps, in the long run, a South Korean protectorate over the North Korean state, encompassing the areas of national security and foreign policy, can bring about peaceful resolution of the escalating nuclear crisis and guarantee peace and stability on the nuclear-free Korean peninsula. [Asymmetrical power] [Nuclear]
Charging The Nuclear Red Line
{Peter Hayes} PFO 03-11A: February 10, 2003 Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, argues that unless the Bush administration initiates talks directly with North Korea immediately, the United States will end up with a nuclear-armed North Korea, no military option to exercise, and a ruptured alliance with South Korea who will go-it-alone. [Asymmetrical power][Nuclear][US NK negotiations]
North Korea On Three Critical Risks: Two Documents
February 7, 2003 [NK US policy] [Negotiating style] [US NK negotiations]
North Korea's Nuclear Problem: Political Implications And Inspection Formats
{Seongwhun Cheon} [Admission] [Nuclear]
US-North Korean Brinkmanship: Relevance To The Middle East? {Emily Landau}
[Admission] [Nuclear] [US NK negotiations] [Israel]
The Perry Report: a scenario for a collision course?
{Hwal-Woong Lee} [Perry] Nautilus PFO 99-07I: November 9, 1999
DPRK Energy Security Without Rewarding Bad Behavior
{Peter Hayes} [Energy] [Security][US NK relations] [Spin][Terrorism] [Counterfeiting]
KEDO Fuel Oil and the DPRK: A Special Report"
{Peter Hayes} [KEDO] [Oil] [Energy]
What Is Uranium Enrichment Technology?
Link between 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework and 1992 Rok-Dprk Denuclearization Declaration with enrichment activity in DPRK
[Nuclear] [Agreed Framework]
NORTH KOREA BACK TO THE FUTURE
{Glyn Ford} [NK US policy] [Economic reform] [NK strategy]
North Korea is no Iraq: Pyongyang's negotiating strategy
{Leon V. Sigal} [US-NK relations] [US-NK negotiations]
Contending with a nuclear North Korea
{Henry Sokolski} [Threat] [US-NK relations]
Reinventing North Korea
{Will B. Weaver} [NK US Policy] [Economic reform] [Training] [Opening] [Railways]
Is the axis of evil synchronizing its asymmetric offensive?
{David S. Maxwell} [Axis] [Nuclear] [Belligerence] [Joint US military]
North Korea Goes Nuclear, Washington Readies for War, South Korea Holds Key
{Alexandre Mansourov} [NK strategy] [NK US policy] [Nuclear] [KEDO] [Kim Jong Il][NPT]
Response to Alexandre Mansourov's essay "North Korea Goes Nuclear...
{Timothy Savage} [Nuclear][Partisan]
DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance and Suggested Approaches to Sectoral Redevelopment
{David Von Hippel} [Energy]
Interview with Peter Hayes
[US-NK negotiations] [KEDO] [Nuclear]
A new approach to N. Korea nuclear problem
{ Kang Jungmin} [KEDO] [Nuclear] [Inspections] [Delay]
A Breakthrough: Reform-minded Kim and Koizumi Open a New Chapter in DPRK-Japan Relations
{Alexandre Y. Mansourov} [Koizumi0209]
Theatre Missile Defense: Korea
[Nuclear] [Imperialism] [Agreed Framework] [Missile Defense][US Military]
US-Korean Nuclear relations
(Nautilus) [US Military][Nuclear] [Missile Defense]
4th Fighter Wing Nuclear Planning, 1998
[US Militaty]
History of the 4th fighter wing
[US Military] (simulating attack on North Korea) {..Southeast Asia. The invasion of an allied nation...we simulated fighting a war in Korea...)
Rural energy survey in Unhari village, methods, results, and Implications
[Energy] [US Aid]
Scenarios for the Future of U.S.-North Korean Relations: Engagement, Containment, or Rollback?
[US-NK relations] [Predictions]
KASM's Position on North Korean Refugee Issues
Korean Dilemma: Normalisation or Unification and Nothing (Dr. Hans Maretzki}
Engaging North Korea (Carl W. Ford, Jr.}
Opinion piece: NMD challenges U.S.-Japan Relations (Weston Konishi}
Special Report on DPRK Defectors - Nautilus Institute
Avoiding War on the Korean Peninsula (Peter M. Beck}
North Korea - the Case for Micro Level Engagement (Bryan Port}
North Korea and the Axis of Evil (Stephan Haggard and Daniel Pinkston}
What to Do with the Ominous Cloud over the Korean Peace Process? (Haksoon Paik}
Bush's Korea Policy in Peril (Hwal-Woong Lee}
The Impact of the US Attacks on North Korea (Brent Choi}
South Korea and NMD (Peter M. Beck}
Recommendations for the Bush Administration ( Haksoon Paik }
The Good Cop and the Bad Cop (Choi Won-Ki}
Korean Peninsula: Are There Things More Important, than Peace?( Georgi Toloraya}
Bush Should Listen To A Korean Elder Statesman (Aidan Foster-Carter}
North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads (William J. Taylor}
China and the End of North Korea (Robert Dujarric}
Nautilus panel "TMD in East Asia: Perspectives on Regional Implications"
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION FOR EAST ASIA: A CHINESE VIEW ( Shen Dingli)
SECURITY PRAGMATICS FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA (Chung-in Moon )
Korean Reconciliation and Reunification Conference
East Asia and Missile Defenses: Right Militarily and Wrong Politically? (Alexander A. Pikayev)
Jane Wales on NMD
Recommendations for the Bush Administration
US-DPRK Missile Talks (2 April 01)
DPRK Foreign Relations (2 April 01)
Northeast Asia Peace & Security Policy Forum Online Archive
Council on Foreign Relation's letter to Bush
Korean Peninsula: Are There Things More Important, than Peace? (Georgi Toloraya)
Korean Reconciliation - Half Way There (Kenneth Quinones)
South Korea and NMD (Peter Beck)
Discussion of William J. Taylor's "North Korea Policy: Steady As She Goes" (Joel Wit)
NapsNet weekly report 16 march 2001
Nautilus wind project in DPRK
East Asian Regional Security Futures: Theater Missile Defense Implications" (Conference June 2000)
Taylor : North Korea: Avoid Another Crossroads
Ju : Comments on: A Regional Approach to Korean Peninsula Security
Background Briefing on Bush-Kim Meeting
NAPSNet SPECIAL REPORT March 8 2001
Taylor: North Korea Policy: Steady As She Goes
Sigal: Six Myths About Dealing With Pyongyang
Dove myths no better than hawk myths
(critique of Sigal by Aidan Foster-Carter)
Pinkston: DPRK Economic Reforms and U.S. Security Policy in Northeast Asia
Von Hippel et al: Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework:The Energy Imperative (pdf file)
Cheong: Inauguration of President Bush and alliance between China and North Korea
Kim: North Korea: Torn Between Two Logical Decisions, Regime Maintenance or Economic Survival?
Sokolski: This Is No Way to Curb the North Korean Threat

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Marcus Noland
Institute for International Economics, Washington

North Korea in 2007
Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics January 2008 Forthcoming in Asia Survey Abstract The year 2007 witnessed a gradual rapprochement between North Korea and the world, reflecting changes both in the country’s external environment and domestic political economy. Key markers were the resumption of the Six-Party Talks and the second North-South summit. Whether these developments will endure depends largely on North Korean intentions. Keywords: North Korea, Six-Party Talks, North-South summit, famine, reform [Victim]
Exit Polls: Refugee Assessments of North Korea's Transition
by Yoonok Chang, Hansei University and Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Results from a survey of more than 1,300 North Korean refugees in China provide insight into changing economic conditions in North Korea. There is modest evidence of slightly more positive assessments among those who exited the country following the initiation of reforms in 2002. Education breeds skepticism; higher levels of education were associated with more negative perceptions of economic conditions and reform efforts. Other demographic markers such as gender or provincial origin are not robustly correlated with attitudes. Instead, personal experiences appear to be central: A significant number of the respondents were unaware of the humanitarian aid program and the ones who knew of it almost universally did not believe that they were beneficiaries. This group’s evaluation of the regime, its intentions, and accomplishments is overwhelmingly negative—even more so than those of respondents who report having had experienced incarceration in political detention facilities—and attests to the powerful role that the famine experience continues to play in the political economy of the country.
Engagement: Brief for an Incoming Korean President
by Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Forthcoming in Freedom Review, January 2008 December 14, 2007
Recent developments on the Korean peninsula present the incoming South Korean president with substantial opportunities. The Six Party Talks have established a road map for North Korean disarmament. The inter-Korean summit outlined an ambitious array of North-South economic initiatives and advanced the goal of replacing the existing armistice with a permanent peace treaty. Subsequent progress has not been uniform and reversals will undoubtedly occur. But do these recent developments vindicate the strategy of engagement with North Korea pursued by the last two administrations? Our answer is “yes,” but with important qualifications. The rationale for engagement is straightforward—to encourage sufficient evolution in North Korea’s internal practices and external behavior to provide a meaningful basis for national reconciliation and eventual unification. The question at this juncture is no longer whether to engage North Korea but rather how to do so most effectively.
How North Korea Funds Its Regime
Marcus Noland Institute for International Economics Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate April 25, 2006
First up is testimony before the Senate Homeland Security Subcommittee Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security on the role of illicit activities in funding the North Korean regime. The testimony also addresses possible issues created by the inclusion of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in the upcoming free trade agreement negotiations between the US and South Korea. The real problem is that while conditions in Kaesong may be exploitative, they probably are considerably better than those existing elsewhere in North Korea, and there may be no shortage of North Koreans willing to work on these terms.
From player to referee? the state and the South Korean economy
The second piece addresses the role of the state in the South Korean economy, highlighting the lagging development of South Korea's political institutions in comparison to its level of economic development:
The Economic Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Breakout
The third piece, commissioned by the National Bureau of Asia Research examines the economic implications for Northeast Asia of a North Korean nuclear breakout. It is bundled with companion pieces by Nick Eberstadt and Brad Babson, respectively, on the possiblity of a North Korean strategic reorientation and and what carrots the international community might offer North Korea to encourage this change. Taken together the message seems to be that the penalties associated with a nuclear breakout and the benefits from a more cooperative stance are unlikely to be of sufficient magnitude to induce a fundamental behavioral change:
Transition from the Bottom-Up: Institutional Change in North Korea
Last is my presidential address before the Association for Comparative Economic Studies. In it I argue that rather than a product of top-down reforms, change in North Korea is better understood as an unmanaged, yet rational, process of coping and adjustment under duress by lower-level social units and institutions in response to the failure of the state to perform its normal functions. This one even includes pictures:
The Legal Framework of US-North Korea Trade Relations
Marcus Noland Institute for International Economics Op-ed in Joongang Ilbo April 27, 2004 Published under the title "North Causes Its Own Trade Ills." (c) Institute for International Economics.
North Korean propaganda incessantly proclaims that the United States is "stifling" North Korea's development. And trade relations between the two countries indeed have always been highly politicized. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Washington imposed comprehensive sanctions under the World War I era Trading With the Enemy Act. However, these sanctions were partially eased in 1995 as part of the Agreed Framework, and a bilateral agreement on long-range missile testing resulted in the removal of all but a few of the remaining trade restrictions in June 2000.
US Economic Diplomacy Toward North Korea
Marcus Noland Institute for International Economics Op-ed in Joongang Ilbo May 21, 2004 Published under the title "America's Economic Diplomacy." (c) Institute for International Economics.
As demonstrated at the Asian Development Bank (ADB) meeting at Jeju-do, American economic diplomacy toward North Korea reflects US laws that use restrictions on economic relations as a means of encouraging desirable action or behavior with respect to global policy concerns such as workers' rights or nuclear proliferation-causes often promoted by political progressives in the United States. Unlike trade sanctions these laws are not directed at North Korea per se, but they affect the DPRK nonetheless.
Copy on Nautilus
North Korean Political Stability in Play with Enormous Implications for South Korea
Marcus Noland North Korean economic reforms are contributing to growing social differentiation and inequality, as a "military-first"campaign has been initiated to reinterpret the country's doctrine of juche and to legitimate the reforms and justify a broad-ranging top-down modernization of society. The central issue is whether the current regime can manage this internal change while confronting the implicit legitimization challenge posed by prosperous, democratic South Korea
Pyongyang's Tightrope-Walker
Marcus Noland Institute for International Economics Op-ed in the Far Eastern Economic Review February 17, 2004
North Korea And The South Korean Economy
{Marcus Noland} [Unification] [Unification cost] [Unification benefit] Paper presented to the Roh Government Transition Team Seoul, Korea February 24, 2003
West-Bound Train Leaving the Station: Pyongyang on the Reform Track
[economic reform]
Trainspotting in North Korea
[Economic reform]
The Future of North Korea
Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (book notice}
FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA: Causes and Cures
A Self-Interested Case for Human Rights in North Korea
SCENARIO BUILDING: NORTH KOREA IN FIVE YEARS
Human Rights in North Korea
NK Is Contingent Liability for S. Korea
North Korea's `Muddling Through' Strategy
Will North Korea Undertake Rapid Reform?
The economics of national reconciliation
Economic integration and cooperation on the Korean peninsula
The summit and the economic future of the Korean peninsula
North Korea: present status and prospects for survival to the year 2000
Some Unpleasant Arithmetic Concerning Unification
Rigorous Speculation: The Collapse and Revival of the North Korean Economy

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Ki-an Park
Kyung Hee University, Seoul

Is Economic Cooperation between two Koreas possible? - A possible Model for South- & North Korea

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Pacific Council on International Policy
California

PCIP Calls N.K. to Map Out Future Policy
Show North Koreans the carrot as well as the stick
Friend or Foe? Helping the U.S. fight terrorism would go a long way toward mending fences. NINA HACHIGIAN and BRUCE W. BENNETT
PCIP The reshaping of Korea
KEEP NORTH KOREA ON LIFE SUPPORT
NORTH KOREA CONSIDERS 'GOING CHINESE' , (MICHAEL PARKS and GREGORY F. TREVERTON}

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Pacific Forum CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington)
US thinktank

PacNet Newsletter

U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Become the Great Britain of Asia?
by Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman Issues & Insights Volume 05-03
The depth and breadth of defense cooperation between Washington and Tokyo since Sept. 11, 2001 have been unprecedented. We have gone from Japan "bashing" and Japan passing" to Japan "surpassing" as Tokyo in recent years has generally not only met but exceeded Washington's expectations. While Japan may not yet be the "U.K. of Asia," as once envisioned by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, it is not too far stretch to call Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro Asia's answer to Tony Blair. [US-Japan alliance]
U.S. East Asia Policy
by James A. Kelly Pacnet newsletter 7 March 2005
As President Bush begins his second term, many have asked how announced and anticipated changes in his foreign policy team will affect U.S. policy in Asia. While I can't predict the prospects for U.S. policy over the next four years, it is safe to say there will be no profound differences. First, many policy aspects worked reasonably well in the first administration; there is little reason to change them. Second, President Bush and Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice have been intimately involved in every important component of East Asia-Pacific policy over the last several years, so there is no reason to expect major shifts. Finally, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick has both affinity for and first-hand experience in Asian political questions, as well as the economic issues on which he put so much attention as U.S. trade representative. As I look back over the last four years, engaging China and handling its "peaceful rise" is inevitably the top priority.
The press is full of stories about how the U.S.-ROK alliance is beset with difficulties. It is true that there are some problems but not as much as media suggest. There are tangible accomplishments, too. South Korea has the third largest number of military forces in Iraq (behind only the U.S. and Britain). After years of effort, we have reached agreement on moving U.S. forces out of Yongsan Base in Seoul. We have agreed on the realignment of U.S. forces in Korea. President Roh has excellent communication with President Bush. He speaks directly and sincerely. On North Korea, when it counts we are on the same page. [Friction]
North Korea: Searching for A.Q. Kim
By Ralph A. Cossa "Some good, some bad, some ugly!'' That was the way a senior Bush administration official summed up the recently completed third plenary session of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing, aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. While other participants were reporting ``substantial progress'' and it was clear that Pyongyang (like Washington) had come to the meeting with a more cooperative attitude, the two sides ``remained far from an agreement''; no breakthroughs had been anticipated and none occurred.
CVID: Does Everyone Agree?
By Ralph A. Cossa
Advice to Senator Kerry
By Ralph A. Cossa President of Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies No one wins votes in the United States by being soft on North Korea. Pyongyang needs to understand that it is inconceivable that any U.S. Congress, regardless of composition or orientation, would ever agree to normalize relations with North Korea as long as it hangs on to its nuclear aspirations.
Pacific Forum CSIS: Comparative Connections January 2003
Vol. 4, No. 4 - 4th Quarter 2002
Japan-DPRK: Seeking a Solution
{Ralph A. Cossa} [abductees] [Koizumi0209]
Iraq and North Korea: Disarmament vs. Deterrence
[Nuclear] {Michael McDevitt}
North Korea: Now What?
[Nuclear] [US-NK negotiations] [Double standards] {Alan D. Romberg}
Hear We Go Again - North Korea and Nuclear Weapons
[Nuclear] {Michael McDevitt}
True Confessions?
[Nuclear] {Ralph A. Cossa}
What a Week for North Korea {Aidan Foster-Carter}
Koizumi Visits Pyongyang: Beginner's luck?
[Koizumi0209] {Yumiko Nakagawa}
A blueprint for U.S. policy toward a unified Korea
[US US-NK relations][Unification] [Security] [Imperialism][Predictions]{Derek Mitchell} (ed) {Victor Cha} {Alexandre Mansourov} August 2002
Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula
[Imperialism]{US NK relations] [Security] [Armaments] [NK Military] [SK Military]
Center for Strategic and International Studies: Proliferation in the "Axis of Evil":North Korea, Iran, and Iraq
North Korea's Options after Sept. 11 (L. Gordon Flake}
North Korea's Misunderstanding of Bush Administration Policy
(Donald G. Gross} [Culture gap]
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Global Nuclear Balance: A Quantitative and Arms Control Analysis (Anthony H. Cordesman}
The Perils of Progress:The U.S.-South Korea Alliance in a Changing Strategic Environment (Eun Jung Cahill Che and Brad Glosserman}
Comparative Connections October 2001

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People's Korea
Pro-DPRK paper published in Japan

North-South Relations -- Undergoing Ups-and-Downs Sang Yong, PK Staff Reporter
Review of DPRK's Foreign Relations in 2001 Progress and Regress By Choe Kwan Ik, Editor
Roundup in 2001
Koizumi's War Shrine Visit Adds Fuel to Flames of Asian Anger......... Choe Kwan Ik, PK Editor
Bush's Policy: Will "Realism" Work?
(Choe Kwan Ik, PK editor)
New Round of Diplomatic Bargaining: Bush and DPRK-U.S. Relationship
(Editor Kwon Jong Sung )
Year 2000 Will Be Remembered Forever as First Year of Reunification
(Editor Kwon Jong Sung)
New Millennium -- Year of Diplomacy
(PK Senior Editor Choe Kwan Ik)

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Rodong Sinmun
Official paper of the Korean Worker's Party, Pyongyang

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Tim Shorrock

Japanese hawks soar on Korea fears
26 November 2003
Bush has his hands full in Korea
{Tim Shorrock} [Admission] [James Kelly] [Friction] [Bush policy]
A Dangerous Game in Korea
{Tim Shorrock} [Admission] [James Kelly] [Friction] [Bush policy] [US NK Negotiations] [Agreed Framework] [Partisan]
Roh's Election Victory and the Widening Gap Between the U.S. and South Korea
{Tim Shorrock} [Roh Moo-hyun] [US NK relations] [Admission] [Japanese remilitarisation]
Tim Shorrock And The Kwangju Stories: A Personal Response And Update
{Tim Shorrock} [Kwangju]
The U.S. Role in Korea in 1979 and 1980
{Tim Shorrock}[Chun doo-hwan] [Role of SK military] [US dominance] [SK US relations]
Carlyle's tentacles embrace Asia
US-Taiwan: The guiding hand of Frank Carlucci
Bush's policy shifts threaten Asian stability
Crony Capitalism Goes Global (extract)
Bush is still a neophyte
Is George W ignoring George Sr's advice on Korea?
US ties with Tokyo, Seoul under strain - and should be
Nixon, Kissinger needed to calm ruffled feathers
Domestic opposition builds to Bush's Korea policy
Paul Wolfowitz: A man to keep a close eye on
Korea (February 1998)

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Hazel Smith
Hazel Smith is Professor of International Relations at the University of Warwick, UK - currently on research leave as Senior Academic Programme Officer, Peace and Governance programme, United Nations University, Tokyo.

Hungry for Peace
Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Change in North Korea (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, July 2005)
Synopsis This revealing and challenging study of the impact of famine on North Korea not only significantly enlarges our understanding of that hermetic country but also urges us to reassess how we deal with it.
Drawing on impressive scholarship and extensive firsthand knowledge of humanitarian relief efforts in North Korea, Hazel Smith provides an eye-opening account of the famine that devastated the country in the 1990s and of the international rescue program that Pyongyang requested and received. Together, she explains, the famine and the humanitarian response have wrought subtle but profound changes in North Korea's economy, society, and security outlook. She makes a compelling argument that the regime has been prodded into accepting some international norms, allowed markets to develop, and has included some human security concerns alongside military-political interests in its negotiations with the West.
The famine and its consequences, the author contends, have made North Korea much more "knowable" and predictable than most Western experts choose to believe. Treating North Korea as a rational actor, albeit one with an idiosyncratic mindset, will enhance long-term regional peace and cooperation; isolating and demonizing it will only perpetuate the anxieties that fuel Pyongyang's belligerence.
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Improving intelligence on North Korea
Despite the wealth of open source material available, assessments on North Korea continue to rely on outmoded and distorted sources of information. Using the example of food aid, Hazel Smith examines the myths and realities that have underpinned thinking on Pyongyang. 0575037 3/04 1:15 pm Page 48
Soldiers desperate enough to steal food may also be steal food aid but there is no evidence of systematic food aid diversion to the army as public or government policy. On the other hand, no international aid agency that has been involved in the regular delivery and distribution of food aid to North Korea has ever reported systematic diversion of food aid.
Brownback bill will not solve North Korea's problems
{Hazel Smith}
By introducing policy initiatives based on ostensibly humanitarian principles but designed to be rejected by Pyongyang, combined with security demands that would in effect mean a voluntary dismantling of what North Korea considers is its only negotiating card, the US administration is able to avoid negotiation while appearing to act in good faith. Pyongyang's refusal to engage in what behind the scenes even US officials admit is tantamount to unilateral disarmament, is portrayed as yet more irrational intransigence from a rogue regime with which it is impossible to do business. Unfortunately, the idea that the use of coercion instead of persuasion, and rhetoric rather than reality, will bring security to the Korean Peninsula is mistaken. Instead, Brownback's proposals further threaten the basic freedoms of North Koreans by providing conservatives in the country an opportunity to restrict the openings to the West that have occurred since the late 1990s.
Overcoming Humanitarian Dilemmas in the DPRK (North Korea)
In 1995 the DPRK (north Korean) government appealed to the international community for assistance to cope with gross food shortages, which threatened starvation for its people...//..
Donor governments should build on the channels opened by humanitarian assistance to further develop policies of constructive engagement, confidence building, and the slow but essential formation of trust that is crucial for bringing human and international security to the Korean peninsula.

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Scott Snyder
Asia Foundation, Seoul

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Erich Weingartner
CanKor, Canada

Report of Developments related to DPRK, Jan-June 2001 (Erich Weingartner}
Korea and the Koreans - Introduction
Peace and Reunification in the Korean Peninsula
[Religion] {Rev. Jung Jiseok}
A Chronicle of the Dialogue between Christians in North and South Korea
[Religion] [Christianity] {Erich Weingartner}
The Road to Reconciliation Korea
[Religion] [Christianity] {Erich Weingartner}

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Kathy Wolfe
Executive Intelligence Review, Washington

DPRK Rejects Neo-con Sanctions, Six Power Talks Frozen
Dick Cheney's neo-cons including US UN Ambassador John Bolton, US ambassador to Seoul Alexander Vershbow, and Bolton's protégé Robert Joseph, Undersecretary for Arms Control, have deliberately provoked trouble for the Six Power Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. After the US put sanctions on North Korea, Vershbow called it a "criminal regime" like "Hitler" on Dec. 7, so North Korea announced Dec. 11 that the Six Power Talks are "indefinitely suspended." All this was predictable, as the neo-cons deliberately provoked North Korea, trying to get the worst possible response. But since we are having "regime change" in Washington and the neo-cons will soon be out, there is no need for alarm. Cheney and his network are desperate so they make trouble like angry children. But they have no power to convince Congress to take any action in Korea. They are already a "lame duck" Administration. Congress and even the US military think the Cheney-Bush Administration is insane. Congress and most of the US military want to exit Iraq and to stop all such "preventive wars." [Camouflage]
Korea Six Power Talks Show Cheney is Weaker
News from the Six Power Talks on North Korea the first week in Beijing June 25-29 indicates more reasons why Cheney may "go crazy." He is losing his power in Washington, as the Congressional attacks on Cheney show. Now, Cheney seems to have lost his hold over the Korea talks. That is good. But be aware: in his last weeks in power, he could strike blindly from anger, perhaps against Iran.
From Niger to Iraq to North Korea: Even the CIA Turns Against the Neo-cons
There may be an earthquake in Washington, soon enough to be felt at the Six Power Talks on Korea in Beijing. Due to failure in Iraq and EIR's work in Washington exposing the neo-cons since 2002, a new faction in Washington now seeks a return to a Clinton-type deal with the DPRK. If the U.S. delegation at the Six Power Talks makes a move toward war, it is possible Cheney and Bush could both be indicted and/or impeached. "Monica-gate" may be out, and "Plame-gate" may be in.
The other Five Powers should conduct robust diplomacy accordingly.
Cheney Threatens DPRK before ROK President Roh's June 10 Summit
North Korea is "a major problem," Vice President Dick Cheney told CNN News "Larry King Live" national U.S. television May 30. He made a fresh personal attack on North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, calling Kim "one of the world's most irresponsible leaders," who runs a "police state leaving his people in despicable poverty and malnutrition. He wants to throw his weight around and become a nuclear power," Cheney said, "but if this happens, North Korea will never have normal relations with the rest of the world."
"North Korean leaders are still demanding a U.S. apology for earlier personal insults to Chairman Kim that Pyongyang is 'an outpost of tyranny'/," Germany's "Der Spiegel" May 30 quotes a Russian source recently in Pyongyang to say, "so Cheney's remarks are sure to be taken" as a deliberate new insult. [Vituperation]
Korea Six Power Talks Collapse; US Alliance Next?
North Korea has declared they have nuclear weapons several times before. This is not the news in Pyongyang's Feb 10 statement. The news is: the Six Power Talks are dead.
But as Donald Gregg said, "The problem is not in Pyongyang. The problem is in Washington." This has been caused by the control maintained by Cheney and the neocons, over US policy. We may see a "who lost Korea?" debate which includes both North and South, very soon.
Bush on 'Auto-pilot' for Korea Conflict, LaRouche Warns
by Kathy Wolfe
"A heightening of tension between China and Japan, would dwarf the much smaller ethnic conflicts around the world." - Ezra Vogel, Harvard University (details at end, below)
"It's a global problem, not a Korean problem. We must shake up the global chess board, and weaken the neo-cons worldwide, to solve the Korea crisis. For example: a crash of the U.S. dollar could shift the world power balance dramatically, and make room for a Korean solution. " - Lyndon LaRouche
N. Korea Freezes Six Power Talks, Gives Missile Test Warning
North Korea has told Russia, China and visiting British Foreign Office minister Bill Rammell, that Pyongyang has no plans to attend Six Power Talks until after the U.S. election Nov. 2, Russian delegation chief Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alekseyev told Interfax Sept. 14.
Will the New Versailles Bring a New Sarajevo?
Seoul Terror Alert: Will Europe's "Operation Gladio" Visit Korea and Japan?
Comments on impeachment of President Roh
"This is a foreign -inspired destabilization of the Korean peninsula, in a situation which could lead to war. Can't people see that it's directly connected to the complete failure of the Six Power Talks, thanks to Mr. Cheney? Didn't Korean people notice that after the talks collapsed, the Russian delegate Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov warned Feb. 29 , that the U.S. might take military action in Korea?
Stop Playing Football with Korean Powderkeg, Russia Warns
EIR Washington, 5 March 2004
Will China, N. Korea Make a Move at Six Power Talks?
From the details of Kahn's signed admission released in public, Kahn admitted only to supplying old and discarded centrifuge and enrichment machines, with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data and depleted hexafluoride gas, to North Korea, according to {The Dawn} of Pakistan, and insider nuclear experts in India contacted by EIR. This is consistent with Dr. Pollack's conclusions at the U.S. Naval War College that, as the CIA also has said, North Korea had nothing close to a functional facility that could make weapons-grade uranium, just some parts. Highly enriching uranium to weapons grade requires literally miles of sophisticated tubing etched in acid which are very difficult to create and maintain without a modern industrial base.
The need by the Cheney crowd to "sex up" evidence is also underscored by the sudden announcement Feb. 7 by top North Korean defector to Seoul, Hwang Jang-Yop, former aid to Chairman Kim Jong-il, that Jon Pyon-Ho, then North Korean Workers' Party secretary for military industry, visited Pakistan for a month in 1996, and signed a contract for a uranium program. Hwang says that Jon told him after the trip: "We don't need plutonium from now on. We are set to make them with uranium-235 under an agreement with Pakistan." Mr. Hwang's word, against Mr. Jon's.
Why was Mr. Hwang silent all these months that the uranium program was at the top of the news, since Oct. 2002, and why did he not bring forth proofs earlier? And what are his proofs? EIR is not ruling out a North Korean uranium program; North Korea is North Korea. But so far, the evidence is not good.
China, N. Korea Hint at Move on Six Power Talks
US, British spies busted Pakistani scientist's nuclear leaks : Tenet
Cheney Opposed a Unified Korea
South Korean magaizine interview Lyndon LaRouche, 10 January 2004
Cheney-gate Pops Cork on World Financial Crisis: Japan, China, Russia call for "Exit Strategy" from Dollar
Cheney WMD Scandal Rocks Washington
2 February 2004
David Kay, Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector in Iraq, has resigned in protest from the Bush Administration, saying that all the intelligence was wrong: Iraq had no Weapons of Mass Destruction. He is also saying loudly to the Congress and on U.S. TV, that we can't trust the U.S. Administration's intelligence on North Korea either. The Iraq War was wrong, Kay says, and furthermore no future wars -- for example, in Korea -- can be permitted, based on "first pre-emptive strike" doctrine, until we have a thorough investigation by an independent commission. How can we make a "first strike" based on intelligence, when it's been shown that our intelligence is wrong?
Shanghai's Maglev Launched: Revolutionary Step for Eurasia
{Rainer Apel} [Railways] [Eurasia]
Two Koreas Finish Rails & Roads; Opposition Builds to War Talk
{Kathy Wolfe} [US NK relations] [Railways] {Eurasian] [Selig Harrison] [Imperialism]
Open North-South Silk Road to prevent new Korea crisis
{Kathy Wolfe} [Railways] [Eurasian]
Koreas' rail agreements mean global strategic breakthrough
{Kathy Wolfe} [Railways] [Eurasian]
Koreas open DMZ at last: `silk road' rail construction starts
{Kathy Wolfe} [Railways] [Eurasian]
Koreas Open DMZ at Last: Construction Begins on The 'Iron Silk Road'
by Kathy Wolfe September, 2002
N. Korea Offers a 'Silk Road' Bargain to the United States
{Kathy Wolfe} [Railways][Eurasian] [NK US relations]
Sanctions against North Korea infuriate U.S. allies, risk war
{Kathy Wolfe} [US-NK relations] [Sanctions]

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